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| author | Tor Andersson <tor@ccxvii.net> | 2023-02-20 14:44:33 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tor Andersson <tor@ccxvii.net> | 2023-03-24 14:03:50 +0100 |
| commit | de8b30846f6cbe6024574552c2a5fb3c99364965 (patch) | |
| tree | 44cfc8574fab5cbb9305ebf5595c9c2624a06fd9 /info/playbook.html | |
| parent | 093ce50ddcb68fe8b5ffbf7f100108bd93b86d76 (diff) | |
| download | andean-abyss-de8b30846f6cbe6024574552c2a5fb3c99364965.tar.gz | |
Rendered rulebook and playbook.
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diff --git a/info/playbook.html b/info/playbook.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a66bac --- /dev/null +++ b/info/playbook.html @@ -0,0 +1,2148 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html> +<head> +<title>Andean Abyss - Playbook</title> +<link rel="stylesheet" href="/fonts/fonts.css"> +<style> +body{background-color:slategray} +div{position:relative;background-color:white;margin:1em auto;box-shadow:1px 1px 8px -2px black} +p{position:absolute;white-space:pre;margin:0} +p{font-family:Times New Roman,Times,serif;line-height:1em;font-size:11.5pt} +</style> +</head> +<body> + +<div id="page1" style="background-image:url('playbook1.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:663.8pt;left:169.2pt;font-size:52.5pt">P L A Y B O O K</p> +<p style="top:257.8pt;left:63.7pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>COIN Series, </b></p> +<p style="top:275.8pt;left:74.5pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Volume I</b></p> +<p style="top:311.8pt;left:94.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>by</b></p> +<p style="top:329.8pt;left:58.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Volko Ruhnke</b></p> +<p style="top:145.5pt;left:86.6pt;font-size:22.5pt"><b>Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Colombia</b></p> +<p style="top:745.4pt;left:290.0pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S</b></p> + +<p style="top:768.8pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><span href="#page" style="color:gray">Tutorial</span> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2</p> +<p style="top:788.5pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page15">Guide to COIN Operations</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15</p> +<p style="top:808.2pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page16">Role Summaries</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16</p> +<p style="top:827.9pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><span href="#page25" style="color:gray">1-Player Example of Play</span> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17</p> +<p style="top:847.6pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><span href="#page25" style="color:gray">Non-Player FARC March Example </span> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25</p> +<p style="top:867.3pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><span href="#page26" style="color:gray">What if a Non-Player Cannot Op?</span> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26</p> +<p style="top:887.0pt;left:87.1pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page27">Design Notes</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27</p> +<p style="top:768.8pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page33">Event Text and Background</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33</p> +<p style="top:788.5pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page41">Selected Sources</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41</p> +<p style="top:808.2pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><span href="#page42" style="color:gray">Counter Scan</span> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42</p> +<p style="top:827.9pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page43">Card List</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43</p> +<p style="top:847.6pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page43">Credits</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43</p> +<p style="top:867.3pt;left:393.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><a href="#page44">Spaces List</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44</p> + +<p style="top:933.2pt;left:161.2pt;font-size:11.2pt">© 2012 GMT Games, LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com</p> +</div> + +<div id="page15" style="background-image:url('playbook15.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>15</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">GUIDE TO COIN OPERATIONS</span></b></p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Strategy Notes for the Government</b></p> +<p style="top:110.6pt;left:56.2pt">by Joel Toppen</p> +<p style="top:133.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Here is an introduction to the forces and some key actions available </i></p> +<p style="top:147.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>to the Government Faction.</i></p> +<p style="top:173.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Troops </b></p> +<p style="top:189.6pt;left:99.4pt">Troops are your workhorses. They’re going to do all the </p> +<p style="top:203.4pt;left:99.4pt">heavy lifting for you. Essentially, Troops are your pieces </p> +<p style="top:217.1pt;left:99.4pt">that can be moved into spaces to search (Sweep) and de-</p> +<p style="top:230.9pt;left:56.2pt">stroy (Assault) Insurgent Guerrillas and Bases. </p> +<p style="top:253.6pt;left:56.2pt">Troops are brought into the game through the Train Operation. </p> +<p style="top:267.4pt;left:56.2pt">Troops can move via:</p> +<p style="top:285.6pt;left:56.2pt"><b>• Sweep Operation</b>—into an adjacent City or Department to find </p> +<p style="top:299.4pt;left:67.5pt">(Activate) Insurgent Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:316.7pt;left:56.3pt"><b>• Patrol Operation</b>—into and/or along LoCs to find (Activate) </p> +<p style="top:330.5pt;left:67.5pt">Insurgent Guerrillas and perhaps kill them in one such space.</p> +<p style="top:347.8pt;left:56.3pt"><b>• Airlift Special Activity</b>—any 3 troops (unlimited with <i>Black-</i></p> +<p style="top:361.6pt;left:67.5pt"><i>hawks</i> Government Capability) move from anywhere to anywhere </p> +<p style="top:375.3pt;left:67.5pt">on the map. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of this Special </p> +<p style="top:389.1pt;left:67.5pt">Activity! </p> +<p style="top:411.8pt;left:56.2pt">Troops kill Insurgent Guerrillas via the Assault Operation, but only </p> +<p style="top:425.6pt;left:56.2pt">Active guerillas.</p> +<p style="top:448.3pt;left:56.2pt">Guerrillas must be Activated by a Sweep (or some action they them-</p> +<p style="top:462.1pt;left:56.2pt">selves undertook) before Government Troops can eliminate them. </p> +<p style="top:484.8pt;left:56.2pt">Also, through their presence, Troops can project Government control </p> +<p style="top:498.6pt;left:56.2pt">of a space in a Control Phase of a Propaganda card. But, and this is </p> +<p style="top:512.3pt;left:56.2pt">important, by themselves, Troops cannot alter Support/Opposition </p> +<p style="top:526.1pt;left:56.2pt">status in an area. They need Police support to effect that. In the </p> +<p style="top:539.8pt;left:56.2pt">Redeploy Phase, Troops in a LoC or Department space without a </p> +<p style="top:553.6pt;left:56.2pt">Government Base must deploy out of that area (even if that space </p> +<p style="top:567.3pt;left:56.2pt">is Government controlled). Thus their staying power outside a City </p> +<p style="top:581.1pt;left:56.2pt">is limited. </p> +<p style="top:603.8pt;left:56.2pt">Lastly, Troops, by their presence in a space, can inhibit the ability </p> +<p style="top:617.6pt;left:56.2pt">of the AUC and FARC to make use of the Extort Special Action. </p> +<p style="top:631.3pt;left:56.2pt">Also, when positioned with Support or on a LoC, Troops can spot </p> +<p style="top:645.1pt;left:56.2pt">(Activate) marching Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:671.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Police </b></p> +<p style="top:687.6pt;left:99.4pt">Police are very, very important Government pieces. While </p> +<p style="top:701.3pt;left:99.4pt">much less mobile than Troops, Police give the Government </p> +<p style="top:715.1pt;left:99.4pt">player crucial positional staying power. </p> +<p style="top:737.8pt;left:56.2pt">Here’s what Police do for you: </p> +<p style="top:756.1pt;left:56.2pt">• Police cannot move with Troops on a Sweep (unless the <i>National </i></p> +<p style="top:769.8pt;left:67.5pt"><i>Defense & Security Council</i> Government Capability is in play). </p> +<p style="top:783.6pt;left:67.5pt">But they can, if already positioned in the space, assist the Troops </p> +<p style="top:797.3pt;left:67.5pt">in the space being swept. Police cubes count when factoring the </p> +<p style="top:811.1pt;left:67.5pt">effect of a Sweep. </p> +<p style="top:828.4pt;left:56.3pt">• Police inhibit the ability of the Cartels to use the Cultivate Special </p> +<p style="top:842.2pt;left:67.5pt">Action. Police can also inhibit FARC from using the Kidnapping </p> +<p style="top:855.9pt;left:67.5pt">Special Action. Like Troops, Police on LoCs or in spaces with </p> +<p style="top:869.7pt;left:67.5pt">Support can spot (Activate) marching Guerrillas (very important to </p> +<p style="top:883.4pt;left:67.5pt">protect the Cities), and inhibit FARC and the AUC from Extorting </p> +<p style="top:897.2pt;left:67.5pt">in a space. </p> +<p style="top:914.5pt;left:56.3pt">• Police can be used to Patrol LoCs to activate Guerrillas on LoCs, </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:405.0pt">and even conduct an Assault on a LoC as a part of the Sweep. </p> +<p style="top:84.3pt;left:393.8pt">• Within Cities, Police can participate in an Assault. </p> +<p style="top:101.6pt;left:393.8pt">• Police, like Troops, can protect a Government Base from Attack </p> +<p style="top:115.4pt;left:405.0pt">(cubes must be removed before a Base is removed). </p> +<p style="top:138.1pt;left:393.8pt">So far they probably don’t sound terribly useful to the player. There </p> +<p style="top:151.9pt;left:393.8pt">is, however, one crucial role Police have that makes them indispens-</p> +<p style="top:165.6pt;left:393.8pt">able: Police enable the Government player to conduct Civic Actions </p> +<p style="top:179.4pt;left:393.8pt">during a Propaganda card, and also as part of a Train Operation. </p> +<p style="top:202.1pt;left:393.8pt">Civic Action is the means by which the Government player degrades </p> +<p style="top:215.9pt;left:393.8pt">Opposition and/or adds/improves Support—necessary to fulfill the </p> +<p style="top:229.6pt;left:393.8pt">Government victory conditions. At least 1 Police cube is required </p> +<p style="top:243.4pt;left:393.8pt">to conduct Civic Action in a Propaganda Phase or as a postscript </p> +<p style="top:257.1pt;left:393.8pt">to a Train Operation. </p> +<p style="top:279.9pt;left:393.8pt">Police cannot move by Airlift or (usually) Sweep. They can only </p> +<p style="top:293.6pt;left:393.8pt">be moved onto LoCs and/or Cities from an adjacent space during a </p> +<p style="top:307.4pt;left:393.8pt">Patrol. If LoCs are free of Insurgent Guerrillas, Police can continue </p> +<p style="top:321.1pt;left:393.8pt">to move from LoC to LoC and City to LoC, etc., until a guerrilla is </p> +<p style="top:334.9pt;left:393.8pt">encountered or the player chooses to stop moving. But getting Police </p> +<p style="top:348.6pt;left:393.8pt">into Departments is not quite as simple and requires some planning. </p> +<p style="top:362.4pt;left:393.8pt">So how do you get Police to where you need them without using a </p> +<p style="top:376.1pt;left:393.8pt">Patrol Operation? There are two methods principally: </p> +<p style="top:398.9pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Training—</b>You can get Police into a space where they are needed by </p> +<p style="top:412.6pt;left:393.8pt">simply undertaking the Train Operation and Training Police in that </p> +<p style="top:426.4pt;left:393.8pt">space. For Cities, this is not a problem as you can Train in any City. </p> +<p style="top:440.1pt;left:393.8pt">Training in a Department, however, requires a bit of planning. </p> +<p style="top:462.9pt;left:393.8pt">In order to place cubes by Training in a Department, you must have </p> +<p style="top:476.6pt;left:393.8pt">a Base there. In order to get a Base into that Department, you must </p> +<p style="top:490.4pt;left:393.8pt">first have three cubes in that Department. OK, so how do you get </p> +<p style="top:504.1pt;left:393.8pt">cubes into a Department so you can place a Base? Typically, you will </p> +<p style="top:517.9pt;left:393.8pt">undertake a Sweep Operation to move Troops into a Department. </p> +<p style="top:531.6pt;left:393.8pt">You could also use the Airlift Special Activity to fly an additional </p> +<p style="top:545.4pt;left:393.8pt">3 Troops there. Then, in a subsequent turn, you undertake a Train </p> +<p style="top:559.1pt;left:393.8pt">Operation in that Department, only you don’t place cubes; instead, </p> +<p style="top:572.9pt;left:393.8pt">you remove 3 cubes and place a Base. </p> +<p style="top:595.6pt;left:393.8pt">Once you have a Base, in a future turn, you can Train and place </p> +<p style="top:609.4pt;left:393.8pt">Police into that Department. If you have Troops and Police and more </p> +<p style="top:623.1pt;left:393.8pt">Government pieces than any other Faction in that Department, you </p> +<p style="top:636.9pt;left:393.8pt">may also pay for Civic Action in order to improve Support (even </p> +<p style="top:650.6pt;left:393.8pt">without a Base). </p> +<p style="top:673.4pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Redeploy</b>—During the Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card, the </p> +<p style="top:687.1pt;left:393.8pt">Government player can reposition any and all of his Police to any </p> +<p style="top:700.9pt;left:393.8pt">LoCs or any space with Government Control.</p> +<p style="top:723.6pt;left:393.8pt">Adjacency does not apply during this Phase, so this is a very pow-</p> +<p style="top:737.4pt;left:393.8pt">erful opportunity to move otherwise less-mobile Police around the </p> +<p style="top:751.1pt;left:393.8pt">board. The player must plan very carefully here lest he be forced to </p> +<p style="top:764.9pt;left:393.8pt">waste Resources and Operational tempo later on. </p> +<p style="top:787.6pt;left:393.8pt">And so, in short, the Government player may reposition his Police </p> +<p style="top:801.4pt;left:393.8pt">preemptively and for free during the Redeploy Phase. The Govern-</p> +<p style="top:815.1pt;left:393.8pt">ment player may place new Police reactively and for a considerable </p> +<p style="top:828.9pt;left:393.8pt">cost in Resources when undertaking a Train Operation during an </p> +<p style="top:842.6pt;left:393.8pt">event card play. Police enable the Government to gain precious </p> +<p style="top:856.4pt;left:393.8pt">support necessary to fulfilling his victory conditions. This then, will </p> +<p style="top:870.1pt;left:393.8pt">likely free up Troops to deploy elsewhere against Insurgents. Police </p> +<p style="top:883.9pt;left:393.8pt">give the Government player staying power. </p> +</div> + +<div id="page16" style="background-image:url('playbook16.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>16</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Bases </b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:115.7pt">Bases are crucial to Government success in that they </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:115.7pt">provide the only means by which the Government </p> +<p style="top:110.5pt;left:115.7pt">player can maintain a constant Troop presence in the </p> +<p style="top:124.2pt;left:115.7pt">countryside. The Government player has only three </p> +<p style="top:138.0pt;left:56.2pt">Bases they can establish. Don’t waste them! </p> +<p style="top:160.8pt;left:56.2pt">Where do you need Bases? You need them in Departments. You </p> +<p style="top:174.5pt;left:56.2pt">do not need them in Cities. Why? Cities, are de facto Bases. Bases </p> +<p style="top:188.3pt;left:56.2pt">enable the player to Train Troops and/or Police in that space. Since </p> +<p style="top:202.0pt;left:56.2pt">you an already do that in a City, you do not need to give up three </p> +<p style="top:215.8pt;left:56.2pt">cubes and use one of your three Base pieces there! The only good </p> +<p style="top:229.5pt;left:56.2pt">a Base will do the Government in a City is deny the ability to place </p> +<p style="top:243.3pt;left:56.2pt">a Base in that City to one of the Insurgent Factions. But since the </p> +<p style="top:257.0pt;left:56.2pt">Government only has three Bases with which to work, this seems </p> +<p style="top:270.8pt;left:56.2pt">to be a wasted use of a Base. </p> +<p style="top:293.5pt;left:56.2pt">Why do you need Bases? You need Bases in order to Train Police </p> +<p style="top:307.3pt;left:56.2pt">and Troops in a Department. In order to decrease Opposition and </p> +<p style="top:321.0pt;left:56.2pt">increase Support for the Government, the Government player must </p> +<p style="top:334.8pt;left:56.2pt">undertake Civic Actions either in conjunction with a Train Operation </p> +<p style="top:348.5pt;left:56.2pt">or during a Propaganda card. In order to undertake a Civic Action, </p> +<p style="top:362.2pt;left:56.2pt">one or more Police must be in that space. In order to get Police into </p> +<p style="top:376.0pt;left:56.2pt">a Department where there are presently no Police, they must usually </p> +<p style="top:389.8pt;left:56.2pt">be Trained there. To be Trained there, you need a Base. </p> +<p style="top:412.5pt;left:56.2pt">Bases also allow Troops to remain in a Department during the </p> +<p style="top:426.2pt;left:56.2pt">Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card. And so if the Government </p> +<p style="top:440.0pt;left:56.2pt">player is still fighting to wrest control of a Department from an </p> +<p style="top:453.8pt;left:56.2pt">Insurgent faction when a Propaganda card is resolved, the presence </p> +<p style="top:467.5pt;left:56.2pt">of a Base in that Department allows the Government player to keep </p> +<p style="top:481.2pt;left:56.2pt">his Troops in the field. </p> +<p style="top:504.0pt;left:56.2pt">So there you have it! Bases are one more important cog in the </p> +<p style="top:517.8pt;left:56.2pt">Government’s machinery. </p> +<p style="top:547.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">ROLE SUMMARIES </span></b></p> +<p style="top:574.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Government </b></p> +<p style="top:590.6pt;left:96.4pt"><b>Situation. </b>Colombia is at the edge of abyss. Illegal armed </p> +<p style="top:604.4pt;left:96.4pt">groups—flush with drug money—are multiplying in the </p> +<p style="top:618.1pt;left:96.4pt">countryside. Terror, sabotage, assassination, and kidnapping </p> +<p style="top:631.9pt;left:56.2pt">have reached alarming rates, and little of the rural population sup-</p> +<p style="top:645.6pt;left:56.2pt">ports the national Government. Only a full-out, whole-of-Govern-</p> +<p style="top:659.4pt;left:56.2pt">ment counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign can restore law and </p> +<p style="top:673.1pt;left:56.2pt">order to your nation. </p> +<p style="top:695.9pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Goal. </b>Expand the Government’s legitimacy throughout the country. </p> +<p style="top:709.6pt;left:56.2pt">The more population that supports you, the greater your chance to </p> +<p style="top:723.4pt;left:56.2pt">win. </p> +<p style="top:746.1pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Tools. </b>You can train forces to outnumber and assault the enemy </p> +<p style="top:759.9pt;left:56.2pt">with fearsome firepower. But guerrillas must first be flushed out </p> +<p style="top:773.6pt;left:56.2pt">from underground by sweeping cities or rural departments where </p> +<p style="top:787.4pt;left:56.2pt">they hide. Your troops are highly mobile by ground or air lift but </p> +<p style="top:801.1pt;left:56.2pt">must return to bases or city garrisons. Police—once established in </p> +<p style="top:814.9pt;left:56.2pt">a department—can stay. Police and troops together can conduct </p> +<p style="top:828.6pt;left:56.2pt">civic action to build your popular support. But COIN requires </p> +<p style="top:842.4pt;left:56.2pt">resources—be sure to control the country’s cities, pipelines, and </p> +<p style="top:856.1pt;left:56.2pt">other lines of communications and cultivate foreign aid to ensure </p> +<p style="top:869.9pt;left:56.2pt">your war chest remains full. </p> +<p style="top:892.6pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Deals. </b>It’s tempting to single-mindedly hammer the FARC and let </p> +<p style="top:906.4pt;left:56.2pt">the cartels and AUC do their thing, since FARC’s political interests </p> +<p style="top:920.1pt;left:56.2pt">directly oppose yours. But the smaller insurgents can quietly gain </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt">momentum and win. Imagine a temporary truce in which you leave </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt">FARC free to fight off the dread paramilitaries, while your eradica-</p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:393.8pt">tion of the Cartels’ fields helps FARC politically and fills your aid </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:393.8pt">coffers. </p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Tip.<i> </i></b>COIN is a gradual campaign—plan your territorial control and </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:393.8pt">civic action several operations ahead.</p> +<p style="top:170.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>FARC </b></p> +<p style="top:187.2pt;left:433.8pt"><b>Situation. </b>Colombia’s popular revolution is ready to tran-</p> +<p style="top:200.9pt;left:433.8pt">sition to the mobile phase. The Government has abandoned </p> +<p style="top:214.7pt;left:433.8pt">the countryside. Your revolutionary movement—the </p> +<p style="top:228.4pt;left:393.8pt">FARC—is drawing resources from Colombia’s drug economy. It’s </p> +<p style="top:242.2pt;left:393.8pt">time to move: rally your People’s Army and march on the strongholds </p> +<p style="top:255.9pt;left:393.8pt">of reaction! </p> +<p style="top:278.7pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Goal. </b>Build opposition to the Government to prepare its collapse. </p> +<p style="top:292.4pt;left:393.8pt">The more of the country’s population you can swing from support </p> +<p style="top:306.2pt;left:393.8pt">to opposition while sustaining your logistics, the better chance </p> +<p style="top:319.9pt;left:393.8pt">you’ll win. </p> +<p style="top:342.7pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Tools. </b>That probably will mean infiltrating cities with your guerril-</p> +<p style="top:356.4pt;left:393.8pt">las to agitate the bourgeoisie into uprising. Wherever you control </p> +<p style="top:370.2pt;left:393.8pt">the population by outnumbering all enemy forces with your fighters </p> +<p style="top:383.9pt;left:393.8pt">and logistical bases, you can agitate. Even where you can’t control </p> +<p style="top:397.7pt;left:393.8pt">territory, you can terrorize the populace into resenting Government </p> +<p style="top:411.4pt;left:393.8pt">fecklessness. To operate, you’ll need resources: extort controlled </p> +<p style="top:425.2pt;left:393.8pt">areas or kidnap and ransom resources away from wealthy drug lords </p> +<p style="top:438.9pt;left:393.8pt">or Government collaborators. If the Government or the reactionary </p> +<p style="top:452.7pt;left:393.8pt">paramilitaries come after you, ambush them first! </p> +<p style="top:475.4pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Deals. </b>You share the countryside with the cartels and can protect </p> +<p style="top:489.2pt;left:393.8pt">drug Bases by making the areas dangerous for troops or police. You </p> +<p style="top:502.9pt;left:393.8pt">share with your Insurgent enemies an interest in a weak Govern-</p> +<p style="top:516.7pt;left:393.8pt">ment—their terror can erode Government support and aid; you in </p> +<p style="top:530.4pt;left:393.8pt">turn can limit the growth of your logistical bases to placate the AUC. </p> +<p style="top:544.2pt;left:393.8pt">Even the Government may help you—giving you a pause to trim </p> +<p style="top:557.9pt;left:393.8pt">the AUC or Cartels when too strong or doing so itself. </p> +<p style="top:580.7pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Tip. </b>Strike the country’s lines of communications—they are the </p> +<p style="top:594.4pt;left:393.8pt">arteries of Government resources and maneuver.</p> +<p style="top:620.7pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>AUC </b></p> +<p style="top:636.9pt;left:433.8pt"><b>Situation.</b> Colombia’s Government has proven incapable </p> +<p style="top:650.7pt;left:433.8pt">of controlling the leftist scourge of the FARC. You will step </p> +<p style="top:664.4pt;left:433.8pt">into the security vacuum and use the terrorists’ own tactics </p> +<p style="top:678.2pt;left:393.8pt">against them. Funded by landowners who have suffered an epi-</p> +<p style="top:691.9pt;left:393.8pt">demic of FARC kidnapping, you will rally the autodefensa militias </p> +<p style="top:705.7pt;left:393.8pt">under the AUC banner and cleanse the land of leftist infrastruc-</p> +<p style="top:719.4pt;left:393.8pt">ture—or at least provide a counterweight. </p> +<p style="top:742.2pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Goal.</b> Eliminate FARC logistical bases while building your own. The </p> +<p style="top:755.9pt;left:393.8pt">more disparity in AUC’s favor, the closer you are to winning. </p> +<p style="top:778.7pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Tools. </b>Your guerrillas are every bit as effective as the FARC’s, </p> +<p style="top:792.4pt;left:393.8pt">though often less numerous, and can ambush to guarantee a suc-</p> +<p style="top:806.2pt;left:393.8pt">cessful attack. Your terror operations enable you to eliminate even </p> +<p style="top:819.9pt;left:393.8pt">protected FARC logistical bases through assassination, neutralize </p> +<p style="top:833.7pt;left:393.8pt">local opposition to the Government to allow you rally forces, and </p> +<p style="top:847.4pt;left:393.8pt">even trim back popular support of and foreign aid for the Government </p> +<p style="top:861.2pt;left:393.8pt">when it’s getting too strong. You can rally your forces in relatively </p> +<p style="top:874.9pt;left:393.8pt">safe Government areas and extort there for resources, then march </p> +<p style="top:888.7pt;left:393.8pt">a guerrilla army into a FARC stronghold to attack or infiltrate indi-</p> +<p style="top:902.4pt;left:393.8pt">vidual units to terrorize. </p> +</div> + +<div id="page17" style="background-image:url('playbook17.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>17</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Deals. </b>You can help the Government by going where it can’t: Your </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:56.2pt">informants enable you to attack underground guerrillas, your terror </p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:56.2pt">instantly dampens FARC-based popular opposition, and you can </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:56.2pt">take on FARC within demilitarized zones. But don’t dismiss hand-</p> +<p style="top:121.9pt;left:56.2pt">shakes with other Insurgents. FARC rallying directly affects your </p> +<p style="top:135.7pt;left:56.2pt">victory—offer truce. And your assassinations can easily target the </p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels’ business—extract drug shipments for “protection”. </p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Tip. </b>You’re a remora on the Government shark. Swim along, but </p> +<p style="top:185.9pt;left:56.2pt">be ready for the day it shakes you off and bites.</p> +<p style="top:212.2pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Cartels </b></p> +<p style="top:228.4pt;left:96.2pt"><b>Situation. </b>You have taken over Colombia’s illegal narcot-</p> +<p style="top:242.2pt;left:96.2pt">ics industry. The bad news is that the Government is gear-</p> +<p style="top:255.9pt;left:96.2pt">ing up its “war on drugs”, and the more it eradicates your </p> +<p style="top:269.7pt;left:56.2pt">drug production bases, the more gringo aid it gets. The good news </p> +<p style="top:283.4pt;left:56.2pt">is that the country is at the height of a civil war, and there are </p> +<p style="top:297.2pt;left:56.2pt">plenty of other illegal groups around to keep the Government busy </p> +<p style="top:310.9pt;left:56.2pt">and off your back. </p> +<p style="top:333.7pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Goal. </b>Make money. And grow your productive base to make sure </p> +<p style="top:347.4pt;left:56.2pt">that you can keep making money. The more resources and bases </p> +<p style="top:361.2pt;left:56.2pt">you accumulate, the more likely you are to win. </p> +<p style="top:383.9pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Tools. </b>You are a commercial insurgency and can attack and terror-</p> +<p style="top:397.7pt;left:56.2pt">ize your enemies like the rest. But your gunmen are less numerous </p> +<p style="top:411.4pt;left:56.2pt">and can’t protect everything you own. Your strength is that you are </p> +<p style="top:425.2pt;left:56.2pt">the fastest growing enterprise in the country: cultivate and process </p> +<p style="top:438.9pt;left:56.2pt">until you’re rich. Then bribe to neutralize whatever enemy guer-</p> +<p style="top:452.7pt;left:56.2pt">rillas, police, or bases stand in your way. Process drugs and use </p> +<p style="top:466.4pt;left:56.2pt">profits from the shipments to grease your operational skids and </p> +<p style="top:480.2pt;left:56.2pt">grow even faster. </p> +<p style="top:502.9pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Deals. </b>You got the drugs and the money, so you can get the deals. </p> +<p style="top:516.7pt;left:56.2pt">Resources are transferable, and—sooner or later—you should have </p> +<p style="top:530.4pt;left:56.2pt">garnered more than you need. Use them to buy friends. Or offer to </p> +<p style="top:544.2pt;left:56.2pt">process shipments for other Insurgents—or even for a staged Gov-</p> +<p style="top:557.9pt;left:56.2pt">ernment drug bust! Or agree to bribe away whatever threatens your </p> +<p style="top:571.7pt;left:56.2pt">enemy—anything to keep the heat off your coca fields. </p> +<p style="top:594.4pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Tip. </b>The potent Medellín gang just got shot up, so you are start-</p> +<p style="top:608.2pt;left:56.2pt">ing weak. Try to get a lot of bases and shipments ready to earn </p> +<p style="top:621.9pt;left:56.2pt">resources—but not so many as to draw unwanted attention!</p> +</div> + +<div id="page27" style="background-image:url('playbook27.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>27</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:182.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">DESIGN NOTES</span></b></p> +<p style="top:206.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> seeks to depict Colombia’s recent struggle in a </p> +<p style="top:219.9pt;left:56.2pt">game that captures key principles of insurgency and counterinsurgen-</p> +<p style="top:233.7pt;left:56.2pt">cy (COIN). Such principles include a focus on legitimacy (popular </p> +<p style="top:247.4pt;left:56.2pt">support or opposition), the contest between government firepower </p> +<p style="top:261.2pt;left:56.2pt">and guerrilla information advantage, and multiparty warfare. I aimed </p> +<p style="top:274.9pt;left:56.2pt">to present the topic via rules no harder to learn than <i>Labyrinth: The </i></p> +<p style="top:288.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>War on Terror</i> and with enthralling gameplay spanning multiplayer, </p> +<p style="top:302.4pt;left:56.2pt">2-player, and solitaire. These Notes go into some of the reasoning </p> +<p style="top:316.2pt;left:56.2pt">and history behind the game and its mechanics.</p> +<p style="top:342.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Origins</b></p> +<p style="top:359.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why a COIN Series?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:378.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today. Indeed, </i></p> +<p style="top:391.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>though military establishments persist in regarding it as “irregu-</i></p> +<p style="top:405.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>lar” or “unconventional”, guerrilla war has been the commonest </i></p> +<p style="top:419.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>of conflicts throughout history, occurring in one variety or another </i></p> +<p style="top:433.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>in almost all known societies. </i></p> +<p style="top:452.5pt;left:56.2pt"> —David Kilcullen, <i>Counterinsurgency,</i> 2010 </p> +<p style="top:475.3pt;left:56.2pt">Much like the study of warfare (in my country at least), board </p> +<p style="top:489.0pt;left:56.2pt">wargaming traditionally has focused on conventional conflict. Even </p> +<p style="top:502.8pt;left:56.2pt">within the realm of modern conflict, designers often choose hypo-</p> +<p style="top:516.5pt;left:56.2pt">thetical conventional wars rather than real, ongoing insurgencies. </p> +<p style="top:539.3pt;left:56.2pt">This fact leaves fields of virgin snow for the game designer who </p> +<p style="top:553.0pt;left:56.2pt">would venture into the complicated topic of insurgency—the effort </p> +<p style="top:566.8pt;left:56.2pt">of armed groups to use both violent and non-violent means to affect </p> +<p style="top:580.5pt;left:56.2pt">political affairs within a state. I design and play wargames in part </p> +<p style="top:594.3pt;left:56.2pt">to grapple with historically relevant issues, and the frequency of </p> +<p style="top:608.0pt;left:56.2pt">insurgency in our life-times surely makes it among the most relevant </p> +<p style="top:621.8pt;left:56.2pt">sorts to conflicts to us today. </p> +<p style="top:644.5pt;left:56.2pt">Perhaps because insurgency (like terrorism) so intimately blends </p> +<p style="top:658.3pt;left:56.2pt">politics with the use of force, too few boardgames have succeeded in </p> +<p style="top:672.0pt;left:56.2pt">adequately representing even the fundamentals of counterinsurgency </p> +<p style="top:685.8pt;left:56.2pt">(or COIN), such as the complex relationship between area control </p> +<p style="top:699.5pt;left:56.2pt">and political legitimacy, to name just one. </p> +<p style="top:722.3pt;left:56.2pt">The first board wargame that I came across that delved substantially </p> +<p style="top:736.0pt;left:56.2pt">into COIN was Nick Karp’s <i>Vietnam 1965-1975</i> (Victory Games, </p> +<p style="top:749.8pt;left:56.2pt">1984), and once I played it, I was hooked on gaming guerrilla </p> +<p style="top:763.5pt;left:56.2pt">ambushes in the jungle, airborne sweeps, pacification, and the rest. </p> +<p style="top:777.3pt;left:56.2pt">But, for all its merits in depicting COIN, <i>Vietnam</i> still focused on </p> +<p style="top:791.0pt;left:56.2pt">the maneuvers and clashes of big military units, with political affairs </p> +<p style="top:804.8pt;left:56.2pt">as a backdrop, and in any event took several hundred hours to play </p> +<p style="top:818.5pt;left:56.2pt">if its political-strategic aspects were to be included.</p> +<p style="top:841.3pt;left:56.2pt">The greatest recent advances in boardgaming COIN, in my view, are </p> +<p style="top:855.0pt;left:56.2pt">to be found in the designs of Canadian Brian Train. Brian’s wargames </p> +<p style="top:868.8pt;left:56.2pt">feature insurgency itself (rather than a hex-and-counter tradition) </p> +<p style="top:882.5pt;left:56.2pt">as their starting perspective, then build accessible simulations from </p> +<p style="top:896.3pt;left:56.2pt">there. His <i>Algeria: The War of Independence, 1954-1962</i> (Fiery </p> +<p style="top:910.0pt;left:56.2pt">Dragon, 2006) more than any other game, provided the conceptual </p> +<p style="top:923.8pt;left:56.2pt">basis for <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i>. <i>ANDEAN ABYSS’s</i> mechanics rendering </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt">asymmetric Operations, Troops and Police, Underground Guer-</p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt">rillas, Government Redeploy and Guerrilla March, Civic Action, </p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:393.8pt">territorial Control, Terror and political Support all have starting </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:393.8pt">points in <i>Algeria.</i></p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:393.8pt">The menu of topics for future volumes in the COIN Series is rich. </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:393.8pt">For Volume II, <i>Cuba Libre,</i> <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> playtester Jeff Gross-</p> +<p style="top:158.4pt;left:393.8pt">man and I adapted the Colombia game to Fidel Castro’s 1957-1958 </p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:393.8pt">insurgency. <i>Cuba Libre</i> exploits the same core system for ease of </p> +<p style="top:185.9pt;left:393.8pt">learning, but portrays a far different insurgency and four factions </p> +<p style="top:199.7pt;left:393.8pt">that each plays quite differently from those in <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i>. I </p> +<p style="top:213.4pt;left:393.8pt">plan the COIN Series in future to visit Africa, East Asia, and the </p> +<p style="top:227.2pt;left:393.8pt">Mid-East—design time and gamer interest being the only limits.</p> +<p style="top:250.7pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why Colombia?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:269.4pt;left:393.8pt">With the wide menu of topics available, I chose Colombia for COIN </p> +<p style="top:283.2pt;left:393.8pt">Volume I both because it is among those topics under-treated in con-</p> +<p style="top:296.9pt;left:393.8pt">flict simulation and because of the remarkable richness of its story. </p> +<p style="top:310.7pt;left:393.8pt">As far as I know, only one other boardgame about Colombia’s recent </p> +<p style="top:324.4pt;left:393.8pt">insurgency exists, <i>Crisis Games:</i> <i>Colombia</i> by Karsten and Kaarin </p> +<p style="top:338.2pt;left:393.8pt">Engelmann, (published in 1990, coincidentally, from my own town </p> +<p style="top:351.9pt;left:393.8pt">of Vienna, Virginia). And that, printed over 20 years ago, predates </p> +<p style="top:365.7pt;left:393.8pt">the period that <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> depicts.</p> +<p style="top:388.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>The violence has worsened in Colombia, as the insurgent armed </i></p> +<p style="top:402.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>struggle has become more entrenched and widespread. The most </i></p> +<p style="top:415.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>violent zones of the country are those where two or more of the ac-</i></p> +<p style="top:429.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>tors involved in social conflict—guerrillas, drug cartels, and illegal </i></p> +<p style="top:443.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>self-defense (paramilitary) groups—are active.</i></p> +<p style="top:462.8pt;left:393.8pt"> —<i>Colombian Labyrinth,</i> RAND Project Air Force, 2001</p> +<p style="top:485.5pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia’s recent history features a full array of combatants of </p> +<p style="top:499.3pt;left:393.8pt">different objectives and tactics, ample to fuel a 4-way asymmetric </p> +<p style="top:513.0pt;left:393.8pt">multiplayer game. The Colombian state in the mid-1990s faced </p> +<p style="top:526.8pt;left:393.8pt">several simultaneous and well-resourced insurgencies—the FARC </p> +<p style="top:540.5pt;left:393.8pt">and its ally ELN, the Cali Cartel and its successors, and the AUC. </p> +<p style="top:554.3pt;left:393.8pt">By the mid-2000s, the state had contained each of them as significant </p> +<p style="top:568.0pt;left:393.8pt">threats to governance. How? I wanted to explore that.</p> +<p style="top:590.8pt;left:393.8pt">It was in the period chosen for the game that the Colombian Gov-</p> +<p style="top:604.5pt;left:393.8pt">ernment learned how to do COIN—jointly by military and civil </p> +<p style="top:618.3pt;left:393.8pt">institutions, extending state presence throughout the national terri-</p> +<p style="top:632.0pt;left:393.8pt">tory, building legitimacy by taking on all illegal armed groups. (See </p> +<p style="top:645.8pt;left:393.8pt">“Why does only the Government get permanent events?” below.) </p> +<p style="top:659.5pt;left:393.8pt">According to some researchers, Colombia is a model COIN success, </p> +<p style="top:673.3pt;left:393.8pt">and indeed the Colombians are now teaching other states. </p> +<p style="top:696.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why multiplayer?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:715.5pt;left:393.8pt">My previous designs, <i>Labyrinth</i> and<i> Wilderness War,</i> feature 2-way </p> +<p style="top:729.3pt;left:393.8pt">asymmetry of roles as a central theme. I wished my next design to </p> +<p style="top:743.0pt;left:393.8pt">take asymmetry to a new level: 4-way, including a solitaire experi-</p> +<p style="top:756.8pt;left:393.8pt">ence that would bring home the complex interplay of many interests </p> +<p style="top:770.5pt;left:393.8pt">that is COIN.</p> +<p style="top:793.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many </i></p> +<p style="top:807.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of its </i></p> +<p style="top:820.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>agenda—counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided. </i></p> +<p style="top:840.2pt;left:403.8pt">—Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles”, reproduced in <i>Counter-</i></p> +<p style="top:853.9pt;left:403.8pt"><i>insurgency</i></p> +<p style="top:876.7pt;left:393.8pt">In <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i>, the 4-way contest allows exploration, for </p> +<p style="top:890.4pt;left:393.8pt">example, of the ambiguous, multi-faceted relationships between </p> +<p style="top:904.2pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia’s Government and the right-wing AUC paramilitaries, </p> +<p style="top:917.9pt;left:393.8pt">and between the FARC and the drug cartels. How long do such </p> +</div> + +<div id="page28" style="background-image:url('playbook28.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>28</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt">uncomfortable bedfellows cooperate? When do they turn on each </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:56.2pt">other? Such decision points become key features of the game’s nar-</p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:56.2pt">rative, as they were in history.</p> +<p style="top:117.2pt;left:56.2pt">As in <i>Labyrinth,</i> ends (victory conditions) differ among roles just </p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:56.2pt">as do ways and means (operations and forces). I had played Joe </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:56.2pt">Miranda’s <i>Battle for Baghdad</i> (MCS Group, 2010) and was taken </p> +<p style="top:158.4pt;left:56.2pt">with its 6-way, overlapping victory conditions: each player con-</p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:56.2pt">stantly has to watch the progress of every other against the unique </p> +<p style="top:185.9pt;left:56.2pt">conditions of each, and more than one player can be making progress </p> +<p style="top:199.7pt;left:56.2pt">without directly impeding the other. The play tension and diplomatic </p> +<p style="top:213.4pt;left:56.2pt">depth offered thereby are tremendous. <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> attempts </p> +<p style="top:227.2pt;left:56.2pt">something similar (if more modest, with just four factions).</p> +<p style="top:249.9pt;left:56.2pt">The greatest design challenge was to render such a multi-faction </p> +<p style="top:263.7pt;left:56.2pt">contest in a solitaire system. <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> provides multiple, </p> +<p style="top:277.4pt;left:56.2pt">asymmetric algorithms for solitaire play—I hope in an accessible </p> +<p style="top:291.2pt;left:56.2pt">enough form that solo players, once used to the play aids, will find </p> +<p style="top:304.9pt;left:56.2pt">the non-player routines well worth the effort of implementing. They </p> +<p style="top:318.7pt;left:56.2pt">generate a kaleidoscopic narrative, in which “bots” react to one </p> +<p style="top:332.4pt;left:56.2pt">another as well as to the player. At the same time, the separate non-</p> +<p style="top:346.2pt;left:56.2pt">player algorithms allow two or three players to represent Colombia’s </p> +<p style="top:359.9pt;left:56.2pt">4-way conflict in a variety of player combinations.</p> +<p style="top:382.7pt;left:56.2pt">An incidental benefit of <i>ANDEAN ABYSS’s</i> role-specific non-player </p> +<p style="top:396.4pt;left:56.2pt">system is that any player but the Government can leave a game in </p> +<p style="top:410.2pt;left:56.2pt">progress, and that game can continue with the system smoothly </p> +<p style="top:423.9pt;left:56.2pt">taking over the departed player’s role (a benefit revealed to good </p> +<p style="top:437.7pt;left:56.2pt">effect during pre-publication demonstrations of <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> </p> +<p style="top:451.4pt;left:56.2pt">at game stores and conventions).</p> +<p style="top:475.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Core Mechanics</b></p> +<p style="top:492.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why no hands of cards? </i></b></p> +<p style="top:511.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> is not in the Card-Driven Game (CDG) family. But </p> +<p style="top:524.9pt;left:56.2pt">it does draw from CDG tradition the exemplary ability of cards with </p> +<p style="top:538.7pt;left:56.2pt">choices between operations and events to bring detailed political and </p> +<p style="top:552.4pt;left:56.2pt">economic occurrences into a wargame’s narrative without fuss.</p> +<p style="top:575.2pt;left:56.2pt">Instead of dealing hands of cards, <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> offers events one </p> +<p style="top:588.9pt;left:56.2pt">at a time from a face-down deck. This puts the focus not on “what’s </p> +<p style="top:602.7pt;left:56.2pt">in my hand” but on “what’s happening on the map,” which seems </p> +<p style="top:616.4pt;left:56.2pt">a more direct representation of managing an insurgent or counter-</p> +<p style="top:630.2pt;left:56.2pt">insurgent campaign. Meanwhile, the unique design of the game’s </p> +<p style="top:643.9pt;left:56.2pt">event card sequence of play interweaves the event and operations </p> +<p style="top:657.7pt;left:56.2pt">choices with the exertion of influence by a faction with the initiative </p> +<p style="top:671.4pt;left:56.2pt">over the options of an adversary or ally.</p> +<p style="top:694.2pt;left:56.2pt">With both the current and upcoming event card exposed, and me-</p> +<p style="top:707.9pt;left:56.2pt">chanics such as lingering “Govt Capabilities” events, <i>ANDEAN </i></p> +<p style="top:721.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ABYSS </i>retains the painful tradeoffs between short- and long-term </p> +<p style="top:735.4pt;left:56.2pt">benefits of great CDGs. But player interaction and development </p> +<p style="top:749.2pt;left:56.2pt">of board position dominate rather than hand or deck management. </p> +<p style="top:762.9pt;left:56.2pt">Insurgency and COIN are long-term strategies, and players who </p> +<p style="top:776.7pt;left:56.2pt">build their position on the map of Colombia toward the endgame </p> +<p style="top:790.4pt;left:56.2pt">tend to succeed.</p> +<p style="top:813.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why so many dual-use events?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:832.7pt;left:56.2pt">In the development of <i>Labyrinth,</i> Joel Toppen and I found ourselves </p> +<p style="top:846.4pt;left:56.2pt">adding more and more events that featured effects that differed </p> +<p style="top:860.2pt;left:56.2pt">depending on which side played them. Because of <i>Labyrinth’s</i> </p> +<p style="top:873.9pt;left:56.2pt">mechanic of card play triggering an enemy event, and therefore the </p> +<p style="top:887.7pt;left:56.2pt">need to have a majority of events dedicated to only one side or the </p> +<p style="top:901.4pt;left:56.2pt">other, these dual-use events had to be limited in number. But they </p> +<p style="top:915.2pt;left:56.2pt">appeared so useful to represent alternative historical paths and the </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt">ambiguous nature of real-world occurrences, that I set dual-use </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt">events as the norm for <i>ANDEAN ABYSS.</i></p> +<p style="top:103.4pt;left:393.8pt">Dual-use events proved particularly helpful in representing the </p> +<p style="top:117.2pt;left:393.8pt">historical and ideological controversy over Colombia’s struggle </p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:393.8pt">prevalent in the sources that I had available (see “Fantasy of the </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:393.8pt">Right—or Left?” below). But these event cards represent not only </p> +<p style="top:158.4pt;left:393.8pt">alternative interpretations, but also alternative history (that which </p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:393.8pt">did not occur, but could have) and double-edged swords (uncertain-</p> +<p style="top:185.9pt;left:393.8pt">ties over which of two effects might most influence the course of </p> +<p style="top:199.7pt;left:393.8pt">conflict). </p> +<p style="top:222.4pt;left:393.8pt">Where dual-use events at least in part represent alternative interpreta-</p> +<p style="top:236.2pt;left:393.8pt">tions, I have sought to provide representatives of both views in the </p> +<p style="top:249.9pt;left:393.8pt">event background notes and their sourcing in this playbook.</p> +<p style="top:273.4pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why different sets of operations?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:292.2pt;left:393.8pt">Beyond giving each faction its own historical identity and flavor, </p> +<p style="top:305.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> tries to model the asymmetric contest between </p> +<p style="top:319.7pt;left:393.8pt">insurgent guerrillas and government security forces. The most central </p> +<p style="top:333.4pt;left:393.8pt">distinction in this regard is the pitting of the insurgents’ information </p> +<p style="top:347.2pt;left:393.8pt">advantage against the counterinsurgents’ firepower advantage—and </p> +<p style="top:360.9pt;left:393.8pt">the nature of insurgent and COIN operations in the game reflects </p> +<p style="top:374.7pt;left:393.8pt">this distinction. </p> +<p style="top:397.4pt;left:393.8pt">Government forces must sweep to expose (find) underground </p> +<p style="top:411.2pt;left:393.8pt">guerrillas before organizing a strike upon them—often giving the </p> +<p style="top:424.9pt;left:393.8pt">insurgents a chance to escape first. Guerrillas know who and where </p> +<p style="top:438.7pt;left:393.8pt">their enemies are, but their attacks are weak compared to govern-</p> +<p style="top:452.4pt;left:393.8pt">ment troop assaults. </p> +<p style="top:475.2pt;left:393.8pt">Since the insurgents get their information advantage from melding </p> +<p style="top:488.9pt;left:393.8pt">with the local population, a hostile population can undo that advan-</p> +<p style="top:502.7pt;left:393.8pt">tage by reporting on (exposing) guerrillas that march into their area. </p> +<p style="top:516.4pt;left:393.8pt">Even a neutral population will quietly tolerate armed forces in their </p> +<p style="top:530.2pt;left:393.8pt">midst, so allowing guerrillas to move safely.</p> +<p style="top:552.9pt;left:393.8pt">These game mechanics represent the real-life cat-and-mouse char-</p> +<p style="top:566.7pt;left:393.8pt">acteristic of COIN engagement, whether in an army “search and </p> +<p style="top:580.4pt;left:393.8pt">destroy” mission against guerrilla columns in the jungle hinterland </p> +<p style="top:594.2pt;left:393.8pt">or a police investigation of an urban underground. </p> +<p style="top:617.7pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why does only the Government get permanent events?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:636.4pt;left:393.8pt">In <i>ANDEAN ABYSS,</i> the Government alone may receive potent </p> +<p style="top:650.2pt;left:393.8pt">improvements to capability that last the remainder of the game. </p> +<p style="top:663.9pt;left:393.8pt">The insurgents, in contrast, can achieve only a momentum that </p> +<p style="top:677.7pt;left:393.8pt">dissipates after a single campaign. This difference represents the </p> +<p style="top:691.4pt;left:393.8pt">fact that, as mentioned above, the period of Colombian conflict </p> +<p style="top:705.2pt;left:393.8pt">portrayed was fundamentally characterized by a steady building of </p> +<p style="top:718.9pt;left:393.8pt">the Government’s COIN skill and capacity.</p> +<p style="top:741.7pt;left:393.8pt">That building capacity rested on unifying COIN into one effort by </p> +<p style="top:755.4pt;left:393.8pt">the whole government: national political leadership from president to </p> +<p style="top:769.2pt;left:393.8pt">legislature, the joint military services, national police and judiciary, </p> +<p style="top:782.9pt;left:393.8pt">and economic development orchestrated as never before to win </p> +<p style="top:796.7pt;left:393.8pt">the war. It also included a better understanding of the nature of the </p> +<p style="top:810.4pt;left:393.8pt">enemy’s strategy, so that military operations could be more effective </p> +<p style="top:824.2pt;left:393.8pt">and supportive of a counter-strategy. The game’s Govt Capabilities </p> +<p style="top:837.9pt;left:393.8pt">events <i>National Defense & Security Council, 1st Division, Tapias, </i></p> +<p style="top:851.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Ospina & Mora</i> and others represent this organizational and strategic </p> +<p style="top:865.4pt;left:393.8pt">development of a potent Colombian COIN. </p> +<p style="top:888.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Uribe pursued an aggressive plan to address Colombia’s decade-long </i></p> +<p style="top:901.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitary </i></p> +<p style="top:915.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>groups and to reduce the production of illicit drugs. ... [Colombia] </i></p> +</div> + +<div id="page29" style="background-image:url('playbook29.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>29</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>has made significant progress in reestablishing government control </i></p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist </i></p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>activities, and reducing poverty.</i></p> +<p style="top:113.8pt;left:56.2pt"> —Congressional Research Service <i>Report for Congress,</i> 2011</p> +<p style="top:136.5pt;left:56.2pt">With increasing US training and equipment assistance during the </p> +<p style="top:150.3pt;left:56.2pt">period, first under the “War on Drugs” then the “War on Terror”, </p> +<p style="top:164.0pt;left:56.2pt">and with Uribe’s full-force war effort against illegal groups, mate-</p> +<p style="top:177.8pt;left:56.2pt">rial COIN capacity built along with skill and strategy. So we have </p> +<p style="top:191.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Blackhawks</i> for air mobility, <i>High Mountain Battalions</i> for Andean </p> +<p style="top:205.3pt;left:56.2pt">operations, <i>7th Special Forces</i> for US training, and so on.</p> +<p style="top:228.0pt;left:56.2pt">This treatment of a building COIN versus more ephemeral insurgent </p> +<p style="top:241.8pt;left:56.2pt">capabilities contrasts with that in Volume II, <i>Cuba Libre.</i> There, to </p> +<p style="top:255.5pt;left:56.2pt">represent the growth of insurgent potency contrasted with the Batista </p> +<p style="top:269.3pt;left:56.2pt">regime’s failure to adapt its means, the game reverses mechanics </p> +<p style="top:283.0pt;left:56.2pt">and instead presents lasting “Insurgent Capabilities” and temporary </p> +<p style="top:296.8pt;left:56.2pt">“Govt Momentum”.</p> +<p style="top:320.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Why include lines of communication?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:339.0pt;left:56.2pt">The game’s mechanics surrounding lines of communication (LoCs) </p> +<p style="top:352.8pt;left:56.2pt">represent the dependence of the country’s economy, government </p> +<p style="top:366.5pt;left:56.2pt">revenues, and therefore COIN operations tempo on railways, roads, </p> +<p style="top:380.3pt;left:56.2pt">powerlines, and—in Colombia especially—pipelines delivering </p> +<p style="top:394.0pt;left:56.2pt">energy exports. </p> +<p style="top:416.8pt;left:56.2pt">A guerrilla sabotage and kidnapping campaign against the LoCs </p> +<p style="top:430.5pt;left:56.2pt">of a government that is already resource-limited can spike a COIN </p> +<p style="top:444.3pt;left:56.2pt">campaign. But insurgent players will find that sabotage is not cake: </p> +<p style="top:458.0pt;left:56.2pt">LoCs are dangerous places for guerrillas, as security forces can reach </p> +<p style="top:471.8pt;left:56.2pt">them quickly and tend to defend them aggressively.</p> +<p style="top:495.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>What does the Propaganda Round represent?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:514.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS’s</i> Propaganda Rounds punctuate insurgency-COIN </p> +<p style="top:527.8pt;left:56.2pt">campaigns at irregular and not precisely predictable moments. They </p> +<p style="top:541.5pt;left:56.2pt">represents less a given moment or time period distinct from the </p> +<p style="top:555.3pt;left:56.2pt">general course of the conflict and more an accounting of various </p> +<p style="top:569.0pt;left:56.2pt">matters that are really progressing concurrently with the game’s </p> +<p style="top:582.8pt;left:56.2pt">events and operations: tax collection, export earnings, the political </p> +<p style="top:596.5pt;left:56.2pt">effects of ongoing and steady FARC propaganda activities (agita-</p> +<p style="top:610.3pt;left:56.2pt">tion) and government investment (civic action), relocation of forces </p> +<p style="top:624.0pt;left:56.2pt">among relatively quiet or controlled areas, and the development of </p> +<p style="top:637.8pt;left:56.2pt">effective local police forces.</p> +<p style="top:660.5pt;left:56.2pt">Knowing only with very little warning exactly when this accounting </p> +<p style="top:674.3pt;left:56.2pt">will take place adds to play tension and represents the real-world </p> +<p style="top:688.0pt;left:56.2pt">uncertainties in war regarding the outcomes of these larger, cumula-</p> +<p style="top:701.8pt;left:56.2pt">tive processes (how much revenue will we collect? how popular will </p> +<p style="top:715.5pt;left:56.2pt">our political and military efforts be? and the like).</p> +<p style="top:741.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>COIN History in the Game: </b></p> +<p style="top:758.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Local Security as a Key</i></b></p> +<p style="top:777.5pt;left:56.2pt">Establishing local security for the population in order to deny support </p> +<p style="top:791.3pt;left:56.2pt">to guerrillas is another key aspect of counterinsurgency represented </p> +<p style="top:805.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS’s</i> mechanics. US COIN scholar Tom Marks de-</p> +<p style="top:818.8pt;left:56.2pt">scribes the local security situation in the Colombian countryside </p> +<p style="top:832.5pt;left:56.2pt">as of the mid-1990s—a good description of the challenge for the </p> +<p style="top:846.3pt;left:56.2pt">Government player at the beginning of the game:</p> +<p style="top:869.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Domination of local areas was the linchpin of the counterinsurgent </i></p> +<p style="top:882.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions were tried to maintain </i></p> +<p style="top:896.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>state presence in affected areas... But in the absence of local forces, </i></p> +<p style="top:910.3pt;left:56.2pt"><i>which had fallen afoul of constitutional court restrictions and thus </i></p> +<p style="top:924.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>were disbanded, it was difficult to consolidate gains. As areas were </i></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>retaken, they could not be garrisoned with home guards. Instead, </i></p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>regular units rotated in and out in a perpetual shell game designed </i></p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>to keep FARC off balance. </i></p> +<p style="top:113.8pt;left:393.8pt"> —<i>Military Review,</i> March-April 2007</p> +<p style="top:136.5pt;left:393.8pt"><b>Troops and Police.</b> In the game, Troops represent the Government’s </p> +<p style="top:150.3pt;left:393.8pt">regular forces: highly mobile across the countryside and hard-hitting </p> +<p style="top:164.0pt;left:393.8pt">against enemy forces, but eventually forced to return to garrison </p> +<p style="top:177.8pt;left:393.8pt">in cities or bases. Police represent the local security forces: time-</p> +<p style="top:191.5pt;left:393.8pt">consuming to build to effectiveness in contested areas, but essential </p> +<p style="top:205.3pt;left:393.8pt">to day-to-day law and order and therefore to the Government’s </p> +<p style="top:219.0pt;left:393.8pt">legitimacy and popular support.</p> +<p style="top:241.8pt;left:393.8pt">In <i>ANDEAN ABYSS,</i> Government troops can sweep into an enemy </p> +<p style="top:255.5pt;left:393.8pt">area and locate and assault guerrilla forces. As troops establish con-</p> +<p style="top:269.3pt;left:393.8pt">trol, police eventually can deploy into the area to stay. Or the troops </p> +<p style="top:283.0pt;left:393.8pt">can establish a Government base to more quickly train local police. </p> +<p style="top:296.8pt;left:393.8pt">Only once both troops and effective police forces are in place, can </p> +<p style="top:310.5pt;left:393.8pt">the Government invest in local development through civic action, </p> +<p style="top:324.3pt;left:393.8pt">thereby building popular support and countering the insurgency.</p> +<p style="top:347.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>“Imaginitive Solutions”—Help for the Government to Stay </i></b></p> +<p style="top:362.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>in Local Areas</i></b></p> +<p style="top:381.5pt;left:393.8pt">The above process is time-consuming and uncertain for the Govern-</p> +<p style="top:395.3pt;left:393.8pt">ment. However, several events can help it establish effective day-</p> +<p style="top:409.0pt;left:393.8pt">to-day security in the countryside more quickly. One example is the </p> +<p style="top:422.8pt;left:393.8pt">establishment of local forces platoons called Soldados Campesinos: </p> +<p style="top:436.5pt;left:393.8pt">forces that blend the advantages of regular troops and regional </p> +<p style="top:450.3pt;left:393.8pt">police. </p> +<p style="top:473.0pt;left:393.8pt">Whether these opportunities become available is not entirely up to </p> +<p style="top:486.8pt;left:393.8pt">the Government COIN strategist: Will the talent to discover and </p> +<p style="top:500.5pt;left:393.8pt">implement imaginative solutions emerge? Will politics and bureau-</p> +<p style="top:514.3pt;left:393.8pt">cracy allow them to bear fruit? In the game, the event card may or </p> +<p style="top:528.0pt;left:393.8pt">may not come up, and the Government player may or may not be </p> +<p style="top:541.8pt;left:393.8pt">eligible to play it when it does, or may decide that other operations </p> +<p style="top:555.5pt;left:393.8pt">are more urgent.<i> </i></p> +<p style="top:555.5pt;left:528.7pt"><i> </i></p> +<p style="top:579.0pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>The Other Edge of the Sword—Military and “Paramilitary”</i></b></p> +<p style="top:597.8pt;left:393.8pt">In light of Colombia’s tradition of local self-defense militias and </p> +<p style="top:611.5pt;left:393.8pt">the evolution of those “autodefensas” into anti-FARC illegal armed </p> +<p style="top:625.3pt;left:393.8pt">groups (labeled “paramilitaries”) eventually under the leadership </p> +<p style="top:639.0pt;left:393.8pt">of Carlos Castaño’s AUC, there historically was concern that new </p> +<p style="top:652.8pt;left:393.8pt">local forces platoons would simply augment the AUC’s reactionary </p> +<p style="top:666.5pt;left:393.8pt">insurgents. In the game, the AUC is more likely than the Government </p> +<p style="top:680.3pt;left:393.8pt">to get the first crack at the <i>Soldados Campesinos</i> event (because of </p> +<p style="top:694.0pt;left:393.8pt">the order of the faction symbols on the card). And the AUC player </p> +<p style="top:707.8pt;left:393.8pt">(or non-player, if run by the game system) would almost certainly </p> +<p style="top:721.5pt;left:393.8pt">implement the card’s shaded, pro-insurgent effect, turning defecting </p> +<p style="top:735.3pt;left:393.8pt">rural police into AUC guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:758.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>And so what is the FARC doing about it?</i></b></p> +<p style="top:777.5pt;left:393.8pt">Beyond such special occurrences as defections, the Government’s </p> +<p style="top:791.3pt;left:393.8pt">rural forces will have to weather the more routine threats that are </p> +<p style="top:805.0pt;left:393.8pt">within the capabilities of the insurgent factions: FARC ambushes, </p> +<p style="top:818.8pt;left:393.8pt">AUC assassinations, Cartels Bribes, and the like. Insurgent players </p> +<p style="top:832.5pt;left:393.8pt">on the ball will be gunning for any newly established rural police </p> +<p style="top:846.3pt;left:393.8pt">before Government civic action can gain the populace’s support </p> +<p style="top:860.0pt;left:393.8pt">and make local insurgent operations that much more difficult: once </p> +<p style="top:873.8pt;left:393.8pt">populations support the Government, they block FARC from ral-</p> +<p style="top:887.5pt;left:393.8pt">lying new forces and (as discussed above) report on any guerrillas </p> +<p style="top:901.3pt;left:393.8pt">entering the area, flushing them from underground status and thereby </p> +<p style="top:915.0pt;left:393.8pt">blocking their ability to terrorize, ambush, and extort.</p> +</div> + +<div id="page30" style="background-image:url('playbook30.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>30</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>FARC History in the Game: </b></p> +<p style="top:83.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Nation Held Hostage </i></b></p> +<p style="top:102.5pt;left:56.2pt">Insurgencies, like governments, need resources to operate, but the </p> +<p style="top:116.2pt;left:56.2pt">collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the world’s leftist move-</p> +<p style="top:130.0pt;left:56.2pt">ments largely on their own. In their 2010 book about Colombian </p> +<p style="top:143.7pt;left:56.2pt">hostages, journalists Victoria Bruce, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique </p> +<p style="top:157.5pt;left:56.2pt">Botero describe how Colombia’s revolutionary FARC insurgency </p> +<p style="top:171.2pt;left:56.2pt">turned to the drug trade for financing—contributing by the mid-</p> +<p style="top:185.0pt;left:56.2pt">1990s both to its development of a kidnapping industry and to the </p> +<p style="top:198.7pt;left:56.2pt">rise of the autodefensas that later merged into the FARC’s right-wing </p> +<p style="top:212.5pt;left:56.2pt">AUC enemy:</p> +<p style="top:235.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>The FARC ... controlled many of the coca-growing regions in central </i></p> +<p style="top:249.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>and southern Colombia, while the cartels managed much of the co-</i></p> +<p style="top:262.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>caine production and trafficking. The guerrillas operated by taxing </i></p> +<p style="top:276.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>the cartels and drug producers for protection and services. ... This </i></p> +<p style="top:290.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>economic alliance began to collapse when the leaders of the cartels </i></p> +<p style="top:304.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>... began investing their newfound wealth in property, primarily </i></p> +<p style="top:317.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>large cattle ranches which placed them firmly in the ranks of the </i></p> +<p style="top:331.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>guerrillas’ traditional enemy—the landowning elite. ... In turn, the </i></p> +<p style="top:345.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>guerrillas began a policy of kidnapping and extortion of the cartel </i></p> +<p style="top:359.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>members. For protection and retaliation, the drug lords organized </i></p> +<p style="top:372.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>and financed their own paramilitary armies. </i></p> +<p style="top:392.1pt;left:56.2pt"> <i>—Hostage Nation: Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed </i></p> +<p style="top:405.9pt;left:67.5pt"><i>War on Drugs,</i> 2010</p> +<p style="top:428.6pt;left:181.1pt"><i>Map from official Colombian sources </i></p> +<p style="top:442.4pt;left:180.9pt"><i>showing intensity of FARC guerrilla ac-</i></p> +<p style="top:456.1pt;left:180.9pt"><i>tivity during the period covered by the </i></p> +<p style="top:469.9pt;left:180.9pt"><i>game. Western Meta and Caquetá De-</i></p> +<p style="top:483.6pt;left:180.9pt"><i>partments are a hotbed containing the </i></p> +<p style="top:497.4pt;left:180.9pt"><i>sites of famous captures of both Colom-</i></p> +<p style="top:511.1pt;left:180.9pt"><i>bian presidential candidate Betancourt </i></p> +<p style="top:524.9pt;left:180.9pt"><i>and of three US DoD contractors.</i></p> +<p style="top:587.1pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>FARC Kidnapping, Cartels and Government Victims, and </i></b></p> +<p style="top:602.1pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>AUC Growth</i></b></p> +<p style="top:620.9pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian analysts in 1998 estimated that kidnappings by the FARC </p> +<p style="top:634.6pt;left:56.2pt">and its sister group, the ELN, accounted for 20 to 30 percent of all </p> +<p style="top:648.4pt;left:56.2pt">kidnappings in the world (RAND, <i>Colombian Labyrinth,</i> p32). The </p> +<p style="top:662.1pt;left:56.2pt">FARC held hundreds of hostages at a time—a large-scale ransoming </p> +<p style="top:675.9pt;left:56.2pt">enterprise for them and a tragedy for the country that developed into </p> +<p style="top:689.6pt;left:56.2pt">a political issue and a cause for national hatred of the guerrillas. </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> depicts the enterprise through the kidnapping spe-</p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt">cial activity that the FARC faction may add to its terror operations. </p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:393.8pt">It also depicts the impact of FARC hostage-taking on politics and </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:393.8pt">military affairs through a series of event cards.</p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:393.8pt">In the game, FARC can use underground Guerrillas to terrorize local </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:393.8pt">populations into opposing the Colombian government. If the terror-</p> +<p style="top:158.4pt;left:393.8pt">ized region has a drug cartels base or is a city or line of communica-</p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:393.8pt">tion—and if FARC guerrillas outnumber local police—FARC may </p> +<p style="top:185.9pt;left:393.8pt">kidnap as well to forcibly transfer a die roll’s worth of resources (or </p> +<p style="top:199.7pt;left:393.8pt">a drug shipment) in ransom from the Cartels or Government faction </p> +<p style="top:213.4pt;left:393.8pt">to FARC. As reaction to FARC kidnapping historically contributed </p> +<p style="top:227.2pt;left:393.8pt">to growth of the right-wing “paramilitaries”, a particularly costly </p> +<p style="top:240.9pt;left:393.8pt">kidnapping (a die roll of “6”) mobilizes a local AUC guerrilla unit </p> +<p style="top:254.7pt;left:393.8pt">or base.</p> +<p style="top:278.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Defense Against Kidnapping</i></b></p> +<p style="top:296.9pt;left:393.8pt">To avoid a grievous drain of resources from the counterinsurgency, </p> +<p style="top:310.7pt;left:393.8pt">the Government will have to protect the populace from FARC kid-</p> +<p style="top:324.4pt;left:393.8pt">nappers with police patrols of the country’s roads and cities. The </p> +<p style="top:338.2pt;left:393.8pt">Cartels often can better afford the drain, but it may at some point </p> +<p style="top:351.9pt;left:393.8pt">have to turn on the FARC parasite, relocate to FARC-free areas, </p> +<p style="top:365.7pt;left:393.8pt">or just pay off the FARC player. The latter option illustrates how </p> +<p style="top:379.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> explores the multifaceted relations among the </p> +<p style="top:393.2pt;left:393.8pt">contenders for control of 1990s Colombia through varied avenues </p> +<p style="top:406.9pt;left:393.8pt">for player diplomacy.</p> +<p style="top:433.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>AUC History in the Game:</b></p> +<p style="top:450.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Right-Wing Army</i></b></p> +<p style="top:468.9pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia in the mid-1990s saw the leftist FARC insurgency build-</p> +<p style="top:482.7pt;left:393.8pt">ing its strength dramatically as it transitioned from small-unit terror </p> +<p style="top:496.4pt;left:393.8pt">tactics to military attacks on the Colombian Army. But the Govern-</p> +<p style="top:510.2pt;left:393.8pt">ment was not yet on a war footing and still tacitly conceded immense </p> +<p style="top:523.9pt;left:393.8pt">areas of countryside to the guerrillas. To protect themselves from </p> +<p style="top:537.7pt;left:393.8pt">FARC terror, landowners in several localities raised self-defense </p> +<p style="top:551.4pt;left:393.8pt">forces, autodefensas, that would use the FARC’s own tactics against </p> +<p style="top:565.2pt;left:393.8pt">it. By 1996, these local anti-FARC units formed a nationwide force </p> +<p style="top:578.9pt;left:393.8pt">under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense </p> +<p style="top:592.7pt;left:393.8pt">Forces of Colombia or AUC) umbrella.</p> +<p style="top:615.4pt;left:393.8pt">Over the next decade, the AUC grew to an estimated 17,000 fighters, </p> +<p style="top:629.2pt;left:393.8pt">approaching the FARC’s strength. Journalist Mario Murillo describes </p> +<p style="top:642.9pt;left:393.8pt">this illegal armed power:</p> +<p style="top:665.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Along with the ongoing collaboration between elements of the army </i></p> +<p style="top:679.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>and the AUC, [as of 2004] there are approximately 1,000 active </i></p> +<p style="top:693.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>AUC members who have served in the Colombian military, includ-</i></p> +<p style="top:706.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ing fifty-three retired military officers who have served as advisors </i></p> +<p style="top:720.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>to the AUC. They have up to fourteen state of the art helicopters, a </i></p> +<p style="top:734.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>dozen small planes, and countless speed-boats with mounted ma-</i></p> +<p style="top:748.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>chine guns to use in their war against the guerrillas. Indeed, they </i></p> +<p style="top:761.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>are a full-fledged army, operating almost with complete impunity </i></p> +<p style="top:775.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>throughout the country. </i></p> +<p style="top:795.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i> —Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabiliza-</i></p> +<p style="top:808.8pt;left:405.0pt"><i>tion,</i> 2004</p> +<p style="top:913.5pt;left:510.9pt"><i>Logo of the AUC</i></p> +<p style="top:918.8pt;left:56.6pt"><i>FARC guerrillas</i></p> +</div> + +<div id="page31" style="background-image:url('playbook31.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>31</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Potent Anti-FARC Faction</i></b></p> +<p style="top:85.6pt;left:56.2pt">In <i>ANDEAN ABYSS,</i> the AUC faction can build an army rivaling the </p> +<p style="top:99.4pt;left:56.2pt">FARC’s in the number of guerrilla pieces—and an army as military </p> +<p style="top:113.1pt;left:56.2pt">effective and typically not under the pressure that Government </p> +<p style="top:126.9pt;left:56.2pt">forces place on the FARC. Both FARC and AUC guerrillas can use </p> +<p style="top:140.6pt;left:56.2pt">an ambush special activity that guarantees a successful attack and </p> +<p style="top:154.4pt;left:56.2pt">the capture of materiel and recruits to form a new underground unit. </p> +<p style="top:168.1pt;left:56.2pt">And a variety of event cards depict additional AUC capacities, both </p> +<p style="top:181.9pt;left:56.2pt">military and terrorist. </p> +<p style="top:205.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>AUC Aces in the Hole: Death Squads and Assassination</i></b></p> +<p style="top:224.1pt;left:56.2pt">More than on military attacks, the AUC relied on terror and mas-</p> +<p style="top:237.9pt;left:56.2pt">sacres as its principal means of taking control of FARC-dominated </p> +<p style="top:251.6pt;left:56.2pt">areas. They mimicked FARC terror, but on a more brutal level, </p> +<p style="top:265.4pt;left:56.2pt">including mass-murders of suspected FARC sympathizers and other </p> +<p style="top:279.1pt;left:56.2pt">undesirables—so-called “limpiezas” that resembled the “ethnic </p> +<p style="top:292.9pt;left:56.2pt">cleansing” that the same period featured in the Balkans. In the game, </p> +<p style="top:306.6pt;left:56.2pt">the AUC can accompany its terror operations with assassination </p> +<p style="top:320.4pt;left:56.2pt">special activities. Provided the AUC can position underground </p> +<p style="top:334.1pt;left:56.2pt">guerrillas in a target area, AUC terror can eliminate an enemy base </p> +<p style="top:347.9pt;left:56.2pt">even when protected by enemy guerrillas. Because the AUC wins by </p> +<p style="top:361.6pt;left:56.2pt">reducing FARC bases to fewer in number than its own, assassination </p> +<p style="top:375.4pt;left:56.2pt">of FARC base pieces is a key AUC tactic.</p> +<p style="top:398.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Double-Edged Sword for the Government</i></b></p> +<p style="top:417.6pt;left:56.2pt">The AUC as blood enemy to the FARC would seem an unalloyed </p> +<p style="top:431.4pt;left:56.2pt">friend to the Government, able to strike the enemy in ways that legal </p> +<p style="top:445.1pt;left:56.2pt">Government forces cannot. But the AUC nevertheless remains an </p> +<p style="top:458.9pt;left:56.2pt">insurgency—an illegal armed group that challenges Government </p> +<p style="top:472.6pt;left:56.2pt">law and order and must in the end be suppressed. </p> +<p style="top:495.4pt;left:56.2pt">In the game, too many AUC forces in a region block Government </p> +<p style="top:509.1pt;left:56.2pt">control and thus the ability to build popular support—the Govern-</p> +<p style="top:522.9pt;left:56.2pt">ment’s victory condition. AUC terror wrecks not only FARC’s politi-</p> +<p style="top:536.6pt;left:56.2pt">cal base but support for the Government, as victimized populations </p> +<p style="top:550.4pt;left:56.2pt">resent the Government’s failure to protect them. And international </p> +<p style="top:564.1pt;left:56.2pt">suspicion of Colombian Army complicity in AUC atrocities costs </p> +<p style="top:577.9pt;left:56.2pt">the Government foreign aid resources. This interplay of capabilities </p> +<p style="top:591.6pt;left:56.2pt">and victory conditions poses the question every game: when will </p> +<p style="top:605.4pt;left:56.2pt">the Government turn on its brutal AUC helpmate—as it ultimately </p> +<p style="top:619.1pt;left:56.2pt">did historically—to trim its control of the countryside?</p> +<p style="top:645.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Cartels History in the Game: </b></p> +<p style="top:662.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Chess Player of Cali</i></b></p> +<p style="top:681.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>[Cali cartel co-founder Gilberto Rodríguez] became known as the </i></p> +<p style="top:694.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>“Chess Player” for his ruthless and calculating approach to the drug </i></p> +<p style="top:708.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>business. ... The Rodríguez brothers ... controlled Cali in the way </i></p> +<p style="top:722.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>that feudal barons once ruled medieval estates. ... Buy Colombia, </i></p> +<p style="top:736.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>rather than terrorize it, became their guiding philosophy. ... The </i></p> +<p style="top:749.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>cartel built dozens of high-rise offices and apartment buildings as </i></p> +<p style="top:763.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>a way of laundering their money. The Cali skyline changed, and </i></p> +<p style="top:777.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>thousands of jobs were created. Their money permeated the city’s </i></p> +<p style="top:791.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>economy, and the natives became addicted to laundered cash and </i></p> +<p style="top:804.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>conspicuous consumption. </i></p> +<p style="top:824.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i> </i>—Ron Chepesiuk,<i> Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali </i></p> +<p style="top:838.0pt;left:67.5pt"><i>Cartel, </i>2003</p> +<p style="top:860.8pt;left:56.2pt">Along with Government security forces, FARC rebels, and AUC </p> +<p style="top:874.5pt;left:56.2pt">paramilitaries, <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> also depicts the Colombian drug </p> +<p style="top:888.2pt;left:56.2pt">cartels. While the illegal drug industry does not care much about </p> +<p style="top:902.0pt;left:56.2pt">legitimacy, it is an insurgency nevertheless. By definitions laid out </p> +<p style="top:915.8pt;left:56.2pt">by National War College scholar Bard O’Neill, the cartels are “com-</p> +<p style="top:198.3pt;left:393.8pt">mercialist insurgent” groups—contesting political power purely to </p> +<p style="top:212.0pt;left:393.8pt">aid their acquisition of material resources (<i>Insurgency & Terrorism: </i></p> +<p style="top:225.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>From Revolution to Apocalypse,</i> 2005). </p> +<p style="top:248.5pt;left:393.8pt">In the game, the Cartels faction wins not through popular support </p> +<p style="top:262.3pt;left:393.8pt">or opposition but by building its criminal organization (expanding </p> +<p style="top:276.0pt;left:393.8pt">its bases) and amassing resources. But its presence can get in the </p> +<p style="top:289.8pt;left:393.8pt">way of other factions’ objectives of territorial control and political </p> +<p style="top:303.5pt;left:393.8pt">support. The Cartels, for example, start the game within one rally </p> +<p style="top:317.3pt;left:393.8pt">action of controlling Cali, which begins politically neutral rather </p> +<p style="top:331.0pt;left:393.8pt">than supportive of the Government.</p> +<p style="top:353.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>As a result of the dismantling of the drug cartels, trafficking has </i></p> +<p style="top:367.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>experienced radical changes in structure. ... There are [now] be-</i></p> +<p style="top:381.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>tween 250 and 300 trafficking organizations in Colombia. Their </i></p> +<p style="top:395.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>leaders are some of the former cartels’ second-rank members ... The </i></p> +<p style="top:408.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>new organizations are smaller, closed, and secret ... . [They] have </i></p> +<p style="top:422.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>developed strategies, methods and techniques aimed at making the </i></p> +<p style="top:436.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>business more dynamic, sneaking away from law enforcement and </i></p> +<p style="top:450.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>blending in better in their respective regions.</i></p> +<p style="top:469.4pt;left:403.8pt">—Álvaro Camacho and Andrés López, “From Smugglers to </p> +<p style="top:483.1pt;left:403.8pt">Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in Illicit Colombian Drug </p> +<p style="top:496.9pt;left:403.8pt">Organizations,” in <i>Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in </i></p> +<p style="top:510.6pt;left:403.8pt"><i>Colombia,</i> 2007</p> +<p style="top:534.1pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>War of Weeds</i></b></p> +<p style="top:552.9pt;left:393.8pt">The historical period of game—mid-1990s to mid-2000s—saw the </p> +<p style="top:566.6pt;left:393.8pt">sunset of Colombia’s flashy, politically active drug cartels, but not </p> +<p style="top:580.4pt;left:393.8pt">of the illicit drug industry that the game’s Cartels faction represents. </p> +<p style="top:594.1pt;left:393.8pt">And so, in <i>ANDEAN ABYSS,</i> the Cartels can reconstitute themselves, </p> +<p style="top:607.9pt;left:393.8pt">able to slip readily out of areas of danger and regrow elsewhere.</p> +<p style="top:630.6pt;left:393.8pt">Unlike other insurgents, the Cartels can recruit forces anywhere: </p> +<p style="top:644.4pt;left:393.8pt">battalions of hired guns—sicarios—await among the poor. But </p> +<p style="top:658.1pt;left:393.8pt">the Cartels’ guerrilla force pool is the smallest: it cannot organize </p> +<p style="top:884.4pt;left:394.1pt"><i>One way to get drugs to US market: a narco-submarine, designed </i></p> +<p style="top:898.1pt;left:394.1pt"><i>to evade detection while it carries its load of product on the pas-</i></p> +<p style="top:911.9pt;left:394.1pt"><i>sage northward.</i></p> +<p style="top:162.5pt;left:393.4pt"><i>Cali skyline</i></p> +<p style="top:160.9pt;left:644.4pt;font-size:7.5pt"><i>Photo by D.A. Rendón</i></p> +</div> + +<div id="page32" style="background-image:url('playbook32.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>32</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt">campaigns on the scale of the more military FARC or AUC. And the </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels do not have the other insurgents’ potent battle tactics.</p> +<p style="top:103.4pt;left:56.2pt">The Cartels faction wins by accumulating resources (money) and </p> +<p style="top:117.2pt;left:56.2pt">bases (the coca and poppy fields, processing labs, and distribution </p> +<p style="top:130.9pt;left:56.2pt">infrastructure needed to continue making money). It will find it hard </p> +<p style="top:144.7pt;left:56.2pt">to protect its bases with its smaller number of guerrillas, and rural </p> +<p style="top:158.4pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels bases are vulnerable to aerial spraying (the Government’s </p> +<p style="top:172.2pt;left:56.2pt">eradication action). </p> +<p style="top:194.9pt;left:56.2pt">But the Cartels also can place new bases more easily than any other </p> +<p style="top:208.7pt;left:56.2pt">faction, quickly though special cultivation actions or with delay but </p> +<p style="top:222.4pt;left:56.2pt">cheaply though processing actions to ready drug shipments. Ship-</p> +<p style="top:236.2pt;left:56.2pt">ment markers represent major caches of processed cocaine or heroin </p> +<p style="top:249.9pt;left:56.2pt">awaiting delivery to market outside Colombia—they are vulnerable </p> +<p style="top:263.7pt;left:56.2pt">to seizure by the other factions: any insurgent faction can liquidate </p> +<p style="top:277.4pt;left:56.2pt">them to accelerate operations. But if defended and held long enough </p> +<p style="top:291.2pt;left:56.2pt">to get to market (in the Propaganda Round), they yield resources </p> +<p style="top:304.9pt;left:56.2pt">or a free base.</p> +<p style="top:327.7pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels terror can hurt the Government or FARC politically, but the </p> +<p style="top:341.4pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels’ most potent weapon is corruption: they can bribe to expose, </p> +<p style="top:355.2pt;left:56.2pt">hide, or neutralize enemy forces—anywhere. Bribes are expensive, </p> +<p style="top:368.9pt;left:56.2pt">however, and so only become a true threat once the Cartels are well </p> +<p style="top:382.7pt;left:56.2pt">above their victory goal in resources. And so the other factions face </p> +<p style="top:396.4pt;left:56.2pt">a choice: dedicate precious time and resources early on to trim the </p> +<p style="top:410.2pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels weeds, or risk the Cartels growing so rich that they can block </p> +<p style="top:423.9pt;left:56.2pt">any offensive by bribing their way out.</p> +<p style="top:450.2pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Fantasy of the Right—or Left?</b></p> +<p style="top:466.4pt;left:56.2pt">English language studies of the Colombian conflict read so differ-</p> +<p style="top:480.2pt;left:56.2pt">ently from one another that they seem to be describing multiple </p> +<p style="top:493.9pt;left:56.2pt">countries. Is Colombia a thriving democracy, with a popular gov-</p> +<p style="top:507.7pt;left:56.2pt">ernment that has brought economic prosperity and relative peace </p> +<p style="top:521.4pt;left:56.2pt">to its people in the face of vicious terrorist and criminal threats? </p> +<p style="top:535.2pt;left:56.2pt">Or is Colombia a harsh dictatorship by an economic elite, dressed </p> +<p style="top:548.9pt;left:56.2pt">up as democracy but in fact using state-sponsored terror to keep its </p> +<p style="top:562.7pt;left:56.2pt">ever more impoverished masses under heel, and the FARC simply </p> +<p style="top:576.4pt;left:56.2pt">the people’s defense? You can find either thesis in North American </p> +<p style="top:590.2pt;left:56.2pt">scholarship.</p> +<p style="top:612.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> does not attempt to settle these questions. I took </p> +<p style="top:626.7pt;left:56.2pt">care to draw from writers (necessarily, for me, in English) who </p> +<p style="top:640.4pt;left:56.2pt">view Colombia’s conflict from a range of political perspectives (see </p> +<p style="top:654.2pt;left:56.2pt">Selected Sources). No one view seems able to tell the full story, and </p> +<p style="top:667.9pt;left:56.2pt">I hope that players of a variety of persuasions will find something </p> +<p style="top:681.7pt;left:56.2pt">relevant in the game’s design.</p> +<p style="top:704.4pt;left:56.2pt">The game does take some positions. For example, it does not fully </p> +<p style="top:718.2pt;left:56.2pt">buy the Left’s thesis of the AUC as an “extension” of the Govern-</p> +<p style="top:731.9pt;left:56.2pt">ment in that both defend elite interests against the rest of the people </p> +<p style="top:745.7pt;left:56.2pt">(see Murillo somewhat and Hristov especially). Yes, the Colombian </p> +<p style="top:759.4pt;left:56.2pt">Government and AUC shared a core interest in suppressing the </p> +<p style="top:773.2pt;left:56.2pt">FARC, and <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> accounts for this shared interest in the </p> +<p style="top:786.9pt;left:56.2pt">factions’ victory conditions. Indeed, Government and AUC players </p> +<p style="top:800.7pt;left:56.2pt">often will collaborate. </p> +<p style="top:823.4pt;left:56.2pt">But the Government under Uribe developed and executed a plan to </p> +<p style="top:837.2pt;left:56.2pt">extend its writ throughout the country—a true and, by the far-Left </p> +<p style="top:850.9pt;left:56.2pt">model, unnecessary departure—including against AUC. Casualties </p> +<p style="top:864.7pt;left:56.2pt">caused the AUC, extraditions of its leaders, and its imperfect but not </p> +<p style="top:878.4pt;left:56.2pt">false demobilization show a real parting of Government and AUC </p> +<p style="top:892.2pt;left:56.2pt">ways. And Colombia’s vigorous electoral politicking and, under </p> +<p style="top:905.9pt;left:56.2pt">Uribe, undeniable and widespread popular enthusiasm for President, </p> +<p style="top:919.7pt;left:56.2pt">government, and army seemed to gainsay the Leftist model of Co-</p> +<p style="top:187.0pt;left:393.8pt">lombia as an exploitative oligarchy defended from its people by force </p> +<p style="top:200.8pt;left:393.8pt">of terror. So <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> has the Government seeking popular </p> +<p style="top:214.5pt;left:393.8pt">support to win, rather than the exploitation of the country’s poor by </p> +<p style="top:228.3pt;left:393.8pt">the violence-backed rich, as the far Left might have it.</p> +<p style="top:251.0pt;left:393.8pt">As for the nature of the FARC, the game does not depict the group </p> +<p style="top:264.8pt;left:393.8pt">as mere “narco-terrorists” who have left people’s revolution behind </p> +<p style="top:278.5pt;left:393.8pt">and continue mainly for personal drug profit (as some on the Right </p> +<p style="top:292.3pt;left:393.8pt">argue). An insurgency may at once benefit from the drug trade and </p> +<p style="top:306.0pt;left:393.8pt">provide much needed services to rural under-privileged. <i>ANDEAN </i></p> +<p style="top:319.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ABYSS</i> models the latter aspect with the FARC Agitation mechanic </p> +<p style="top:333.5pt;left:393.8pt">and the effects of events such as <i>Crop Substitution, Unión Sindical </i></p> +<p style="top:347.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Obrera,</i> and others. </p> +<p style="top:370.0pt;left:393.8pt">The persistence in hard times of the FARC’s leaders and fighters </p> +<p style="top:383.8pt;left:393.8pt">demonstrates ideological commitment—dedication to something </p> +<p style="top:397.5pt;left:393.8pt">larger than self. Purely commercialist insurgent leaders at some </p> +<p style="top:411.3pt;left:393.8pt">point wish to live the high life. In contrast, Reyes, Mono Jojoy, </p> +<p style="top:425.0pt;left:393.8pt">Cano, and the rest carried on in the face of the hardships of lethal </p> +<p style="top:438.8pt;left:393.8pt">Government pursuit—and despite opportunities for reconciliation. </p> +<p style="top:452.5pt;left:393.8pt">In the game, FARC victory depends directly on popular opposi-</p> +<p style="top:466.3pt;left:393.8pt">tion and the strength of the movement’s political and logistical </p> +<p style="top:480.0pt;left:393.8pt">base—the preconditions for an eventual revolution and overthrow </p> +<p style="top:493.8pt;left:393.8pt">of the existing order.</p> +<p style="top:516.5pt;left:393.8pt">Finally, <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> represents the US-sponsored “War on </p> +<p style="top:530.3pt;left:393.8pt">Drugs” as neither clear failure nor clear success. Eradication in the </p> +<p style="top:544.0pt;left:393.8pt">game may be a mixed bag politically, but, used judiciously, it is a </p> +<p style="top:557.8pt;left:393.8pt">necessary and potent means for the Government to keep the Cartels </p> +<p style="top:571.5pt;left:393.8pt">in check. Historically, aerial coca eradication has had its place in </p> +<p style="top:585.3pt;left:393.8pt">curbing supply, as have the successes of the kingpin strategy of the </p> +<p style="top:599.0pt;left:393.8pt">Colombian Police and US DEA. Economics being what they are, </p> +<p style="top:612.8pt;left:393.8pt">Colombian coca production continues. But the country has escaped </p> +<p style="top:626.5pt;left:393.8pt">the level of terror and political challenge of the big cartels that now </p> +<p style="top:640.3pt;left:393.8pt">traumatize Mexico and Central America so brutally. Colombians </p> +<p style="top:654.0pt;left:393.8pt">today can take pride in a low murder rate, growing economy, and </p> +<p style="top:667.8pt;left:393.8pt">better governance.</p> +<p style="top:694.0pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>Thanks and Dedication</b></p> +<p style="top:710.3pt;left:393.8pt">My special gratitude is due to several groups and individuals for their </p> +<p style="top:724.0pt;left:393.8pt">efforts on behalf of <i>ANDEAN ABYSS:</i> To Joel Toppen, who patiently </p> +<p style="top:737.8pt;left:393.8pt">heard me out as we drove through the desert, when all I had was </p> +<p style="top:751.5pt;left:393.8pt">first drafts of curious ops menus. To GMT Games and the testers </p> +<p style="top:765.3pt;left:393.8pt">and players across many countries who made this project happen. </p> +<p style="top:779.0pt;left:393.8pt">And to Dr. Thomas Marks of the National Defense University, for </p> +<p style="top:792.8pt;left:393.8pt">sharing with me his photos and his deep and personal knowledge </p> +<p style="top:806.5pt;left:393.8pt">of Colombian COIN.</p> +<p style="top:829.3pt;left:393.8pt">Finally, I dedicate the design of <i>ANDEAN ABYSS</i> to Juan Fran-</p> +<p style="top:843.0pt;left:393.8pt">cisco’s nation and people: They have faced their past—may they </p> +<p style="top:856.8pt;left:393.8pt">overcome it.</p> +<p style="top:879.5pt;left:393.8pt"> Volko F. Ruhnke</p> +<p style="top:907.0pt;left:393.8pt"> January, 2012<sup> Vienna, Virginia</sup></p> +</div> + +<div id="page33" style="background-image:url('playbook33.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>33</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.3pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:21.3pt;letter-spacing:-1pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">EVENT TEXT AND BACKGROUND</span></b></p> +<p style="top:90.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>This section reproduces the<span style="color:#0000ff"> </span>full text of each event card, along with </i></p> +<p style="top:104.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>sourced historical and other background commentary.</i></p> +<p style="top:134.1pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>1. 1st Division <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:168.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Jointness:</i> 1 Civic Action space each Support Phase requires Govt </p> +<p style="top:182.5pt;left:56.2pt">Control and any cube.</p> +<p style="top:201.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Service parochialism:</i> Civic Action requires at least 2 Troops and </p> +<p style="top:215.6pt;left:56.2pt">2 Police.</p> +<p style="top:235.0pt;left:56.2pt">The Colombian Army’s 1st Division in late 2004 became a joint </p> +<p style="top:248.7pt;left:56.2pt">operational command, part of a process of integrating services to </p> +<p style="top:262.5pt;left:56.2pt">replace exclusively army divisional areas. (Marks p137)</p> +<p style="top:292.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>2. Ospina & Mora <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:307.3pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:326.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>COIN experts take charge:</i> Sweep costs 1 Resource per space.</p> +<p style="top:346.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>COIN strategy eludes Army:</i> Sweep Operations may target only 1 </p> +<p style="top:359.8pt;left:56.2pt">space per card.</p> +<p style="top:379.1pt;left:56.2pt">Senior army commanders Carlos Ospina Ovalle and Jorge Mora </p> +<p style="top:392.9pt;left:56.2pt">Rangel collaborated intimately—Ospina fathering a sound coun-</p> +<p style="top:406.6pt;left:56.2pt">terinsurgent strategy from his study of captured FARC documents </p> +<p style="top:420.4pt;left:56.2pt">and Mora ensuring its practical implementation. (Conversation with </p> +<p style="top:434.1pt;left:56.2pt">Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Ospina pp57,58,60)</p> +<p style="top:603.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>General Mora Photo by Tom Marks</i></p> +<p style="top:633.2pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>3. Tapias <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:648.5pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:667.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>CO tightens civil-military bonds:</i> Assault costs 1 Resource per </p> +<p style="top:681.6pt;left:56.2pt">space.</p> +<p style="top:701.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Civil-military rivalries fester: </i>Assault Operations may target only </p> +<p style="top:714.8pt;left:56.2pt">1 space per card.</p> +<p style="top:734.1pt;left:56.2pt">Military Forces Commander Fernando Tapias Stahelin drew the </p> +<p style="top:747.9pt;left:56.2pt">political backing to forge a whole-of-government COIN effort. </p> +<p style="top:761.6pt;left:56.2pt">(Conversation with Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Marks, p139; Ospina </p> +<p style="top:775.4pt;left:56.2pt">p60)</p> +<p style="top:804.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>4. Caño Limón—Coveñas <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:820.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Profitable pipeline: </i>Add twice the Econ of 3 unSabotaged pipelines </p> +<p style="top:833.9pt;left:56.2pt">to Government Resources.</p> +<p style="top:853.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Pipeline draws attacks:</i> Sabotage the 3 pipelines with highest value </p> +<p style="top:867.0pt;left:56.2pt">and no cubes. </p> +<p style="top:886.4pt;left:56.2pt">A particularly lucrative energy export pipeline from Arauca to the </p> +<p style="top:900.1pt;left:56.2pt">sea attracted both rebel attacks and US training assistance. (Brittain </p> +<p style="top:913.9pt;left:56.2pt">p23; Ricks-Lightner pp25,58,80; Hristov p34)</p> +<p style="top:66.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>5. Occidental & Ecopetrol <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Oil company security:</i> Place 6 Police onto pipelines. 3 Guerrillas </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:393.8pt">there or adjacent flip to Active.</p> +<p style="top:116.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Industry thought exploitative:</i> Shift a space adjacent to a 3-Econ </p> +<p style="top:129.9pt;left:393.8pt">LoC by 2 levels toward Active Opposition.</p> +<p style="top:149.2pt;left:393.8pt">Joint ventures between US and Colombian oil companies provided </p> +<p style="top:163.0pt;left:393.8pt">enough government revenue to justify major security measures. </p> +<p style="top:176.8pt;left:393.8pt">(Brittain p228; Ricks-Lightner p80) A $93-million batch of US </p> +<p style="top:190.5pt;left:393.8pt">counterterrorism aid in 2003, for example, focused on protection </p> +<p style="top:204.2pt;left:393.8pt">of Colombian assets of California-based Occidental Petroleum. </p> +<p style="top:218.0pt;left:393.8pt">(Hristov p34) Critics saw government concessions to multinational </p> +<p style="top:231.8pt;left:393.8pt">oil giants as overly generous and tied poverty and human rights </p> +<p style="top:245.5pt;left:393.8pt">violations to US support for oil industry in the country. (Murillo </p> +<p style="top:259.2pt;left:393.8pt">pp87-88; Hristov pp17-18,34-35)</p> +<p style="top:285.5pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b>6. Oil Spill <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:301.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Rebels blamed:</i> Shift 2 Opposition or Neutral Departments adjacent </p> +<p style="top:315.5pt;left:393.8pt">to Sabotage to Passive Support.</p> +<p style="top:334.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Multinationals make mess:</i> Sabotage a pipeline. Shift an adjacent </p> +<p style="top:348.6pt;left:393.8pt">Department by 1 level toward Active Opposition.</p> +<p style="top:368.0pt;left:393.8pt">Spilled oil from attacks created substantial environmental damage, </p> +<p style="top:381.8pt;left:393.8pt">generating local hostility against whichever combatant side got the </p> +<p style="top:395.5pt;left:393.8pt">blame. (Ricks-Lightner p80)</p> +<p style="top:425.0pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>7. 7th Special Forces <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:440.2pt;left:393.8pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:459.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Infrastructure protection training:</i> Each Control phase, Govt may </p> +<p style="top:473.4pt;left:393.8pt">remove 1-3 Terror or Sabotage.</p> +<p style="top:492.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>US training ineffective:</i> Control phase—Sabotage LoCs with any </p> +<p style="top:506.5pt;left:393.8pt">Guerrillas equal to cubes.</p> +<p style="top:525.9pt;left:393.8pt">The US Bush Administration deployed some 600 personnel of the 7th </p> +<p style="top:539.6pt;left:393.8pt">Special Forces Group (Airborne), most to train a new “infrastructure </p> +<p style="top:553.4pt;left:393.8pt">protection brigade” in embattled Arauca Department. (Marks p131; </p> +<p style="top:567.1pt;left:393.8pt">Ricks-Lightner p25)</p> +<p style="top:596.6pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:611.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>COIN strike aircraft:</i> Govt executes 3 free Air Strikes.</p> +<p style="top:631.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Budget diverted to expensive jets:</i> Government Resources –9.</p> +<p style="top:650.6pt;left:393.8pt">After FARC successes in the late 1990s in overrunning remote </p> +<p style="top:664.4pt;left:393.8pt">government centers, the Colombian military equipped its air force </p> +<p style="top:678.1pt;left:393.8pt">with night-vision gear and learned to integrate air power in support </p> +<p style="top:691.9pt;left:393.8pt">of ground operations. (RAND pp101-102) Less relevant to COIN, </p> +<p style="top:705.6pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia also maintained a force of high-speed Kfir and Mirage </p> +<p style="top:719.4pt;left:393.8pt">V jets. (RAND p42)</p> +<p style="top:748.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>9. High Mountain Battalions <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:764.1pt;left:393.8pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:783.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Elites guard high-altitude corridors:</i> Assault treats Mountain as </p> +<p style="top:797.2pt;left:393.8pt">City.</p> +<p style="top:816.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Equipment not delivered: </i>Assault in Mountain removes only 1 piece </p> +<p style="top:830.4pt;left:393.8pt">for 4 Troops.</p> +<p style="top:849.8pt;left:393.8pt">The Army in the Pastrana years equipped and situated special bat-</p> +<p style="top:863.5pt;left:393.8pt">talions to block insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inac-</p> +<p style="top:877.2pt;left:393.8pt">cessible heights. (Marks p135)</p> +</div> + +<div id="page34" style="background-image:url('playbook34.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>34</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>10. Blackhawks <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:102.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>US helos delivered:</i> Air Lift moves any number of Troops.</p> +<p style="top:121.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Delivery of US helos delayed:</i> Air Lift moves only 1 Troops cube.</p> +<p style="top:141.1pt;left:56.2pt">The military as of 2000 had only 17 operational heavy-lift helicop-</p> +<p style="top:154.9pt;left:56.2pt">ters. The US was to add 30 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 UH-1H Huey </p> +<p style="top:168.6pt;left:56.2pt">transports, but they had yet to be delivered. (RAND pp63,65,68-</p> +<p style="top:182.4pt;left:56.2pt">69,104)</p> +<p style="top:211.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>11. National Defense & Security Council <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:227.1pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:246.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Military-police jointness:</i> 1 Police may enter each Sweep space.</p> +<p style="top:265.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Military-police rivalry: </i>A Sweep Operation Activates Guerrillas via </p> +<p style="top:279.6pt;left:56.2pt">Troops or Police, not both.</p> +<p style="top:299.0pt;left:56.2pt">Uribe’s “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” integrated </p> +<p style="top:312.8pt;left:56.2pt">COIN planning, adding a National Defense and Security Council </p> +<p style="top:326.5pt;left:56.2pt">to ensure coordinated and unified action by all state bodies. (Marks </p> +<p style="top:340.2pt;left:56.2pt">pp132-133)</p> +<p style="top:369.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>12. Plan Colombia <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:385.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>US “War on Drugs”: </i>Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Resources. </p> +<p style="top:398.8pt;left:56.2pt">Then Aid +10.</p> +<p style="top:418.1pt;left:56.2pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:431.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>US aid focuses on drug war:</i> No Air Strike or Activation by Patrol </p> +<p style="top:445.6pt;left:56.2pt">until next Propaganda.</p> +<p style="top:465.0pt;left:56.2pt">The Pastrana Government’s response to Colombia’s insurgency, </p> +<p style="top:478.8pt;left:56.2pt">Plan Colombia, included seeking $3.5-billion in foreign aid. The </p> +<p style="top:492.5pt;left:56.2pt">US earmarked 3/4ths of its part of that aid to counternarcotics. </p> +<p style="top:506.2pt;left:56.2pt">(RAND pp61-62)</p> +<p style="top:535.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>13. Plan Meteoro <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:551.0pt;left:56.2pt">GOVT CAPABILITIES</p> +<p style="top:570.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Transport protection units:</i> Patrol conducts a free Assault in each </p> +<p style="top:584.1pt;left:56.2pt">LoC.</p> +<p style="top:603.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Transport security deemphasized:</i> Patrols do not conduct a free </p> +<p style="top:617.2pt;left:56.2pt">Assault.</p> +<p style="top:636.6pt;left:56.2pt">The Uribe Administration funded special transportation network </p> +<p style="top:650.4pt;left:56.2pt">protection units under “Plan Meteor”. (Marks p135)</p> +<p style="top:679.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>14. Tres Esquinas <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:695.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Forward base:</i> Government places 1 Base and 3 Troops into any </p> +<p style="top:708.9pt;left:56.2pt">Department.</p> +<p style="top:728.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Base overrun:</i> Remove 1 Government Base and 1 cube from a </p> +<p style="top:742.0pt;left:56.2pt">Department.</p> +<p style="top:761.4pt;left:56.2pt">During the late-1990s heyday of the FARC’s large-unit “mobile </p> +<p style="top:775.1pt;left:56.2pt">warfare”, it succeeded in overrunning a series of isolated army po-</p> +<p style="top:788.9pt;left:56.2pt">sitions and briefly holding the capital of Vaupés. (Ospina pp59-60; </p> +<p style="top:802.6pt;left:56.2pt">Marks p127; RAND pp42-43) Tres Esquinas was a key army base </p> +<p style="top:816.4pt;left:56.2pt">at the heart of later Government sweeps into the FARC strongholds </p> +<p style="top:830.1pt;left:56.2pt">of the southeast. (www.GlobalSecurity.org; Brittain pp226-227) </p> +<p style="top:843.9pt;left:56.2pt">As of 2002, it hosted a Joint Intelligence Center and some 100 US </p> +<p style="top:857.6pt;left:56.2pt">military advisors. (Hristov p35)</p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>15. War Tax <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Defense budget shot in the arm:</i> Roll a die and add 4 times the result </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:393.8pt">to Government Resources. </p> +<p style="top:116.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Middle class resents cost of war: </i>Shift a City from Neutral or Pas-</p> +<p style="top:129.9pt;left:393.8pt">sive Support to Passive Opposition.</p> +<p style="top:149.2pt;left:393.8pt">Uribe shifted and increased the tax burden in order to help fund the </p> +<p style="top:163.0pt;left:393.8pt">military effort against the guerrillas. (Brittain p228-229)</p> +<p style="top:192.5pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>16. Coffee Prices <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:207.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>They’re up:</i> Each Mountain, +5 Resources to Faction with most </p> +<p style="top:221.5pt;left:393.8pt">pieces, tied spaces to Govt.</p> +<p style="top:240.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>They’re down:</i> Government Resources –10.</p> +<p style="top:260.2pt;left:393.8pt">Export income from coffee—a traditional source of economic </p> +<p style="top:274.0pt;left:393.8pt">security to the Colombian highlands—fluctuated wildly from the </p> +<p style="top:287.8pt;left:393.8pt">1990s on, mostly downward. (Brittain pp84-88; Hristov p191; </p> +<p style="top:301.5pt;left:393.8pt">RAND p5) The late 1990s saw increased guerrilla presence in </p> +<p style="top:315.2pt;left:393.8pt">the country’s agricultural backbone, the central coffee-growing </p> +<p style="top:329.0pt;left:393.8pt">departments, apparently as part of FARC, ELN, and AUC strategy. </p> +<p style="top:342.8pt;left:393.8pt">(RAND pp46-47)</p> +<p style="top:372.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>17. Madrid Donors <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:387.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Aid conference generous:</i> Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Re-</p> +<p style="top:401.2pt;left:393.8pt">sources. Then Aid +6.</p> +<p style="top:420.6pt;left:393.8pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:434.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>EU aid focuses on reconstruction:</i> No Sweep or Assault in Depts </p> +<p style="top:448.1pt;left:393.8pt">until next Propaganda.</p> +<p style="top:467.5pt;left:393.8pt">European and Japanese donors to Colombia channeled aid to non-</p> +<p style="top:481.2pt;left:393.8pt">military programs. A July 2000 donors’ conference in Madrid, for </p> +<p style="top:495.0pt;left:393.8pt">example, pledged $619-million, mostly for social development </p> +<p style="top:508.8pt;left:393.8pt">projects. (RAND pp62,64)</p> +<p style="top:538.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>18. NSPD-18 <span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:553.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>US “War on Terror” takes on FARC: </i>Add lesser of Aid or +20 to </p> +<p style="top:567.2pt;left:393.8pt">Govt Resources. Then Aid +20.</p> +<p style="top:586.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>US focused on Mid-East and South Asia:</i> Government Resources </p> +<p style="top:600.4pt;left:393.8pt">–6. Subtract a die roll from Aid.</p> +<p style="top:619.8pt;left:393.8pt">In a departure from the more restrictive “war on drugs”, the US Bush </p> +<p style="top:633.5pt;left:393.8pt">Administration’s 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 18, </p> +<p style="top:647.2pt;left:393.8pt">“Supporting Democracy in Colombia”, called on the State Depart-</p> +<p style="top:661.0pt;left:393.8pt">ment to implement a new US political-military plan in direct support </p> +<p style="top:674.8pt;left:393.8pt">of Colombian national security strategy. The Bush Administration </p> +<p style="top:688.5pt;left:393.8pt">had linked the counternarcotics fight to the “war on terror” and </p> +<p style="top:702.2pt;left:393.8pt">would pursue not only cartels but the FARC and the AUC directly. </p> +<p style="top:716.0pt;left:393.8pt">(Marks p131; Chepesiuk p281) </p> +<p style="top:745.5pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>19. General Offensive <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:760.8pt;left:393.8pt">In each space possible, choose and execute either free Sweep without </p> +<p style="top:774.5pt;left:393.8pt">movement or Assault (if Government), or free Attack or Terror (if </p> +<p style="top:788.2pt;left:393.8pt">Insurgent).</p> +<p style="top:807.6pt;left:393.8pt">The conflict during the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a number of </p> +<p style="top:821.4pt;left:393.8pt">FARC offensives, including the use of homemade armored vehicles. </p> +<p style="top:835.1pt;left:393.8pt">The Government’s 2003-2004 Plan Patriota included a major military </p> +<p style="top:848.9pt;left:393.8pt">offensive around the capital and into FARC-held territory in the </p> +<p style="top:862.6pt;left:393.8pt">southeast. (Ospina pp59-60; CRS p10; Hristov p36) </p> +</div> + +<div id="page35" style="background-image:url('playbook35.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>35</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>20. Mono Jojoy <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C </span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>KIA puts FARC in disarray:</i> Govt player repositions up to 6 FARC </p> +<p style="top:96.9pt;left:56.2pt">Guerrillas into adjacent spaces.</p> +<p style="top:116.3pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Military strategist: </i>FARC free Marches any of its Guerrillas then </p> +<p style="top:130.0pt;left:56.2pt">flips up to 3 of its Guerrillas Underground.</p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">A Colombian military and police operation in Meta Department in </p> +<p style="top:163.1pt;left:56.2pt">September 2010 killed the FARC’s operational second-in-command, </p> +<p style="top:176.9pt;left:56.2pt">Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez or “Mono </p> +<p style="top:190.6pt;left:56.2pt">Jojoy”, adding to a period of strong pressure on guerrilla remnants. </p> +<p style="top:204.4pt;left:56.2pt">(CRS pp1,13) </p> +<p style="top:233.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>21. Raúl Reyes <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C </span></b></p> +<p style="top:249.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>FARC Deputy killed:</i> FARC Resources –6. Remove 1 FARC Base.</p> +<p style="top:268.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>FARC Deputy channels foreign support:</i> FARC Resources +6. Place </p> +<p style="top:282.3pt;left:56.2pt">a FARC Base in a City or Department.</p> +<p style="top:305.0pt;left:56.2pt">A 2008 Colombian military raid into Ecuador killed then second-</p> +<p style="top:318.8pt;left:56.2pt">highest FARC commander Luís Édgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”) </p> +<p style="top:332.5pt;left:56.2pt">and recovered evidence of planned Venezuelan and possibly Ecua-</p> +<p style="top:346.3pt;left:56.2pt">doran support to the FARC. (CRS p10; Marks pp140-141n) </p> +<p style="top:375.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>22. Alfonso Cano <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:391.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>FARC leader killed in military strike:</i> Shift an Opposition space to </p> +<p style="top:404.8pt;left:56.2pt">Neutral.</p> +<p style="top:424.1pt;left:56.2pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:437.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Ideologue:</i> May Agitate also in up to 3 spaces with FARC piece </p> +<p style="top:451.6pt;left:56.2pt">and no Govt Control.</p> +<p style="top:471.0pt;left:56.2pt">Communist Bogotá University student Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas </p> +<p style="top:484.8pt;left:56.2pt">joined the FARC in the 1980s and eventually became its master </p> +<p style="top:498.5pt;left:56.2pt">revolutionary ideologue, “Alfonso Cano”. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero </p> +<p style="top:512.3pt;left:56.2pt">pp138-139) A 2011 military strike in Cauca Department killed him. </p> +<p style="top:526.0pt;left:56.2pt">(www.ColombiaReports.com)</p> +<p style="top:555.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>23. DoD Contractors <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:570.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>US provides aircrew:</i> In a Dept, Activate all Guerrillas and remove </p> +<p style="top:584.5pt;left:56.2pt">all Cartels Bases.</p> +<p style="top:603.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Plane down—hostage search and evasion:</i> Govt removes 3 Troops. </p> +<p style="top:617.6pt;left:56.2pt">Mark Govt and FARC Ineligible through next card.</p> +<p style="top:637.0pt;left:56.2pt">US contractors provided pilots for crop spraying over FARC-held ter-</p> +<p style="top:650.8pt;left:56.2pt">ritory and for reconnaissance flights to pinpoint guerrillas. Patrolling </p> +<p style="top:664.5pt;left:56.2pt">FARC guerrillas in 2003 shot down one such flight along the western </p> +<p style="top:678.3pt;left:56.2pt">slopes of Caquetá and took three US personnel hostage, setting off a </p> +<p style="top:692.0pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian Army manhunt. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp3-19,107)</p> +<p style="top:721.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>24. Operación Jaque <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:736.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Dramatic hostage rescue:</i> 1 City to Active Support. Mark FARC </p> +<p style="top:750.5pt;left:56.2pt">Ineligible through next card. </p> +<p style="top:769.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Hostage rescue goes awry:</i> Remove 2 Troops from a space with </p> +<p style="top:783.6pt;left:56.2pt">FARC pieces. Shift a City with Support to Neutral.</p> +<p style="top:803.0pt;left:56.2pt">In a show of operational prowess, Colombian forces in 2008 tricked </p> +<p style="top:816.8pt;left:56.2pt">FARC captors into delivering celebrity hostage Ingrid Betancourt </p> +<p style="top:830.5pt;left:56.2pt">and 3 US DoD contractors held since 2003. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero </p> +<p style="top:844.3pt;left:56.2pt">pp238-256)</p> +<p style="top:67.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.1pt;left:393.7pt"><i>ELN and FARC jockey:</i> Remove all FARC pieces from 1 Moun-</p> +<p style="top:96.9pt;left:393.7pt">tain.</p> +<p style="top:116.3pt;left:393.7pt"><i>ELN and FARC coordinate ops:</i> Place any 3 FARC pieces into </p> +<p style="top:130.0pt;left:393.7pt">Antioquia or an adjacent Department.</p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:393.7pt">Colombia’s second-largest revolutionary army, the Castroite ELN, </p> +<p style="top:163.1pt;left:393.7pt">concentrated in the northern mountains, where it sought a Sierra </p> +<p style="top:176.9pt;left:393.7pt">Maestra-style stronghold. While the ELN and the FARC shared the </p> +<p style="top:190.6pt;left:393.7pt">same enemies and often coordinated operations, the two Marxist </p> +<p style="top:204.4pt;left:393.7pt">groups occasionally clashed over territory or resources. (RAND </p> +<p style="top:218.1pt;left:393.7pt">pp30-31,44; CRS pp13-14)</p> +<p style="top:247.6pt;left:393.7pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>26. Gramaje <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:262.9pt;left:393.7pt"><i>FARC protection rejected:</i> All Cartels Guerrillas in spaces with </p> +<p style="top:276.6pt;left:393.7pt">FARC free Attack FARC.</p> +<p style="top:296.0pt;left:393.7pt"><i>Schedule of fees: </i>Cartels transfers 3 Resources to FARC for each </p> +<p style="top:309.8pt;left:393.7pt">space with Cartels Base and FARC Guerrilla.</p> +<p style="top:329.1pt;left:393.7pt">The FARC had a precise schedule of fees, gramaje, that it charged </p> +<p style="top:342.9pt;left:393.7pt">to drug producers and smugglers for protection and other services. </p> +<p style="top:356.6pt;left:393.7pt">Though imposed by the guerrillas, these taxes served as a US argu-</p> +<p style="top:370.4pt;left:393.7pt">ment that the FARC and the drug lords were in cahoots. (RAND </p> +<p style="top:384.1pt;left:393.7pt">p32; Camacho-López p80)</p> +<p style="top:411.1pt;left:393.7pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>27. Misil Antiaéreo <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:426.4pt;left:393.7pt"><i>FARC MANPADs deemed a myth: </i>Government executes 3 free </p> +<p style="top:440.1pt;left:393.7pt">Special Activities.</p> +<p style="top:459.5pt;left:393.7pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:473.3pt;left:393.7pt"><i>MANPADs feared: </i>Until next Propaganda, no Govt Special Activi-</p> +<p style="top:487.0pt;left:393.7pt">ties where Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:506.4pt;left:393.7pt">Given the importance of air power to Colombian COIN, fears grew </p> +<p style="top:520.1pt;left:393.7pt">that guerrilla use of surface-to-air missiles could change the strategic </p> +<p style="top:533.9pt;left:393.7pt">balance. (RAND pp35,102)</p> +<p style="top:563.4pt;left:393.7pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>28. Hugo Chávez <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:578.6pt;left:393.7pt"><i>Caracas controls border:</i> Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a </p> +<p style="top:592.4pt;left:393.7pt">space next to Venezuela.</p> +<p style="top:611.8pt;left:393.7pt"><i>Caracas aids rebels: </i>Place a FARC Base in a Dept next to Venezuela. </p> +<p style="top:625.5pt;left:393.7pt">Sabotage each empty LoC touching Cúcuta. </p> +<p style="top:644.9pt;left:393.7pt">FARC information taken in the 2008 raid on Raúl Reyes suggested </p> +<p style="top:658.6pt;left:393.7pt">that Venezuela was providing support to the insurgent group, includ-</p> +<p style="top:672.4pt;left:393.7pt">ing plans by the Hugo Chávez regime to grant millions of dollars for </p> +<p style="top:686.1pt;left:393.7pt">weapons purchases. Chávez later that year called on the FARC to </p> +<p style="top:699.9pt;left:393.7pt">cease military operations, signaling a change in at least Venezuela’s </p> +<p style="top:713.6pt;left:393.7pt">public stance. (CRS p10)</p> +<p style="top:743.1pt;left:393.7pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>29. Kill Zone <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:758.4pt;left:393.7pt"><i>Army sniffs out FARC trap:</i> Govt in 1 space Activates all FARC and </p> +<p style="top:772.1pt;left:393.7pt">executes free Assault.</p> +<p style="top:791.5pt;left:393.7pt"><i>Tactics lure enemy in:</i> FARC or AUC in a space executes 2 free </p> +<p style="top:805.3pt;left:393.7pt">Ambushes with any of its Guerrillas without Activating.</p> +<p style="top:824.6pt;left:393.7pt">The FARC between 1996 and 2000 developed a tactic to lure Army </p> +<p style="top:838.4pt;left:393.7pt">reaction forces into a prepared kill zone surrounded by intercon-</p> +<p style="top:852.1pt;left:393.7pt">nected rifle pits and bunkers. In one such kill-zone action in late </p> +<p style="top:865.9pt;left:393.7pt">2000 along a key route from Antioquia to Chocó, guerrillas inflicted </p> +<p style="top:879.6pt;left:393.7pt">heavy casualties on special forces of the Colombian 4th Brigade. </p> +<p style="top:893.4pt;left:393.7pt">Often, however, the army could detect the kill zone before falling </p> +<p style="top:907.1pt;left:393.7pt">into the trap. (RAND pp44-45,45n)</p> +</div> + +<div id="page36" style="background-image:url('playbook36.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>36</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>30. Peace Commission <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>FARC accused in Commissioner’s killing:</i> Remove 1 FARC Zone.</p> +<p style="top:102.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Peace bid: </i>Government places 1 FARC Zone. (See 6.4.3) </p> +<p style="top:121.9pt;left:56.2pt">The FARC’s ambush and execution in late 2000 of the head of the </p> +<p style="top:135.6pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian congressional peace commission, Diego Torbay, dealt </p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">Pastrana’s peace policy a new blow. (RAND pp73-74)</p> +<p style="top:178.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>31. Betancourt <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:194.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Sympathy for famous hostage:</i> Shift 2 Cities and 1 Dept 1 level each </p> +<p style="top:207.9pt;left:56.2pt">toward Active Support.</p> +<p style="top:227.3pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Hostage negotiations forum for FARC:</i> Shift 3 spaces from Passive </p> +<p style="top:241.0pt;left:56.2pt">Opposition to Active Opposition</p> +<p style="top:260.4pt;left:56.2pt">Spitfire senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—</p> +<p style="top:274.1pt;left:56.2pt">known among other things for her outreach to the FARC—fell </p> +<p style="top:287.9pt;left:56.2pt">hostage in 2002 as she toured the recently remilitarized FARC </p> +<p style="top:301.6pt;left:56.2pt">zone. She became an international symbol of Colombia’s hostage </p> +<p style="top:315.4pt;left:56.2pt">tragedy—and of the FARC’s role in it. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-</p> +<p style="top:329.1pt;left:56.2pt">102,145,168-171,242)</p> +<p style="top:358.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>32. Secuestrados <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:373.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Fed up with hostage-taking:</i> Shift 2 spaces from Neutral or Passive </p> +<p style="top:387.6pt;left:56.2pt">Opposition to Passive Support.</p> +<p style="top:407.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Ransoming highly profitable: </i>FARC Resources +12.</p> +<p style="top:426.4pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian media constantly reminded the populace that kidnap-</p> +<p style="top:440.1pt;left:56.2pt">pings were garnering 100s of millions of dollars for the FARC and </p> +<p style="top:453.9pt;left:56.2pt">other groups. Public outcry grew under Pastrana as negotiations </p> +<p style="top:467.6pt;left:56.2pt">with FARC failed to end the scourge, and regular radio messages </p> +<p style="top:481.4pt;left:56.2pt">from loved ones to hostages further broadcast the trauma. (Bruce-</p> +<p style="top:495.1pt;left:56.2pt">Hayes-Botero pp95-96,141-143,173)</p> +<p style="top:524.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>33. Sucumbíos <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:539.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Ecuadoran buffer zone:</i> Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a </p> +<p style="top:553.6pt;left:56.2pt">space bordering Ecuador.</p> +<p style="top:573.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Cross-border war:</i> Place 2 pieces in Ecuador. It is a 0 Pop Dept. No </p> +<p style="top:586.8pt;left:56.2pt">more than 2 pieces per Faction may stack there.</p> +<p style="top:606.1pt;left:56.2pt">As the 2008 Colombian raid on a FARC camp in the Ecuadoran </p> +<p style="top:619.9pt;left:56.2pt">province of Sucumbíos vividly illustrated, Colombia’s insurgency </p> +<p style="top:633.6pt;left:56.2pt">and counterinsurgency often spilled over borders. The FARC used </p> +<p style="top:647.4pt;left:56.2pt">Ecuador’s territory for rest, resupply, and training; and some coca </p> +<p style="top:661.1pt;left:56.2pt">processing took place there as well. (CRS pp10,23-24) Ecuadoran </p> +<p style="top:674.9pt;left:56.2pt">troops at times clashed with suspected Colombian guerrillas within </p> +<p style="top:688.6pt;left:56.2pt">Ecuador. Quito planned increases in development spending in border </p> +<p style="top:702.4pt;left:56.2pt">provinces such as Sucumbíos to create a social and economic buffer </p> +<p style="top:716.1pt;left:56.2pt">zone. (RAND pp88-89)</p> +<p style="top:745.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>34. Airdropped AKs <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:760.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Insurgents scammed by Russian criminals:</i> Drop an Insurgent </p> +<p style="top:774.6pt;left:56.2pt">Faction’s Resources by –5.</p> +<p style="top:794.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Covert weapons delivery:</i> An Insurgent Faction places 2 Guerrillas </p> +<p style="top:807.8pt;left:56.2pt">and 1 Base into a 0 Population Department.</p> +<p style="top:827.1pt;left:56.2pt">A creative arms-for-drugs deal brokered by Russian mafia in 2000 </p> +<p style="top:840.9pt;left:56.2pt">included Russian planes parachuting as many as 30,000 automatic </p> +<p style="top:854.6pt;left:56.2pt">rifles to the FARC in eastern Colombia. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero p91; </p> +<p style="top:868.4pt;left:56.2pt">RAND pp36-37)</p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>35. Crop Substitution <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Government initiative: </i>Replace the Cartels Bases in 1 Department </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:393.8pt">with 1 Police each. Aid +3.</p> +<p style="top:119.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>FARC proposals lauded:</i> Shift a Department with a Cartels Base by </p> +<p style="top:133.3pt;left:393.8pt">2 levels toward Active Opposition.</p> +<p style="top:156.0pt;left:393.8pt">Crop substitution or “alternative development” programs sought to </p> +<p style="top:169.8pt;left:393.8pt">supplement coca and poppy eradication by providing licit income </p> +<p style="top:183.5pt;left:393.8pt">to farmers who otherwise would replant drug crops. FARC initia-</p> +<p style="top:197.3pt;left:393.8pt">tives in its zone in 1999-2002 drew attention and support from the </p> +<p style="top:211.0pt;left:393.8pt">United Nations, the European Union, and other foreigners. (Brittain </p> +<p style="top:224.8pt;left:393.8pt">pp95-98) US support via Plan Colombia also featured crop substitu-</p> +<p style="top:238.5pt;left:393.8pt">tion. The US Agency for International Development claimed such </p> +<p style="top:252.3pt;left:393.8pt">a program from 2005-2009 reduced coca growing by 85% in a key </p> +<p style="top:266.0pt;left:393.8pt">cultivation region of western Meta. (CRS pp26-29)</p> +<p style="top:295.5pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>36. Zona de Convivencia <span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:310.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>ELN gets its DMZ:</i> Govt places a FARC Zone in Mountain. (See </p> +<p style="top:324.5pt;left:393.8pt">6.4.3) Shift 2 adjacent Neutral spaces to Passive Support, if possible. </p> +<p style="top:338.2pt;left:393.8pt">Executing Faction remains Eligible past this card.</p> +<p style="top:357.6pt;left:393.8pt">The Pastrana administration explored negotiations with the ELN, </p> +<p style="top:371.4pt;left:393.8pt">parallel to those with the FARC. The ELN demanded a zone analo-</p> +<p style="top:385.1pt;left:393.8pt">gous to that granted to the FARC, and Pastrana agreed in principle to </p> +<p style="top:398.9pt;left:393.8pt">a 5000km<sup>2</sup> “live-and-let-live zone” around the juncture of Antioquia, </p> +<p style="top:412.6pt;left:393.8pt">Bolívar, and Santander. (RAND pp41,74) Uribe also pursued the </p> +<p style="top:426.4pt;left:393.8pt">ELN’s negotiated demobilization, but the group broke off talks in </p> +<p style="top:440.1pt;left:393.8pt">2008. (CRS pp13-14)</p> +<p style="top:466.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>37. Former Military <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C </span></b></p> +<p style="top:481.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Ties that bind:</i> Government free Sweeps or Assaults FARC within </p> +<p style="top:495.2pt;left:393.8pt">each space, no moves; AUC Guerrillas act as Troops. </p> +<p style="top:514.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Ex-officers advise paramilitaries:</i> AUC free Marches any of its </p> +<p style="top:528.4pt;left:393.8pt">Guerrillas and then, at any 1 destination, free Ambushes.</p> +<p style="top:547.8pt;left:393.8pt">The AUC was purported to collaborate with elements of the Colom-</p> +<p style="top:561.5pt;left:393.8pt">bian Army and to have some 1000 active members who had served </p> +<p style="top:575.2pt;left:393.8pt">in the nation’s armed forces, including 53 retired military officers </p> +<p style="top:589.0pt;left:393.8pt">who acted as AUC advisors. AUC leader Carlos Castaño himself </p> +<p style="top:602.8pt;left:393.8pt">corroborated these estimates when in 2000 he claimed to have more </p> +<p style="top:616.5pt;left:393.8pt">than 1000 ex-soldiers and 135 former army officers among his forces. </p> +<p style="top:630.2pt;left:393.8pt">(Murillo p100; Hristov pp71,86-87)</p> +<p style="top:659.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>38. National Coordination Center <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C </span></b></p> +<p style="top:675.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>New command fights paramilitaries: </i>Remove all Active AUC Guer-</p> +<p style="top:688.8pt;left:393.8pt">rillas from up to 3 spaces with cubes or Support. </p> +<p style="top:708.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Sympathizers alert AUC: </i>All AUC Guerrillas in spaces with cubes </p> +<p style="top:721.9pt;left:393.8pt">or Support to Underground. </p> +<p style="top:741.2pt;left:393.8pt">The Colombian Government as of 2000 had declared the battle </p> +<p style="top:755.0pt;left:393.8pt">against illegal autodefensas to be a strategic priority and established </p> +<p style="top:768.8pt;left:393.8pt">the National Coordination Center to lead that fight. Government-</p> +<p style="top:782.5pt;left:393.8pt">reported kills and captures of paramilitaries had been far lower than </p> +<p style="top:796.2pt;left:393.8pt">of rebel guerrillas in absolute numbers. The casualties were more </p> +<p style="top:810.0pt;left:393.8pt">comparable in percentages of total AUC and FARC-ELN strength, </p> +<p style="top:823.8pt;left:393.8pt">however. Moreover, argued the Defense Ministry, the fact that rebels </p> +<p style="top:837.5pt;left:393.8pt">sought out confrontations with security forces more often than would </p> +<p style="top:851.2pt;left:393.8pt">paramilitaries explained any disparity. (RAND pp57-58)</p> +</div> + +<div id="page37" style="background-image:url('playbook37.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>37</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>39. Soldados Campesinos <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Local forces platoons:</i> Place 1 Police into each of 6 Depts.</p> +<p style="top:102.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Local forces augment autodefensas:</i> In up to 3 Depts, replace 1 </p> +<p style="top:116.1pt;left:56.2pt">Police with 1 available AUC Guerrilla. </p> +<p style="top:135.5pt;left:56.2pt">The reestablishment of local forces—Soldados Campesinos (“Peas-</p> +<p style="top:149.2pt;left:56.2pt">ant Soldiers”), later Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”)—and </p> +<p style="top:163.0pt;left:56.2pt">a related expansion of municipal police proved indispensable to </p> +<p style="top:176.8pt;left:56.2pt">Uribe’s counterinsurgency in providing a state presence in threatened </p> +<p style="top:190.5pt;left:56.2pt">areas. (Marks p135,136) Others saw such forces as legitimation of </p> +<p style="top:204.2pt;left:56.2pt">paramilitaries, in light of the overlap of their membership with that </p> +<p style="top:218.0pt;left:56.2pt">of the AUC. (Murillo pp103,113-114)</p> +<p style="top:247.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>40. Demobilization <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:262.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Negotiated reintegration:</i> Replace 3 AUC Guerrillas with available </p> +<p style="top:276.5pt;left:56.2pt">Police.</p> +<p style="top:295.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Talks a ruse, fighters recycled:</i> Move all cubes in a Dept with AUC </p> +<p style="top:309.6pt;left:56.2pt">to any Cities. Place 1 AUC piece in each of 2 Cities.</p> +<p style="top:329.0pt;left:56.2pt">The Uribe administration in 2003-2006 negotiated the AUC’s </p> +<p style="top:342.8pt;left:56.2pt">demobilization. Some suspected that the aim was to rein in para-</p> +<p style="top:356.5pt;left:56.2pt">militaries mainly to legitimize the state’s main offensive against the </p> +<p style="top:370.2pt;left:56.2pt">FARC. (Murillo p102) Others charged that—while thousands of </p> +<p style="top:384.0pt;left:56.2pt">AUC members demobilized and turned in weapons—much of the </p> +<p style="top:397.8pt;left:56.2pt">demobilization was faked or of only temporary impact on paramili-</p> +<p style="top:411.5pt;left:56.2pt">tary capabilities. (Hristov pp146-160) A UN and US view was that </p> +<p style="top:425.2pt;left:56.2pt">remaining paramilitary bands were of a different nature, criminal </p> +<p style="top:439.0pt;left:56.2pt">rather than political in purpose. (CRS p14) </p> +<p style="top:468.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>41. Mancuso <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:483.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>AUC No.2 extradited: </i>AUC Resources –6. Remove all AUC pieces </p> +<p style="top:497.5pt;left:56.2pt">from 1 space.</p> +<p style="top:516.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>AUC drug lord: </i>AUC Resources +3 for each space with AUC and </p> +<p style="top:530.6pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels pieces.</p> +<p style="top:550.0pt;left:56.2pt">The FARC was far from the only insurgent group to benefit from </p> +<p style="top:563.8pt;left:56.2pt">the drug trade. The AUC’s chief in 2000 acknowledged that the </p> +<p style="top:577.5pt;left:56.2pt">paramilitary coalition received a majority of its financing from </p> +<p style="top:591.2pt;left:56.2pt">drug trafficking. The US labeled the AUC a “cocaine-smuggling </p> +<p style="top:605.0pt;left:56.2pt">terrorist” organization and sought its leaders’ extradition. Colom-</p> +<p style="top:618.8pt;left:56.2pt">bian authorities extradited AUC deputy and military commander </p> +<p style="top:632.5pt;left:56.2pt">Salvatore Mancuso to the US in 2008. (Camacho-López pp85-86; </p> +<p style="top:646.2pt;left:56.2pt">Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp90-91; Murillo pp105,111-112; Hristov p80; </p> +<p style="top:660.0pt;left:56.2pt">Chepesiuk p280; www.ColombiaReports.com) </p> +<p style="top:689.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>42. Senado & Cámara <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:704.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Unity behind Presidential war policy: </i>2 Neutral spaces to Passive </p> +<p style="top:718.5pt;left:56.2pt">Support. Govt Resources +3.</p> +<p style="top:737.9pt;left:56.2pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:751.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Insurgent sympathies:</i> No Sweep or Assault against executing Fac-</p> +<p style="top:765.4pt;left:56.2pt">tion until next Propaganda.</p> +<p style="top:784.8pt;left:56.2pt">The Left charged that not only the military but the entire Colombian </p> +<p style="top:798.5pt;left:56.2pt">political system defended elite interests by protecting right-wing </p> +<p style="top:812.2pt;left:56.2pt">paramilitary violence, and therefore constituted no more than a </p> +<p style="top:826.0pt;left:56.2pt">“death-squad democracy”. (Brittain pp204-205) Some claimed that </p> +<p style="top:839.8pt;left:56.2pt">a third to a half of Colombian legislators were pro-AUC. (Murillo </p> +<p style="top:853.5pt;left:56.2pt">pp105,212n34; Hristov p133) Paramilitary intimidation of politicians </p> +<p style="top:867.2pt;left:56.2pt">may have played a role. (Hristov p125) Other AUC sympathies in </p> +<p style="top:881.0pt;left:56.2pt">the legislature may have represented popular views, in light of polls </p> +<p style="top:894.8pt;left:56.2pt">seeing the paramilitaries as less of a threat than the FARC. (RAND </p> +<p style="top:908.5pt;left:56.2pt">pp56,59) As for the cartels, buying politicians rather than terrorizing </p> +<p style="top:922.2pt;left:56.2pt">the public was a key Cali tactic, and some drug lords themselves </p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:393.8pt">competed electorally at the local level. (Chepesiuk p68; Camacho-</p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:393.8pt">López pp75-76) Finally, legislators and political candidates who saw </p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:393.8pt">themselves as Government-FARC interlocutors engaged personally </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:393.8pt">in the peace process. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-97) In any event, </p> +<p style="top:121.9pt;left:393.8pt">by Uribe’s term, public distaste for the status quo provided a uni-</p> +<p style="top:135.7pt;left:393.8pt">fied political front for his war on all illegal armed groups. (Marks </p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:393.8pt">pp129,131,138-139; Ospina p60)</p> +<p style="top:178.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>43. Calima Front <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:194.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Suspect leftists massacred: </i>Place 2 Terror in and remove all FARC </p> +<p style="top:207.9pt;left:393.8pt">Bases from a Dept with Troops.</p> +<p style="top:227.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Brutality blamed on Army:</i> Place 2 Terror in a Dept with Troops. </p> +<p style="top:241.0pt;left:393.8pt">Aid –9. </p> +<p style="top:260.4pt;left:393.8pt">Affected communities charged that paramilitaries carried out assas-</p> +<p style="top:274.2pt;left:393.8pt">sinations in broad daylight and close proximity to military posts. The </p> +<p style="top:287.9pt;left:393.8pt">Army in 1999 in Cauca reportedly helped set up a paramilitary group </p> +<p style="top:301.7pt;left:393.8pt">called the Calima Front, with military officers providing weapons, </p> +<p style="top:315.4pt;left:393.8pt">logistics, and intelligence to AUC fighters—a case emblematic to </p> +<p style="top:329.2pt;left:393.8pt">human rights observers of the AUC’s ability to wage war on civilians </p> +<p style="top:342.9pt;left:393.8pt">with impunity. (Murillo pp94-97) </p> +<p style="top:372.4pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>44. Colombia Nueva <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:387.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Anti-corruption campaign:</i> Shift a non-Opposition City to Active </p> +<p style="top:401.4pt;left:393.8pt">Support. Govt Resources +3.</p> +<p style="top:420.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Political campaign divisive:</i> Shift a City from Support to Neutral. </p> +<p style="top:434.5pt;left:393.8pt">Govt Resources –3.</p> +<p style="top:453.9pt;left:393.8pt">Young congresswoman and later senator Ingrid Betancourt made her </p> +<p style="top:467.7pt;left:393.8pt">political reputation by outing fellow legislators for corruption and </p> +<p style="top:481.4pt;left:393.8pt">by pursuing President Samper’s impeachment. Her tenacity earned </p> +<p style="top:495.2pt;left:393.8pt">her both wild popularity and death threats. By her 2002 presidential </p> +<p style="top:508.9pt;left:393.8pt">run— “Colombia Nueva” was her slogan—she had lost her popular-</p> +<p style="top:522.7pt;left:393.8pt">ity, blamed for airing Colombia’s dirty laundry internationally in </p> +<p style="top:536.4pt;left:393.8pt">her French-published autobiography. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero, pp94-</p> +<p style="top:550.2pt;left:393.8pt">97,136-137) </p> +<p style="top:579.7pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>45. Los Derechos Humanos <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:594.9pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Officers disciplined: </i>Shift each space with cubes and Terror 1 level </p> +<p style="top:608.7pt;left:393.8pt">toward Active Support.</p> +<p style="top:628.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>International human rights cartel:</i> –1 Aid for each space with AUC </p> +<p style="top:641.8pt;left:393.8pt">pieces. Subtract a die roll from Govt Resources.</p> +<p style="top:661.2pt;left:393.8pt">Debates in the US Congress over aid funding focused on allega-</p> +<p style="top:674.9pt;left:393.8pt">tions of human rights abuses on all sides, especially by paramilitary </p> +<p style="top:688.7pt;left:393.8pt">groups and the Colombian military. Colombian authorities took </p> +<p style="top:702.4pt;left:393.8pt">steps against military-paramilitary collusion, for example, in 2000 </p> +<p style="top:716.2pt;left:393.8pt">dismissing 388 military officers and NCOs for human rights abuses </p> +<p style="top:729.9pt;left:393.8pt">or corruption and indicting several generals. (RAND, p58) By </p> +<p style="top:743.7pt;left:393.8pt">2010, the Obama Administration certified to Congress that “years </p> +<p style="top:757.4pt;left:393.8pt">of reforms and training [were] leading to an increased respect for ... </p> +<p style="top:771.2pt;left:393.8pt">human rights by most members of the [Colombian] Armed Forces.” </p> +<p style="top:784.9pt;left:393.8pt">Some outside observers felt that human rights charges had gone </p> +<p style="top:798.7pt;left:393.8pt">too far and constituted “lawfare” against Colombia’s self-defense </p> +<p style="top:812.4pt;left:393.8pt">by an international “human rights cartel”. In this view, foreign crit-</p> +<p style="top:826.2pt;left:393.8pt">ics—hostile to the Colombian state itself—remained unwilling to </p> +<p style="top:839.9pt;left:393.8pt">acknowledge any human rights progress despite a surging national </p> +<p style="top:853.7pt;left:393.8pt">popularity of military and government. (Murillo p19; CRS pp14-</p> +<p style="top:867.4pt;left:393.8pt">15,18-19,36; Marks pp129,137)</p> +</div> + +<div id="page38" style="background-image:url('playbook38.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>38</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>46. Limpieza <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Ruthless elimination:</i> An Insurgent Faction executes free Terror </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:56.2pt">with any Guerrilla, removes any 2 enemy pieces in the space, and </p> +<p style="top:110.5pt;left:56.2pt">sets it to Passive Support or Opposition (unless 0 Pop). The Terror </p> +<p style="top:124.2pt;left:56.2pt">places 2 markers.</p> +<p style="top:143.6pt;left:56.2pt">“Limpieza social” (“social cleansing”) killings rose in Colombia in </p> +<p style="top:157.4pt;left:56.2pt">the late-1990s and early-2000s, as both leftist guerrillas and rightist </p> +<p style="top:171.1pt;left:56.2pt">paramilitaries sought to consolidate control by eliminating people </p> +<p style="top:184.9pt;left:56.2pt">considered misfits or suspected of collaboration with the other side. </p> +<p style="top:198.6pt;left:56.2pt">(RAND p6-7) Paramilitaries would defend areas from guerrillas </p> +<p style="top:212.4pt;left:56.2pt">preemptively, by drawing up lists of potential leftist sympathizers </p> +<p style="top:226.1pt;left:56.2pt">and then exterminating them, or using random terror to seed fear </p> +<p style="top:239.9pt;left:56.2pt">and show what might happen to anyone leaning toward the FARC </p> +<p style="top:253.6pt;left:56.2pt">or ELN. (Hristov pp74,92-94) </p> +<p style="top:283.1pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>47. Pinto & del Rosario <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:298.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Human rights investigators:</i> All AUC Guerrillas Active. All Police </p> +<p style="top:312.1pt;left:56.2pt">free Assault AUC as if Troops.</p> +<p style="top:331.5pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Prosecutors killed: </i>AUC places 2 Guerrillas in Cúcuta, executes free </p> +<p style="top:345.2pt;left:56.2pt">Terror there, and flips any 2 AUC Guerrillas Underground.</p> +<p style="top:364.6pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian police and judicial authorities investigating right-wing </p> +<p style="top:378.4pt;left:56.2pt">involvement in massacres became targets of threats and assassina-</p> +<p style="top:392.1pt;left:56.2pt">tion. (Hristov p133) In what appeared to be one such case in 2001, </p> +<p style="top:405.9pt;left:56.2pt">Cúcuta special prosecutor María del Rosario Silva Ríos and then her </p> +<p style="top:419.6pt;left:56.2pt">replacement Carlos Arturo Pinto Bohórquez were both shot to death. </p> +<p style="top:433.4pt;left:56.2pt">Authorities later convicted Cúcuta regional paramilitary commander </p> +<p style="top:447.1pt;left:56.2pt">Jorge Iván “The Iguana” Laverde Zapata in the killings. Demobi-</p> +<p style="top:460.9pt;left:56.2pt">lized paramilitary Orlando Bocanegra Arteaga also acknowledged </p> +<p style="top:474.6pt;left:56.2pt">responsibility. (www.ElEspectador.com; www.ElTiempo.com)</p> +<p style="top:499.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>48. Unión Sindical Obrera <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:514.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>AUC targets oil labor organizers:</i> Remove 1 Opposition or FARC </p> +<p style="top:528.6pt;left:56.2pt">Base adjacent to 3-Econ pipeline.</p> +<p style="top:548.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Labor backs FARC:</i> Shift 1 level toward Active Opposition in 2 </p> +<p style="top:561.8pt;left:56.2pt">Cities other than Bogotá.</p> +<p style="top:581.1pt;left:56.2pt">Labor unions—suspected of a similar social agenda as that of the </p> +<p style="top:594.9pt;left:56.2pt">rebel guerrillas and therefore of collusion with them—became fre-</p> +<p style="top:608.6pt;left:56.2pt">quent targets of right-wing paramilitary violence. The FARC and </p> +<p style="top:622.4pt;left:56.2pt">the ELN had maintained a strong presence around the oil-refining </p> +<p style="top:636.1pt;left:56.2pt">town of Barrancabermeja in Santander, a hotbed of the powerful oil </p> +<p style="top:649.9pt;left:56.2pt">workers union, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO). The AUC entered the </p> +<p style="top:663.6pt;left:56.2pt">area in 2001, killing 180 and displacing some 4000—acts popularly </p> +<p style="top:677.4pt;left:56.2pt">seen as a continuation of efforts to suppress popular organizing </p> +<p style="top:691.1pt;left:56.2pt">in the town. AUC leader Carlos Castaño in 2003 sent a menacing </p> +<p style="top:704.9pt;left:56.2pt">email to the union, declaring all USO leaders and the children of </p> +<p style="top:718.6pt;left:56.2pt">USO members to be “military targets”. (Murillo pp87-88; Hristov </p> +<p style="top:732.4pt;left:56.2pt">pp77,117,120) </p> +<p style="top:757.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>49. Bloques <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:772.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Militias defy Castaño:</i> Permanently remove 3 available AUC Guer-</p> +<p style="top:786.4pt;left:56.2pt">rillas.</p> +<p style="top:805.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Independent militias join AUC: </i>Place an AUC Guerrilla and Base </p> +<p style="top:819.5pt;left:56.2pt">in any Department.</p> +<p style="top:838.9pt;left:56.2pt">The AUC came together in the mid-1990s as an umbrella for several </p> +<p style="top:852.6pt;left:56.2pt">regional “self-defense” organizations (bloques). An amalgam of </p> +<p style="top:866.4pt;left:56.2pt">autonomous groups, the AUC was less cohesive than the FARC. </p> +<p style="top:880.1pt;left:56.2pt">Several powerful groups, such as the Bloque Central Bolívar, did </p> +<p style="top:893.9pt;left:56.2pt">not recognize AUC leadership, and paramilitaries fought turf wars </p> +<p style="top:907.6pt;left:56.2pt">amongst themselves. (RAND pp54-55; Hristov p70; Murillo p108; </p> +<p style="top:921.4pt;left:56.2pt">Brittain p126) </p> +<p style="top:67.3pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>50. Carabineros <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:82.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>National police field forces:</i> Govt places a total of up to 3 Police </p> +<p style="top:96.3pt;left:393.8pt">into any Departments.</p> +<p style="top:115.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>National police corruption:</i> Remove any 2 Police or replace them </p> +<p style="top:129.4pt;left:393.8pt">with available AUC Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:148.8pt;left:393.8pt">During the Pastrana and then Uribe years, Colombia systematically </p> +<p style="top:162.6pt;left:393.8pt">established police presence in every county of the country. Those </p> +<p style="top:176.3pt;left:393.8pt">areas historically thought too dangerous for police presence were </p> +<p style="top:190.1pt;left:393.8pt">manned by police field forces (Carabineros), similar in size and na-</p> +<p style="top:203.8pt;left:393.8pt">ture to army local forces but more mobile and better armed. (Marks </p> +<p style="top:217.6pt;left:393.8pt">pp136,145n38) As with the Army, however, some police were </p> +<p style="top:231.3pt;left:393.8pt">suspected of collusion with the paramilitaries, for example taking </p> +<p style="top:245.1pt;left:393.8pt">payments in return for armed protection of paramilitary units while </p> +<p style="top:258.8pt;left:393.8pt">the latter carried out their terror campaigns. (Hristov, p87) </p> +<p style="top:288.3pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>51. Pipeline Repairs <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:303.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Speedy patching:</i> Remove all Pipeline Sabotage or, if none, Govern-</p> +<p style="top:317.3pt;left:393.8pt">ment Resources +12.</p> +<p style="top:336.7pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Security concerns hinder maintenance:</i> Sabotage 3 Pipelines with </p> +<p style="top:350.4pt;left:393.8pt">or adjacent to FARC Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:369.8pt;left:393.8pt">Guerrilla action against energy pipelines often becomes a race be-</p> +<p style="top:383.6pt;left:393.8pt">tween how often the saboteurs can damage the line and how quickly </p> +<p style="top:397.3pt;left:393.8pt">the defenders can repair them. Attacks on the key northern-Colom-</p> +<p style="top:411.1pt;left:393.8pt">bian Caño-Limón pipeline in the guerrilla heyday of 2001 shut it </p> +<p style="top:424.8pt;left:393.8pt">down for 240 days out of the year. (Ricks-Lightner p80) Coordinated </p> +<p style="top:438.6pt;left:393.8pt">FARC pipeline attacks as late as 2008 halted production of over </p> +<p style="top:452.3pt;left:393.8pt">800,000 barrels of oil. (Brittain p23)</p> +<p style="top:481.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>52. Castaño <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:497.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>AUC leader’s memoir a best seller: </i>Shift 2 City or Mountain each </p> +<p style="top:510.8pt;left:393.8pt">1 level toward Active Support.</p> +<p style="top:530.2pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Charismatic AUC political leader:</i> Place an AUC Base into a space </p> +<p style="top:543.9pt;left:393.8pt">with AUC, then add +1 AUC Resources per AUC Base.</p> +<p style="top:563.3pt;left:393.8pt">Charismatic AUC chief Carlos Castaño Gil gave interviews to lead-</p> +<p style="top:577.1pt;left:393.8pt">ing national publications and obtained favorable media coverage to </p> +<p style="top:590.8pt;left:393.8pt">portray the movement as a politically legitimate “third actor” in the </p> +<p style="top:604.6pt;left:393.8pt">Colombian conflict. The 2001 book <i>Mi Confesión,</i> purporting to </p> +<p style="top:618.3pt;left:393.8pt">“reveal his secrets”, sold in all major Colombian cities and became </p> +<p style="top:632.1pt;left:393.8pt">one of the most popular books in the country. (Murillo p99)</p> +<p style="top:661.6pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>53. Criminal Air Force <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:676.8pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Insurgent access to small aircraft:</i> An Insurgent Faction moves 1 </p> +<p style="top:690.6pt;left:393.8pt">or 2 Guerrillas between any 2 Departments and flips them Under-</p> +<p style="top:704.3pt;left:393.8pt">ground.</p> +<p style="top:723.7pt;left:393.8pt">The AUC as of 2004 reportedly fielded up to 14 state-of-art helicop-</p> +<p style="top:737.4pt;left:393.8pt">ters and a dozen small planes. (Murillo p100) AUC chief Castaño </p> +<p style="top:751.2pt;left:393.8pt">in 2001 claimed to have loaned helicopters to the Cali Cartel. </p> +<p style="top:764.9pt;left:393.8pt">(Chepesiuk p143) Witnesses reported Army helicopters deploying </p> +<p style="top:778.7pt;left:393.8pt">AUC fighters to new regions or supplying them with ammunition </p> +<p style="top:792.4pt;left:393.8pt">and medications while on terror operations. (Hristov pp85,88) Some </p> +<p style="top:806.2pt;left:393.8pt">charged that troops wearing AUC armbands in 2003 parachuted </p> +<p style="top:819.9pt;left:393.8pt">from military aircraft into a region of Arauca to conduct a massacre. </p> +<p style="top:833.7pt;left:393.8pt">(Brittain p136) </p> +</div> + +<div id="page39" style="background-image:url('playbook39.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>39</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>54. Deserters & Defectors <span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:56.2pt">Remove up to 2 Guerrillas or replace them with any other Factions’ </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:56.2pt">available Guerrillas. </p> +<p style="top:116.1pt;left:56.2pt">AUC ranks contained numerous FARC deserters, because of the </p> +<p style="top:129.9pt;left:56.2pt">harsh discipline imposed by the FARC and because the AUC of-</p> +<p style="top:143.6pt;left:56.2pt">fered protection from retaliation by former comrades. (RAND p56) </p> +<p style="top:157.4pt;left:56.2pt">Castaño in 2000 claimed 800 ex-leftist guerrillas among his forces. </p> +<p style="top:171.1pt;left:56.2pt">One such defector from the FARC led the rightist Bloque Norte y </p> +<p style="top:184.9pt;left:56.2pt">Anorí. The AUC also offered monthly wages to unemployed youth </p> +<p style="top:198.6pt;left:56.2pt">who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they would </p> +<p style="top:212.4pt;left:56.2pt">serve as AUC troops. (Hristov pp71,88,96,106) </p> +<p style="top:241.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>55. DEA Agents <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:257.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Law enforcement assistance:</i> Remove a Shipment and any 5 Cartels </p> +<p style="top:270.9pt;left:56.2pt">Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:290.2pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Más Yanquis:</i> In 3 spaces with Cartels pieces, shift 1 level toward </p> +<p style="top:304.0pt;left:56.2pt">Active Opposition.</p> +<p style="top:323.4pt;left:56.2pt">Colombian-US counternarcotics cooperation thrived from the mid-</p> +<p style="top:337.1pt;left:56.2pt">1990s on, especially via the US Drug Enforcement Administration. </p> +<p style="top:350.9pt;left:56.2pt">Some regard the takedown of the Cali Cartel during this period as </p> +<p style="top:364.6pt;left:56.2pt">the DEA’s greatest victory. The relationship was not without its </p> +<p style="top:378.4pt;left:56.2pt">political frictions, though, including a struggle under Samper over </p> +<p style="top:392.1pt;left:56.2pt">how much control the Colombians would have over DEA activities </p> +<p style="top:405.9pt;left:56.2pt">in the country. Exaggeration in Colombian media may have added </p> +<p style="top:419.6pt;left:56.2pt">to the tension: the press in 1995 reported the presence of more than </p> +<p style="top:433.4pt;left:56.2pt">500 DEA agents in Cali alone, even though the agency in reality </p> +<p style="top:447.1pt;left:56.2pt">had no more than 2 or 3 agents there at a time. (Chepesiuk pp201-</p> +<p style="top:460.9pt;left:56.2pt">202,272) </p> +<p style="top:490.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>56. Drogas La Rebaja <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:505.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Cali cartel’s drugstore chain seized:</i> Transfer 9 Resources from </p> +<p style="top:519.4pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels to Government.</p> +<p style="top:538.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Retail empire:</i> Add twice Cartels pieces in Cities to Cartels Re-</p> +<p style="top:552.5pt;left:56.2pt">sources. Then place a Cartels Base in each of 2 Cities.</p> +<p style="top:571.9pt;left:56.2pt">The Cali Cartel’s Rodríguez brothers used their cocaine profits </p> +<p style="top:585.6pt;left:56.2pt">to build a semi-legal business empire, the heart of which was the </p> +<p style="top:599.4pt;left:56.2pt">Drogas La Rebaja drugstore chain. The Government in 2004 seized </p> +<p style="top:613.1pt;left:56.2pt">the 400-store chain, breaking the back of that cartel’s finances. </p> +<p style="top:626.9pt;left:56.2pt">(Chepesiuk pp68-69,259) </p> +<p style="top:656.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>57. Op Millennium <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:671.6pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Colombian-US strike at Bernal syndicate:</i> Replace up to 3 Cartels </p> +<p style="top:685.4pt;left:56.2pt">pieces with available Police.</p> +<p style="top:708.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Investigation penetrated:</i> In each of 2 spaces, replace a Police with </p> +<p style="top:721.9pt;left:56.2pt">an available Cartels piece.</p> +<p style="top:744.6pt;left:56.2pt">After dismembering the Medellín and Cali cartels, Colombian and </p> +<p style="top:758.4pt;left:56.2pt">US authorities pressed ahead with joint efforts to capture leaders </p> +<p style="top:772.1pt;left:56.2pt">of the surviving, decentralized “cartelitos”. Operation Millenium </p> +<p style="top:785.9pt;left:56.2pt">in 1999 netted drug group leader Alejandro Bernal and previously </p> +<p style="top:799.6pt;left:56.2pt">released Medellín Cartel co-founder Fabio Ochoa. But an estimated </p> +<p style="top:813.4pt;left:56.2pt">several hundred small cartels remained, into which Colombian po-</p> +<p style="top:827.1pt;left:56.2pt">lice and the US DEA had little insight. (Chepesiuk pp241,276-277; </p> +<p style="top:840.9pt;left:56.2pt">RAND pp15-16) </p> +<p style="top:67.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>58. General Serrano <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>National Police hammer cartels:</i> Cartels Resources –6. Remove all </p> +<p style="top:96.8pt;left:393.8pt">Cartels Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:116.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Officials on cartel payroll:</i> Cartels relocate up to 4 Police to any </p> +<p style="top:129.9pt;left:393.8pt">spaces.</p> +<p style="top:149.2pt;left:393.8pt">Colombian police—traditionally seen as corrupt, and many of whose </p> +<p style="top:163.0pt;left:393.8pt">members were at the service of the Cali Cartel—in the mid-1990s </p> +<p style="top:176.8pt;left:393.8pt">effectively declared war against drug traffickers. (Camacho-López </p> +<p style="top:190.5pt;left:393.8pt">p79) Studious and tough Policía Nacional chief General Rosso José </p> +<p style="top:204.2pt;left:393.8pt">Serrano Cadena cleaned house and from late 1994 on led the as-</p> +<p style="top:218.0pt;left:393.8pt">sault on the Cali Cartel, in close alliance with the US. (Chepesiuk </p> +<p style="top:231.8pt;left:393.8pt">pp xxi,192-197) </p> +<p style="top:261.2pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>59. Salcedo <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:276.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Cartel informant:</i> All Cartels Guerrillas to Active. Free Assault </p> +<p style="top:290.2pt;left:393.8pt">against Cartels in each space.</p> +<p style="top:309.6pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Cali cartel security chief: </i>Cartels flip all their Guerrillas Under-</p> +<p style="top:323.4pt;left:393.8pt">ground and relocate up to 3 of them anywhere.</p> +<p style="top:342.8pt;left:393.8pt">Jorge Salcedo was a key member of the Cali Cartel’s intelligence </p> +<p style="top:356.5pt;left:393.8pt">and security team—the talented, charismatic son of a Colombian </p> +<p style="top:370.2pt;left:393.8pt">general, he had military training, counterinsurgency field experience, </p> +<p style="top:384.0pt;left:393.8pt">excellent computer skills, and fluent English. Turned informant </p> +<p style="top:397.8pt;left:393.8pt">by US enforcement authorities, Salcedo opened a window on Cali </p> +<p style="top:411.5pt;left:393.8pt">Cartel operations and enabled the capture of its leaders. (Chepesiuk </p> +<p style="top:425.2pt;left:393.8pt">pp137-138,212-219) </p> +<p style="top:454.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>60. The Chess Player <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:470.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Kingpin strategy scores:</i> Remove all Cartels pieces from 2 Cities </p> +<p style="top:483.8pt;left:393.8pt">or 1 Dept. Govt Resources +6.</p> +<p style="top:503.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Cali’s Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela expands empire:</i> Cartels place </p> +<p style="top:516.9pt;left:393.8pt">an available Base in each of 2 Cities and free Bribe in 1 space.</p> +<p style="top:536.2pt;left:393.8pt">Less violent than Medellín’s Pablo Escobar, Cali Cartel co-found-</p> +<p style="top:550.0pt;left:393.8pt">ers Gilberto (“The Chess Player”—cartel strategic planner) and </p> +<p style="top:563.8pt;left:393.8pt">Miguel (“El Señor”—cartel boss) Rodríguez Orejuela only became </p> +<p style="top:577.5pt;left:393.8pt">a Government priority after Escobar’s death in late 1993 and a drug </p> +<p style="top:591.2pt;left:393.8pt">financing scandal reached the Presidency of Ernesto Samper in 1994. </p> +<p style="top:605.0pt;left:393.8pt">A Colombian-US strategy of combining leads and focusing resources </p> +<p style="top:618.8pt;left:393.8pt">on capturing cartel leaders netted the Rodríguez brothers’ arrests by </p> +<p style="top:632.5pt;left:393.8pt">1996 and extradition to the US by 2005. (Camacho-López pp78-79; </p> +<p style="top:646.2pt;left:393.8pt">Chepesiuk, pp xxi,22-23,68,95,202,269-270) </p> +<p style="top:675.8pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>61. Air Bridge <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:691.0pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Peruvian coca supply controlled:</i> Remove all Cartels pieces from </p> +<p style="top:704.8pt;left:393.8pt">1 City. Cartels Resources –6.</p> +<p style="top:727.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Colombian coca growers fill Peruvian void:</i> Place 1 Cartels Base </p> +<p style="top:741.2pt;left:393.8pt">into each of 3 Depts with no Cartels pieces.</p> +<p style="top:764.0pt;left:393.8pt">Traditionally, the bulk of coca processed into cocaine in Colombia </p> +<p style="top:777.8pt;left:393.8pt">had been grown in Peru and Bolivia. An “air-bridge” strategy of </p> +<p style="top:791.5pt;left:393.8pt">US-Peruvian interdiction of coca deliveries into Colombia denied </p> +<p style="top:805.2pt;left:393.8pt">Colombian traffickers most of this central-Andean crop—with the </p> +<p style="top:819.0pt;left:393.8pt">unintended effect of encouraging coca cultivation inside Colombia. </p> +<p style="top:832.8pt;left:393.8pt">Between 1995 and 1999, Colombia became the center of all stages </p> +<p style="top:846.5pt;left:393.8pt">of cocaine production, from harvest to delivery. (RAND pp12,20-21; </p> +<p style="top:860.2pt;left:393.8pt">Camacho-López pp 82-83) </p> +</div> + +<div id="page40" style="background-image:url('playbook40.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>40</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:67.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>66. Tingo María <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Coca crop fails:</i> Remove 3 Cartels Bases from Forest.</p> +<p style="top:102.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Hearty coca variety:</i> Within stacking, place an available Cartels </p> +<p style="top:116.3pt;left:393.8pt">Base into each Forest that already has one.</p> +<p style="top:135.6pt;left:393.8pt">Under pressure from the Government’s coca eradication spraying </p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:393.8pt">to shift cultivation to less ideal terrain, growers adapted by devel-</p> +<p style="top:163.1pt;left:393.8pt">oping new varieties of the coca plant. One such variety, the Tingo </p> +<p style="top:176.9pt;left:393.8pt">María, would produce 3 times as much coca as the traditional plant. </p> +<p style="top:190.6pt;left:393.8pt">(RAND p66) </p> +<p style="top:220.1pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>67. Mexican Traffickers <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:235.4pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Major shipment busted en route:</i> Cartels Resources –10.</p> +<p style="top:254.8pt;left:393.8pt">INSURGENT MOMENTUM</p> +<p style="top:268.5pt;left:393.8pt"><i>New routes to US market:</i> This Resources phase, Cartels add Re-</p> +<p style="top:282.3pt;left:393.8pt">sources equal to 4 x Bases.</p> +<p style="top:301.6pt;left:393.8pt">The Cali Cartel had relied on its own delivery networks to get cocaine </p> +<p style="top:315.4pt;left:393.8pt">to US market. Disruption of that cartel’s distribution routes through </p> +<p style="top:329.1pt;left:393.8pt">the Caribbean and the dismantling of the Cartel itself in 1995-1996 </p> +<p style="top:342.9pt;left:393.8pt">created opportunities for Mexican traffickers to provide Colombian </p> +<p style="top:356.6pt;left:393.8pt">wholesalers with delivery and retailing services. Already prior to </p> +<p style="top:370.4pt;left:393.8pt">Op Millenium, the Colombian Bernal group was working with a </p> +<p style="top:384.1pt;left:393.8pt">Mexican Ciudad Juárez-based cartel to deliver 20-30 tons of cocaine </p> +<p style="top:397.9pt;left:393.8pt">monthly to the United States. Mexicans soon came to dominate US </p> +<p style="top:411.6pt;left:393.8pt">cocaine distribution with more extensive and efficient networks. </p> +<p style="top:425.4pt;left:393.8pt">(Camacho-López p83; Chepesiuk p278; RAND p15) </p> +<p style="top:454.9pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>68. Narco-Subs <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:470.1pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Submersibles seized: </i>Remove from coastal spaces 2 Cartels pieces </p> +<p style="top:483.9pt;left:393.8pt">or up to 2 Shipments.</p> +<p style="top:503.3pt;left:393.8pt"><i>Littoral stealth:</i> Cartels Resources +2 per Cartels piece in coastal </p> +<p style="top:517.0pt;left:393.8pt">spaces.</p> +<p style="top:536.4pt;left:393.8pt">A predawn Colombian police raid on a Bogotá warehouse in 2000 </p> +<p style="top:550.1pt;left:393.8pt">discovered a 100-foot submarine under construction, a joint proj-</p> +<p style="top:563.9pt;left:393.8pt">ect between a Colombian cartel and the Russian mob, intended to </p> +<p style="top:577.6pt;left:393.8pt">smuggle tons of narcotics. (Chepesiuk pp227-8) </p> +<p style="top:607.1pt;left:393.8pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>69. Riverines & Fast Boats <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:622.4pt;left:393.8pt">Move any of your cubes or Guerrillas from 1 space through a chain </p> +<p style="top:636.1pt;left:393.8pt">of up to 3 adjacent Depts. You then may execute a free Op other </p> +<p style="top:649.9pt;left:393.8pt">than Patrol or March within the final space.</p> +<p style="top:669.3pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia features two major river valleys—the Magdalena and </p> +<p style="top:683.0pt;left:393.8pt">the Cauca—running south-to-north along the Andes, numerous </p> +<p style="top:696.8pt;left:393.8pt">major rivers draining the eastern plains into the Amazon, and both </p> +<p style="top:710.5pt;left:393.8pt">Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In all, 18,000km of navigable rivers in </p> +<p style="top:724.3pt;left:393.8pt">Colombia serve as highways for Government forces, guerrillas, </p> +<p style="top:67.9pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>62. Amazonía <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:83.1pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Brasília’s Op Cobra blocks border:</i> Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces </p> +<p style="top:96.9pt;left:56.2pt">from 0 Population Forests.</p> +<p style="top:116.3pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Jungle landing strips:</i> Place 1 Cartels Base each in Guainía, Vaupés, </p> +<p style="top:130.0pt;left:56.2pt">and Amazonas.</p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">The lowlands of eastern Colombia, comprising 60 percent of national </p> +<p style="top:163.1pt;left:56.2pt">territory but only 4 percent of population, formed a vast hinterland </p> +<p style="top:176.9pt;left:56.2pt">vacuum for illegal groups to fill. Government pressure in the late </p> +<p style="top:190.6pt;left:56.2pt">1990s and early 2000s pushed these groups—coca growers and </p> +<p style="top:204.4pt;left:56.2pt">FARC alike—ever deeper into jungle sanctuaries. Brazil shared an </p> +<p style="top:218.1pt;left:56.2pt">interest with Colombia in controlling their vast Amazonian frontier. </p> +<p style="top:231.9pt;left:56.2pt">So it sought to block the daily clandestine flights between Colombia </p> +<p style="top:245.6pt;left:56.2pt">and its airspace and, with Colombian authorities, dismantled numer-</p> +<p style="top:259.4pt;left:56.2pt">ous jungle landing strips near the border. In 2000, it launched its </p> +<p style="top:273.1pt;left:56.2pt">3-year Operation Cobra to augment its border presence with the </p> +<p style="top:286.9pt;left:56.2pt">deployment of 6,000 Brazilian troops to the region. (Marks p129; </p> +<p style="top:300.6pt;left:56.2pt">RAND pp66,90-91) </p> +<p style="top:330.1pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>63. Narco-War <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:345.4pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Rival syndicates go for the throat:</i> In each space with Cartels Guer-</p> +<p style="top:359.1pt;left:56.2pt">rillas, remove all but 1; Cartels conduct free Terror with that 1. Mark </p> +<p style="top:372.9pt;left:56.2pt">Cartels Ineligible through next card.</p> +<p style="top:392.3pt;left:56.2pt">Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel in 1993 fell into a tit-for-tat ter-</p> +<p style="top:406.0pt;left:56.2pt">ror battle with a vigilante group (“los pepes”) backed by the Cali </p> +<p style="top:419.8pt;left:56.2pt">Cartel—a narco-war that played a substantial role in Escobar’s fall. </p> +<p style="top:433.5pt;left:56.2pt">(Chepesiuk pp139-142) Fighting among cartels as of the late 1990s </p> +<p style="top:447.3pt;left:56.2pt">remained a major cause of the country’s 30,000 murders annually. </p> +<p style="top:461.0pt;left:56.2pt">(RAND p17)</p> +<p style="top:490.5pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>64. Cocaine Labs <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:505.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>FARC taps suppliers: </i>Place a Shipment with a FARC Guerrilla in </p> +<p style="top:519.5pt;left:56.2pt">the same space as a Cartels Base.</p> +<p style="top:538.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Well-oiled industry:</i> For each Cartels Base, Cartels Resources +2 if </p> +<p style="top:552.6pt;left:56.2pt">in City, +1 if in Dept.</p> +<p style="top:572.0pt;left:56.2pt">Colombia’s illicit drug industry built on a long tradition of Latin </p> +<p style="top:585.8pt;left:56.2pt">American smuggling. It initially required only the investment in </p> +<p style="top:599.5pt;left:56.2pt">urban laboratories to process rural crop into cocaine and heroin. </p> +<p style="top:613.3pt;left:56.2pt">Over decades, cartels built up into large-scale enterprises. The </p> +<p style="top:627.0pt;left:56.2pt">Cali Cartel boasted safe houses strategically spread across the city </p> +<p style="top:640.8pt;left:56.2pt">and an intelligence network of hotel clerks, corrupt police, street </p> +<p style="top:654.5pt;left:56.2pt">vendors, and 5,000 taxi drivers. With the breakup of the big urban </p> +<p style="top:668.3pt;left:56.2pt">cartels in the mid-1990s, profits declined, but the industry continued. </p> +<p style="top:682.0pt;left:56.2pt">(Camacho-López pp61,64-67,82-84; Chepesiuk pp203-204) The </p> +<p style="top:695.8pt;left:56.2pt">FARC helped fill any vacuum. For a fee, it would protect cocaine </p> +<p style="top:709.5pt;left:56.2pt">laboratories and landing strips, transport precursor chemicals, or </p> +<p style="top:723.3pt;left:56.2pt">ship finished cocaine. (RAND pp32-33)</p> +<p style="top:752.8pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>65. Poppies <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:768.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Growers and Government eradication focus on heroin source:</i> </p> +<p style="top:781.8pt;left:56.2pt">Place or remove 1 Shipment or Insurgent Base in any Mountain </p> +<p style="top:795.5pt;left:56.2pt">Department.</p> +<p style="top:814.9pt;left:56.2pt">Colombia in the 1990s became the Western Hemisphere’s largest </p> +<p style="top:828.6pt;left:56.2pt">producer of opium poppies and refined heroin (though Asia produced </p> +<p style="top:842.4pt;left:56.2pt">far more), with an estimated 7,500 hectares under poppy cultiva-</p> +<p style="top:856.1pt;left:56.2pt">tion as of 1999. Locals in coffee-growing regions had responded </p> +<p style="top:869.9pt;left:56.2pt">to a precipitous drop in coffee prices by switching to poppies, and </p> +<p style="top:883.6pt;left:56.2pt">the Government quickly responded with aerial spraying. (RAND </p> +<p style="top:897.4pt;left:56.2pt">pp12-13; Chepesiuk p27; Hristov p191) </p> +</div> + +<div id="page41" style="background-image:url('playbook41.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>41</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:66.9pt;left:56.2pt">and drug shipments. To exploit and control these waterways, the </p> +<p style="top:80.7pt;left:56.2pt">Government with US support in 1999 established a riverine brigade </p> +<p style="top:94.4pt;left:56.2pt">of 5 battalions spread throughout the country. The AUC meanwhile </p> +<p style="top:108.2pt;left:56.2pt">fielded large numbers of speedboats with mounted machineguns </p> +<p style="top:121.9pt;left:56.2pt">for their war against the FARC. And on the coasts, Colombian </p> +<p style="top:135.7pt;left:56.2pt">narcotraffickers and guerrillas used fast boats that outclassed those </p> +<p style="top:149.4pt;left:56.2pt">available to regional navies. (RAND pp xix,33,65,86,97; Hristov </p> +<p style="top:163.2pt;left:56.2pt">p190; Bruce-Hayes-Botero p90; Murillo p100) </p> +<p style="top:192.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>70. Ayahuasca Tourism <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:207.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Eco-tourism helps trade balance: </i>Government Resources +6 for </p> +<p style="top:221.7pt;left:56.2pt">each Forest without Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:241.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Eco-tourists taken:</i> A Faction executes free Terror with any 1 Guer-</p> +<p style="top:254.8pt;left:56.2pt">rilla in each Forest and gets +3 Resources per Terror.</p> +<p style="top:274.2pt;left:56.2pt">Colombia hosts some of the most pristine rain forests in South </p> +<p style="top:287.9pt;left:56.2pt">America, drawing a growing eco-tourist trade (locally known as </p> +<p style="top:301.7pt;left:56.2pt">Ayahuasca tourism). Pharmaceutical companies have shown in-</p> +<p style="top:315.4pt;left:56.2pt">creased interest in the Colombian forest for potential medicines. The </p> +<p style="top:329.2pt;left:56.2pt">amazing variety of species also supports a thriving illegal export of </p> +<p style="top:342.9pt;left:56.2pt">animals. (Ricks-Lightner pp12-13) </p> +<p style="top:372.4pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>71. Darién <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:387.7pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Arms traffic interdicted:</i> Remove a Guerrilla from Chocó; its Faction </p> +<p style="top:401.4pt;left:56.2pt">suffers –5 Resources.</p> +<p style="top:420.8pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Border sanctuary:</i> Place 1-2 Bases in Panamá. It is a 0 Pop Forest. </p> +<p style="top:434.5pt;left:56.2pt">Sweep does not Activate Guerrillas there.</p> +<p style="top:453.9pt;left:56.2pt">Arms stockpiles from the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan civil wars of </p> +<p style="top:467.7pt;left:56.2pt">the 1980s were a major source of weapons smuggled into Colombia. </p> +<p style="top:481.4pt;left:56.2pt">Central American arms arrived in part via a network of 40-50 foot-</p> +<p style="top:495.2pt;left:56.2pt">paths through the triple-canopy jungle of Panama’s Darién province </p> +<p style="top:508.9pt;left:56.2pt">bordering Colombia. The same network served to smuggle drugs </p> +<p style="top:522.7pt;left:56.2pt">in the opposite direction. The FARC reportedly maintained 2 bat-</p> +<p style="top:536.4pt;left:56.2pt">talion-sized units and a major logistics and support base in Darién, </p> +<p style="top:550.2pt;left:56.2pt">outgunning the Panamanians. (RAND pp35,36f,85-86) </p> +<p style="top:579.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:13.8pt"><b>72. Sicarios <span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a"> </span></b></p> +<p style="top:594.9pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Hired drug guns unreliable:</i> Replace all Cartels Guerrillas in 2 </p> +<p style="top:608.7pt;left:56.2pt">spaces with other Guerrillas.</p> +<p style="top:628.0pt;left:56.2pt"><i>Unemployed ready to work for syndicates:</i> Place all available Cartels </p> +<p style="top:641.8pt;left:56.2pt">Guerrillas into spaces with Cartels Bases.</p> +<p style="top:661.2pt;left:56.2pt">Colombia’s big drug traffickers and guerrilla groups created a </p> +<p style="top:674.9pt;left:56.2pt">violent social type—the sicario: a poor youngster, mainly urban, </p> +<p style="top:688.7pt;left:56.2pt">who for a sum of money would kill a cartel’s opponents. The M19 </p> +<p style="top:702.4pt;left:56.2pt">guerrilla group in the 1980s, before its demobilization, organized </p> +<p style="top:716.2pt;left:56.2pt">and trained such poor urban youth, who later became gangsters for </p> +<p style="top:729.9pt;left:56.2pt">hire to the highest bidder, typically the cartels. (Camacho-López </p> +<p style="top:743.7pt;left:56.2pt">pp79-80) The AUC in turn offered monthly wages to unemployed </p> +<p style="top:757.4pt;left:56.2pt">youth who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they </p> +<p style="top:771.2pt;left:56.2pt">would serve as AUC troops. (Hristov p96) Finally, ex-AUC fight-</p> +<p style="top:784.9pt;left:56.2pt">ers with few alternatives often became sicarios for drug traffickers. </p> +<p style="top:798.7pt;left:56.2pt">(Hristov p155) </p> +<p style="top:76.7pt;left:405.3pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">SELECTED SOURCES</span></b></p> +<p style="top:100.3pt;left:405.3pt">(roughly, from Right to Left)</p> +<p style="top:123.1pt;left:405.3pt">“Insights from Colombia’s ‘Prolonged War’” by Carlos Alberto </p> +<p style="top:136.8pt;left:405.3pt">Ospina Ovalle, <i>JFQ,</i> issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006. The importance </p> +<p style="top:150.6pt;left:405.3pt">of strategy, doctrine, and legitimacy in internal war, from the </p> +<p style="top:164.3pt;left:405.3pt">architect of modern Colombian COIN.</p> +<p style="top:187.1pt;left:405.3pt">“Colombia—Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response” </p> +<p style="top:200.8pt;left:405.3pt">by Thomas A. Marks, <i>Prism</i> 1, No.4, August 2010. How the </p> +<p style="top:214.6pt;left:405.3pt">Colombian Army and Government learned COIN during the </p> +<p style="top:228.3pt;left:405.3pt">period of the game and won against FARC and AUC.</p> +<p style="top:251.1pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Colombian Labyrinth—The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency </i></p> +<p style="top:264.8pt;left:405.3pt"><i>and Its Implications for Regional Stability</i> by Angel Rabasa </p> +<p style="top:278.6pt;left:405.3pt">and Peter Chalk, RAND, 2001. From mid-period of the game, </p> +<p style="top:292.3pt;left:405.3pt">a US view of how to win as the Government.</p> +<p style="top:315.1pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Colombia—Issues for Congress</i> by June Beittel, Congressional </p> +<p style="top:328.8pt;left:405.3pt">Research Service (CRS), March 2011. Looking back on prog-</p> +<p style="top:342.6pt;left:405.3pt">ress in Colombian COIN and counter-narcotics, as assessed </p> +<p style="top:356.3pt;left:405.3pt">for the US Congress.</p> +<p style="top:379.1pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali Cartel</i> by Ron </p> +<p style="top:392.8pt;left:405.3pt">Chepesiuk, Milo Books Ltd, 2003. Focused on US assistance </p> +<p style="top:406.6pt;left:405.3pt">to the Government in fighting the last flashy cartel.</p> +<p style="top:429.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Insurgency & Terrorism—From Revolution to Apocalypse</i> by </p> +<p style="top:443.1pt;left:405.3pt">Bard O’Neill, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. Theoretical discus-</p> +<p style="top:456.8pt;left:405.3pt">sion of insurgency and COIN, including the nature of egalitarian </p> +<p style="top:470.6pt;left:405.3pt">(FARC), preservationist (AUC), and commercialist (Cartels) </p> +<p style="top:484.3pt;left:405.3pt">insurgencies worldwide.</p> +<p style="top:507.1pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Colombia: d20—Guerilla Warfare</i> by Tom Ricks and Ken </p> +<p style="top:520.8pt;left:405.3pt">Lightner, Holistic Design Inc., 2003. Background for roleplay-</p> +<p style="top:534.6pt;left:405.3pt">ing the Colombian conflict, including economic and cultural </p> +<p style="top:548.3pt;left:405.3pt">aspects.</p> +<p style="top:571.1pt;left:405.3pt">“From Smugglers to Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in </p> +<p style="top:584.8pt;left:405.3pt">Illicit Colombian Drug Organizations” by Álvaro Camacho </p> +<p style="top:598.6pt;left:405.3pt">Guizado and Andrés López Restrepo, <i>Peace, Democracy, and </i></p> +<p style="top:612.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Human Rights in Colombia,</i> University of Notre Dame Press, </p> +<p style="top:626.1pt;left:405.3pt">2007. How the big cartels learned to decentralize and keep a </p> +<p style="top:639.8pt;left:405.3pt">low profile.</p> +<p style="top:662.6pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Hostage Nation—Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed </i></p> +<p style="top:676.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>War on Drugs</i> by Victoria Bruce and Karin Hayes, with Jorge </p> +<p style="top:690.1pt;left:405.3pt">Enrique Botero, Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. The stories of the most </p> +<p style="top:703.8pt;left:405.3pt">famous FARC hostages of the Uribe period.</p> +<p style="top:726.6pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Colombia and the United States—War, Unrest and Destabiliza-</i></p> +<p style="top:740.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>tion</i> by Mario A. Murillo, Seven Stories Press, 2003. Discus-</p> +<p style="top:754.1pt;left:405.3pt">sion of the development, nature, and capabilities of the AUC; </p> +<p style="top:767.8pt;left:405.3pt">sees Government design in the formation and tolerance of the </p> +<p style="top:781.6pt;left:405.3pt">paramilitaries.</p> +<p style="top:804.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Blood and Capital—The Paramilitarization of Colombia</i> by </p> +<p style="top:818.1pt;left:405.3pt">Jasmin Hristov, Ohio University Press, 2009. A catalogue of </p> +<p style="top:831.8pt;left:405.3pt">human rights abuses by AUC and Army, pinned herein on class </p> +<p style="top:845.6pt;left:405.3pt">interests and Government complicity.</p> +<p style="top:868.3pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia—The Origin and </i></p> +<p style="top:882.1pt;left:405.3pt"><i>Direction of the FARC-EP</i> by James J. Brittain, Pluto Press, </p> +<p style="top:895.8pt;left:405.3pt">2010. The Marxist view of the conflict and why FARC is </p> +<p style="top:909.6pt;left:405.3pt">destined to win.</p> +</div> + +<div id="page43" style="background-image:url('playbook43.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:695.3pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>43</b></p> +<p style="top:36.6pt;left:344.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:78.8pt;left:496.8pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#006d39">CREDITS</span></b></p> +<p style="top:105.8pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Game Design:</b> Volko Ruhnke</p> +<p style="top:128.5pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Development:</b> Joel Toppen</p> +<p style="top:151.2pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Art Director, Cover Art and Package De-</b></p> +<p style="top:165.0pt;left:496.8pt"><b>sign:</b> Rodger B. MacGowan</p> +<p style="top:184.4pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Map and Counters:</b> Chechu Nieto, Xavier </p> +<p style="top:198.1pt;left:496.8pt">Carrascosa</p> +<p style="top:220.9pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Cards:</b> Mark Simonitch and Chechu Nieto</p> +<p style="top:243.6pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Rules and Charts:</b> Mark Simonitch and </p> +<p style="top:257.4pt;left:496.8pt">Charles Kibler</p> +<p style="top:280.1pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Playtest:</b> <i>Solitaire Aces</i>—Steve Caler, James </p> +<p style="top:293.9pt;left:496.8pt">“Norbert” Stockdale, Todd Quinn; <i>2-Player </i></p> +<p style="top:307.6pt;left:496.8pt"><i>Remoras</i>—Jeremy Antley, Mike Owens; </p> +<p style="top:321.4pt;left:496.8pt"><i>3-Player Home Front</i>—Andrew Ruhnke, </p> +<p style="top:335.1pt;left:496.8pt">Daniel Ruhnke; <i>Cartels Kingpin</i>—Darién </p> +<p style="top:348.9pt;left:496.8pt">Fenoglio; <i>Team Bogotá</i>—Juan Francisco </p> +<p style="top:362.6pt;left:496.8pt">Torres; <i>Devil’s Advocates</i>—Jeff Baker, </p> +<p style="top:376.4pt;left:496.8pt">John Gitzen, Dan McGuire, Patrick Neary, </p> +<p style="top:390.1pt;left:496.8pt">Joel Tamburo; <i>Demo King</i>—Mark Mitchell; </p> +<p style="top:403.9pt;left:496.8pt"><i>Guerrilleros</i>—Paul Aceto, Wendell Al-</p> +<p style="top:417.6pt;left:496.8pt">bright, Mike Bertucelli, Jeff Grossman, Igor </p> +<p style="top:431.4pt;left:496.8pt">Horst, Michael Lessard, Fred Manzo, Tim </p> +<p style="top:445.1pt;left:496.8pt">Porter, Stéphane Renard, Martin Sample, </p> +<p style="top:458.9pt;left:496.8pt">Roger Taylor.</p> +<p style="top:481.6pt;left:496.8pt"><b>VASSAL Module:</b> Joel Toppen</p> +<p style="top:504.4pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Images:</b> 1st Division, Ospina & Mora, </p> +<p style="top:518.1pt;left:496.8pt">High Mountain Battalions, Plan Meteoro, </p> +<p style="top:531.9pt;left:496.8pt">Kill Zone, Soldados Campesinos, National </p> +<p style="top:545.6pt;left:496.8pt">Coordination Center, Carabineros—Tom </p> +<p style="top:559.4pt;left:496.8pt">Marks; Caño Limón-Coveñas—Sémhur; </p> +<p style="top:573.1pt;left:496.8pt">Occidental & Ecopetrol—Pedro Filipe; </p> +<p style="top:586.9pt;left:496.8pt">War Tax, Colombia Nueva —Julián Ortega </p> +<p style="top:600.6pt;left:496.8pt">Martínez & equinoXio; DoD Contractors—P </p> +<p style="top:614.4pt;left:496.8pt">Alejandro Diaz; Gramaje—Luis Acosta; </p> +<p style="top:628.1pt;left:496.8pt">Hugo Chávez—Presidencia Argentina; </p> +<p style="top:641.9pt;left:496.8pt">Peace Commission—Germán Cabrejo; </p> +<p style="top:655.6pt;left:496.8pt">Secuestrados—Paola Vargas & equinoXio; </p> +<p style="top:669.4pt;left:496.8pt">Former Military—TerceraInformacion.</p> +<p style="top:683.1pt;left:496.8pt">es; Calima Front—La FM; Senado & Cá-</p> +<p style="top:696.9pt;left:496.8pt">mara—Leandro Neumann Ciuffo; Pinto & </p> +<p style="top:710.6pt;left:496.8pt">del Rosario—Louise Wolff; Unión Sindical </p> +<p style="top:724.4pt;left:496.8pt">Obrera—Mennonot; Bloques—Silvia An-</p> +<p style="top:738.1pt;left:496.8pt">drea Moreno; Castaño—Socialist Worker; </p> +<p style="top:751.9pt;left:496.8pt">Criminal Air Force—Mabadia71; Deserters </p> +<p style="top:765.6pt;left:496.8pt">& Defectors—John Jairo Bonilla; Drogas </p> +<p style="top:779.4pt;left:496.8pt">La Rebaja—jthadeo; Amazonía—Navy of </p> +<p style="top:793.1pt;left:496.8pt">Brazil; Narco-War—F3rn4nd0; Cocaine </p> +<p style="top:806.9pt;left:496.8pt">Labs—Valter Campanato ABr; Tingo </p> +<p style="top:820.6pt;left:496.8pt">María—H Zell; Darién—Christian Ziegler; </p> +<p style="top:834.4pt;left:496.8pt">Sicarios—Luis Pérez.</p> +<p style="top:857.1pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Production Coordination:</b> Tony Curtis</p> +<p style="top:879.9pt;left:496.8pt"><b>Producers:</b> Tony Curtis, Rodger Mac-</p> +<p style="top:893.6pt;left:496.8pt">Gowan, Andy Lewis, Gene Billingsley and </p> +<p style="top:907.4pt;left:496.8pt">Mark Simonitch</p> +<p style="top:107.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:123.2pt;left:56.2pt">1. 1st Division</p> +<p style="top:137.0pt;left:56.2pt">2. Ospina & Mora</p> +<p style="top:150.7pt;left:56.2pt">3. Tapias</p> +<p style="top:168.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:184.2pt;left:56.2pt">4. Caño Limón - Coveñas</p> +<p style="top:198.0pt;left:56.2pt">5. Occidental & Ecopetrol</p> +<p style="top:211.7pt;left:56.2pt">6. Oil Spill</p> +<p style="top:229.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:245.2pt;left:56.2pt">7. 7th Special Forces</p> +<p style="top:259.0pt;left:56.2pt">8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana</p> +<p style="top:272.7pt;left:56.2pt">9. High Mountain Battalions</p> +<p style="top:290.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:306.2pt;left:56.2pt">10. Blackhawks</p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:56.2pt">11. National Defense & Security Council</p> +<p style="top:333.7pt;left:56.2pt">12. Plan Colombia</p> +<p style="top:351.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:367.2pt;left:56.2pt">13. Plan Meteoro</p> +<p style="top:381.0pt;left:56.2pt">14. Tres Esquinas </p> +<p style="top:394.7pt;left:56.2pt">15. War Tax</p> +<p style="top:412.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:428.2pt;left:56.2pt">16. Coffee Prices</p> +<p style="top:442.0pt;left:56.2pt">17. Madrid Donors</p> +<p style="top:455.7pt;left:56.2pt">18. NSPD-18</p> +<p style="top:473.0pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:489.2pt;left:56.2pt">19. General Offensive</p> +<p style="top:503.0pt;left:56.2pt">20. Mono Jojoy<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:516.7pt;left:56.2pt">21. Raúl Reyes<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:531.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:548.0pt;left:56.2pt">22. Alfonso Cano</p> +<p style="top:561.7pt;left:56.2pt">23. DoD Contractors </p> +<p style="top:575.5pt;left:56.2pt">24. Operación Jaque</p> +<p style="top:592.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:609.0pt;left:56.2pt">25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:622.7pt;left:56.2pt">26. Gramaje<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:636.5pt;left:56.2pt">27. Misil Antiaéreo</p> +<p style="top:653.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:670.0pt;left:56.2pt">28. Hugo Chávez</p> +<p style="top:683.7pt;left:56.2pt">29. Kill Zone</p> +<p style="top:697.5pt;left:56.2pt">30. Peace Commission<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:714.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:731.0pt;left:56.2pt">31. Betancourt</p> +<p style="top:744.7pt;left:56.2pt">32. Secuestrados<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:758.5pt;left:56.2pt">33. Sucumbíos</p> +<p style="top:775.7pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:792.0pt;left:56.2pt">34. Airdropped AKs</p> +<p style="top:805.7pt;left:56.2pt">35. Crop Substitution </p> +<p style="top:819.5pt;left:56.2pt">36. Zona de Convivencia</p> +<p style="top:107.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:123.2pt;left:279.4pt">37. Former Military<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:137.0pt;left:279.4pt">38. National Coordination Center<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:150.7pt;left:279.4pt">39. Soldados campesinos </p> +<p style="top:168.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:184.2pt;left:279.4pt">40. Demobilization</p> +<p style="top:198.0pt;left:279.4pt">41. Mancuso<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:211.7pt;left:279.4pt">42. Senado & Cámara</p> +<p style="top:229.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span></b></p> +<p style="top:245.2pt;left:279.4pt">43. Calima Front</p> +<p style="top:259.0pt;left:279.4pt">44. Colombia Nueva</p> +<p style="top:272.7pt;left:279.4pt">45. Los Derechos Humanos</p> +<p style="top:290.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:306.2pt;left:279.4pt">46. Limpieza</p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:279.4pt">47. Pinto & del Rosario<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:333.7pt;left:279.4pt">48. Unión Sindical Obrera</p> +<p style="top:351.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:367.2pt;left:279.4pt">49. Bloques<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:381.0pt;left:279.4pt">50. Carabineros</p> +<p style="top:394.7pt;left:279.4pt">51. Pipeline Repairs</p> +<p style="top:412.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:428.2pt;left:279.4pt">52. Castaño<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:442.0pt;left:279.4pt">53. Criminal Air Force</p> +<p style="top:455.7pt;left:279.4pt">54. Deserters & Defectors</p> +<p style="top:473.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:489.2pt;left:279.4pt">55. DEA Agents</p> +<p style="top:503.0pt;left:279.4pt">56. Drogas La Rebaja<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:516.7pt;left:279.4pt">57. Op Millennium</p> +<p style="top:534.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:550.2pt;left:279.4pt">58. General Serrano</p> +<p style="top:564.0pt;left:279.4pt">59. Salcedo<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:577.7pt;left:279.4pt">60. The Chess Player</p> +<p style="top:595.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span></b></p> +<p style="top:611.2pt;left:279.4pt">61. Air Bridge<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:625.0pt;left:279.4pt">62. Amazonía<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:638.7pt;left:279.4pt">63. Narco-War<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:656.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:672.2pt;left:279.4pt">64. Cocaine Labs<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:686.0pt;left:279.4pt">65. Poppies</p> +<p style="top:699.7pt;left:279.4pt">66. Tingo María<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:717.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span></b></p> +<p style="top:733.2pt;left:279.4pt">67. Mexican Traffickers</p> +<p style="top:747.0pt;left:279.4pt">68. Narco-Subs<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:760.7pt;left:279.4pt">69. Riverines & Fast Boats</p> +<p style="top:778.0pt;left:279.4pt;font-size:15.0pt"><b><span style="color:#00894a">C</span><span style="color:#e7b91f">A</span><span style="color:#ec1c23">F</span><span style="color:#0070bb">G</span></b></p> +<p style="top:794.2pt;left:279.4pt">70. Ayahuasca Tourism</p> +<p style="top:808.0pt;left:279.4pt">71. Darién</p> +<p style="top:821.7pt;left:279.4pt">72. Sicarios<b> </b></p> +<p style="top:841.1pt;left:279.4pt">73-76. Propaganda!</p> +<p style="top:71.0pt;left:216.0pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#ffffff">CARD LIST</span></b></p> +</div> + +<div id="page44" style="background-image:url('playbook44.jpg');width:765.0pt;height:990.0pt"> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:56.2pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>44</b></p> +<p style="top:37.6pt;left:346.8pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b><i>Andean Abyss</i></b></p> +<p style="top:891.1pt;left:331.7pt;font-size:12.5pt"><b>GMT Games, LLC</b></p> +<p style="top:905.6pt;left:289.2pt;font-size:11.2pt">P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308</p> +<p style="top:919.1pt;left:330.1pt;font-size:11.2pt">www.GMTGames.com</p> +<p style="top:71.0pt;left:327.4pt;font-size:21.3pt"><b><span style="color:#ffffff">SPACES LIST</span></b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Cities </b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:225.0pt"><b> </b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:240.1pt"><b>Pop</b></p> +<p style="top:126.2pt;left:56.2pt">Bogotá & Villavicencio . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:126.2pt;left:247.0pt">8</p> +<p style="top:145.6pt;left:56.2pt">Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:145.6pt;left:247.0pt">3</p> +<p style="top:165.0pt;left:56.2pt">Medellín. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:165.0pt;left:247.0pt">3</p> +<p style="top:184.3pt;left:56.2pt">Bucaramanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:184.3pt;left:247.0pt">2</p> +<p style="top:203.7pt;left:56.2pt">Ibagué & Pereira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:203.7pt;left:247.0pt">2</p> +<p style="top:223.1pt;left:56.2pt">Santa Marta & Barranquilla. . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:223.1pt;left:247.0pt">2</p> +<p style="top:242.5pt;left:56.2pt">Cartagena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:242.5pt;left:247.0pt">1</p> +<p style="top:261.8pt;left:56.2pt">Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:261.8pt;left:247.0pt">1</p> +<p style="top:281.2pt;left:56.2pt">Neiva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:281.2pt;left:247.0pt">1</p> +<p style="top:300.6pt;left:56.2pt">Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:300.6pt;left:247.0pt">1</p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:56.2pt">Sincelejo & Montería. . . . . . . . . . . </p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:247.0pt">1</p> +<p style="top:339.3pt;left:56.2pt"><b>Total Population: 25</b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:279.4pt"><b>Departments </b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:425.7pt"><b>Type </b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:463.2pt"><b>Pop</b></p> +<p style="top:126.2pt;left:279.4pt">Antioquia - Bolívar . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:145.6pt;left:279.4pt">Huila - Tolima . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:165.0pt;left:279.4pt">Santander - Boyacá . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:184.3pt;left:279.4pt">Arauca - Casanare . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1</p> +<p style="top:203.7pt;left:279.4pt">Atlántico - Magdalena . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:223.1pt;left:279.4pt">Cesar - La Guajira . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .1</p> +<p style="top:242.5pt;left:279.4pt">Chocó - Córdoba . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:261.8pt;left:279.4pt">Guaviare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:281.2pt;left:279.4pt">Meta East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1</p> +<p style="top:300.6pt;left:279.4pt">Meta West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:279.4pt">Nariño - Cauca. . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:339.3pt;left:279.4pt">Putumayo - Caquetá . . . . . . .Forest. . .1</p> +<p style="top:358.7pt;left:279.4pt">Amazonas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0</p> +<p style="top:378.1pt;left:279.4pt">Guainía. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0</p> +<p style="top:397.5pt;left:279.4pt">Vaupés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0</p> +<p style="top:416.8pt;left:279.4pt">Vichada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .0</p> +<p style="top:436.2pt;left:279.4pt"><b>Total Population: 15</b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:502.5pt"><b>Lines of Communication </b></p> +<p style="top:106.8pt;left:648.8pt"><b>Type Econ</b></p> +<p style="top:126.2pt;left:502.5pt">Arauca - Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3</p> +<p style="top:145.6pt;left:502.5pt">Cúcuta - Ayacucho . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3</p> +<p style="top:165.0pt;left:502.5pt">Ayachucho - Sincelejo . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3</p> +<p style="top:184.3pt;left:502.5pt">Bucaramanga - Ayacucho. . . . Pipe. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:203.7pt;left:502.5pt">Ayacucho - Barranquilla . . . . Pipe. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:223.1pt;left:502.5pt">Medellín - Sincelejo. . . . . . . . Pipe . . .2</p> +<p style="top:242.5pt;left:502.5pt">Neiva - Bogotá. . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:261.8pt;left:502.5pt">Yopal - Bogotá . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:281.2pt;left:502.5pt">Bogotá-Ibagué-Bucaramanga Pipe. . . .2</p> +<p style="top:300.6pt;left:502.5pt">Cartagena - Sincelejo. . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1</p> +<p style="top:320.0pt;left:502.5pt">Medellín - Ibagué. . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1</p> +<p style="top:339.3pt;left:502.5pt">Ibagué - Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1</p> +<p style="top:358.7pt;left:502.5pt">Cali - Buenaventura . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1</p> +<p style="top:378.1pt;left:502.5pt">Cartagena - Barranquilla . . . . Road . . .1</p> +<p style="top:397.5pt;left:502.5pt">Bogotá - San José. . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1</p> +<p style="top:416.8pt;left:502.5pt">Cali - Pasto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1</p> +<p style="top:436.2pt;left:502.5pt">Neiva - Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1</p> +<p style="top:455.6pt;left:502.5pt">Pasto - Tumaco. . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1</p> +<p style="top:475.0pt;left:502.5pt"><b>Total Economic Value: 30</b></p> +</div> +</body> +</html> |