Andean Abyss - Playbook

Andean Abyss

GUIDE TO COIN OPERATIONS

Strategy Notes for the Government

by Joel Toppen

Here is an introduction to the forces and some key actions available

to the Government Faction.

Troops

Troops are your workhorses. They’re going to do all the

heavy lifting for you. Essentially, Troops are your pieces

that can be moved into spaces to search (Sweep) and de-

stroy (Assault) Insurgent Guerrillas and Bases.

Troops are brought into the game through the Train Operation.

Troops can move via:

• Sweep Operation—into an adjacent City or Department to find

(Activate) Insurgent Guerrillas.

• Patrol Operation—into and/or along LoCs to find (Activate)

Insurgent Guerrillas and perhaps kill them in one such space.

• Airlift Special Activity—any 3 troops (unlimited with Black-

hawks Government Capability) move from anywhere to anywhere

on the map. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of this Special

Activity!

Troops kill Insurgent Guerrillas via the Assault Operation, but only

Active guerillas.

Guerrillas must be Activated by a Sweep (or some action they them-

selves undertook) before Government Troops can eliminate them.

Also, through their presence, Troops can project Government control

of a space in a Control Phase of a Propaganda card. But, and this is

important, by themselves, Troops cannot alter Support/Opposition

status in an area. They need Police support to effect that. In the

Redeploy Phase, Troops in a LoC or Department space without a

Government Base must deploy out of that area (even if that space

is Government controlled). Thus their staying power outside a City

is limited.

Lastly, Troops, by their presence in a space, can inhibit the ability

of the AUC and FARC to make use of the Extort Special Action.

Also, when positioned with Support or on a LoC, Troops can spot

(Activate) marching Guerrillas.

Police

Police are very, very important Government pieces. While

much less mobile than Troops, Police give the Government

player crucial positional staying power.

Here’s what Police do for you:

• Police cannot move with Troops on a Sweep (unless the National

Defense & Security Council Government Capability is in play).

But they can, if already positioned in the space, assist the Troops

in the space being swept. Police cubes count when factoring the

effect of a Sweep.

• Police inhibit the ability of the Cartels to use the Cultivate Special

Action. Police can also inhibit FARC from using the Kidnapping

Special Action. Like Troops, Police on LoCs or in spaces with

Support can spot (Activate) marching Guerrillas (very important to

protect the Cities), and inhibit FARC and the AUC from Extorting

in a space.

• Police can be used to Patrol LoCs to activate Guerrillas on LoCs,

and even conduct an Assault on a LoC as a part of the Sweep.

• Within Cities, Police can participate in an Assault.

• Police, like Troops, can protect a Government Base from Attack

(cubes must be removed before a Base is removed).

So far they probably don’t sound terribly useful to the player. There

is, however, one crucial role Police have that makes them indispens-

able: Police enable the Government player to conduct Civic Actions

during a Propaganda card, and also as part of a Train Operation.

Civic Action is the means by which the Government player degrades

Opposition and/or adds/improves Support—necessary to fulfill the

Government victory conditions. At least 1 Police cube is required

to conduct Civic Action in a Propaganda Phase or as a postscript

to a Train Operation.

Police cannot move by Airlift or (usually) Sweep. They can only

be moved onto LoCs and/or Cities from an adjacent space during a

Patrol. If LoCs are free of Insurgent Guerrillas, Police can continue

to move from LoC to LoC and City to LoC, etc., until a guerrilla is

encountered or the player chooses to stop moving. But getting Police

into Departments is not quite as simple and requires some planning.

So how do you get Police to where you need them without using a

Patrol Operation? There are two methods principally:

Training—You can get Police into a space where they are needed by

simply undertaking the Train Operation and Training Police in that

space. For Cities, this is not a problem as you can Train in any City.

Training in a Department, however, requires a bit of planning.

In order to place cubes by Training in a Department, you must have

a Base there. In order to get a Base into that Department, you must

first have three cubes in that Department. OK, so how do you get

cubes into a Department so you can place a Base? Typically, you will

undertake a Sweep Operation to move Troops into a Department.

You could also use the Airlift Special Activity to fly an additional

3 Troops there. Then, in a subsequent turn, you undertake a Train

Operation in that Department, only you don’t place cubes; instead,

you remove 3 cubes and place a Base.

Once you have a Base, in a future turn, you can Train and place

Police into that Department. If you have Troops and Police and more

Government pieces than any other Faction in that Department, you

may also pay for Civic Action in order to improve Support (even

without a Base).

Redeploy—During the Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card, the

Government player can reposition any and all of his Police to any

LoCs or any space with Government Control.

Adjacency does not apply during this Phase, so this is a very pow-

erful opportunity to move otherwise less-mobile Police around the

board. The player must plan very carefully here lest he be forced to

waste Resources and Operational tempo later on.

And so, in short, the Government player may reposition his Police

preemptively and for free during the Redeploy Phase. The Govern-

ment player may place new Police reactively and for a considerable

cost in Resources when undertaking a Train Operation during an

event card play. Police enable the Government to gain precious

support necessary to fulfilling his victory conditions. This then, will

likely free up Troops to deploy elsewhere against Insurgents. Police

give the Government player staying power.

Andean Abyss

Bases

Bases are crucial to Government success in that they

provide the only means by which the Government

player can maintain a constant Troop presence in the

countryside. The Government player has only three

Bases they can establish. Don’t waste them!

Where do you need Bases? You need them in Departments. You

do not need them in Cities. Why? Cities, are de facto Bases. Bases

enable the player to Train Troops and/or Police in that space. Since

you an already do that in a City, you do not need to give up three

cubes and use one of your three Base pieces there! The only good

a Base will do the Government in a City is deny the ability to place

a Base in that City to one of the Insurgent Factions. But since the

Government only has three Bases with which to work, this seems

to be a wasted use of a Base.

Why do you need Bases? You need Bases in order to Train Police

and Troops in a Department. In order to decrease Opposition and

increase Support for the Government, the Government player must

undertake Civic Actions either in conjunction with a Train Operation

or during a Propaganda card. In order to undertake a Civic Action,

one or more Police must be in that space. In order to get Police into

a Department where there are presently no Police, they must usually

be Trained there. To be Trained there, you need a Base.

Bases also allow Troops to remain in a Department during the

Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card. And so if the Government

player is still fighting to wrest control of a Department from an

Insurgent faction when a Propaganda card is resolved, the presence

of a Base in that Department allows the Government player to keep

his Troops in the field.

So there you have it! Bases are one more important cog in the

Government’s machinery.

ROLE SUMMARIES

Government

Situation. Colombia is at the edge of abyss. Illegal armed

groups—flush with drug money—are multiplying in the

countryside. Terror, sabotage, assassination, and kidnapping

have reached alarming rates, and little of the rural population sup-

ports the national Government. Only a full-out, whole-of-Govern-

ment counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign can restore law and

order to your nation.

Goal. Expand the Government’s legitimacy throughout the country.

The more population that supports you, the greater your chance to

win.

Tools. You can train forces to outnumber and assault the enemy

with fearsome firepower. But guerrillas must first be flushed out

from underground by sweeping cities or rural departments where

they hide. Your troops are highly mobile by ground or air lift but

must return to bases or city garrisons. Police—once established in

a department—can stay. Police and troops together can conduct

civic action to build your popular support. But COIN requires

resources—be sure to control the country’s cities, pipelines, and

other lines of communications and cultivate foreign aid to ensure

your war chest remains full.

Deals. It’s tempting to single-mindedly hammer the FARC and let

the cartels and AUC do their thing, since FARC’s political interests

directly oppose yours. But the smaller insurgents can quietly gain

momentum and win. Imagine a temporary truce in which you leave

FARC free to fight off the dread paramilitaries, while your eradica-

tion of the Cartels’ fields helps FARC politically and fills your aid

coffers.

Tip. COIN is a gradual campaign—plan your territorial control and

civic action several operations ahead.

FARC

Situation. Colombia’s popular revolution is ready to tran-

sition to the mobile phase. The Government has abandoned

the countryside. Your revolutionary movement—the

FARC—is drawing resources from Colombia’s drug economy. It’s

time to move: rally your People’s Army and march on the strongholds

of reaction!

Goal. Build opposition to the Government to prepare its collapse.

The more of the country’s population you can swing from support

to opposition while sustaining your logistics, the better chance

you’ll win.

Tools. That probably will mean infiltrating cities with your guerril-

las to agitate the bourgeoisie into uprising. Wherever you control

the population by outnumbering all enemy forces with your fighters

and logistical bases, you can agitate. Even where you can’t control

territory, you can terrorize the populace into resenting Government

fecklessness. To operate, you’ll need resources: extort controlled

areas or kidnap and ransom resources away from wealthy drug lords

or Government collaborators. If the Government or the reactionary

paramilitaries come after you, ambush them first!

Deals. You share the countryside with the cartels and can protect

drug Bases by making the areas dangerous for troops or police. You

share with your Insurgent enemies an interest in a weak Govern-

ment—their terror can erode Government support and aid; you in

turn can limit the growth of your logistical bases to placate the AUC.

Even the Government may help you—giving you a pause to trim

the AUC or Cartels when too strong or doing so itself.

Tip. Strike the country’s lines of communications—they are the

arteries of Government resources and maneuver.

AUC

Situation. Colombia’s Government has proven incapable

of controlling the leftist scourge of the FARC. You will step

into the security vacuum and use the terrorists’ own tactics

against them. Funded by landowners who have suffered an epi-

demic of FARC kidnapping, you will rally the autodefensa militias

under the AUC banner and cleanse the land of leftist infrastruc-

ture—or at least provide a counterweight.

Goal. Eliminate FARC logistical bases while building your own. The

more disparity in AUC’s favor, the closer you are to winning.

Tools. Your guerrillas are every bit as effective as the FARC’s,

though often less numerous, and can ambush to guarantee a suc-

cessful attack. Your terror operations enable you to eliminate even

protected FARC logistical bases through assassination, neutralize

local opposition to the Government to allow you rally forces, and

even trim back popular support of and foreign aid for the Government

when it’s getting too strong. You can rally your forces in relatively

safe Government areas and extort there for resources, then march

a guerrilla army into a FARC stronghold to attack or infiltrate indi-

vidual units to terrorize.

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Deals. You can help the Government by going where it can’t: Your

informants enable you to attack underground guerrillas, your terror

instantly dampens FARC-based popular opposition, and you can

take on FARC within demilitarized zones. But don’t dismiss hand-

shakes with other Insurgents. FARC rallying directly affects your

victory—offer truce. And your assassinations can easily target the

Cartels’ business—extract drug shipments for “protection”.

Tip. You’re a remora on the Government shark. Swim along, but

be ready for the day it shakes you off and bites.

Cartels

Situation. You have taken over Colombia’s illegal narcot-

ics industry. The bad news is that the Government is gear-

ing up its “war on drugs”, and the more it eradicates your

drug production bases, the more gringo aid it gets. The good news

is that the country is at the height of a civil war, and there are

plenty of other illegal groups around to keep the Government busy

and off your back.

Goal. Make money. And grow your productive base to make sure

that you can keep making money. The more resources and bases

you accumulate, the more likely you are to win.

Tools. You are a commercial insurgency and can attack and terror-

ize your enemies like the rest. But your gunmen are less numerous

and can’t protect everything you own. Your strength is that you are

the fastest growing enterprise in the country: cultivate and process

until you’re rich. Then bribe to neutralize whatever enemy guer-

rillas, police, or bases stand in your way. Process drugs and use

profits from the shipments to grease your operational skids and

grow even faster.

Deals. You got the drugs and the money, so you can get the deals.

Resources are transferable, and—sooner or later—you should have

garnered more than you need. Use them to buy friends. Or offer to

process shipments for other Insurgents—or even for a staged Gov-

ernment drug bust! Or agree to bribe away whatever threatens your

enemy—anything to keep the heat off your coca fields.

Tip. The potent Medellín gang just got shot up, so you are start-

ing weak. Try to get a lot of bases and shipments ready to earn

resources—but not so many as to draw unwanted attention!

Andean Abyss

DESIGN NOTES

ANDEAN ABYSS seeks to depict Colombia’s recent struggle in a

game that captures key principles of insurgency and counterinsurgen-

cy (COIN). Such principles include a focus on legitimacy (popular

support or opposition), the contest between government firepower

and guerrilla information advantage, and multiparty warfare. I aimed

to present the topic via rules no harder to learn than Labyrinth: The

War on Terror and with enthralling gameplay spanning multiplayer,

2-player, and solitaire. These Notes go into some of the reasoning

and history behind the game and its mechanics.

Origins

Why a COIN Series?

Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today. Indeed,

though military establishments persist in regarding it as “irregu-

lar” or “unconventional”, guerrilla war has been the commonest

of conflicts throughout history, occurring in one variety or another

in almost all known societies.

—David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2010

Much like the study of warfare (in my country at least), board

wargaming traditionally has focused on conventional conflict. Even

within the realm of modern conflict, designers often choose hypo-

thetical conventional wars rather than real, ongoing insurgencies.

This fact leaves fields of virgin snow for the game designer who

would venture into the complicated topic of insurgency—the effort

of armed groups to use both violent and non-violent means to affect

political affairs within a state. I design and play wargames in part

to grapple with historically relevant issues, and the frequency of

insurgency in our life-times surely makes it among the most relevant

sorts to conflicts to us today.

Perhaps because insurgency (like terrorism) so intimately blends

politics with the use of force, too few boardgames have succeeded in

adequately representing even the fundamentals of counterinsurgency

(or COIN), such as the complex relationship between area control

and political legitimacy, to name just one.

The first board wargame that I came across that delved substantially

into COIN was Nick Karp’s Vietnam 1965-1975 (Victory Games,

1984), and once I played it, I was hooked on gaming guerrilla

ambushes in the jungle, airborne sweeps, pacification, and the rest.

But, for all its merits in depicting COIN, Vietnam still focused on

the maneuvers and clashes of big military units, with political affairs

as a backdrop, and in any event took several hundred hours to play

if its political-strategic aspects were to be included.

The greatest recent advances in boardgaming COIN, in my view, are

to be found in the designs of Canadian Brian Train. Brian’s wargames

feature insurgency itself (rather than a hex-and-counter tradition)

as their starting perspective, then build accessible simulations from

there. His Algeria: The War of Independence, 1954-1962 (Fiery

Dragon, 2006) more than any other game, provided the conceptual

basis for ANDEAN ABYSS. ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics rendering

asymmetric Operations, Troops and Police, Underground Guer-

rillas, Government Redeploy and Guerrilla March, Civic Action,

territorial Control, Terror and political Support all have starting

points in Algeria.

The menu of topics for future volumes in the COIN Series is rich.

For Volume II, Cuba Libre, ANDEAN ABYSS playtester Jeff Gross-

man and I adapted the Colombia game to Fidel Castro’s 1957-1958

insurgency. Cuba Libre exploits the same core system for ease of

learning, but portrays a far different insurgency and four factions

that each plays quite differently from those in ANDEAN ABYSS. I

plan the COIN Series in future to visit Africa, East Asia, and the

Mid-East—design time and gamer interest being the only limits.

Why Colombia?

With the wide menu of topics available, I chose Colombia for COIN

Volume I both because it is among those topics under-treated in con-

flict simulation and because of the remarkable richness of its story.

As far as I know, only one other boardgame about Colombia’s recent

insurgency exists, Crisis Games: Colombia by Karsten and Kaarin

Engelmann, (published in 1990, coincidentally, from my own town

of Vienna, Virginia). And that, printed over 20 years ago, predates

the period that ANDEAN ABYSS depicts.

The violence has worsened in Colombia, as the insurgent armed

struggle has become more entrenched and widespread. The most

violent zones of the country are those where two or more of the ac-

tors involved in social conflict—guerrillas, drug cartels, and illegal

self-defense (paramilitary) groups—are active.

—Colombian Labyrinth, RAND Project Air Force, 2001

Colombia’s recent history features a full array of combatants of

different objectives and tactics, ample to fuel a 4-way asymmetric

multiplayer game. The Colombian state in the mid-1990s faced

several simultaneous and well-resourced insurgencies—the FARC

and its ally ELN, the Cali Cartel and its successors, and the AUC.

By the mid-2000s, the state had contained each of them as significant

threats to governance. How? I wanted to explore that.

It was in the period chosen for the game that the Colombian Gov-

ernment learned how to do COIN—jointly by military and civil

institutions, extending state presence throughout the national terri-

tory, building legitimacy by taking on all illegal armed groups. (See

“Why does only the Government get permanent events?” below.)

According to some researchers, Colombia is a model COIN success,

and indeed the Colombians are now teaching other states.

Why multiplayer?

My previous designs, Labyrinth and Wilderness War, feature 2-way

asymmetry of roles as a central theme. I wished my next design to

take asymmetry to a new level: 4-way, including a solitaire experi-

ence that would bring home the complex interplay of many interests

that is COIN.

Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many

groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of its

agenda—counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided.

—Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles”, reproduced in Counter-

insurgency

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the 4-way contest allows exploration, for

example, of the ambiguous, multi-faceted relationships between

Colombia’s Government and the right-wing AUC paramilitaries,

and between the FARC and the drug cartels. How long do such

Andean Abyss

uncomfortable bedfellows cooperate? When do they turn on each

other? Such decision points become key features of the game’s nar-

rative, as they were in history.

As in Labyrinth, ends (victory conditions) differ among roles just

as do ways and means (operations and forces). I had played Joe

Miranda’s Battle for Baghdad (MCS Group, 2010) and was taken

with its 6-way, overlapping victory conditions: each player con-

stantly has to watch the progress of every other against the unique

conditions of each, and more than one player can be making progress

without directly impeding the other. The play tension and diplomatic

depth offered thereby are tremendous. ANDEAN ABYSS attempts

something similar (if more modest, with just four factions).

The greatest design challenge was to render such a multi-faction

contest in a solitaire system. ANDEAN ABYSS provides multiple,

asymmetric algorithms for solitaire play—I hope in an accessible

enough form that solo players, once used to the play aids, will find

the non-player routines well worth the effort of implementing. They

generate a kaleidoscopic narrative, in which “bots” react to one

another as well as to the player. At the same time, the separate non-

player algorithms allow two or three players to represent Colombia’s

4-way conflict in a variety of player combinations.

An incidental benefit of ANDEAN ABYSS’s role-specific non-player

system is that any player but the Government can leave a game in

progress, and that game can continue with the system smoothly

taking over the departed player’s role (a benefit revealed to good

effect during pre-publication demonstrations of ANDEAN ABYSS

at game stores and conventions).

Core Mechanics

Why no hands of cards?

ANDEAN ABYSS is not in the Card-Driven Game (CDG) family. But

it does draw from CDG tradition the exemplary ability of cards with

choices between operations and events to bring detailed political and

economic occurrences into a wargame’s narrative without fuss.

Instead of dealing hands of cards, ANDEAN ABYSS offers events one

at a time from a face-down deck. This puts the focus not on “what’s

in my hand” but on “what’s happening on the map,” which seems

a more direct representation of managing an insurgent or counter-

insurgent campaign. Meanwhile, the unique design of the game’s

event card sequence of play interweaves the event and operations

choices with the exertion of influence by a faction with the initiative

over the options of an adversary or ally.

With both the current and upcoming event card exposed, and me-

chanics such as lingering “Govt Capabilities” events, ANDEAN

ABYSS retains the painful tradeoffs between short- and long-term

benefits of great CDGs. But player interaction and development

of board position dominate rather than hand or deck management.

Insurgency and COIN are long-term strategies, and players who

build their position on the map of Colombia toward the endgame

tend to succeed.

Why so many dual-use events?

In the development of Labyrinth, Joel Toppen and I found ourselves

adding more and more events that featured effects that differed

depending on which side played them. Because of Labyrinth’s

mechanic of card play triggering an enemy event, and therefore the

need to have a majority of events dedicated to only one side or the

other, these dual-use events had to be limited in number. But they

appeared so useful to represent alternative historical paths and the

ambiguous nature of real-world occurrences, that I set dual-use

events as the norm for ANDEAN ABYSS.

Dual-use events proved particularly helpful in representing the

historical and ideological controversy over Colombia’s struggle

prevalent in the sources that I had available (see “Fantasy of the

Right—or Left?” below). But these event cards represent not only

alternative interpretations, but also alternative history (that which

did not occur, but could have) and double-edged swords (uncertain-

ties over which of two effects might most influence the course of

conflict).

Where dual-use events at least in part represent alternative interpreta-

tions, I have sought to provide representatives of both views in the

event background notes and their sourcing in this playbook.

Why different sets of operations?

Beyond giving each faction its own historical identity and flavor,

ANDEAN ABYSS tries to model the asymmetric contest between

insurgent guerrillas and government security forces. The most central

distinction in this regard is the pitting of the insurgents’ information

advantage against the counterinsurgents’ firepower advantage—and

the nature of insurgent and COIN operations in the game reflects

this distinction.

Government forces must sweep to expose (find) underground

guerrillas before organizing a strike upon them—often giving the

insurgents a chance to escape first. Guerrillas know who and where

their enemies are, but their attacks are weak compared to govern-

ment troop assaults.

Since the insurgents get their information advantage from melding

with the local population, a hostile population can undo that advan-

tage by reporting on (exposing) guerrillas that march into their area.

Even a neutral population will quietly tolerate armed forces in their

midst, so allowing guerrillas to move safely.

These game mechanics represent the real-life cat-and-mouse char-

acteristic of COIN engagement, whether in an army “search and

destroy” mission against guerrilla columns in the jungle hinterland

or a police investigation of an urban underground.

Why does only the Government get permanent events?

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the Government alone may receive potent

improvements to capability that last the remainder of the game.

The insurgents, in contrast, can achieve only a momentum that

dissipates after a single campaign. This difference represents the

fact that, as mentioned above, the period of Colombian conflict

portrayed was fundamentally characterized by a steady building of

the Government’s COIN skill and capacity.

That building capacity rested on unifying COIN into one effort by

the whole government: national political leadership from president to

legislature, the joint military services, national police and judiciary,

and economic development orchestrated as never before to win

the war. It also included a better understanding of the nature of the

enemy’s strategy, so that military operations could be more effective

and supportive of a counter-strategy. The game’s Govt Capabilities

events National Defense & Security Council, 1st Division, Tapias,

Ospina & Mora and others represent this organizational and strategic

development of a potent Colombian COIN.

Uribe pursued an aggressive plan to address Colombia’s decade-long

conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitary

groups and to reduce the production of illicit drugs. ... [Colombia]

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has made significant progress in reestablishing government control

over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist

activities, and reducing poverty.

—Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2011

With increasing US training and equipment assistance during the

period, first under the “War on Drugs” then the “War on Terror”,

and with Uribe’s full-force war effort against illegal groups, mate-

rial COIN capacity built along with skill and strategy. So we have

Blackhawks for air mobility, High Mountain Battalions for Andean

operations, 7th Special Forces for US training, and so on.

This treatment of a building COIN versus more ephemeral insurgent

capabilities contrasts with that in Volume II, Cuba Libre. There, to

represent the growth of insurgent potency contrasted with the Batista

regime’s failure to adapt its means, the game reverses mechanics

and instead presents lasting “Insurgent Capabilities” and temporary

“Govt Momentum”.

Why include lines of communication?

The game’s mechanics surrounding lines of communication (LoCs)

represent the dependence of the country’s economy, government

revenues, and therefore COIN operations tempo on railways, roads,

powerlines, and—in Colombia especially—pipelines delivering

energy exports.

A guerrilla sabotage and kidnapping campaign against the LoCs

of a government that is already resource-limited can spike a COIN

campaign. But insurgent players will find that sabotage is not cake:

LoCs are dangerous places for guerrillas, as security forces can reach

them quickly and tend to defend them aggressively.

What does the Propaganda Round represent?

ANDEAN ABYSS’s Propaganda Rounds punctuate insurgency-COIN

campaigns at irregular and not precisely predictable moments. They

represents less a given moment or time period distinct from the

general course of the conflict and more an accounting of various

matters that are really progressing concurrently with the game’s

events and operations: tax collection, export earnings, the political

effects of ongoing and steady FARC propaganda activities (agita-

tion) and government investment (civic action), relocation of forces

among relatively quiet or controlled areas, and the development of

effective local police forces.

Knowing only with very little warning exactly when this accounting

will take place adds to play tension and represents the real-world

uncertainties in war regarding the outcomes of these larger, cumula-

tive processes (how much revenue will we collect? how popular will

our political and military efforts be? and the like).

COIN History in the Game:

Local Security as a Key

Establishing local security for the population in order to deny support

to guerrillas is another key aspect of counterinsurgency represented

ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics. US COIN scholar Tom Marks de-

scribes the local security situation in the Colombian countryside

as of the mid-1990s—a good description of the challenge for the

Government player at the beginning of the game:

Domination of local areas was the linchpin of the counterinsurgent

effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions were tried to maintain

state presence in affected areas... But in the absence of local forces,

which had fallen afoul of constitutional court restrictions and thus

were disbanded, it was difficult to consolidate gains. As areas were

retaken, they could not be garrisoned with home guards. Instead,

regular units rotated in and out in a perpetual shell game designed

to keep FARC off balance.

—Military Review, March-April 2007

Troops and Police. In the game, Troops represent the Government’s

regular forces: highly mobile across the countryside and hard-hitting

against enemy forces, but eventually forced to return to garrison

in cities or bases. Police represent the local security forces: time-

consuming to build to effectiveness in contested areas, but essential

to day-to-day law and order and therefore to the Government’s

legitimacy and popular support.

In ANDEAN ABYSS, Government troops can sweep into an enemy

area and locate and assault guerrilla forces. As troops establish con-

trol, police eventually can deploy into the area to stay. Or the troops

can establish a Government base to more quickly train local police.

Only once both troops and effective police forces are in place, can

the Government invest in local development through civic action,

thereby building popular support and countering the insurgency.

“Imaginitive Solutions”—Help for the Government to Stay

in Local Areas

The above process is time-consuming and uncertain for the Govern-

ment. However, several events can help it establish effective day-

to-day security in the countryside more quickly. One example is the

establishment of local forces platoons called Soldados Campesinos:

forces that blend the advantages of regular troops and regional

police.

Whether these opportunities become available is not entirely up to

the Government COIN strategist: Will the talent to discover and

implement imaginative solutions emerge? Will politics and bureau-

cracy allow them to bear fruit? In the game, the event card may or

may not come up, and the Government player may or may not be

eligible to play it when it does, or may decide that other operations

are more urgent.

The Other Edge of the Sword—Military and “Paramilitary”

In light of Colombia’s tradition of local self-defense militias and

the evolution of those “autodefensas” into anti-FARC illegal armed

groups (labeled “paramilitaries”) eventually under the leadership

of Carlos Castaño’s AUC, there historically was concern that new

local forces platoons would simply augment the AUC’s reactionary

insurgents. In the game, the AUC is more likely than the Government

to get the first crack at the Soldados Campesinos event (because of

the order of the faction symbols on the card). And the AUC player

(or non-player, if run by the game system) would almost certainly

implement the card’s shaded, pro-insurgent effect, turning defecting

rural police into AUC guerrillas.

And so what is the FARC doing about it?

Beyond such special occurrences as defections, the Government’s

rural forces will have to weather the more routine threats that are

within the capabilities of the insurgent factions: FARC ambushes,

AUC assassinations, Cartels Bribes, and the like. Insurgent players

on the ball will be gunning for any newly established rural police

before Government civic action can gain the populace’s support

and make local insurgent operations that much more difficult: once

populations support the Government, they block FARC from ral-

lying new forces and (as discussed above) report on any guerrillas

entering the area, flushing them from underground status and thereby

blocking their ability to terrorize, ambush, and extort.

Andean Abyss

FARC History in the Game:

Nation Held Hostage

Insurgencies, like governments, need resources to operate, but the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the world’s leftist move-

ments largely on their own. In their 2010 book about Colombian

hostages, journalists Victoria Bruce, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique

Botero describe how Colombia’s revolutionary FARC insurgency

turned to the drug trade for financing—contributing by the mid-

1990s both to its development of a kidnapping industry and to the

rise of the autodefensas that later merged into the FARC’s right-wing

AUC enemy:

The FARC ... controlled many of the coca-growing regions in central

and southern Colombia, while the cartels managed much of the co-

caine production and trafficking. The guerrillas operated by taxing

the cartels and drug producers for protection and services. ... This

economic alliance began to collapse when the leaders of the cartels

... began investing their newfound wealth in property, primarily

large cattle ranches which placed them firmly in the ranks of the

guerrillas’ traditional enemy—the landowning elite. ... In turn, the

guerrillas began a policy of kidnapping and extortion of the cartel

members. For protection and retaliation, the drug lords organized

and financed their own paramilitary armies.

—Hostage Nation: Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

War on Drugs, 2010

Map from official Colombian sources

showing intensity of FARC guerrilla ac-

tivity during the period covered by the

game. Western Meta and Caquetá De-

partments are a hotbed containing the

sites of famous captures of both Colom-

bian presidential candidate Betancourt

and of three US DoD contractors.

FARC Kidnapping, Cartels and Government Victims, and

AUC Growth

Colombian analysts in 1998 estimated that kidnappings by the FARC

and its sister group, the ELN, accounted for 20 to 30 percent of all

kidnappings in the world (RAND, Colombian Labyrinth, p32). The

FARC held hundreds of hostages at a time—a large-scale ransoming

enterprise for them and a tragedy for the country that developed into

a political issue and a cause for national hatred of the guerrillas.

ANDEAN ABYSS depicts the enterprise through the kidnapping spe-

cial activity that the FARC faction may add to its terror operations.

It also depicts the impact of FARC hostage-taking on politics and

military affairs through a series of event cards.

In the game, FARC can use underground Guerrillas to terrorize local

populations into opposing the Colombian government. If the terror-

ized region has a drug cartels base or is a city or line of communica-

tion—and if FARC guerrillas outnumber local police—FARC may

kidnap as well to forcibly transfer a die roll’s worth of resources (or

a drug shipment) in ransom from the Cartels or Government faction

to FARC. As reaction to FARC kidnapping historically contributed

to growth of the right-wing “paramilitaries”, a particularly costly

kidnapping (a die roll of “6”) mobilizes a local AUC guerrilla unit

or base.

Defense Against Kidnapping

To avoid a grievous drain of resources from the counterinsurgency,

the Government will have to protect the populace from FARC kid-

nappers with police patrols of the country’s roads and cities. The

Cartels often can better afford the drain, but it may at some point

have to turn on the FARC parasite, relocate to FARC-free areas,

or just pay off the FARC player. The latter option illustrates how

ANDEAN ABYSS explores the multifaceted relations among the

contenders for control of 1990s Colombia through varied avenues

for player diplomacy.

AUC History in the Game:

Right-Wing Army

Colombia in the mid-1990s saw the leftist FARC insurgency build-

ing its strength dramatically as it transitioned from small-unit terror

tactics to military attacks on the Colombian Army. But the Govern-

ment was not yet on a war footing and still tacitly conceded immense

areas of countryside to the guerrillas. To protect themselves from

FARC terror, landowners in several localities raised self-defense

forces, autodefensas, that would use the FARC’s own tactics against

it. By 1996, these local anti-FARC units formed a nationwide force

under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense

Forces of Colombia or AUC) umbrella.

Over the next decade, the AUC grew to an estimated 17,000 fighters,

approaching the FARC’s strength. Journalist Mario Murillo describes

this illegal armed power:

Along with the ongoing collaboration between elements of the army

and the AUC, [as of 2004] there are approximately 1,000 active

AUC members who have served in the Colombian military, includ-

ing fifty-three retired military officers who have served as advisors

to the AUC. They have up to fourteen state of the art helicopters, a

dozen small planes, and countless speed-boats with mounted ma-

chine guns to use in their war against the guerrillas. Indeed, they

are a full-fledged army, operating almost with complete impunity

throughout the country.

—Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabiliza-

tion, 2004

Logo of the AUC

FARC guerrillas

Andean Abyss

Potent Anti-FARC Faction

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the AUC faction can build an army rivaling the

FARC’s in the number of guerrilla pieces—and an army as military

effective and typically not under the pressure that Government

forces place on the FARC. Both FARC and AUC guerrillas can use

an ambush special activity that guarantees a successful attack and

the capture of materiel and recruits to form a new underground unit.

And a variety of event cards depict additional AUC capacities, both

military and terrorist.

AUC Aces in the Hole: Death Squads and Assassination

More than on military attacks, the AUC relied on terror and mas-

sacres as its principal means of taking control of FARC-dominated

areas. They mimicked FARC terror, but on a more brutal level,

including mass-murders of suspected FARC sympathizers and other

undesirables—so-called “limpiezas” that resembled the “ethnic

cleansing” that the same period featured in the Balkans. In the game,

the AUC can accompany its terror operations with assassination

special activities. Provided the AUC can position underground

guerrillas in a target area, AUC terror can eliminate an enemy base

even when protected by enemy guerrillas. Because the AUC wins by

reducing FARC bases to fewer in number than its own, assassination

of FARC base pieces is a key AUC tactic.

Double-Edged Sword for the Government

The AUC as blood enemy to the FARC would seem an unalloyed

friend to the Government, able to strike the enemy in ways that legal

Government forces cannot. But the AUC nevertheless remains an

insurgency—an illegal armed group that challenges Government

law and order and must in the end be suppressed.

In the game, too many AUC forces in a region block Government

control and thus the ability to build popular support—the Govern-

ment’s victory condition. AUC terror wrecks not only FARC’s politi-

cal base but support for the Government, as victimized populations

resent the Government’s failure to protect them. And international

suspicion of Colombian Army complicity in AUC atrocities costs

the Government foreign aid resources. This interplay of capabilities

and victory conditions poses the question every game: when will

the Government turn on its brutal AUC helpmate—as it ultimately

did historically—to trim its control of the countryside?

Cartels History in the Game:

Chess Player of Cali

[Cali cartel co-founder Gilberto Rodríguez] became known as the

“Chess Player” for his ruthless and calculating approach to the drug

business. ... The Rodríguez brothers ... controlled Cali in the way

that feudal barons once ruled medieval estates. ... Buy Colombia,

rather than terrorize it, became their guiding philosophy. ... The

cartel built dozens of high-rise offices and apartment buildings as

a way of laundering their money. The Cali skyline changed, and

thousands of jobs were created. Their money permeated the city’s

economy, and the natives became addicted to laundered cash and

conspicuous consumption.

—Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali

Cartel, 2003

Along with Government security forces, FARC rebels, and AUC

paramilitaries, ANDEAN ABYSS also depicts the Colombian drug

cartels. While the illegal drug industry does not care much about

legitimacy, it is an insurgency nevertheless. By definitions laid out

by National War College scholar Bard O’Neill, the cartels are “com-

mercialist insurgent” groups—contesting political power purely to

aid their acquisition of material resources (Insurgency & Terrorism:

From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2005).

In the game, the Cartels faction wins not through popular support

or opposition but by building its criminal organization (expanding

its bases) and amassing resources. But its presence can get in the

way of other factions’ objectives of territorial control and political

support. The Cartels, for example, start the game within one rally

action of controlling Cali, which begins politically neutral rather

than supportive of the Government.

As a result of the dismantling of the drug cartels, trafficking has

experienced radical changes in structure. ... There are [now] be-

tween 250 and 300 trafficking organizations in Colombia. Their

leaders are some of the former cartels’ second-rank members ... The

new organizations are smaller, closed, and secret ... . [They] have

developed strategies, methods and techniques aimed at making the

business more dynamic, sneaking away from law enforcement and

blending in better in their respective regions.

—Álvaro Camacho and Andrés López, “From Smugglers to

Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in Illicit Colombian Drug

Organizations,” in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in

Colombia, 2007

War of Weeds

The historical period of game—mid-1990s to mid-2000s—saw the

sunset of Colombia’s flashy, politically active drug cartels, but not

of the illicit drug industry that the game’s Cartels faction represents.

And so, in ANDEAN ABYSS, the Cartels can reconstitute themselves,

able to slip readily out of areas of danger and regrow elsewhere.

Unlike other insurgents, the Cartels can recruit forces anywhere:

battalions of hired guns—sicarios—await among the poor. But

the Cartels’ guerrilla force pool is the smallest: it cannot organize

One way to get drugs to US market: a narco-submarine, designed

to evade detection while it carries its load of product on the pas-

sage northward.

Cali skyline

Photo by D.A. Rendón

Andean Abyss

campaigns on the scale of the more military FARC or AUC. And the

Cartels do not have the other insurgents’ potent battle tactics.

The Cartels faction wins by accumulating resources (money) and

bases (the coca and poppy fields, processing labs, and distribution

infrastructure needed to continue making money). It will find it hard

to protect its bases with its smaller number of guerrillas, and rural

Cartels bases are vulnerable to aerial spraying (the Government’s

eradication action).

But the Cartels also can place new bases more easily than any other

faction, quickly though special cultivation actions or with delay but

cheaply though processing actions to ready drug shipments. Ship-

ment markers represent major caches of processed cocaine or heroin

awaiting delivery to market outside Colombia—they are vulnerable

to seizure by the other factions: any insurgent faction can liquidate

them to accelerate operations. But if defended and held long enough

to get to market (in the Propaganda Round), they yield resources

or a free base.

Cartels terror can hurt the Government or FARC politically, but the

Cartels’ most potent weapon is corruption: they can bribe to expose,

hide, or neutralize enemy forces—anywhere. Bribes are expensive,

however, and so only become a true threat once the Cartels are well

above their victory goal in resources. And so the other factions face

a choice: dedicate precious time and resources early on to trim the

Cartels weeds, or risk the Cartels growing so rich that they can block

any offensive by bribing their way out.

Fantasy of the Right—or Left?

English language studies of the Colombian conflict read so differ-

ently from one another that they seem to be describing multiple

countries. Is Colombia a thriving democracy, with a popular gov-

ernment that has brought economic prosperity and relative peace

to its people in the face of vicious terrorist and criminal threats?

Or is Colombia a harsh dictatorship by an economic elite, dressed

up as democracy but in fact using state-sponsored terror to keep its

ever more impoverished masses under heel, and the FARC simply

the people’s defense? You can find either thesis in North American

scholarship.

ANDEAN ABYSS does not attempt to settle these questions. I took

care to draw from writers (necessarily, for me, in English) who

view Colombia’s conflict from a range of political perspectives (see

Selected Sources). No one view seems able to tell the full story, and

I hope that players of a variety of persuasions will find something

relevant in the game’s design.

The game does take some positions. For example, it does not fully

buy the Left’s thesis of the AUC as an “extension” of the Govern-

ment in that both defend elite interests against the rest of the people

(see Murillo somewhat and Hristov especially). Yes, the Colombian

Government and AUC shared a core interest in suppressing the

FARC, and ANDEAN ABYSS accounts for this shared interest in the

factions’ victory conditions. Indeed, Government and AUC players

often will collaborate.

But the Government under Uribe developed and executed a plan to

extend its writ throughout the country—a true and, by the far-Left

model, unnecessary departure—including against AUC. Casualties

caused the AUC, extraditions of its leaders, and its imperfect but not

false demobilization show a real parting of Government and AUC

ways. And Colombia’s vigorous electoral politicking and, under

Uribe, undeniable and widespread popular enthusiasm for President,

government, and army seemed to gainsay the Leftist model of Co-

lombia as an exploitative oligarchy defended from its people by force

of terror. So ANDEAN ABYSS has the Government seeking popular

support to win, rather than the exploitation of the country’s poor by

the violence-backed rich, as the far Left might have it.

As for the nature of the FARC, the game does not depict the group

as mere “narco-terrorists” who have left people’s revolution behind

and continue mainly for personal drug profit (as some on the Right

argue). An insurgency may at once benefit from the drug trade and

provide much needed services to rural under-privileged. ANDEAN

ABYSS models the latter aspect with the FARC Agitation mechanic

and the effects of events such as Crop Substitution, Unión Sindical

Obrera, and others.

The persistence in hard times of the FARC’s leaders and fighters

demonstrates ideological commitment—dedication to something

larger than self. Purely commercialist insurgent leaders at some

point wish to live the high life. In contrast, Reyes, Mono Jojoy,

Cano, and the rest carried on in the face of the hardships of lethal

Government pursuit—and despite opportunities for reconciliation.

In the game, FARC victory depends directly on popular opposi-

tion and the strength of the movement’s political and logistical

base—the preconditions for an eventual revolution and overthrow

of the existing order.

Finally, ANDEAN ABYSS represents the US-sponsored “War on

Drugs” as neither clear failure nor clear success. Eradication in the

game may be a mixed bag politically, but, used judiciously, it is a

necessary and potent means for the Government to keep the Cartels

in check. Historically, aerial coca eradication has had its place in

curbing supply, as have the successes of the kingpin strategy of the

Colombian Police and US DEA. Economics being what they are,

Colombian coca production continues. But the country has escaped

the level of terror and political challenge of the big cartels that now

traumatize Mexico and Central America so brutally. Colombians

today can take pride in a low murder rate, growing economy, and

better governance.

Thanks and Dedication

My special gratitude is due to several groups and individuals for their

efforts on behalf of ANDEAN ABYSS: To Joel Toppen, who patiently

heard me out as we drove through the desert, when all I had was

first drafts of curious ops menus. To GMT Games and the testers

and players across many countries who made this project happen.

And to Dr. Thomas Marks of the National Defense University, for

sharing with me his photos and his deep and personal knowledge

of Colombian COIN.

Finally, I dedicate the design of ANDEAN ABYSS to Juan Fran-

cisco’s nation and people: They have faced their past—may they

overcome it.

Volko F. Ruhnke

January, 2012^{Vienna, Virginia}

Andean Abyss

EVENT TEXT AND BACKGROUND

This section reproduces the full text of each event card, along with

sourced historical and other background commentary.

1. 1st Division GFAC

GOVT CAPABILITIES

Jointness: 1 Civic Action space each Support Phase requires Govt

Control and any cube.

Service parochialism: Civic Action requires at least 2 Troops and

2 Police.

The Colombian Army’s 1st Division in late 2004 became a joint

operational command, part of a process of integrating services to

replace exclusively army divisional areas. (Marks p137)

2. Ospina & Mora GFAC

GOVT CAPABILITIES

COIN experts take charge: Sweep costs 1 Resource per space.

COIN strategy eludes Army: Sweep Operations may target only 1

space per card.

Senior army commanders Carlos Ospina Ovalle and Jorge Mora

Rangel collaborated intimately—Ospina fathering a sound coun-

terinsurgent strategy from his study of captured FARC documents

and Mora ensuring its practical implementation. (Conversation with

Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Ospina pp57,58,60)

General Mora Photo by Tom Marks

3. Tapias GFAC

GOVT CAPABILITIES

CO tightens civil-military bonds: Assault costs 1 Resource per

space.

Civil-military rivalries fester: Assault Operations may target only

1 space per card.

Military Forces Commander Fernando Tapias Stahelin drew the

political backing to forge a whole-of-government COIN effort.

(Conversation with Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Marks, p139; Ospina

p60)

4. Caño Limón—Coveñas GFCA

Profitable pipeline: Add twice the Econ of 3 unSabotaged pipelines

to Government Resources.

Pipeline draws attacks: Sabotage the 3 pipelines with highest value

and no cubes.

A particularly lucrative energy export pipeline from Arauca to the

sea attracted both rebel attacks and US training assistance. (Brittain

p23; Ricks-Lightner pp25,58,80; Hristov p34)

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol GFCA

Oil company security: Place 6 Police onto pipelines. 3 Guerrillas

there or adjacent flip to Active.

Industry thought exploitative: Shift a space adjacent to a 3-Econ

LoC by 2 levels toward Active Opposition.

Joint ventures between US and Colombian oil companies provided

enough government revenue to justify major security measures.

(Brittain p228; Ricks-Lightner p80) A $93-million batch of US

counterterrorism aid in 2003, for example, focused on protection

of Colombian assets of California-based Occidental Petroleum.

(Hristov p34) Critics saw government concessions to multinational

oil giants as overly generous and tied poverty and human rights

violations to US support for oil industry in the country. (Murillo

pp87-88; Hristov pp17-18,34-35)

6. Oil Spill GFCA

Rebels blamed: Shift 2 Opposition or Neutral Departments adjacent

to Sabotage to Passive Support.

Multinationals make mess: Sabotage a pipeline. Shift an adjacent

Department by 1 level toward Active Opposition.

Spilled oil from attacks created substantial environmental damage,

generating local hostility against whichever combatant side got the

blame. (Ricks-Lightner p80)

7. 7th Special Forces GAFC

GOVT CAPABILITIES

Infrastructure protection training: Each Control phase, Govt may

remove 1-3 Terror or Sabotage.

US training ineffective: Control phase—Sabotage LoCs with any

Guerrillas equal to cubes.

The US Bush Administration deployed some 600 personnel of the 7th

Special Forces Group (Airborne), most to train a new “infrastructure

protection brigade” in embattled Arauca Department. (Marks p131;

Ricks-Lightner p25)

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana GAFC

COIN strike aircraft: Govt executes 3 free Air Strikes.

Budget diverted to expensive jets: Government Resources –9.

After FARC successes in the late 1990s in overrunning remote

government centers, the Colombian military equipped its air force

with night-vision gear and learned to integrate air power in support

of ground operations. (RAND pp101-102) Less relevant to COIN,

Colombia also maintained a force of high-speed Kfir and Mirage

V jets. (RAND p42)

9. High Mountain Battalions GAFC

GOVT CAPABILITIES

Elites guard high-altitude corridors: Assault treats Mountain as

City.

Equipment not delivered: Assault in Mountain removes only 1 piece

for 4 Troops.

The Army in the Pastrana years equipped and situated special bat-

talions to block insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inac-

cessible heights. (Marks p135)

Andean Abyss

10. Blackhawks GACF

GOVT CAPABILITIES

US helos delivered: Air Lift moves any number of Troops.

Delivery of US helos delayed: Air Lift moves only 1 Troops cube.

The military as of 2000 had only 17 operational heavy-lift helicop-

ters. The US was to add 30 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 UH-1H Huey

transports, but they had yet to be delivered. (RAND pp63,65,68-

69,104)

11. National Defense & Security Council GACF

GOVT CAPABILITIES

Military-police jointness: 1 Police may enter each Sweep space.

Military-police rivalry: A Sweep Operation Activates Guerrillas via

Troops or Police, not both.

Uribe’s “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” integrated

COIN planning, adding a National Defense and Security Council

to ensure coordinated and unified action by all state bodies. (Marks

pp132-133)

12. Plan Colombia GACF

US “War on Drugs”: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Resources.

Then Aid +10.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

US aid focuses on drug war: No Air Strike or Activation by Patrol

until next Propaganda.

The Pastrana Government’s response to Colombia’s insurgency,

Plan Colombia, included seeking $3.5-billion in foreign aid. The

US earmarked 3/4ths of its part of that aid to counternarcotics.

(RAND pp61-62)

13. Plan Meteoro GCFA

GOVT CAPABILITIES

Transport protection units: Patrol conducts a free Assault in each

LoC.

Transport security deemphasized: Patrols do not conduct a free

Assault.

The Uribe Administration funded special transportation network

protection units under “Plan Meteor”. (Marks p135)

14. Tres Esquinas GCFA

Forward base: Government places 1 Base and 3 Troops into any

Department.

Base overrun: Remove 1 Government Base and 1 cube from a

Department.

During the late-1990s heyday of the FARC’s large-unit “mobile

warfare”, it succeeded in overrunning a series of isolated army po-

sitions and briefly holding the capital of Vaupés. (Ospina pp59-60;

Marks p127; RAND pp42-43) Tres Esquinas was a key army base

at the heart of later Government sweeps into the FARC strongholds

of the southeast. (www.GlobalSecurity.org; Brittain pp226-227)

As of 2002, it hosted a Joint Intelligence Center and some 100 US

military advisors. (Hristov p35)

15. War Tax GCFA

Defense budget shot in the arm: Roll a die and add 4 times the result

to Government Resources.

Middle class resents cost of war: Shift a City from Neutral or Pas-

sive Support to Passive Opposition.

Uribe shifted and increased the tax burden in order to help fund the

military effort against the guerrillas. (Brittain p228-229)

16. Coffee Prices GCAF

They’re up: Each Mountain, +5 Resources to Faction with most

pieces, tied spaces to Govt.

They’re down: Government Resources –10.

Export income from coffee—a traditional source of economic

security to the Colombian highlands—fluctuated wildly from the

1990s on, mostly downward. (Brittain pp84-88; Hristov p191;

RAND p5) The late 1990s saw increased guerrilla presence in

the country’s agricultural backbone, the central coffee-growing

departments, apparently as part of FARC, ELN, and AUC strategy.

(RAND pp46-47)

17. Madrid Donors GCAF

Aid conference generous: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Re-

sources. Then Aid +6.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

EU aid focuses on reconstruction: No Sweep or Assault in Depts

until next Propaganda.

European and Japanese donors to Colombia channeled aid to non-

military programs. A July 2000 donors’ conference in Madrid, for

example, pledged $619-million, mostly for social development

projects. (RAND pp62,64)

18. NSPD-18 GCAF

US “War on Terror” takes on FARC: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to

Govt Resources. Then Aid +20.

US focused on Mid-East and South Asia: Government Resources

–6. Subtract a die roll from Aid.

In a departure from the more restrictive “war on drugs”, the US Bush

Administration’s 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 18,

“Supporting Democracy in Colombia”, called on the State Depart-

ment to implement a new US political-military plan in direct support

of Colombian national security strategy. The Bush Administration

had linked the counternarcotics fight to the “war on terror” and

would pursue not only cartels but the FARC and the AUC directly.

(Marks p131; Chepesiuk p281)

19. General Offensive FGAC

In each space possible, choose and execute either free Sweep without

movement or Assault (if Government), or free Attack or Terror (if

Insurgent).

The conflict during the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a number of

FARC offensives, including the use of homemade armored vehicles.

The Government’s 2003-2004 Plan Patriota included a major military

offensive around the capital and into FARC-held territory in the

southeast. (Ospina pp59-60; CRS p10; Hristov p36)

Andean Abyss

20. Mono Jojoy FGAC

KIA puts FARC in disarray: Govt player repositions up to 6 FARC

Guerrillas into adjacent spaces.

Military strategist: FARC free Marches any of its Guerrillas then

flips up to 3 of its Guerrillas Underground.

A Colombian military and police operation in Meta Department in

September 2010 killed the FARC’s operational second-in-command,

Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez or “Mono

Jojoy”, adding to a period of strong pressure on guerrilla remnants.

(CRS pp1,13)

21. Raúl Reyes FGAC

FARC Deputy killed: FARC Resources –6. Remove 1 FARC Base.

FARC Deputy channels foreign support: FARC Resources +6. Place

a FARC Base in a City or Department.

A 2008 Colombian military raid into Ecuador killed then second-

highest FARC commander Luís Édgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”)

and recovered evidence of planned Venezuelan and possibly Ecua-

doran support to the FARC. (CRS p10; Marks pp140-141n)

22. Alfonso Cano FGCA

FARC leader killed in military strike: Shift an Opposition space to

Neutral.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

Ideologue: May Agitate also in up to 3 spaces with FARC piece

and no Govt Control.

Communist Bogotá University student Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas

joined the FARC in the 1980s and eventually became its master

revolutionary ideologue, “Alfonso Cano”. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

pp138-139) A 2011 military strike in Cauca Department killed him.

(www.ColombiaReports.com)

23. DoD Contractors FGCA

US provides aircrew: In a Dept, Activate all Guerrillas and remove

all Cartels Bases.

Plane down—hostage search and evasion: Govt removes 3 Troops.

Mark Govt and FARC Ineligible through next card.

US contractors provided pilots for crop spraying over FARC-held ter-

ritory and for reconnaissance flights to pinpoint guerrillas. Patrolling

FARC guerrillas in 2003 shot down one such flight along the western

slopes of Caquetá and took three US personnel hostage, setting off a

Colombian Army manhunt. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp3-19,107)

24. Operación Jaque FGCA

Dramatic hostage rescue: 1 City to Active Support. Mark FARC

Ineligible through next card.

Hostage rescue goes awry: Remove 2 Troops from a space with

FARC pieces. Shift a City with Support to Neutral.

In a show of operational prowess, Colombian forces in 2008 tricked

FARC captors into delivering celebrity hostage Ingrid Betancourt

and 3 US DoD contractors held since 2003. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

pp238-256)

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional FAGC

ELN and FARC jockey: Remove all FARC pieces from 1 Moun-

tain.

ELN and FARC coordinate ops: Place any 3 FARC pieces into

Antioquia or an adjacent Department.

Colombia’s second-largest revolutionary army, the Castroite ELN,

concentrated in the northern mountains, where it sought a Sierra

Maestra-style stronghold. While the ELN and the FARC shared the

same enemies and often coordinated operations, the two Marxist

groups occasionally clashed over territory or resources. (RAND

pp30-31,44; CRS pp13-14)

26. Gramaje FAGC

FARC protection rejected: All Cartels Guerrillas in spaces with

FARC free Attack FARC.

Schedule of fees: Cartels transfers 3 Resources to FARC for each

space with Cartels Base and FARC Guerrilla.

The FARC had a precise schedule of fees, gramaje, that it charged

to drug producers and smugglers for protection and other services.

Though imposed by the guerrillas, these taxes served as a US argu-

ment that the FARC and the drug lords were in cahoots. (RAND

p32; Camacho-López p80)

27. Misil Antiaéreo FAGC

FARC MANPADs deemed a myth: Government executes 3 free

Special Activities.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

MANPADs feared: Until next Propaganda, no Govt Special Activi-

ties where Guerrillas.

Given the importance of air power to Colombian COIN, fears grew

that guerrilla use of surface-to-air missiles could change the strategic

balance. (RAND pp35,102)

28. Hugo Chávez FACG

Caracas controls border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

space next to Venezuela.

Caracas aids rebels: Place a FARC Base in a Dept next to Venezuela.

Sabotage each empty LoC touching Cúcuta.

FARC information taken in the 2008 raid on Raúl Reyes suggested

that Venezuela was providing support to the insurgent group, includ-

ing plans by the Hugo Chávez regime to grant millions of dollars for

weapons purchases. Chávez later that year called on the FARC to

cease military operations, signaling a change in at least Venezuela’s

public stance. (CRS p10)

29. Kill Zone FACG

Army sniffs out FARC trap: Govt in 1 space Activates all FARC and

executes free Assault.

Tactics lure enemy in: FARC or AUC in a space executes 2 free

Ambushes with any of its Guerrillas without Activating.

The FARC between 1996 and 2000 developed a tactic to lure Army

reaction forces into a prepared kill zone surrounded by intercon-

nected rifle pits and bunkers. In one such kill-zone action in late

2000 along a key route from Antioquia to Chocó, guerrillas inflicted

heavy casualties on special forces of the Colombian 4th Brigade.

Often, however, the army could detect the kill zone before falling

into the trap. (RAND pp44-45,45n)

Andean Abyss

30. Peace Commission FACG

FARC accused in Commissioner’s killing: Remove 1 FARC Zone.

Peace bid: Government places 1 FARC Zone. (See 6.4.3)

The FARC’s ambush and execution in late 2000 of the head of the

Colombian congressional peace commission, Diego Torbay, dealt

Pastrana’s peace policy a new blow. (RAND pp73-74)

31. Betancourt FCGA

Sympathy for famous hostage: Shift 2 Cities and 1 Dept 1 level each

toward Active Support.

Hostage negotiations forum for FARC: Shift 3 spaces from Passive

Opposition to Active Opposition

Spitfire senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—

known among other things for her outreach to the FARC—fell

hostage in 2002 as she toured the recently remilitarized FARC

zone. She became an international symbol of Colombia’s hostage

tragedy—and of the FARC’s role in it. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-

102,145,168-171,242)

32. Secuestrados FCGA

Fed up with hostage-taking: Shift 2 spaces from Neutral or Passive

Opposition to Passive Support.

Ransoming highly profitable: FARC Resources +12.

Colombian media constantly reminded the populace that kidnap-

pings were garnering 100s of millions of dollars for the FARC and

other groups. Public outcry grew under Pastrana as negotiations

with FARC failed to end the scourge, and regular radio messages

from loved ones to hostages further broadcast the trauma. (Bruce-

Hayes-Botero pp95-96,141-143,173)

33. Sucumbíos FCGA

Ecuadoran buffer zone: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

space bordering Ecuador.

Cross-border war: Place 2 pieces in Ecuador. It is a 0 Pop Dept. No

more than 2 pieces per Faction may stack there.

As the 2008 Colombian raid on a FARC camp in the Ecuadoran

province of Sucumbíos vividly illustrated, Colombia’s insurgency

and counterinsurgency often spilled over borders. The FARC used

Ecuador’s territory for rest, resupply, and training; and some coca

processing took place there as well. (CRS pp10,23-24) Ecuadoran

troops at times clashed with suspected Colombian guerrillas within

Ecuador. Quito planned increases in development spending in border

provinces such as Sucumbíos to create a social and economic buffer

zone. (RAND pp88-89)

34. Airdropped AKs FCAG

Insurgents scammed by Russian criminals: Drop an Insurgent

Faction’s Resources by –5.

Covert weapons delivery: An Insurgent Faction places 2 Guerrillas

and 1 Base into a 0 Population Department.

A creative arms-for-drugs deal brokered by Russian mafia in 2000

included Russian planes parachuting as many as 30,000 automatic

rifles to the FARC in eastern Colombia. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero p91;

RAND pp36-37)

35. Crop Substitution FCAG

Government initiative: Replace the Cartels Bases in 1 Department

with 1 Police each. Aid +3.

FARC proposals lauded: Shift a Department with a Cartels Base by

2 levels toward Active Opposition.

Crop substitution or “alternative development” programs sought to

supplement coca and poppy eradication by providing licit income

to farmers who otherwise would replant drug crops. FARC initia-

tives in its zone in 1999-2002 drew attention and support from the

United Nations, the European Union, and other foreigners. (Brittain

pp95-98) US support via Plan Colombia also featured crop substitu-

tion. The US Agency for International Development claimed such

a program from 2005-2009 reduced coca growing by 85% in a key

cultivation region of western Meta. (CRS pp26-29)

36. Zona de Convivencia FCAG

ELN gets its DMZ: Govt places a FARC Zone in Mountain. (See

6.4.3) Shift 2 adjacent Neutral spaces to Passive Support, if possible.

Executing Faction remains Eligible past this card.

The Pastrana administration explored negotiations with the ELN,

parallel to those with the FARC. The ELN demanded a zone analo-

gous to that granted to the FARC, and Pastrana agreed in principle to

a 5000km² “live-and-let-live zone” around the juncture of Antioquia,

Bolívar, and Santander. (RAND pp41,74) Uribe also pursued the

ELN’s negotiated demobilization, but the group broke off talks in

2008. (CRS pp13-14)

37. Former Military AGFC

Ties that bind: Government free Sweeps or Assaults FARC within

each space, no moves; AUC Guerrillas act as Troops.

Ex-officers advise paramilitaries: AUC free Marches any of its

Guerrillas and then, at any 1 destination, free Ambushes.

The AUC was purported to collaborate with elements of the Colom-

bian Army and to have some 1000 active members who had served

in the nation’s armed forces, including 53 retired military officers

who acted as AUC advisors. AUC leader Carlos Castaño himself

corroborated these estimates when in 2000 he claimed to have more

than 1000 ex-soldiers and 135 former army officers among his forces.

(Murillo p100; Hristov pp71,86-87)

38. National Coordination Center AGFC

New command fights paramilitaries: Remove all Active AUC Guer-

rillas from up to 3 spaces with cubes or Support.

Sympathizers alert AUC: All AUC Guerrillas in spaces with cubes

or Support to Underground.

The Colombian Government as of 2000 had declared the battle

against illegal autodefensas to be a strategic priority and established

the National Coordination Center to lead that fight. Government-

reported kills and captures of paramilitaries had been far lower than

of rebel guerrillas in absolute numbers. The casualties were more

comparable in percentages of total AUC and FARC-ELN strength,

however. Moreover, argued the Defense Ministry, the fact that rebels

sought out confrontations with security forces more often than would

paramilitaries explained any disparity. (RAND pp57-58)

Andean Abyss

39. Soldados Campesinos AGFC

Local forces platoons: Place 1 Police into each of 6 Depts.

Local forces augment autodefensas: In up to 3 Depts, replace 1

Police with 1 available AUC Guerrilla.

The reestablishment of local forces—Soldados Campesinos (“Peas-

ant Soldiers”), later Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”)—and

a related expansion of municipal police proved indispensable to

Uribe’s counterinsurgency in providing a state presence in threatened

areas. (Marks p135,136) Others saw such forces as legitimation of

paramilitaries, in light of the overlap of their membership with that

of the AUC. (Murillo pp103,113-114)

40. Demobilization AGCF

Negotiated reintegration: Replace 3 AUC Guerrillas with available

Police.

Talks a ruse, fighters recycled: Move all cubes in a Dept with AUC

to any Cities. Place 1 AUC piece in each of 2 Cities.

The Uribe administration in 2003-2006 negotiated the AUC’s

demobilization. Some suspected that the aim was to rein in para-

militaries mainly to legitimize the state’s main offensive against the

FARC. (Murillo p102) Others charged that—while thousands of

AUC members demobilized and turned in weapons—much of the

demobilization was faked or of only temporary impact on paramili-

tary capabilities. (Hristov pp146-160) A UN and US view was that

remaining paramilitary bands were of a different nature, criminal

rather than political in purpose. (CRS p14)

41. Mancuso AGCF

AUC No.2 extradited: AUC Resources –6. Remove all AUC pieces

from 1 space.

AUC drug lord: AUC Resources +3 for each space with AUC and

Cartels pieces.

The FARC was far from the only insurgent group to benefit from

the drug trade. The AUC’s chief in 2000 acknowledged that the

paramilitary coalition received a majority of its financing from

drug trafficking. The US labeled the AUC a “cocaine-smuggling

terrorist” organization and sought its leaders’ extradition. Colom-

bian authorities extradited AUC deputy and military commander

Salvatore Mancuso to the US in 2008. (Camacho-López pp85-86;

Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp90-91; Murillo pp105,111-112; Hristov p80;

Chepesiuk p280; www.ColombiaReports.com)

42. Senado & Cámara AGCF

Unity behind Presidential war policy: 2 Neutral spaces to Passive

Support. Govt Resources +3.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

Insurgent sympathies: No Sweep or Assault against executing Fac-

tion until next Propaganda.

The Left charged that not only the military but the entire Colombian

political system defended elite interests by protecting right-wing

paramilitary violence, and therefore constituted no more than a

“death-squad democracy”. (Brittain pp204-205) Some claimed that

a third to a half of Colombian legislators were pro-AUC. (Murillo

pp105,212n34; Hristov p133) Paramilitary intimidation of politicians

may have played a role. (Hristov p125) Other AUC sympathies in

the legislature may have represented popular views, in light of polls

seeing the paramilitaries as less of a threat than the FARC. (RAND

pp56,59) As for the cartels, buying politicians rather than terrorizing

the public was a key Cali tactic, and some drug lords themselves

competed electorally at the local level. (Chepesiuk p68; Camacho-

López pp75-76) Finally, legislators and political candidates who saw

themselves as Government-FARC interlocutors engaged personally

in the peace process. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-97) In any event,

by Uribe’s term, public distaste for the status quo provided a uni-

fied political front for his war on all illegal armed groups. (Marks

pp129,131,138-139; Ospina p60)

43. Calima Front AFGC

Suspect leftists massacred: Place 2 Terror in and remove all FARC

Bases from a Dept with Troops.

Brutality blamed on Army: Place 2 Terror in a Dept with Troops.

Aid –9.

Affected communities charged that paramilitaries carried out assas-

sinations in broad daylight and close proximity to military posts. The

Army in 1999 in Cauca reportedly helped set up a paramilitary group

called the Calima Front, with military officers providing weapons,

logistics, and intelligence to AUC fighters—a case emblematic to

human rights observers of the AUC’s ability to wage war on civilians

with impunity. (Murillo pp94-97)

44. Colombia Nueva AFGC

Anti-corruption campaign: Shift a non-Opposition City to Active

Support. Govt Resources +3.

Political campaign divisive: Shift a City from Support to Neutral.

Govt Resources –3.

Young congresswoman and later senator Ingrid Betancourt made her

political reputation by outing fellow legislators for corruption and

by pursuing President Samper’s impeachment. Her tenacity earned

her both wild popularity and death threats. By her 2002 presidential

run— “Colombia Nueva” was her slogan—she had lost her popular-

ity, blamed for airing Colombia’s dirty laundry internationally in

her French-published autobiography. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero, pp94-

97,136-137)

45. Los Derechos Humanos AFGC

Officers disciplined: Shift each space with cubes and Terror 1 level

toward Active Support.

International human rights cartel: –1 Aid for each space with AUC

pieces. Subtract a die roll from Govt Resources.

Debates in the US Congress over aid funding focused on allega-

tions of human rights abuses on all sides, especially by paramilitary

groups and the Colombian military. Colombian authorities took

steps against military-paramilitary collusion, for example, in 2000

dismissing 388 military officers and NCOs for human rights abuses

or corruption and indicting several generals. (RAND, p58) By

2010, the Obama Administration certified to Congress that “years

of reforms and training [were] leading to an increased respect for ...

human rights by most members of the [Colombian] Armed Forces.”

Some outside observers felt that human rights charges had gone

too far and constituted “lawfare” against Colombia’s self-defense

by an international “human rights cartel”. In this view, foreign crit-

ics—hostile to the Colombian state itself—remained unwilling to

acknowledge any human rights progress despite a surging national

popularity of military and government. (Murillo p19; CRS pp14-

15,18-19,36; Marks pp129,137)

Andean Abyss

46. Limpieza AFCG

Ruthless elimination: An Insurgent Faction executes free Terror

with any Guerrilla, removes any 2 enemy pieces in the space, and

sets it to Passive Support or Opposition (unless 0 Pop). The Terror

places 2 markers.

“Limpieza social” (“social cleansing”) killings rose in Colombia in

the late-1990s and early-2000s, as both leftist guerrillas and rightist

paramilitaries sought to consolidate control by eliminating people

considered misfits or suspected of collaboration with the other side.

(RAND p6-7) Paramilitaries would defend areas from guerrillas

preemptively, by drawing up lists of potential leftist sympathizers

and then exterminating them, or using random terror to seed fear

and show what might happen to anyone leaning toward the FARC

or ELN. (Hristov pp74,92-94)

47. Pinto & del Rosario AFCG

Human rights investigators: All AUC Guerrillas Active. All Police

free Assault AUC as if Troops.

Prosecutors killed: AUC places 2 Guerrillas in Cúcuta, executes free

Terror there, and flips any 2 AUC Guerrillas Underground.

Colombian police and judicial authorities investigating right-wing

involvement in massacres became targets of threats and assassina-

tion. (Hristov p133) In what appeared to be one such case in 2001,

Cúcuta special prosecutor María del Rosario Silva Ríos and then her

replacement Carlos Arturo Pinto Bohórquez were both shot to death.

Authorities later convicted Cúcuta regional paramilitary commander

Jorge Iván “The Iguana” Laverde Zapata in the killings. Demobi-

lized paramilitary Orlando Bocanegra Arteaga also acknowledged

responsibility. (www.ElEspectador.com; www.ElTiempo.com)

48. Unión Sindical Obrera AFCG

AUC targets oil labor organizers: Remove 1 Opposition or FARC

Base adjacent to 3-Econ pipeline.

Labor backs FARC: Shift 1 level toward Active Opposition in 2

Cities other than Bogotá.

Labor unions—suspected of a similar social agenda as that of the

rebel guerrillas and therefore of collusion with them—became fre-

quent targets of right-wing paramilitary violence. The FARC and

the ELN had maintained a strong presence around the oil-refining

town of Barrancabermeja in Santander, a hotbed of the powerful oil

workers union, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO). The AUC entered the

area in 2001, killing 180 and displacing some 4000—acts popularly

seen as a continuation of efforts to suppress popular organizing

in the town. AUC leader Carlos Castaño in 2003 sent a menacing

email to the union, declaring all USO leaders and the children of

USO members to be “military targets”. (Murillo pp87-88; Hristov

pp77,117,120)

49. Bloques ACGF

Militias defy Castaño: Permanently remove 3 available AUC Guer-

rillas.

Independent militias join AUC: Place an AUC Guerrilla and Base

in any Department.

The AUC came together in the mid-1990s as an umbrella for several

regional “self-defense” organizations (bloques). An amalgam of

autonomous groups, the AUC was less cohesive than the FARC.

Several powerful groups, such as the Bloque Central Bolívar, did

not recognize AUC leadership, and paramilitaries fought turf wars

amongst themselves. (RAND pp54-55; Hristov p70; Murillo p108;

Brittain p126)

50. Carabineros ACGF

National police field forces: Govt places a total of up to 3 Police

into any Departments.

National police corruption: Remove any 2 Police or replace them

with available AUC Guerrillas.

During the Pastrana and then Uribe years, Colombia systematically

established police presence in every county of the country. Those

areas historically thought too dangerous for police presence were

manned by police field forces (Carabineros), similar in size and na-

ture to army local forces but more mobile and better armed. (Marks

pp136,145n38) As with the Army, however, some police were

suspected of collusion with the paramilitaries, for example taking

payments in return for armed protection of paramilitary units while

the latter carried out their terror campaigns. (Hristov, p87)

51. Pipeline Repairs ACGF

Speedy patching: Remove all Pipeline Sabotage or, if none, Govern-

ment Resources +12.

Security concerns hinder maintenance: Sabotage 3 Pipelines with

or adjacent to FARC Guerrillas.

Guerrilla action against energy pipelines often becomes a race be-

tween how often the saboteurs can damage the line and how quickly

the defenders can repair them. Attacks on the key northern-Colom-

bian Caño-Limón pipeline in the guerrilla heyday of 2001 shut it

down for 240 days out of the year. (Ricks-Lightner p80) Coordinated

FARC pipeline attacks as late as 2008 halted production of over

800,000 barrels of oil. (Brittain p23)

52. Castaño ACFG

AUC leader’s memoir a best seller: Shift 2 City or Mountain each

1 level toward Active Support.

Charismatic AUC political leader: Place an AUC Base into a space

with AUC, then add +1 AUC Resources per AUC Base.

Charismatic AUC chief Carlos Castaño Gil gave interviews to lead-

ing national publications and obtained favorable media coverage to

portray the movement as a politically legitimate “third actor” in the

Colombian conflict. The 2001 book Mi Confesión, purporting to

“reveal his secrets”, sold in all major Colombian cities and became

one of the most popular books in the country. (Murillo p99)

53. Criminal Air Force ACFG

Insurgent access to small aircraft: An Insurgent Faction moves 1

or 2 Guerrillas between any 2 Departments and flips them Under-

ground.

The AUC as of 2004 reportedly fielded up to 14 state-of-art helicop-

ters and a dozen small planes. (Murillo p100) AUC chief Castaño

in 2001 claimed to have loaned helicopters to the Cali Cartel.

(Chepesiuk p143) Witnesses reported Army helicopters deploying

AUC fighters to new regions or supplying them with ammunition

and medications while on terror operations. (Hristov pp85,88) Some

charged that troops wearing AUC armbands in 2003 parachuted

from military aircraft into a region of Arauca to conduct a massacre.

(Brittain p136)

Andean Abyss

54. Deserters & Defectors ACFG

Remove up to 2 Guerrillas or replace them with any other Factions’

available Guerrillas.

AUC ranks contained numerous FARC deserters, because of the

harsh discipline imposed by the FARC and because the AUC of-

fered protection from retaliation by former comrades. (RAND p56)

Castaño in 2000 claimed 800 ex-leftist guerrillas among his forces.

One such defector from the FARC led the rightist Bloque Norte y

Anorí. The AUC also offered monthly wages to unemployed youth

who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they would

serve as AUC troops. (Hristov pp71,88,96,106)

55. DEA Agents CGFA

Law enforcement assistance: Remove a Shipment and any 5 Cartels

Guerrillas.

Más Yanquis: In 3 spaces with Cartels pieces, shift 1 level toward

Active Opposition.

Colombian-US counternarcotics cooperation thrived from the mid-

1990s on, especially via the US Drug Enforcement Administration.

Some regard the takedown of the Cali Cartel during this period as

the DEA’s greatest victory. The relationship was not without its

political frictions, though, including a struggle under Samper over

how much control the Colombians would have over DEA activities

in the country. Exaggeration in Colombian media may have added

to the tension: the press in 1995 reported the presence of more than

500 DEA agents in Cali alone, even though the agency in reality

had no more than 2 or 3 agents there at a time. (Chepesiuk pp201-

202,272)

56. Drogas La Rebaja CGFA

Cali cartel’s drugstore chain seized: Transfer 9 Resources from

Cartels to Government.

Retail empire: Add twice Cartels pieces in Cities to Cartels Re-

sources. Then place a Cartels Base in each of 2 Cities.

The Cali Cartel’s Rodríguez brothers used their cocaine profits

to build a semi-legal business empire, the heart of which was the

Drogas La Rebaja drugstore chain. The Government in 2004 seized

the 400-store chain, breaking the back of that cartel’s finances.

(Chepesiuk pp68-69,259)

57. Op Millennium CGFA

Colombian-US strike at Bernal syndicate: Replace up to 3 Cartels

pieces with available Police.

Investigation penetrated: In each of 2 spaces, replace a Police with

an available Cartels piece.

After dismembering the Medellín and Cali cartels, Colombian and

US authorities pressed ahead with joint efforts to capture leaders

of the surviving, decentralized “cartelitos”. Operation Millenium

in 1999 netted drug group leader Alejandro Bernal and previously

released Medellín Cartel co-founder Fabio Ochoa. But an estimated

several hundred small cartels remained, into which Colombian po-

lice and the US DEA had little insight. (Chepesiuk pp241,276-277;

RAND pp15-16)

58. General Serrano CGAF

National Police hammer cartels: Cartels Resources –6. Remove all

Cartels Guerrillas.

Officials on cartel payroll: Cartels relocate up to 4 Police to any

spaces.

Colombian police—traditionally seen as corrupt, and many of whose

members were at the service of the Cali Cartel—in the mid-1990s

effectively declared war against drug traffickers. (Camacho-López

p79) Studious and tough Policía Nacional chief General Rosso José

Serrano Cadena cleaned house and from late 1994 on led the as-

sault on the Cali Cartel, in close alliance with the US. (Chepesiuk

pp xxi,192-197)

59. Salcedo CGAF

Cartel informant: All Cartels Guerrillas to Active. Free Assault

against Cartels in each space.

Cali cartel security chief: Cartels flip all their Guerrillas Under-

ground and relocate up to 3 of them anywhere.

Jorge Salcedo was a key member of the Cali Cartel’s intelligence

and security team—the talented, charismatic son of a Colombian

general, he had military training, counterinsurgency field experience,

excellent computer skills, and fluent English. Turned informant

by US enforcement authorities, Salcedo opened a window on Cali

Cartel operations and enabled the capture of its leaders. (Chepesiuk

pp137-138,212-219)

60. The Chess Player CGAF

Kingpin strategy scores: Remove all Cartels pieces from 2 Cities

or 1 Dept. Govt Resources +6.

Cali’s Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela expands empire: Cartels place

an available Base in each of 2 Cities and free Bribe in 1 space.

Less violent than Medellín’s Pablo Escobar, Cali Cartel co-found-

ers Gilberto (“The Chess Player”—cartel strategic planner) and

Miguel (“El Señor”—cartel boss) Rodríguez Orejuela only became

a Government priority after Escobar’s death in late 1993 and a drug

financing scandal reached the Presidency of Ernesto Samper in 1994.

A Colombian-US strategy of combining leads and focusing resources

on capturing cartel leaders netted the Rodríguez brothers’ arrests by

1996 and extradition to the US by 2005. (Camacho-López pp78-79;

Chepesiuk, pp xxi,22-23,68,95,202,269-270)

61. Air Bridge CFGA

Peruvian coca supply controlled: Remove all Cartels pieces from

1 City. Cartels Resources –6.

Colombian coca growers fill Peruvian void: Place 1 Cartels Base

into each of 3 Depts with no Cartels pieces.

Traditionally, the bulk of coca processed into cocaine in Colombia

had been grown in Peru and Bolivia. An “air-bridge” strategy of

US-Peruvian interdiction of coca deliveries into Colombia denied

Colombian traffickers most of this central-Andean crop—with the

unintended effect of encouraging coca cultivation inside Colombia.

Between 1995 and 1999, Colombia became the center of all stages

of cocaine production, from harvest to delivery. (RAND pp12,20-21;

Camacho-López pp 82-83)

Andean Abyss

66. Tingo María CFAG

Coca crop fails: Remove 3 Cartels Bases from Forest.

Hearty coca variety: Within stacking, place an available Cartels

Base into each Forest that already has one.

Under pressure from the Government’s coca eradication spraying

to shift cultivation to less ideal terrain, growers adapted by devel-

oping new varieties of the coca plant. One such variety, the Tingo

María, would produce 3 times as much coca as the traditional plant.

(RAND p66)

67. Mexican Traffickers CAGF

Major shipment busted en route: Cartels Resources –10.

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

New routes to US market: This Resources phase, Cartels add Re-

sources equal to 4 x Bases.

The Cali Cartel had relied on its own delivery networks to get cocaine

to US market. Disruption of that cartel’s distribution routes through

the Caribbean and the dismantling of the Cartel itself in 1995-1996

created opportunities for Mexican traffickers to provide Colombian

wholesalers with delivery and retailing services. Already prior to

Op Millenium, the Colombian Bernal group was working with a

Mexican Ciudad Juárez-based cartel to deliver 20-30 tons of cocaine

monthly to the United States. Mexicans soon came to dominate US

cocaine distribution with more extensive and efficient networks.

(Camacho-López p83; Chepesiuk p278; RAND p15)

68. Narco-Subs CAGF

Submersibles seized: Remove from coastal spaces 2 Cartels pieces

or up to 2 Shipments.

Littoral stealth: Cartels Resources +2 per Cartels piece in coastal

spaces.

A predawn Colombian police raid on a Bogotá warehouse in 2000

discovered a 100-foot submarine under construction, a joint proj-

ect between a Colombian cartel and the Russian mob, intended to

smuggle tons of narcotics. (Chepesiuk pp227-8)

69. Riverines & Fast Boats CAGF

Move any of your cubes or Guerrillas from 1 space through a chain

of up to 3 adjacent Depts. You then may execute a free Op other

than Patrol or March within the final space.

Colombia features two major river valleys—the Magdalena and

the Cauca—running south-to-north along the Andes, numerous

major rivers draining the eastern plains into the Amazon, and both

Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In all, 18,000km of navigable rivers in

Colombia serve as highways for Government forces, guerrillas,

62. Amazonía CFGA

Brasília’s Op Cobra blocks border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces

from 0 Population Forests.

Jungle landing strips: Place 1 Cartels Base each in Guainía, Vaupés,

and Amazonas.

The lowlands of eastern Colombia, comprising 60 percent of national

territory but only 4 percent of population, formed a vast hinterland

vacuum for illegal groups to fill. Government pressure in the late

1990s and early 2000s pushed these groups—coca growers and

FARC alike—ever deeper into jungle sanctuaries. Brazil shared an

interest with Colombia in controlling their vast Amazonian frontier.

So it sought to block the daily clandestine flights between Colombia

and its airspace and, with Colombian authorities, dismantled numer-

ous jungle landing strips near the border. In 2000, it launched its

3-year Operation Cobra to augment its border presence with the

deployment of 6,000 Brazilian troops to the region. (Marks p129;

RAND pp66,90-91)

63. Narco-War CFGA

Rival syndicates go for the throat: In each space with Cartels Guer-

rillas, remove all but 1; Cartels conduct free Terror with that 1. Mark

Cartels Ineligible through next card.

Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel in 1993 fell into a tit-for-tat ter-

ror battle with a vigilante group (“los pepes”) backed by the Cali

Cartel—a narco-war that played a substantial role in Escobar’s fall.

(Chepesiuk pp139-142) Fighting among cartels as of the late 1990s

remained a major cause of the country’s 30,000 murders annually.

(RAND p17)

64. Cocaine Labs CFAG

FARC taps suppliers: Place a Shipment with a FARC Guerrilla in

the same space as a Cartels Base.

Well-oiled industry: For each Cartels Base, Cartels Resources +2 if

in City, +1 if in Dept.

Colombia’s illicit drug industry built on a long tradition of Latin

American smuggling. It initially required only the investment in

urban laboratories to process rural crop into cocaine and heroin.

Over decades, cartels built up into large-scale enterprises. The

Cali Cartel boasted safe houses strategically spread across the city

and an intelligence network of hotel clerks, corrupt police, street

vendors, and 5,000 taxi drivers. With the breakup of the big urban

cartels in the mid-1990s, profits declined, but the industry continued.

(Camacho-López pp61,64-67,82-84; Chepesiuk pp203-204) The

FARC helped fill any vacuum. For a fee, it would protect cocaine

laboratories and landing strips, transport precursor chemicals, or

ship finished cocaine. (RAND pp32-33)

65. Poppies CFAG

Growers and Government eradication focus on heroin source:

Place or remove 1 Shipment or Insurgent Base in any Mountain

Department.

Colombia in the 1990s became the Western Hemisphere’s largest

producer of opium poppies and refined heroin (though Asia produced

far more), with an estimated 7,500 hectares under poppy cultiva-

tion as of 1999. Locals in coffee-growing regions had responded

to a precipitous drop in coffee prices by switching to poppies, and

the Government quickly responded with aerial spraying. (RAND

pp12-13; Chepesiuk p27; Hristov p191)

Andean Abyss

and drug shipments. To exploit and control these waterways, the

Government with US support in 1999 established a riverine brigade

of 5 battalions spread throughout the country. The AUC meanwhile

fielded large numbers of speedboats with mounted machineguns

for their war against the FARC. And on the coasts, Colombian

narcotraffickers and guerrillas used fast boats that outclassed those

available to regional navies. (RAND pp xix,33,65,86,97; Hristov

p190; Bruce-Hayes-Botero p90; Murillo p100)

70. Ayahuasca Tourism CAFG

Eco-tourism helps trade balance: Government Resources +6 for

each Forest without Guerrillas.

Eco-tourists taken: A Faction executes free Terror with any 1 Guer-

rilla in each Forest and gets +3 Resources per Terror.

Colombia hosts some of the most pristine rain forests in South

America, drawing a growing eco-tourist trade (locally known as

Ayahuasca tourism). Pharmaceutical companies have shown in-

creased interest in the Colombian forest for potential medicines. The

amazing variety of species also supports a thriving illegal export of

animals. (Ricks-Lightner pp12-13)

71. Darién CAFG

Arms traffic interdicted: Remove a Guerrilla from Chocó; its Faction

suffers –5 Resources.

Border sanctuary: Place 1-2 Bases in Panamá. It is a 0 Pop Forest.

Sweep does not Activate Guerrillas there.

Arms stockpiles from the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan civil wars of

the 1980s were a major source of weapons smuggled into Colombia.

Central American arms arrived in part via a network of 40-50 foot-

paths through the triple-canopy jungle of Panama’s Darién province

bordering Colombia. The same network served to smuggle drugs

in the opposite direction. The FARC reportedly maintained 2 bat-

talion-sized units and a major logistics and support base in Darién,

outgunning the Panamanians. (RAND pp35,36f,85-86)

72. Sicarios CAFG

Hired drug guns unreliable: Replace all Cartels Guerrillas in 2

spaces with other Guerrillas.

Unemployed ready to work for syndicates: Place all available Cartels

Guerrillas into spaces with Cartels Bases.

Colombia’s big drug traffickers and guerrilla groups created a

violent social type—the sicario: a poor youngster, mainly urban,

who for a sum of money would kill a cartel’s opponents. The M19

guerrilla group in the 1980s, before its demobilization, organized

and trained such poor urban youth, who later became gangsters for

hire to the highest bidder, typically the cartels. (Camacho-López

pp79-80) The AUC in turn offered monthly wages to unemployed

youth who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they

would serve as AUC troops. (Hristov p96) Finally, ex-AUC fight-

ers with few alternatives often became sicarios for drug traffickers.

(Hristov p155)

SELECTED SOURCES

(roughly, from Right to Left)

“Insights from Colombia’s ‘Prolonged War’” by Carlos Alberto

Ospina Ovalle, JFQ, issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006. The importance

of strategy, doctrine, and legitimacy in internal war, from the

architect of modern Colombian COIN.

“Colombia—Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response”

by Thomas A. Marks, Prism 1, No.4, August 2010. How the

Colombian Army and Government learned COIN during the

period of the game and won against FARC and AUC.

Colombian Labyrinth—The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency

and Its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa

and Peter Chalk, RAND, 2001. From mid-period of the game,

a US view of how to win as the Government.

Colombia—Issues for Congress by June Beittel, Congressional

Research Service (CRS), March 2011. Looking back on prog-

ress in Colombian COIN and counter-narcotics, as assessed

for the US Congress.

Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali Cartel by Ron

Chepesiuk, Milo Books Ltd, 2003. Focused on US assistance

to the Government in fighting the last flashy cartel.

Insurgency & Terrorism—From Revolution to Apocalypse by

Bard O’Neill, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. Theoretical discus-

sion of insurgency and COIN, including the nature of egalitarian

(FARC), preservationist (AUC), and commercialist (Cartels)

insurgencies worldwide.

Colombia: d20—Guerilla Warfare by Tom Ricks and Ken

Lightner, Holistic Design Inc., 2003. Background for roleplay-

ing the Colombian conflict, including economic and cultural

aspects.

“From Smugglers to Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in

Illicit Colombian Drug Organizations” by Álvaro Camacho

Guizado and Andrés López Restrepo, Peace, Democracy, and

Human Rights in Colombia, University of Notre Dame Press,

2007. How the big cartels learned to decentralize and keep a

low profile.

Hostage Nation—Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

War on Drugs by Victoria Bruce and Karin Hayes, with Jorge

Enrique Botero, Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. The stories of the most

famous FARC hostages of the Uribe period.

Colombia and the United States—War, Unrest and Destabiliza-

tion by Mario A. Murillo, Seven Stories Press, 2003. Discus-

sion of the development, nature, and capabilities of the AUC;

sees Government design in the formation and tolerance of the

paramilitaries.

Blood and Capital—The Paramilitarization of Colombia by

Jasmin Hristov, Ohio University Press, 2009. A catalogue of

human rights abuses by AUC and Army, pinned herein on class

interests and Government complicity.

Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia—The Origin and

Direction of the FARC-EP by James J. Brittain, Pluto Press,

2010. The Marxist view of the conflict and why FARC is

destined to win.

Andean Abyss

CREDITS

Game Design: Volko Ruhnke

Development: Joel Toppen

Art Director, Cover Art and Package De-

sign: Rodger B. MacGowan

Map and Counters: Chechu Nieto, Xavier

Carrascosa

Cards: Mark Simonitch and Chechu Nieto

Rules and Charts: Mark Simonitch and

Charles Kibler

Playtest: Solitaire Aces—Steve Caler, James

“Norbert” Stockdale, Todd Quinn; 2-Player

Remoras—Jeremy Antley, Mike Owens;

3-Player Home Front—Andrew Ruhnke,

Daniel Ruhnke; Cartels Kingpin—Darién

Fenoglio; Team Bogotá—Juan Francisco

Torres; Devil’s Advocates—Jeff Baker,

John Gitzen, Dan McGuire, Patrick Neary,

Joel Tamburo; Demo King—Mark Mitchell;

Guerrilleros—Paul Aceto, Wendell Al-

bright, Mike Bertucelli, Jeff Grossman, Igor

Horst, Michael Lessard, Fred Manzo, Tim

Porter, Stéphane Renard, Martin Sample,

Roger Taylor.

VASSAL Module: Joel Toppen

Images: 1st Division, Ospina & Mora,

High Mountain Battalions, Plan Meteoro,

Kill Zone, Soldados Campesinos, National

Coordination Center, Carabineros—Tom

Marks; Caño Limón-Coveñas—Sémhur;

Occidental & Ecopetrol—Pedro Filipe;

War Tax, Colombia Nueva —Julián Ortega

Martínez & equinoXio; DoD Contractors—P

Alejandro Diaz; Gramaje—Luis Acosta;

Hugo Chávez—Presidencia Argentina;

Peace Commission—Germán Cabrejo;

Secuestrados—Paola Vargas & equinoXio;

Former Military—TerceraInformacion.

es; Calima Front—La FM; Senado & Cá-

mara—Leandro Neumann Ciuffo; Pinto &

del Rosario—Louise Wolff; Unión Sindical

Obrera—Mennonot; Bloques—Silvia An-

drea Moreno; Castaño—Socialist Worker;

Criminal Air Force—Mabadia71; Deserters

& Defectors—John Jairo Bonilla; Drogas

La Rebaja—jthadeo; Amazonía—Navy of

Brazil; Narco-War—F3rn4nd0; Cocaine

Labs—Valter Campanato ABr; Tingo

María—H Zell; Darién—Christian Ziegler;

Sicarios—Luis Pérez.

Production Coordination: Tony Curtis

Producers: Tony Curtis, Rodger Mac-

Gowan, Andy Lewis, Gene Billingsley and

Mark Simonitch

GFAC

1. 1st Division

2. Ospina & Mora

3. Tapias

GFCA

4. Caño Limón - Coveñas

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol

6. Oil Spill

GAFC

7. 7th Special Forces

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana

9. High Mountain Battalions

GACF

10. Blackhawks

11. National Defense & Security Council

12. Plan Colombia

GCFA

13. Plan Meteoro

14. Tres Esquinas

15. War Tax

GCAF

16. Coffee Prices

17. Madrid Donors

18. NSPD-18

FGAC

19. General Offensive

20. Mono Jojoy

21. Raúl Reyes

FGCA

22. Alfonso Cano

23. DoD Contractors

24. Operación Jaque

FAGC

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional

26. Gramaje

27. Misil Antiaéreo

FACG

28. Hugo Chávez

29. Kill Zone

30. Peace Commission

FCGA

31. Betancourt

32. Secuestrados

33. Sucumbíos

FCAG

34. Airdropped AKs

35. Crop Substitution

36. Zona de Convivencia

AGFC

37. Former Military

38. National Coordination Center

39. Soldados campesinos

AGCF

40. Demobilization

41. Mancuso

42. Senado & Cámara

AFGC

43. Calima Front

44. Colombia Nueva

45. Los Derechos Humanos

AFCG

46. Limpieza

47. Pinto & del Rosario

48. Unión Sindical Obrera

ACGF

49. Bloques

50. Carabineros

51. Pipeline Repairs

ACFG

52. Castaño

53. Criminal Air Force

54. Deserters & Defectors

CGFA

55. DEA Agents

56. Drogas La Rebaja

57. Op Millennium

CGAF

58. General Serrano

59. Salcedo

60. The Chess Player

CFGA

61. Air Bridge

62. Amazonía

63. Narco-War

CFAG

64. Cocaine Labs

65. Poppies

66. Tingo María

CAGF

67. Mexican Traffickers

68. Narco-Subs

69. Riverines & Fast Boats

CAFG

70. Ayahuasca Tourism

71. Darién

72. Sicarios

73-76. Propaganda!

CARD LIST

Andean Abyss

GMT Games, LLC

P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308

www.GMTGames.com

SPACES LIST

Cities

Pop

Bogotá & Villavicencio . . . . . . . . .

Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medellín. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bucaramanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ibagué & Pereira . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Santa Marta & Barranquilla. . . . . .

Cartagena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Neiva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sincelejo & Montería. . . . . . . . . . .

Total Population: 25

Departments

Type

Pop

Antioquia - Bolívar . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

Huila - Tolima . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

Santander - Boyacá . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

Arauca - Casanare . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

Atlántico - Magdalena . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Cesar - La Guajira . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .1

Chocó - Córdoba . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Guaviare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Meta East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

Meta West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Nariño - Cauca. . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Putumayo - Caquetá . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

Amazonas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

Guainía. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

Vaupés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

Vichada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .0

Total Population: 15

Lines of Communication

Type Econ

Arauca - Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

Cúcuta - Ayacucho . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

Ayachucho - Sincelejo . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

Bucaramanga - Ayacucho. . . . Pipe. . . .2

Ayacucho - Barranquilla . . . . Pipe. . . .2

Medellín - Sincelejo. . . . . . . . Pipe . . .2

Neiva - Bogotá. . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

Yopal - Bogotá . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

Bogotá-Ibagué-Bucaramanga Pipe. . . .2

Cartagena - Sincelejo. . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

Medellín - Ibagué. . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

Ibagué - Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

Cali - Buenaventura . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

Cartagena - Barranquilla . . . . Road . . .1

Bogotá - San José. . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

Cali - Pasto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

Neiva - Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

Pasto - Tumaco. . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

Total Economic Value: 30