Washington's War - Playbook

Washington’s War Playbook

War and Politics

Like the American Revolution that the game models, Washing-

ton’s War, is both a political conflict as well as a military conflict.

In my opinion, the biggest challenge that players will face in this

game is balancing political initiatives with military action. If too

much emphasis is placed on one dimension to the neglect of the

other, you will lose the game. Before rushing your redcoats or

patriots into a pitched battle, you’d better have a greater purpose

than “killing the enemy.” Conversely, if all you do is place PC

markers, sooner or later you will either lack spaces to place PC

markers, or you will find yourself the victim of mass isolation

and removal of PC markers.

The successful player is the one who uses his military forces

(his armies) in coordination with his political initiatives to gain

control of as many colonies as possible while at the same time

preventing his opponent from doing the same.

Play To Your Strengths

Washington’s War is a game of asymmetrical warfare. That

is to say the British will need to be played completely differ-

ently from how the American side will be played. Each side has

certain intrinsic strengths. In any such asymmetrical conflict, it

is essential that you play to your strengths and try to force your

opponent to “play your game.”

The British strengths are pretty obvious at the start of the game:

• They control the sea and may use Naval Movement to

move from port-to-port. The most extreme example of

this incredible mobility is a British Naval move from

Montreal or Quebec to St. Mary’s, Georgia or vice-

versa.

• British-controlled ports cannot be isolated.

• For the British, all ports are considered to be adjacent

to each other for all purposes. This enables the Brit-

ish to place PC markers into a neutral port anywhere

on the map so long as they control at least one port

of their own. Conversely, they may remove American

PC markers from un-garrisoned ports by discarding an

Event Card.

• British Armies in un-blockaded ports (whether at-

tacking or defending) and friendly-controlled fortified

ports (like Charleston), gain a +1 drm in battle for the

presence of the Royal Navy.

• The British may use Landing Parties with the play of

a Campaign Card to suddenly descend upon an en-

emy controlled but un-garrisoned port with an entire

army—ala Long Island, 1776. The effect of this and

the above two points is that it is very, very difficult

for the Americans to exercise anything resembling firm

control over the coast.

• The British Army is composed of trained regular

troops at the start of the game. This gives the British a

+1 DRM in any battle until this advantage is lost due

to high casualties in a defeat or the play of the Von

Steuben event. Winning battles does much to keep the

French from entering the war and changing the com-

plexion of the game.

• On several game turns, the British get reinforcements

in large quantities. This allows a sudden concentration

of enemy troops to appear in a friendly or neutral port.

• British Armies may enter Winter Quarters to avoid any

Winter Attrition. This allows the British to maintain

large armies in the field, something the Americans,

with the exception of Washington and perhaps Ro-

chambeau simply cannot do.

• Lastly, the British Generals, though fewer in number

than the Americans, are in all but one case (Burgoyne),

at the least equal, and usually superior in battle to any

American (or French) General.

The British Player will want to harness these advantages to

master his opponent.

The American advantages seem slender to the inexperienced

eye, but in fact, they can be quite formidable:

• They may exercise rapid marches overland. Provid-

ed they don’t conduct an overrun or initiate a battle,

American armies may move five spaces instead of the

usual four spaces. Furthermore, the John Glover Event

allows an American army to move six spaces, and en-

gage in Battle. This capability can be used to outma-

neuver the British inland or to counter a sudden naval

descent upon the coast.

• The Americans have more Generals than the Brit-

ish (7 to the British 5; 8 to 5 when the French enter

the game). This allows the Americans to field more

(though smaller) Armies. If well handled, many very

small armies, like a horde of ants, can bring down the

British elephant.

WASHINGTON’S WAR

PLAYER’S NOTES

by Joel Toppen

WW Playbook.indd 12

11/4/2009 11:59:56

Washington’s War Playbook

• The American Generals have low Strategy Ratings.

This allows them to be moved with the play of any

OPS card. Only Gates, Lincoln, and Rochambeau have

Strategy Ratings of “two.” No American General has a

Strategy Rating of “three.”

• American Armies may intercept moving British

Armies. This is something the British cannot do. Even

if the Americans lose the impending battle, the moving

British Army must stop and end its move.

• American Armies may retreat before battle—but not if

they intercept. Washington and Greene are especially

adept at this technique. Withdrawing on a die roll of

1-4, they have a 66% chance of success every time a

British Army engages them. If successful, the British

Army cannot pursue and must stop movement. What

this, and the above points mean is the Americans are

very, very maneuverable. Like a slippery fish, they are

hard to fix and destroy. Their constant presence can be

a real pest to the British. If you can keep the British

chasing ghosts as it were, you will succeed in making

the British play your game. Remember, it only takes an

Army of one Combat Unit to flip a PC marker at the

end of a turn or establish a blocking position to isolate

one or more British PC markers.

• The Americans have a potential ally in the French. The

British must avoid losing battles lest the French Alli-

ance come into being. The establishment of a French

Alliance will change the complexion of the game in

that the French will be able to blockade ports with their

navy—thus greatly hindering the British naval advan-

tages noted above. The French Alliance will also bring

in a capable General (Rochambeau) and five Combat

Units of French Troops which, when kept separate

from Americans, may go into Winter Quarters and

pose a real threat to the British Armies.

• The Americans can play two cards each turn to bring

in reinforcements. The Americans will never run out of

reinforcements (they don’t have a finite ‘pool’ of rein-

forcements like the British) while the British reinforce-

ment pool has the very real potential to run dry. If the

game is going long and the British reinforcement pool

is running dry, the Americans can begin to try to wear

down the remaining redcoats by repeatedly attacking

them and dwindling their numbers.

• Lastly, unless the British preempt with the play of a

Campaign Event, the American player will be able to

decide whether to go first or second in the turn. By

going first, the player will have the initiative. But go-

ing last has some very powerful benefits in that he will

be able make a move to which his opponent cannot

respond.

The American player will want to play to these strengths to

gain success against British combinations.

Some General Maxims

“For Every Action…”

Maintain the strategic initiative. That is to say, when possible,

make card plays which force your opponent to respond to your

play. If your opponent tries this against you, if you can, raise

the stakes and play a card that forces him to choose whether to

continue on his present course or respond to your play.

“He Who Laughs Last, Laughs Best.”

Going last is almost always best. Before deciding to go first,

you’d better have a very good reason for it. Going last with a

Campaign event has the potential to isolate and remove a number

of enemy PCs.

“When in Doubt, Isolate.”

Isolating enemy PCs is a pow-

erful tactic since isolated PCs are

removed at the end of a turn. If

you can isolate large numbers of

enemy PCs, you can turn the tide

of a game completely around. So

when you are unsure of what you

should be doing, strive to isolate

enemy PCs.

“A Colony is a Colony.”

In terms of victory conditions,

Delaware and Rhode Island are

every bit as valuable as New

York and Virginia. In fact, they

might be even more valuable

since they each consist of one

space and that one space equates

to one Colony towards your

victory conditions. So, as the

prophet said, “Don’t despise the

day of small things.”

“One Man’s Junk is Another Man’s Treasure.”

Be careful what you throw away. In discarding an enemy Event

Card, be aware that your opponent could bring that card into his

hand and use it against you. If you time things carefully, however,

you can mitigate against potential calamity.

“I’d rather be Fishing.”

A Battle Event has one very lovely bonus: it allows the player

to draw a replacement card. If you’ve got a weak hand, sometimes

it’s worth fighting a battle so that you can use this card to draw

another card. Of course it is entirely possible that the card drawn

puts you in a worse position. But I’ve also drawn a card in this

way that really helped me.

Lastly, have fun!

Joel Toppen

WW Playbook.indd 13

11/4/2009 11:59:57

Washington’s War Playbook

Fifteen-Year CDG Journey

When I designed We The People (hereafter WTP) back in the

mid-nineties I was intent on showing the American Revolution

as a political-military struggle. To support this goal I wanted a

design that focused on uncertainty and its impact on having and

maintaining the strategic initiative. Somehow I hit on the Card

Driven Game (hereafter CDG) mechanic whereby the player

had to choose between political or military options.

The big surprise for me was how quickly the CDG mechanic

caught on and spawned a new games genre with over twenty

designs in the catalog. Early on I decided to forgo applying for a

patent and instead chose to open the concept to the hobby. I have

never regretted this decision as it opened the concept to evolution

and expansion. Toward that end I would like to acknowledge

the talents of Mark Simonitch (Hannibal), Ted Raicer (Paths

of Glory), Mark McLaughlin (The Napoleonic Wars), Ananda

Gupta (Twilight Struggle), Jason Mathews (1960: The Making

of A President), Charlie Vasey (Unhappy King Charles), and Ed

Beach (Here I Stand) to name a few who have made significant

contributions to the CDG mechanic. So, here I stand, fifteen years

later with the original in the series about to be re-published in a

significantly transformed design.

We the People: The Good, the Bad

and the Ugly

The difficulty for me with the We The People design was ap-

preciating how much more complex the cards made a wargame

that was already grappling with the interactions of rules, pieces

and board position. Even a simple wargame like WTP was dif-

ficult to playtest as each play through seemed to create another

unique set of positions and narrative. Even more surprising was

how the CDG genre reinvigorated competitive play. The combi-

nation of these two features created a tension between achieving

play balance in a more complex mathematical design.

When confronted with the opportunity to re-publish the WTP

design over a decade after the last copies were sold retail I had

to choose between a straight re-print or a transformed design.

Over the last fifteen years and two additional CDG designs under

my belt (For The People and Empire of the Sun) I had learned

what I did and did not like about WTP. The good was how the

game viewed the war as a political struggle for the hearts and

minds of the American populace in a fast playing format. Charlie

Vasey and I had an interesting conversation in London many

moons back while drinking some excellent wine. Due to the

second bottle of wine I do not remember the entire conversation,

but I do remember that we discussed and agreed that the WTP

singularity of card use, event or operations, was a good model

for pre-19^th century warfare, which I note he maintained in his

recently published Unhappy King Charles CDG.

Another CDG distinction that has arisen over the last fifteen

years was the issue of unscripted single deck designs versus

scripted temporally segregated deck designs. I prefer the more

open narrative that is enabled by a less scripted environment

and the broader range of plausible historical narratives thereby

created. There is no correct answer, but I remain committed to a

less scripted CDG environment in my designs and this held true

in Washington’s War (hereafter WW).

The things that I would rate as bad with WTP were the oc-

casional hand where most of the player’s cards were enemy

events. This problem has been handled in different ways by

other CDGs and we now have another option added to the genre.

I combined the Washington’s War discard mechanic with my

desire to enhance the guerrilla war dimension of the design, but