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+

P L A Y B O O K

+

COIN Series,

+

Volume I

+

by

+

Volko Ruhnke

+

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Colombia

+ +

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

+

Tutorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

+

Guide to COIN Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

+

Role Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

+

1-Player Example of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

+

Non-Player FARC March Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

+

What if a Non-Player Cannot Op? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

+

Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

+

Event Text and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

+

Selected Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

+

Counter Scan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

+

Card List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

+

Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

+

Spaces List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

+ +

© 2012 GMT Games, LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com

+
+ +
+

2

+

Andean Abyss

+

Welcome to ANDEAN ABYSS! Because this game employs some

+

innovative new game mechanics, we thought it would be easiest to

+

learn if we included an interactive tutorial to teach new players how

+

to play the game with a minimal amount of fuss. In this interactive

+

tutorial we will use a more conversational style of writing. Occasion-

+

ally we will ask the reader to read certain rules from the rulebook

+

before continuing the tutorial.

+

The first thing you will need to do if you haven’t already is unfold

+

the game’s mapboard. Place it on a clean surface, making sure to

+

have ample space around the perimeter of the board so as to have

+

room for game pieces. (Three to five inches of room should suffice

+

nicely.)

+

Next, punch out all the game’s cardboard pieces (we call them

+

“counters”) and sort them by type. Place them within easy reach

+

because we’re going to set up the game shortly.

+

Now sort the wooden pieces by color and shape. Place them in sorted

+

piles near the mapboard. We’ll put them on the mapboard shortly.

+

Finally, unwrap the game’s playing cards. There are basically two

+

different type of cards in the game: Event Cards (the vast majority)

+

and Propaganda Cards (there are four of these). Put the four Pro-

+

paganda Cards in one pile, and all the Event Cards in another pile.

+

We will construct the game’s deck in just a moment.

+

STOP. Please pause just a moment and read section 1.1

+

through section 1.3.4 of the rulebook. When you’re finished,

+

we’ll begin setting up the game.

+

All done? Great! You should now have a decent understanding of

+

the game’s map. With this knowledge in hand, let’s begin setting

+

up the game:

+

• Place the “Aid” counter on the “9” space of the General Records

+

Track that runs around the perimeter of the gameboard.

+

• Place the Government Resources cylinder (large blue cylinder)

+

on the “40” space; and the the FARC, AUC, and Cartel Resources

+

cylinders (large red, yellow, and green respectively) on the “10”

+

space.

+

• Place the “Total Support” counter on the “50” space.

+

• Place the “Opposition + Bases” counter on the “20” space.

+

• Place the “El Presidente” counter on the “Samper” box of the “El

+

Presidente” display on the map.

+

• Place the remaining four large cylinders (Eligibility cylinders)

+

into the “Eligible” box on the “Sequence of Play” display.

+

• Collect 2 “Active Support” counters and place one into the

+

“Neutral” boxes inside the departments of Atlántico and Santander

+

on the map.

+

• Collect 10 more “Active Support” counters and place one into

+

each city except Cali. (Cali begins Neutral.)

+

• Collect 7 “Active Opposition” counters and place one into the

+

“Neutral” boxes inside the departments of Chocó, Arauca, Meta

+

East, Meta West, Guaviare, Putumayo, and Nariño.

+

Ok, we’re off to a great start! The next thing we need to do is put

+

the forces of the four factions onto the map.

+

STOP. Please pause just a moment and read section 1.4

+

through section 1.4.3 of the rulebook. When you’re finished

+

we’ll continue setting up the game.

+

Now that you’ve read about the different forces available to the

+

players, we can begin putting those pieces on the map. But first, we

+

should do an inventory of the wooden pieces you sorted earlier. It’s

+

likely that you will have one or two extra pieces so let’s find those

+

and get those out of the way first. Your game should have:

+

• 30 dark blue cubes

+

• 30 light blue cubes

+

• 3 dark blue discs

+

• 12 green octagonal cylinders

+

• 15 green discs

+

• 18 yellow octagonal cylinders

+

• 6 yellow discs

+

• 30 red octagonal cylinders

+

• 9 red discs

+

Place any extra blue, green, yellow, and/or red wooden pieces into

+

the box; they are extra pieces. (But don’t throw these away! These

+

extra bits may come in handy if you accidentally lose a piece.)

+

Ok, now that any extra bits have been removed from the mix, let’s be-

+

gin the setup (note that all Guerrillas start embossed side down):

+

• Collect a total of 12 dark blue cubes, which you now know as

+

“Troops.” Place 3 Troops in each of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, and

+

Santander.

+

• Now collect 2 light blue cubes—Police: place both in the city of

+

Bogotá.

+

• Collect 10 more Police and place one in each of the remaining

+

Cities which do not already have Police.

+

• Collect a single dark blue disc—a Government Base. Place it into

+

one of the “base” spaces in the department of Santander.

+

• Place all remaining cubes (18 Police AND 18 Troops) into the

+

“Government Troops & Police” display.

+

• Place the two remaining Government Bases into the “3” and “2”

+

circular spaces of the Government Bases track.

+

• Collect 12 red cylinders—FARC Guerrillas. Place one into each

+

of Nariño, Chocó, Santander, Huila, Arauca, and Meta East; place

+

two into each of Meta West, Guaviare, and Putumayo.

+

• Place the remaining 18 FARC Guerrillas into the “FARC

+

Guerrillas” box on the map.

+

• Collect 6 red discs—FARC Bases. Place one into a “base” space

+

in each of the departments of Chocó, Huila, Arauca, Meta East,

+

Meta West, and Guaviare.

+

• Place the remaining 3 FARC Bases into the “7”, “8”, and “9”

+

circular spaces of the FARC Bases track.

+

• Now collect 6 yellow cylinders—AUC Guerrillas. Place one into

+

each of Atlántico, Antioquia, Santander, Arauca, Guaviare, and

+

Putumayo.

+

• Place the remaining 12 AUC Guerrillas into the “AUC Guerrillas”

+

box on the map.

+

• Collect 1 yellow disc—an AUC Base. Place it into a “base” space

+

Andean Abyss Tutorial

+

by Joel Toppen

+

First-time players should start here!

+
+ +
+

3

+

Andean Abyss

+

in the department of Antioquia.

+

• Place the remaining 5 AUC Bases into the “6”, “5”, “4”, “3”, and

+

“2” circular spaces of the AUC Bases track.

+

• Next, collect 2 green cylinders—Cartel Guerrillas. Place one into

+

each of Cali and Putumayo.

+

• Place the remaining 10 Cartel Guerrillas into the “Cartel

+

Guerrillas” box on the map.

+

• Now collect 6 green discs—Cartel Bases. Place one into Cali;

+

place one into the empty “base” space in each of Meta East, Meta

+

West, and Guaviare. Place 2 Cartel Bases into the “base” spaces

+

of Putumayo.

+

• Place the remaining 9 Cartel Bases into the “7”, “8”, “9”, “10”,

+

“11”, “12”, “13”, “14”, and “15” circular spaces of the Cartel

+

Bases track.

+

• Finally, place the four circular “Shipment” counters into the empty

+

spaces available for them in the “Shipments” box.

+

Important: Deck construction instructions are found in the

+

rulebook. For the purposes of this tutorial, however, we will

+

be creating a special, stacked deck.

+

Well done! The map is now set up. One last thing needs to be done:

+

we need to construct the deck. Place 3 Propaganda Cards face down

+

in a row from left to right.

+

Now remove the following Event Cards and set them aside: #1 1st

+

Division, #12 Plan Colombia, #19 General Offensive, #21 Raúl

+

Reyes, #26 Gramaje, #28 Hugo Chávez, #29 Kill Zone, #44 Co-

+

lombia Nueva, #45 Los Derechos Humanos, #48 Unión Sindical

+

Obrera, #50 Carabineros, #68 Narco-Subs, #72 Sicarios, and #76

+

Propaganda.

+

Next, shuffle the remaining Event cards together. Deal 15 Event

+

Cards on top of each of the 3 Propaganda cards so that three stacks

+

of 16 cards is created. Shuffle each stack separately, then place each

+

stack on top of one another, creating a single deck.

+

Now draw two more Event cards and place them face-down on top

+

of the deck. Finally, place the cards we set aside earlier face down

+

on top of the deck. Place them in this EXACT order (from bottom

+

to top): #21, 45, 76, 44, 50, 19, 26, 72, 1, 48, 68, 29, 28, and 12

+

(top-most card). Note that 12 cards are not used in each game. Place

+

these unused cards back into the box.

+

STOP. Please pause just a moment and read section 1.5

+

through section 1.7 of the rulebook. We’ll start playing

+

when you’re done!

+

Tip: For your first competitive game, we recommend you

+

only reveal the card being resolved. Being able to see one

+

card into the future may produce “analysis paralysis” in new

+

players and slow gameplay down.

+

The one thing that makes ANDEAN ABYSS a unique game is the

+

role that cards play in the game. Cards will be played from the deck

+

created at game start. Players do not maintain a “hand” of cards as

+

in other card-driven games. Instead, cards are played from the top

+

of the deck. Ordinarily, two cards are always visible to the players:

+

the card being resolved, and the next card to be resolved. In other

+

words, players get to look one card into the future.

+

Go ahead and draw the topmost card from the deck: Card #12, Plan

+

Colombia. Place it face-up on a “played cards” pile near the game

+

board. Next, reveal the topmost card on the deck but leave it on top

+

of the deck face-up: Card #28, Hugo Chávez.

+

Plan Colombia is the card

+

to be resolved first. Knowl-

+

edge of the upcoming Hugo

+

Chavez event may influence

+

the decisions players make.

+

Each Event Card has four symbols across the top, one for each fac-

+

tion in the game. The order of these symbols dictates which faction

+

has initiative on that card.

+

In order to be eligible to execute an Operation or carry out the card’s

+

Event, a Faction must have its Eligibility cylinder in the “Eligible”

+

box on the Sequence of Play display. Eligible factions may either

+

play or pass. At this time, all four factions are eligible.

+

To determine who get’s to choose first, look at the order of the eligi-

+

bility symbols. The faction with the leftmost symbol gets to choose

+

what to do first and becomes the 1st Eligible Faction. In the case of

+

Plan Colombia, the Government player is the 1st Eligible Faction.

+

The 1st Eligible Faction—the Government in this case—may do

+

one of four things: (1) he may execute the card’s event; OR (2) he

+

may conduct a single type of Operation without any supplemental

+

Special Activity; OR (3) he may conduct a single type of Operation

+

with a single Special Activity; OR (4) he may pass.

+

If the 1st Eligible Faction chooses to Pass, he remains eligible to play

+

on the next card; if he does anything other than pass, he becomes

+

ineligible to play on the next card. The corollary of this is that a

+

faction usually may only play on every other card.

+

If the 1st Eligible Faction chooses to pass, then the faction who’s

+

symbol is to the immediate right of his symbol on the card being

+

resolved becomes the 1st Eligible Faction. In the case of Plan

+

Colombia, if the Government passes, the AUC would become 1st

+

Eligible. It is possible that all factions could pass on a given card

+

and thus remain eligible on the next card.

+

Hint: Events in the unshaded portion of the card typically

+

are favorable to the Government; events in the shaded por-

+

tion are typically antagonistic to the Government.

+

Here, however, the Government player decides to act. Some Event

+

Cards have one event; others, like Plan Colombia have two ver-

+

Card to resolve

+

Next card

+
+ +
+

4

+

Andean Abyss

+

Support, one level in his favor. The Government player will spend

+

6 Resources total to shift Cali from Neutral to Passive Support, and

+

then from Passive Support to Active Support (3 Resources per shift).

+

Adjust Government Resources from 40 to 34 on the General Records

+

Track and place an Active Support counter on Cali.

+

Cali has a Population value of “3.” Since Cali is marked with Active

+

Support, Cali’s Population times two is added to the Government’s

+

Total Support. Adjust the “Total Support” counter by +6, from 50

+

to 56.

+

The Government player could supplement his Training Operation

+

with either an Airstrike or Eradicate Special Activity. This, however,

+

would enable the 2nd Eligible Faction to be allowed to execute one

+

of the events on Plan Colombia. Not willing to chance the AUC

+

player executing the event in the shaded portion (which would be

+

most hurtful to the Government), the Government player chooses

+

to only execute an Operation.

+

We’ll finish the Government’s Operation by spending 3 Resources

+

per space selected for Training (i.e. per space marked with a white

+

pawn). Adjust the Government Resources from 34 to 28. Finally,

+

place the blue Government Eligibility cylinder into the “1st Faction

+

Op Only” box on the Sequence of Play display.

+

Hint: Civic Actions may only be conducted during a Training

+

Operation or during the Resolution of a Propaganda Card.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 3.0 through 3.2.1

+

in order to reinforce your understanding of what we’ve

+

done so far.

+

After the 1st Eligible Faction has acted, the next eligible faction

+

becomes known as the 2nd Eligible Faction. Looking back at Plan

+

Colombia, we see that the AUC is the 2nd Eligible Faction.

+

Just what the 2nd Eligible Faction may do is determined by what

+

the 1st Eligible Faction did (see Sequence of Play display). Since

+

the 1st Eligible Faction conducted an Operation Only (no Special

+

Activity), the 2nd Eligible Faction may either execute a Limited

+

Operation—a single Operation in ONE and only ONE space; OR

+

he may pass.

+

Passing does have its benefits. By choosing to Pass, the Govern-

+

ment player will gain +3 Resources; Insurgent players will gain +1

+

Resource.

+

Looking at the next card, Hugo Chávez, the AUC player feels

+

confident that the FARC (1st Eligible on Hugo) will take the event.

+

This would then give the AUC more freedom of action as the 2nd

+

Eligible Faction on that card. And so with a smug look, the AUC

+

chooses to Pass. Place the AUC Eligibility cylinder on the “Pass”

+

box on the Sequence of Play display and adjust the AUC Resources

+

from 10 to 11.

+

INSERT ILLO

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 2.0 through 2.4.1.

+

This will give you an excellent understanding of the se-

+

quence of play.

+

sions of the event—called dual-use events. If a player executes an

+

Event, he must execute either one or the other, never both versions

+

of the event.

+

The Government would like to execute the event, but at this time,

+

due to Samper being El Presidente, the effects of the event are not

+

as immediately helpful. Instead, the Government will conduct an

+

Operation.

+

Operations do most of a player’s “heavy lifting” in the game. Opera-

+

tions, however, are not free. They cost Resource Points. Furthermore,

+

the player may only conduct ONE type of Operation; he may not

+

mix two different Operations.

+

Please take one of the Faction Operations Foldouts. Look at the

+

panel for the Government player. As you can see by the left col-

+

umn, he can do one of four things: (1) he can Train in order to get

+

more cubes on the board; OR (2) he can Patrol in order to protect

+

his Lines of Communication (hereafter known as LoCs)—vital to

+

his Resource income; OR (3) he can conduct Sweeps in order to

+

detect Guerrillas; OR (4) he can Assault in order to destroy detected

+

(i.e. Active) Guerrillas. The Operation the active faction carries out

+

dictates what Special Activities may accompany it (if eligible to

+

conduct a Special Activity).

+

The Government chooses to Train. This Action allows the Govern-

+

ment player to select any Cities or Departments. Each selected City

+

or Department will cost 3 Resources. In any City or in a Department

+

with a Government Base the Government player may place up to

+

6 cubes of any type.

+

For now, the Government will select Cali and Bucaramanga. Place

+

a white pawn in each location to mark these locations. In Cali, the

+

Government player places 3 Police and 3 Troops. There are now

+

6 Troops and 4 Police in Cali. In Bucaramanga, the Government

+

places 4 Troops and 2 Police.

+

As a part of the Training Operation, the Government may also pick

+

one selected space (which has been marked with a pawn) and either

+

remove 3 cubes from that space in order to place available Govern-

+

ment Base into that space; OR he can choose to conduct something

+

known as a Civic Action in that space.

+

Reminder: Remember that there can only be 2 bases of any

+

combination of factions in ANY City/Department.

+

In our case here, the Government will choose to do a Civic Action in

+

Cali. A Civic Action has two requirements: the Government player

+

must have more pieces in the space than any other combination of

+

factions combined, and it must have both Troops and Police. In

+

Cali, the Cartels have 2 pieces; the Government has 10, including

+

both Troops and Police giving the Government Control and ability

+

to conduct a Civic Action. Civic Actions allow the Government

+

player to spend 3 Resources to shift the level of Opposition and/or

+

1st Eligible

+

Passed

+

2nd Eligible

+
+ +
+

5

+

Andean Abyss

+

All done? Excellent! Let’s proceed: With the AUC passing, the

+

Cartels now may become the 2nd Eligible faction. Looking at the

+

next card, Hugo Chávez, it is apparent that FARC and the AUC will

+

both act on that card leaving the Cartels without an action, because

+

only two actions occur each card. Knowing this, the Cartels see no

+

reason not to at least take a Limited Operation here.

+

All three Insurgent factions (FARC, AUC, and Cartels) have the same

+

Operations available to them. There, are, however, some subtle yet

+

important differences.

+

The Cartels decide to conduct a Rally Operation in Huila. Since

+

this is the only space where the Operation is taking place we won’t

+

need to place a pawn. Looking at the Cartel’s panel of the Opera-

+

tions Foldout, we see it will cost 1 Resource and we will be able

+

to place 1 Cartel Guerrilla into Huila. Always place new Guerrillas

+

face-down (with embossed side downward).

+

1 Guerrilla is placed in Huila

+

Bases greatly empower the Rally Operation, but it takes Guerrillas

+

in order to create a base. Thus the Cartel’s decision to merely place

+

a single Guerrilla into Huila. Later on, the Cartels can build up their

+

presence in the region.

+

This will conclude the Cartel Limited Operation. Please adjust Cartel

+

Resources from 10 to 9 and place the Cartel Eligibility cylinder into

+

the “2nd Faction LimOP” box (to the right of the Government’s

+

cylinder) in the Sequence of Play display.

+

Since both the 1st and 2nd Eligible Factions have executed their

+

activities on this card, we will now adjust eligibility on the Sequence

+

of Play display: All factions that executed an Event, Operation, or

+

Limited Operation now have their eligibility cylinder placed into

+

the “Ineligible” box on the Sequence of Play. Factions that did not

+

execute an Event, Operation, or Limited Operation will either remain

+

in, or slide back to the “Eligible” box.

+

In our case, both the Government and the Cartels will slide to the

+

“Ineligible” box. The FARC cylinder will remain in the “Eligible”

+

box. The AUC cylinder will slide back to the “Eligible” box.

+

Draw Hugo Chávez off the deck onto Plan Colombia and reveal the

+

next card to be played: card #29 Kill Zone.

+

FARC is 1st Eligible on Hugo Chávez and chooses to execute the

+

shaded Event. The Event text reads, “Place a FARC Base in a Dept

+

next to Venezuela. Sabotage each empty LoC touching Cúcuta.”

+

Go ahead and place a “Sabotage” counter on the two pipeline LoCs

+

touching Cúcuta. This will hurt the Government’s ability to gain

+

Resources when the next Propaganda card is resolved. Next, take the

+

FARC base off of the “7” space of the FARC Bases track and place

+

it into the Department of Arauca. Note that Arauca may not receive

+

any other bases since there are now two bases there.

+

The Hugo Chávez event allows the FARC to place two Sabotage mark-

+

ers and a Base.

+

The FARC has as its victory condition, the goal of having a level

+

of Opposition plus on-map bases greater than 25. Since the FARC

+

just added a base, adjust the “Opposition + Bases” counter from 20

+

to 21, then place the FARC Eligibility cylinder in the “1st Faction

+

Event” box on the 1st Eligible column of the Sequence of Play.

+

Now only the AUC is eligible. The next card, however, is a very

+

attractive event for the AUC and it passes again. Adjust the AUC

+

Resources from 11 to 12.

+

With the Hugo Chávez card fully resolved, we adjust eligibility: All

+

cylinders in the “Ineligible” box go back to the “Eligible” box—they

+

did not carry out an Event, Operation, or Limited Operation. The

+

AUC will will also go back to “Eligible.” Only FARC’s cylinder

+

slides to the “Ineligible” box.

+

Draw Kill Zone off the deck onto Hugo Chávez and reveal the next

+

card: Card #68, Narco-Subs.

+

FARC would be 1st Eligible on Kill Zone, but is in the Ineligible box,

+

so the AUC now becomes 1st Eligible. The AUC wants to execute

+

the shaded portion of the Event. The Event text reads, “FARC or

+

AUC in a space executes two free Ambushes with any of its Guer-

+

rillas without Activating.”

+

An “Ambush” is a Special Activity that can only accompany an At-

+

tack Operation (see the Faction Operations Foldout). Only the FARC

+
+ +
+

6

+

Andean Abyss

+

and the AUC may carry out an Ambush Special Activity. Unless

+

otherwise indicated by Event text, the executing Faction decides

+

how to carry out the Event. In this case, the AUC chooses to have

+

the AUC Guerrillas execute two Ambushes. (If another faction like

+

the Cartels executed this event, it could choose either the AUC or

+

the FARC to Ambush—and the chosen Faction would then decide

+

where to execute the Ambush.)

+

The word “free” on the card tells us that these Ambushes will not cost

+

any Resources. Ordinarily, an Attack that an Ambush accompanies

+

costs 1 Resource. Also, ordinarily only ONE Ambush may be ex-

+

ecuted per Operation (so even if you were carrying out five Attacks,

+

only one Attack could have an Ambush). In this case, however, it is

+

an event and events trump the ordinary rules.

+

The AUC decides to Ambush in Arauca twice so no need to mark the

+

space with pawns. To carry out an Ambush Attack, one Guerrilla is

+

activated (flipped over to show its embossed side) and two enemy

+

pieces are destroyed and returned to their holding box (Guerrillas/

+

Troops/Police) or track (bases). As a bonus, however, the Ambush-

+

ing player may place one available Guerrilla into the space where

+

the Ambush occurred. In this situation, the event stipulated that no

+

Guerrillas activate so we won’t activate the single Guerrilla. The

+

AUC would like to kill both FARC Bases as his victory conditions

+

are to have more bases on the map than the FARC. But before a

+

base can be eliminated in any Attack, Ambush or Assault, all Guer-

+

rillas of the same faction as the base must first be eliminated. The

+

AUC therefore eliminates the lone FARC Guerrilla and one of the

+

bases in Arauca. Place the Guerrilla back into the Available Guer-

+

rillas box and the base onto the “7” space of the FARC Bases track.

+

Adjust the “Opposition + Bases” counter from 21 to 20. Place 1

+

more AUC Guerrilla into Arauca. This concludes the first Ambush

+

from the event.

+

AUC uses the Kill Zone Event to conduct two Ambushes

+

For the second Ambush, the AUC will hit Arauca again; the newly-

+

placed Guerrilla from the first Ambush will be the attacking Guer-

+

rilla. Only 1 FARC piece remains in Arauca, a single base. Return

+

this base to the “6” space on the FARC Bases track. Adjust the

+

“Opposition + Bases” counter from 20 to 19. Place 1 more available

+

AUC Guerrilla into Arauca.

+

This concludes the AUC’s Event. Place the AUC Eligibility cylinder

+

into the Event box on the 1st Faction column of the Sequence of

+

Play display.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 4.4.1, then 4.3.2. This

+

will reinforce your understanding of the Ambush mechanic.

+

When we last left things the AUC had just finished carrying out the

+

Kill Zone event. Now the Cartels are the 2nd Eligible on this card.

+

The Cartels need to establish bases in order to achieve their two-fold

+

victory condition: have more than 10 bases on the map, and have

+

more than 40 Resources. With this end in mind, the Cartels choose

+

to carry out a Rally Operation.

+

Because the AUC carried out an Event, the 2nd Eligible Cartels may

+

carry out an Operation and a Special Activity. The Cartels choose to

+

Rally in Cali, Meta East, Meta West, and Huila. Place a white pawn

+

in each of these four spaces.

+

Most of these spaces contain a Cartel base. In such spaces, the num-

+

ber of Guerrillas that may be placed is equal to the number of Cartel

+

bases in that space plus the Population value of that space.

+

Starting in Cali, the Cartels will place 4 Guerrillas from their Avail-

+

able Forces (population 3 + 1 Cartel base). Place the Guerrillas there

+

now. Next, place 2 Guerrillas into Meta West (population 1 + 1 base)

+

and 2 more into Meta East. The last available Cartel Guerrilla will

+

be placed into Huila.

+

Next, since the Cartels chose to Rally, and are eligible for a Special

+

Activity, the Cartels will execute a “Cultivate” Special Activity

+

(see Cartels panel of the Operations Foldout). To do so they must

+

choose a space with a population greater than zero and where Cartel

+

Guerrillas outnumber the number of Police. There also needs to be

+

room to place a base. The Cartels choose Huila.

+

With the space chosen, the Cartel player may either move a base

+

from anywhere on the map to that location (whether city or depart-

+

ment), OR place a new base into a department (not a city) where

+

he conducted a Rally Operation. The Cartel player will place a new

+

base into Huila. Place a Cartel base from the “7” space of the Cartel

+

Bases track into the empty “base” space in Huila.

+

This Operation cost 4 Resources so reduce the Cartel Resources from

+

9 to to 5 and remove the white pawns. Place the Cartel Eligibility

+

cylinder into the “2nd Faction Op + Special Activity” box on the

+

Sequence of Play.

+

Next, we adjust Eligibility: The AUC and Cartels are now Ineligible;

+

the Government and FARC are Eligible. Draw Narco-Subs off

+

the deck on top of Kill Zone and reveal the next card: #48, Unión

+

Sindical Obrera.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 3.3 through 3.3.1.

+

and 4.5.1. This will reinforce your understanding of the Rally

+

Operation and Cultivate Special Activity.

+

Cartel places 9 Guerrillas with the Rally Operation and then uses a

+

Special Activity to “Cultivate” a Base in Huila.

+
+ +
+

7

+

Andean Abyss

+

Ready to continue? Let’s go!

+

The Narco-Subs event is pretty

+

much useless at the present

+

time—both the unshaded and

+

shaded portions have no effect

+

since there are no Cartel pieces

+

in coastal spaces. The Govern-

+

ment is the 1st Eligible since

+

both Cartels and AUC are in the

+

Ineligible box. The Government

+

decides to Conduct a Sweep

+

Operation and an Airstrike

+

Special Activity.

+

STOP. Please stop here and

+

read section 3.2.3 before

+

continuing.

+

The target areas for the Sweeps will be Cali, Santander, and Chocó.

+

Mark each space with a white pawn.

+

For the Sweep into Chocó, move all 3 Troops from Medellín and 3

+

Troop cubes from Cali into Chocó.

+

Because Chocó is a Forest space, it takes 2 cubes to Activate 1

+

Guerrilla. The Government sent more than enough cubes to get

+

the job done. Flip the single FARC Guerrilla in Chocó to Active

+

(embossed side up).

+

For the Sweep into Santander, the Government Troops in the depart-

+

ment will Sweep in place. There are 3 cubes in Santander, more than

+

enough to Activate both the AUC and the FARC Guerrillas. Flip

+

both Guerrillas to Active.

+

For the Sweep in Cali, the Government will again Sweep in place.

+

Note that while only Troops can move in a Sweep—Troops in Cali

+

for example could move as far as Pasto, via the Cali-Pasto LoC if

+

Pasto was a target for a Sweep Operation—ANY cube in the target

+

location is counted for implementing the effects of the Sweep. The

+

Government has 3 Troops and 4 Police. The 7 cubes in Cali will be

+

enough to Activate all 5 Cartel Guerrillas.

+

Next, the Government will execute its Special Activity. We’ve

+

already conducted one Special Activity in this tutorial, but there

+

are some things you need to understand about Special Activities

+

before we go further.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 4.1 through 4.2.3

+

before continuing.

+

Ok, now you should know how Special Activities work and how

+

they can work in conjunction with an Operation. Theoretically,

+

the Government could have done the Airstrike at the start of the

+

Operation rather than at the end of the Operation. But as you no

+

doubt read, an Airstrike can only destroy an Active Guerrilla, or an

+

unprotected base.

+

Of the Active Guerrillas on the map, the FARC Guerrilla in the

+

mountains of Santander is the most juicy. It takes 2 Troop cubes to

+

kill 1 Guerrilla in the mountains. Killing the FARC Guerrilla with

+

an Airstrike is very efficient. The Government chooses to do just

+

this, so remove the FARC Guerrilla from Santander. (The AUC

+

Guerrilla could also have been targeted, but the AUC can Rally

+

in Santander so it wouldn’t have been gone for long whereas the

+

FARC cannot Rally in Santander due to the department’s Support

+

for the Government.)

+

Adjust the Government Resources by –9 (it cost 3 Resources for each

+

Sweep), from 28 to 19. Place the Government Eligibility cylinder

+

into the “Op + Special Activity” box on 1st Faction column of the

+

Sequence of Play.

+

FARC is then left with an unfortunate decision: either take a Limited

+

Op or execute the Narco-Subs event (which is useless). Not wishing

+

to waste an OP, FARC instead Passes. Adjust FARC Resources from

+

10 to 11. FARC will enjoy 2nd Eligibility, and better opportunities

+

on the next card, Unión Sindical Obrera.

+

Adjust Eligibility: Government is Ineligible; all other factions are

+

Eligible. Draw Unión Sindical Obrera off the deck on top of Narco-

+

Subs, and reveal the next card: #1, 1st Division.

+

The AUC is the 1st Eligible Faction on Unión Sindical Obrera. Take

+

a moment to look at the “Rally” Operation’s requirements on the

+

AUC’s panel of a Operations Foldout. You’ll quickly notice that in

+

order to Rally, the target space cannot have “Opposition.” The AUC

+

would like to carry on its momentum in the department of Arauca,

+

but cannot Rally there at the present time because of the “Active

+

Opposition” marker. The unshaded version of the Unión Sindical

+

Obrera event appears to be just the ticket. The event text reads,

+

“Remove 1 Opposition or FARC Base adjacent to 3-Econ pipeline.”

+

Government Sweeps and an Airstrike take out Guerrillas.

+
+ +
+

8

+

Andean Abyss

+

Conveniently, Arauca is adjacent to the 3-Econ pipeline LoC that

+

connects the town of Arauca with the city of Cúcuta, making it an

+

eligible space for the event. There’s no longer any FARC base in

+

Arauca, but there is an Opposition counter in the department. The

+

AUC chooses to remove the “Active Opposition” counter, thus mak-

+

ing Arauca Neutral—and thus eligible for AUC Rally Operations

+

later on in the game. Note that the AUC could also have removed an

+

Opposition counter if it was on its “Passive Opposition” side since

+

the event did not specify either Passive or Active Opposition.

+

The effects of this event also cause the “Opposition + Bases” counter

+

to move from 19 to 17 on the numbered track since Arauca’s Popula-

+

tion of 1 is no longer under any level of Opposition (under Active

+

Opposition a space with a Population of “1” would contribute a

+

factor of 2 Opposition on the track).

+

Place the AUC’s Eligibility cylinder into the Event box on the 1st

+

Faction column of the Sequence of Play display. Now FARC is the

+

2nd Eligible Faction.

+

FARC needs guerrillas on the map so FARC will take the opportunity

+

to Rally across the map. As you read earlier, FARC can only Rally

+

in cities/departments without Government Support. This means they

+

cannot Rally in Santander to replace the guerrilla eliminated by the

+

Government Airstrike. FARC chooses to Rally in the following

+

departments: Cesar, Antioquia, Chocó, Arauca, Huila, Nariño, Meta

+

West, Meta East, Guaviare, Putumayo, Vichada, and Guainía—12

+

spaces. Place a pawn in each space to mark the locations.

+

But wait! You may have noticed that there’s not enough Resources

+

available to the FARC to Rally in 12 spaces! FARC only has 11

+

Resources. Fortunately for FARC, since the 1st Eligible Faction

+

executed an Event, the 2nd Eligible Faction may carry out a Special

+

Activity. Special Activities, as you read earlier, can be carried out at

+

any one time during an Operation. FARC will execute an “Extort”

+

Special Activity as it Rallies in order to gain the Resources necessary

+

to carry out the Operation.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 4.3 through 4.3.3

+

before continuing.

+

Now that you know more about the FARC Special Activities, we can

+

continue. For this Operation, we will pay the Resources necessary

+

as we move along.

+

FARC begins Rallying in Cesar: place 1 available FARC guerrilla

+

into the department. FARC could choose to Extort here since FARC

+

has an underground guerrilla now and outnumbers all enemy pieces,

+

but chooses not to do so at this time. Adjust FARC Resources from

+

11 to 10.

+

Next, FARC conducts a Rally Op in both Antioquia and Arauca,

+

placing 1 available guerrilla into each department. FARC will be un-

+

able to Extort in either space since they do not outnumber all enemy

+

pieces in either department. Adjust FARC Resources from 10 to 8.

+

FARC will Rally in Nariño next and place 1 available guerrilla into

+

the space. Here, FARC now has two underground guerrillas and

+

outnumbers all enemy pieces so FARC will extort here. Flip one of

+

the two FARC guerrillas over to its Active side. The Resource cost

+

for the Rally Operation here will be offset by the 1 Resource gained

+

by the Extort Special Activity.

+

In Putumayo, FARC could remove two Guerrillas in order to place a

+

base, but the newly-placed base would be vulnerable to enemy attack

+

or a Government airstrike. Knowing this, FARC places 1 available

+

guerrilla. FARC outnumbers the AUC in Putumayo, but does not

+

outnumber all the enemies in Putumayo put together so they cannot

+

Extort here. Adjust FARC Resources from 8 to 7.

+

In Chocó, FARC has a single base and the department has a Popu-

+

lation of 1. FARC, therefore, places 2 available guerrillas into the

+

department. This safeguards the FARC base from the Government

+

troops prowling the Chocó forests. FARC cannot Extort here though,

+

so adjust FARC Resources from 7 to 6.

+

Huila has a population of 2 and a single FARC base. FARC will,

+

therefore, place 3 available guerrillas Huila. FARC now outnumbers

+

all enemies in Huila so FARC will Extort. Flip one FARC guerrilla

+

in Huila over to its Active side. The Resource cost for the Rally

+

Operation here will be offset by the 1 Resource gained by the Extort

+

Special Activity.

+

Meta East, Meta West, and Guaviare each have a Population of 1 and

+

a single FARC base. FARC places 2 available guerrillas into each

+

department. Each of these spaces also now qualifies for the Extort

+

Special Activity so flip 1 FARC guerrilla in each space over to its

+

Active side. The Resource cost for each space will thus be offset by

+

the Resource gained by the Extort Special Activity.

+

Vichada, and Guainía are 0-population departments. This fact doesn’t

+

preclude Rally or Extortion! FARC will Rally in each and Extort in

+

each location. Place 1 available FARC guerrilla into each space and

+

flip it over to its Active side. The Resource cost for each space is thus

+

offset by the Resource gained by the Extort Special Activity.

+

Wow! That was a LOT of Rallying! FARC ends the Operation with

+

only 2 guerrillas in its “Available Guerrillas” box. Thanks to the

+

Extort Special Activity, FARC ends the Operation with 6 Resources.

+

Please remove all the pawns from the board.

+

We’ll finish the card by adjusting Eligibility. Both FARC and the

+

AUC cylinders move to the Ineligible box on the Sequence of Play

+

display. The Government and the Cartels remain eligible to act on

+

1st Division. Draw 1st Division off the deck on top of Unión Sindical

+

Obrera, and reveal the next card: #72, Sicarios.

+

1st Division is one of several Event Cards which when played as

+

an event will produce long-lasting results known as “Government

+

Capabilities.” In addition to these, there are also cards with “Insur-

+

gent Momentum” in the game.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 5.3 through 5.4.

+

before continuing.

+

Now that you know all about Government Capabilities and Insurgent

+

Momentum we can continue.

+

The Government is now cast upon the horns of a dilemma: They

+

can execute the event, but would lose the opportunity to follow-up

+

their Sweeps in Cali—the Cartels will almost certainly have their

+
+ +
+

9

+

Andean Abyss

+

Active guerrillas go Underground in Cali. On the other hand, if the

+

government wipes out the Cartels in Cali and chase the Operation

+

with a Special Activity, the Cartels might play the event against the

+

Government. The 1st Division event’s unshaded version gives the

+

Government the powerful capability of engaging in Civic Actions

+

without the need of Police and Troops—only one cube and control

+

is needed! But if the shaded version is played, the Government

+

would require 2 Troops and 2 Police for Civic Actions—a very

+

tough task to achieve!

+

FARC Rallies 18 Guerrillas in 12 different departments.

+
+ +
+

10

+

Andean Abyss

+

As nice as the event’s permanent effect would be, the Government

+

decides that the opportunity to inflict a terrible wound to the Cali

+

Cartel is one which must not be deferred. The Government decides

+

to execute Assault Operations. To protect against 1st Division being

+

played against them, however, the Government chooses not to un-

+

dertake any Special Activities—leaving the 2nd Eligible Cartels with

+

only the option of executing a Limited Operation on this card.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 3.2.4 before con-

+

tinuing.

+

Ok, now that you know the rules for Assault Operations we will

+

proceed with the Government’s operation. Currently, there are three

+

spaces where the Government could Assault: Chocó, Santander,

+

and Cali. But because it costs 3 Resources per space to execute, the

+

Government will conserve its Resources and only Assault in Cali.

+

Since Cali is a city space, any

+

cube can be used to eliminate

+

an enemy piece. The Govern-

+

ment has 3 Troops and 4 Po-

+

lice, a total of 7 cubes. These

+

each eliminate one Cartel

+

piece, eliminating all 5 Cartel

+

guerrillas and the single Car-

+

tel base. Place the guerrillas

+

back into the Cartel’s Avail-

+

able Guerrillas box. Place the base into the “7” space on the Cartel

+

Bases Track. Adjust the Government’s Resources from 19 to 16.

+

Place the Government’s Eligibility cylinder into the “Op Only” box

+

on the Sequence of Play display.

+

The Cartel player is now facing a dilemma similar to that which the

+

Government faced. The upcoming Sicarios event could be played

+

against them. Cartels, being 1st Eligible on Sicarios, therefore, opt

+

to Pass. Adjust Cartel Resources from 5 to 6.

+

That concludes the 1st Division card. The Government Eligibility

+

cylinder moves to the Ineligible box while all other Factions move to

+

the Eligible box on the Sequence of Play. Draw Sicarios off the deck

+

on top of 1st Division, and reveal the next card: #26, Gramaje.

+

Seeing the Gramaje card on the horizon, the Cartel player resolves

+

to eschew frugality with his Resources. The Cartel player wants

+

to get reestablished in a City so as to hold some leverage over the

+

Government (and be safe from Eradication Special Activities). The

+

Cartels decide to Rally in Medellín, Bucaramanga, and Arauca, plac-

+

ing a single available guerrilla in each space. The Cartels will also

+

execute a Cultivate Special Activity to place a base (from the 7 space

+

of the Cartel Bases track) into Arauca. Note that neither Medellín nor

+

Bucaramanga are eligible for a

+

Cultivate Special Activity since

+

the number of Cartel guerrillas

+

does not exceed the number of

+

Police in those spaces.

+

Adjust the Cartel Resources

+

from 6 to 3 and place the Cartel

+

Eligibility cylinder into the “OP

+

+ Special Activity” box on the

+

Sequence of Play display.

+

Now the AUC is 2nd Eligible to

+

play on Sicarios. The AUC opts

+

to execute the unshaded portion

+

of the Sicarios event. Two Car-

+

tel guerrillas are removed from

+

Meta West and replaced with 2 AUC guerrillas. Two more Cartel

+

guerrillas are removed from Meta East and likewise replaced with

+

2 AUC guerrillas. The AUC now have guerrillas in two more Op-

+

position areas where they can wreak more havoc on the FARC. This

+

ends the Sicarios card. Both Cartel and AUC Eligibility cylinders

+

move to the Ineligible box. Draw Gramaje off the deck on top of

+

Sicarios, and reveal the next card: #19, General Offensive.

+

FARC is the 1st Eligible Faction on Gramaje and decides to conduct a

+

March Operation without a Special Activity. Place FARC’s Eligibil-

+

ity Pawn on the appropriate box of the Sequence of Play display.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 3.3.2 before con-

+

tinuing.

+

Now that you know how the March Operation works, let’s pro-

+

ceed:

+

A) FARC will March all 3 guerrillas in Putumayo. One will go into

+

Pasto; 1 will go into Neiva; and 1 will go onto the Pasto-Neiva

+

road. None of these will activate since there are not enough

+

cubes + moving guerrillas in any of these three spaces to cause

+

the guerrillas to activate (the total must exceed 3 to cause the

+

moving guerrillas to go Active). Adjust FARC Resources from

+

6 to 4—this cost 2 Resources (Marching onto LoCs does not

+

cost any Resources).

+

B) Two underground guerrillas will March from Meta West: one

+

onto the Neiva-Bogotá pipeline and one onto the Bogotá-San

+

José road.

+

C) One underground guerrilla from Meta East will March onto the

+

Bogotá-Yopal pipeline.

+

D) One underground guerrilla from Chocó will March onto the

+

Sincelejo-Medellín pipeline.

+

E) One underground guerrilla from Nariño will March onto the

+

Cali-Pasto road.

+

F) Finally, one guerrilla from Huila will March onto the Ibagué-

+

Bogotá-Bucaramanga pipeline.

+

The Government is the now eligible to play, but will need more than

+

a Limited Operation to deal with the multiplicity of threats to his

+

LoCs and cities! The Government, therefore, passes and collects 3

+

Resources. Adjust the Government’s Resources from 16 to 19.

+

Now adjust Eligibility: only FARC goes to the Ineligible box; all

+

other Factions go to the Eligible box on the Sequence of Play display.

+

Draw General Offensive off the deck on top of Gramaje, and reveal

+

the next card: #50, Carabineros.

+

The Cartel uses the Rally Action to bring on 3 more Guerrillas and

+

uses the Cultivate Special Activity to place a Base.

+
+ +
+

11

+

Andean Abyss

+

The Government is the 1st Eligible Faction to play on General Of-

+

fensive. With so many FARC guerrillas on LoCs, the Government

+

decides to launch a Patrol Operation.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 3.2.2 before con-

+

tinuing.

+

Now you know what the Patrol Operation does. The Government

+

begins its Patrol Operation with the Police cube in Cartagena moving

+

onto the Cartagena-Sincelejo pipeline. Since there are no guerrillas

+

on this LoC, the Police cube continues moving into Sincelejo (also

+

guerrilla-free) and then onto the Sincelejo-Medellín pipeline where

+

it must stop. The Police cube then activates one guerrilla—the only

+

guerrilla on the LoC belonging to the FARC.

+

Next, the Police cube on Cúcuta moves onto the Cúcuta-Ayacucho

+

pipeline. The fact that this LoC is sabotaged does not impede the

+

Police cube’s ability to Patrol so it continues to the Ayacucho-Santa

+

Marta pipeline where it stops. It will protect this important Pipeline

+

from any future FARC mischief.

+

One Police cube from Bucaramanga moves onto the Bucaramanga-

+

Ibagué-Bogotá pipeline where it stops and activates the FARC

+

guerrilla. Note that the Cartel guerrilla does not keep a cube from

+

leaving the space during a Patrol.

+

In Bogotá, one Troops cube will move into the Bo-

+

gotá-Neiva pipeline and activate the FARC guerrilla.

+

Another Troops cube will move from Bogotá onto

+

the Bogotá-Yopal pipeline and activate the FARC

+

guerrilla. One more Troops cube will move from

+

Bogotá onto the Bogotá-San José road and activate

+

the FARC guerrilla.

+

The Police in Neiva could Patrol onto the Neiva-

+

Pasto Road, but this would leave Neiva vulnerable

+

to FARC Kidnapping, so the Police cube there will

+

remain where it is and do nothing. The only type

+

of space where guerrillas can be activated during a

+

Patrol is a LoC.

+

Next, one Police cube in Cali will move onto the Cali-

+

Pasto road and activate the FARC guerrilla.

+

Thus far the Government has been able to activate

+

all FARC guerrillas on LoCs except one: the guer-

+

rilla on the Neiva-Pasto road. To deal with this, the

+

Government executes an Airlift Special Activity in

+

the middle of the Patrol Operation. 3 Troop cubes

+

Airlift from Chocó to Neiva. Then, one Troop cube in

+

Neiva moves onto the Neiva-Pasto road and activates

+

the FARC guerrilla.

+

Finally, as a part of the Patrol Operation, the Govern-

+

ment may execute a free Assault on any one LoC. The

+

Government chooses to eliminate the FARC Guerrilla

+

on the Ibagué-Bogotá-Bucaramanga pipeline. This

+

Operation cost the Government 3 Resources so adjust

+

the Government Resources from 19 to 16 and place

+

the Government Eligibility cylinder on the “Op +

+

Special Activity” box on the Sequence of Play.

+

The AUC is now the 2nd Eligible player on General

+

Offensive. The AUC, however, does not feel as though

+

the event would be of great use, so the AUC will pass. Adjust the

+

AUC’s Resources from 12 to 13 and place the AUC’s Eligibility

+

cylinder into the Pass box on the Sequence of Play.

+

The Cartels decide that the General Offensive event isn’t for them

+

either. They too decide to pass and collect a Resource—adjust from

+

3 to 4.

+

Adjust Eligibility: only the Government goes to the Ineligible box;

+

all other Factions go to the Eligible box on the Sequence of Play

+

display. Draw Carabineros on top of General Offensive, and reveal

+

the next card: #44, Colombia

+

Nueva.

+

The AUC is the 1st Eligible play-

+

er on Carabineros. The AUC

+

has two overarching goals: kill

+

FARC bases; and building their

+

own bases. And so the AUC,

+

flush with Resources, opts to

+

forgo the Event and instead Rally

+

across the map. Place white

+

pawns into the departments of

+

Atlántico, Antioquia, Santander,

+

Arauca, and Huila.

+

Place 1 available AUC guerrilla

+

into Atlántico. Place 3 available

+

FARC March Actions

+
+ +
+

12

+

Andean Abyss

+

AUC guerrillas into Antioquia (base + Population). Place 1 avail-

+

able AUC guerrilla into Santander. Place the last available AUC

+

guerrilla into Huila.

+

In Arauca, the AUC has a couple choices: they could replace two

+

guerrillas with a base; or they could remove any one of their guer-

+

rillas from elsewhere on the map and place it back into the available

+

Guerrillas box in order that they might Rally that guerrilla into

+

Arauca. Not needing their guerrilla in Putumayo, the AUC removes

+

this guerrilla to the AUC Available guerrillas box. The AUC player

+

then completes his Rally action by placing the newly-available

+

guerrilla into Arauca.

+

To defray the cost of this Operation, the AUC chooses to Extort in

+

each of Atlántico, Antioquia, and Arauca (don’t forget to mark 1

+

guerrilla in each Extort space as Active). This brings the total cost

+

of the Operation down to –3 Resources. Adjust the AUC Resources

+

from 13 to 10. Place the AUC Eligibility cylinder into the “Op +

+

Special Activity” box on the Sequence of Play display.

+

The Cartels are now the 2nd Eligible Faction. The Cartels opt to take

+

a Limited Operation in order to Rally in Medellín. Place 1 available

+

Cartel guerrilla in Medellín. Adjust Cartel Resources from 4 to 3.

+

Both the Cartel and AUC cylinders move into the Ineligible box; the

+

FARC cylinder moves back into the Eligible box on the Sequence

+

of Play display. Draw Colombia Nueva on top of Carabineros, and

+

reveal the next card: a Propaganda card!

+

Only the Government and the FARC are eligible to take immediate

+

advantage of the knowledge of the upcoming Propaganda card.

+

FARC is the 1st Eligible player on Colombia Nueva. FARC chooses

+

to conduct a Terror Operation.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read sections 3.3.4 and 4.3.3

+

before continuing.

+

Ready to continue? Excellent! As you no doubt read, Terror is a

+

powerful tool in the hands of the Insurgents. It is especially useful

+

to FARC because it either degrades Support or builds Opposition.

+

All other Insurgent Terror causes Support or Opposition to gravitate

+

towards Neutral.

+

Here, the FARC will engage in Terror and combine it with the Kid-

+

napping Special Activity! Place a white pawn in each of Cesar,

+

Antioquia, Huila, Arauca, and the cities of Pasto and Neiva. FARC

+

would like to wage Terror on LoCs because it is both free and it

+

causes Sabotage, but cannot since Terror requires underground guer-

+

rillas and all guerrillas on LoCs were Activated by the Government

+

Patrol operation.

+

FARC will start its Terror Operation in Huila. Flip one guerrilla

+

to show its Active side. Find and place a “Terror” counter into the

+

department. Next, place a “Passive Opposition” counter to cover

+

the “Neutral” box in Huila. Adjust the “Opposition + Bases” from

+

17 to 19 (Huila has a population of 2). Next, for the Kidnapping

+

Special Activity in Huila, the FARC targets the Cartel base and rolls

+

a die—our first die roll of the game! The die roll result is a “2”. Sub-

+

tract 2 Cartel Resources (from 3 to 1) and add 2 FARC Resources

+

(from 4 to 6). Then subtract 1 FARC Resource for the cost of the

+

Operation in that space (back from 6 to 5).

+

FARC’s next target for Terror is the department of Cesar. Flip the

+

guerrilla to show its Active side, place a Terror and a Passive Op-

+

position counter. Adjust “Opposition + Bases” from 19 to 20 and

+

FARC Resources from 5 to 4.

+

FARC next targets Antioquia. Flip the guerrilla to show its Active

+

side, place a Terror and a Passive Opposition counter. Adjust “Op-

+

position + Bases” from 20 to 22 (Population of 2 in Antioquia) and

+

FARC Resources from 4 to 3.

+

Next up for Terror is Arauca. Flip the guerrilla to show its Active

+

side, place a Terror and a Passive Opposition counter. Adjust “Op-

+

position + Bases” from 22 to 23 and FARC Resources from 3 to 2.

+

FARC will also Kidnap in Arauca, targeting the Cartel base. A die is

+

still rolled even though the Cartels have only 1 Resource because if

+

a “6” is rolled, an AUC guerrilla may be placed in the area. The die

+

roll is a “4”, however, so the only effect is the Cartels lose their last

+

Resource and FARC gains that one Resource (from 2 to 3)—FARC

+

doesn’t gain 4 even though a 4 was rolled because the Cartels don’t

+

have 4 Resources to give.

+

FARC turns its attention to the city of Neiva. Flip the guerrilla

+

to show its Active side, place a Terror counter and flip the Active

+

Support counter over to its Passive Support side. Adjust the “Total

+

Support” from 56 to 55 and FARC Resources from 3 to 2.

+

Finally, FARC resolves a Terror Operation in Pasto. Flip the guerrilla

+

to show its Active side, place a Terror counter and flip the Active

+

Support counter over to its Passive Support side. Adjust the “Total

+

Support” from 55 to 54 and FARC Resources from 2 to 1.

+

FARC would like to carry out Kidnapping against the Govern-

+

ment, but can only do so in a City or LoC where FARC guerrillas

+

outnumber Police. Neither Pasto

+

nor Neiva qualify.

+

Place FARC’s Eligibility counter

+

into the “Op + Special Activity”

+

box on the Sequence of Play

+

display.

+

The Government will now carry

+

out the unshaded portion of the

+

Colombia Nueva event. The

+

Government shifts Pasto back

+

from Passive Support to Active

+

Support and gains +3 Resources

+

(from 16 to 19). Adjust the “Total

+

Support” from 54 back to 55.

+

Place the Government Eligibil-

+

FARC Terror in the cities of Pasto and Neiva, and in the Department

+

of Huila.

+
+ +
+

13

+

Andean Abyss

+

ity cylinder into the “LimOp or

+

Event” box on the Sequence of

+

Play display.

+

Draw Propaganda! on top of

+

Colombia Nueva, and reveal the

+

next card: #45, Los Derechos

+

Humanos!

+

Important: Unless using the

+

“No Reveal Option” (2.2), only

+

Limited Operations may be con-

+

ducted when resolving the card

+

immediately preceding the final

+

Propaganda Card of the game

+

(2.3.9)!

+

STOP. Please stop here and read sections 6.0 through 7.3

+

before continuing.

+

Place the “Prop Card” counter on the “Victory?” space of the Pro-

+

paganda Card track on the Sequence of Play display. During this

+

phase, we check to see if any faction has won the game. At this

+

time no faction has met their victory condition. Just for grins, let’s

+

look at the current victory margin for each faction (how close the

+

Factions are to winning):

+

The Government has 55 Total Support for a victory margin of –5

+

(55 – 60 = –5). The Cartels have 0 Resources and only 7 bases on

+

the map for a victory margin of –40 (0 – 40 = –40)—not even close!

+

The AUC has 1 base on the map compared with 5 FARC bases for a

+

victory margin of –4 (1 – 5 = –4). FARC has 23 Opposition + Bases

+

for a victory margin of –2 (23 – 25 = –2). So right now, FARC is in

+

first place; AUC is a close second; Government is not far behind in

+

third place; and the Cartels lag far behind in fourth place.

+

Move the “Prop Card” counter to the next space on the Propaganda

+

Card track, the “Control” space. Control only matters for the FARC

+

and the Government. FARC controls a space that has more FARC

+

pieces than all other factions put together. Similarly, the Govern-

+

ment controls all spaces where the Government has more pieces

+

than all other factions. Furthermore, control is mainly applicable in

+

departments and cities with a population of 1 or more—not LoCs

+

or 0-Population departments.

+

Currently the Government controls the following spaces: Santa

+

Marta, Sincelejo, Bucaramanga, Santander, Bogotá, Ibagué, Neiva,

+

and Cali. Place a control counter on the “Government Control” side

+

in each of these spaces.

+

FARC currently controls: Cesar, Nariño, and Guaviare. Place a

+

control counter on the “FARC Control” side in each of these spaces.

+

Next, if FARC controls any cities, a Sabotage counter is placed on

+

each un-sabotaged LoC connected to those cities. FARC, however,

+

does not control any cities at this time. Similarly, a Sabotage counter

+

is placed on each un-sabotaged LoC with more guerrillas (of any

+

combination of factions) than cubes. Right now there is no such

+

LoC.

+

Move the “Prop Card” counter over to the “Resources” space of the

+

Propaganda Card track on the Sequence of Play display. During this

+

phase, each faction will collect Resources:

+

The Government will collect 1 Resource for each un-sabotaged LoC.

+

The sum total economic value of all LoCs is 30 so the easy way to

+

calculate this is simply to subtract the economic value of each sabo-

+

taged LoC from 30. There are two 3-Econ LoCs which are marked

+

with a Sabotage counter so the Government gains +24 Resources

+

(30 – 6 = 24). Increase the Government’s Resources from 19 to 43.

+

Ordinarily the Government would also gain a number of Resources

+

equal to the number the “Aid” counter is covering on the numbered

+

track (currently the Government has 9 Aid). But when Samper is El

+

Presidente, the Government does not receive Aid.

+

FARC and the AUC receive 1 Resource for each base they have on

+

the map. AUC, therefore, receives 1 Resource. Increase the AUC’s

+

Resources from 10 to 11. FARC has 5 bases on the map so adjust

+

FARC Resources from 1 to 6.

+

The Cartels gain 3 Resources for each base they have on the map.

+

Cartels have 7 bases on the map so the Cartels gain 21 Resources.

+

Adjust Cartel Resources from 0 to 21.

+

Move the “Prop Card” counter over to the “Support” space of the

+

Propaganda Card track on the Sequence of Play display. During

+

this Phase, the Government and FARC can engage in Civic Ac-

+

tions and Agitation (respectively) in order to improve Support

+

and degrade Opposition(Government), or degrade Support and

+

improve Opposition (FARC). In order to conduct Civic Actions,

+

the Government must have control, troops, and police. In order to

+

conduct Agitation, FARC must have control.

+

First, the Government will conduct Civic Actions in Neiva. It costs

+

3 Resources (from 43 to 40) to remove the Terror counter. Once all

+

Terror counters are removed, the Government can spend more Re-

+

sources to adjust Support. The Government spends 3 more Resources

+

(from 40 to 37) to improve Support in Neiva from Passive to Active

+

Support. Adjust “Total Support” from 55 to 56.

+

Next, FARC Agitates in Cesar. It costs 1 Resource for FARC to

+

remove each Terror counter. FARC spends 1 Resource (from 6 to 5)

+

to remove the single Terror counter from Cesar. FARC will spend 1

+

more Resource (from 5 to 4) to improve Opposition from Passive

+

to Active Opposition. Adjust the “Opposition + Bases” counter

+

from 23 to 24.

+

The next thing we do in the Support phase is conduct the Election.

+

Support is less than 60, so move the El Presidente counter one box

+

to the right to show the new Presidente is Pastrana. One effect of

+

Pastrana’s election is that a FARC Zone counter must be placed.

+

FARC Zone counters must be placed into the space containing the

+

most FARC pieces. Guaviare has the most FARC pieces so the

+
+ +
+

14

+

Andean Abyss

+

FARC Zone counter is placed into that department. Any Government

+

pieces in a space receiving a FARC Zone counter must immediately

+

redeploy. Presently there are no Government pieces in Guaviare so

+

no redeployment is necessary. The Government will not be able to

+

place any of its pieces into the department of Guaviare so long as a

+

FARC Zone counter is in that space.

+

The last thing we do in the Support Phase is conduct “Elite Back-

+

ing” (see 6.4.4). The AUC now has the opportunity to conduct a

+

free Rally in any one space that is not marked with an Opposition

+

(Active or Passive) nor a Control counter (Government or FARC).

+

The AUC will opt to remove two of its Guerillas from Atlántico and

+

place one AUC Base into one of the two empty “Base” spaces in

+

that department. Take the AUC Base from the “2” space on the AUC

+

Bases track. Place the removed Guerrillas back into the Available

+

AUC Guerrillas box. This does not cost the AUC any Resources

+

since this is a “Free” Operation.

+

Move the “Prop Card” counter over to the “Redeploy” space of the

+

Propaganda Card track on the Sequence of Play display. During this

+

phase all Government Troops (not Police) on LoCs or in departments

+

without a Government base must redeploy to either a Government-

+

controlled city or a Government-controlled department containing

+

a Government base. If no such space exists, Troops can Redeploy

+

to Bogotá. All 3 Troops in Chocó Redeploy to Ibagué. The Troop

+

cube on the Pasto-Neiva road Redeploys to Neiva. All 3 Troop cubes

+

on the LoCs connected to Bogotá Redeploy to Bogotá. Finally, one

+

Troop cube from Bucaramanga will Redeploy to Santander (this is

+

an optional Redeployment; not a mandatory one like the previous

+

series of Re-deployments).

+

During the Redeploy phase, any and all Police cubes on the map

+

may Redeploy to any LoCs or Government-controlled spaces. One

+

Police cube in Cali Redeploys to the Pasto-Neiva road. One Police

+

cube in Cali Redeploys to the Neiva-Bogotá pipeline. One Police

+

cube in Bogotá Redeploys to the Bogotá-Yopal pipeline. All other

+

Police remain in place.

+

Move the “Prop Card” counter over to the “Reset” space of the Propa-

+

ganda Card track on the Sequence of Play display. During this phase

+

all factions have their Eligibility cylinder placed into the Eligible box

+

on the Sequence of Play. All Terror, Sabotage, and Control counters

+

are removed from the map. Any Insurgent Momentum cards in play

+

are discarded (none are currently in play). Finally, all guerrillas on

+

the map are flipped to their underground side.

+

Draw Los Derechos Humanos on top of the Propaganda card and

+

reveal the next card: #45, Raúl Reyes.

+

We’ll conclude this tutorial by resolving the Los Derechos Humanos

+

card. The AUC is the 1st Eligible faction on this card. Wanting to

+

reestablish neutrality in several spaces as well as harm the FARC

+

bases, the AUC decides to conduct a Terror Operation in Antioquia,

+

Arauca, and Huila. The AUC will also conduct an Assassinate

+

Special Activity.

+

STOP. Please stop here and read section 4.4.2 before con-

+

tinuing.

+

The first AUC target is Antioquia. Flip 1 AUC guerrilla in Antioquia

+

over to its Active side. Place 1 Terror counter and remove the Passive

+

Opposition counter from the department. Adjust the “Opposition +

+

Bases” from 24 to 22. Next, the AUC Assassinates in Antioquia,

+

killing the lone FARC guerrilla.

+

Next, the AUC conducts Terror in Arauca. Flip 1 AUC guerrilla in

+

the department over to its Active side. Place 1 Terror counter and

+

remove the Passive Opposition counter from the department. Adjust

+

the “Opposition + Bases” from 22 to 21. Next, the AUC Assassinates

+

in Arauca, killing the lone FARC guerrilla.

+

Finally, the AUC conducts Terror in Huila. Flip the AUC guerrilla

+

in the department over to its Active side. Place 1 Terror counter

+

and remove the Passive Opposition counter from the department.

+

Adjust the “Opposition + Bases” from 21 to 19. Next, the AUC As-

+

sassinates in Huila. For this Assassination Special Activity the AUC

+

will remove the lone FARC Base. Note that this IS possible even

+

though there are FARC guerrillas in the space—ANY enemy piece

+

in the location where an Assassination takes place can be eliminated!

+

Place the FARC base back on the “5” space of the FARC Bases track.

+

Adjust the “Opposition + Bases” from 19 to 18.

+

Because the AUC conducted Terror in more than 1 space, the Govern-

+

ment loses 5 Aid points (adjust from 9 to 4). Finally, the AUC has

+

to pay for all this destruction! Adjust AUC Resources from 11 to 8.

+

Place the AUC Eligibility cylinder into the “Op + Special Activity”

+

box on the Sequence of Play display.

+

By this time, you should have a pretty good understanding of the

+

game. There are a few rules, however, that we were unable to ad-

+

dress in this tutorial. We recommend that you read rule section 4.5

+

through 4.5.3 and all of section 5.

+

Section 8 of the rulebook contains the Non-Player rules for solitaire

+

play or for games with less than four players. We strongly recom-

+

mend that you learn the game’s core mechanics (sections 1-7) before

+

attempting to implement the Non-Player rules.

+

GO! Please feel free to continue the game from this point!

+

FARC is 2nd Eligible to play on “Los Derechos Humanos.”

+

Have fun!

+
+ +
+

15

+

Andean Abyss

+

GUIDE TO COIN OPERATIONS

+

Strategy Notes for the Government

+

by Joel Toppen

+

Here is an introduction to the forces and some key actions available

+

to the Government Faction.

+

Troops

+

Troops are your workhorses. They’re going to do all the

+

heavy lifting for you. Essentially, Troops are your pieces

+

that can be moved into spaces to search (Sweep) and de-

+

stroy (Assault) Insurgent Guerrillas and Bases.

+

Troops are brought into the game through the Train Operation.

+

Troops can move via:

+

• Sweep Operation—into an adjacent City or Department to find

+

(Activate) Insurgent Guerrillas.

+

• Patrol Operation—into and/or along LoCs to find (Activate)

+

Insurgent Guerrillas and perhaps kill them in one such space.

+

• Airlift Special Activity—any 3 troops (unlimited with Black-

+

hawks Government Capability) move from anywhere to anywhere

+

on the map. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of this Special

+

Activity!

+

Troops kill Insurgent Guerrillas via the Assault Operation, but only

+

Active guerillas.

+

Guerrillas must be Activated by a Sweep (or some action they them-

+

selves undertook) before Government Troops can eliminate them.

+

Also, through their presence, Troops can project Government control

+

of a space in a Control Phase of a Propaganda card. But, and this is

+

important, by themselves, Troops cannot alter Support/Opposition

+

status in an area. They need Police support to effect that. In the

+

Redeploy Phase, Troops in a LoC or Department space without a

+

Government Base must deploy out of that area (even if that space

+

is Government controlled). Thus their staying power outside a City

+

is limited.

+

Lastly, Troops, by their presence in a space, can inhibit the ability

+

of the AUC and FARC to make use of the Extort Special Action.

+

Also, when positioned with Support or on a LoC, Troops can spot

+

(Activate) marching Guerrillas.

+

Police

+

Police are very, very important Government pieces. While

+

much less mobile than Troops, Police give the Government

+

player crucial positional staying power.

+

Here’s what Police do for you:

+

• Police cannot move with Troops on a Sweep (unless the National

+

Defense & Security Council Government Capability is in play).

+

But they can, if already positioned in the space, assist the Troops

+

in the space being swept. Police cubes count when factoring the

+

effect of a Sweep.

+

• Police inhibit the ability of the Cartels to use the Cultivate Special

+

Action. Police can also inhibit FARC from using the Kidnapping

+

Special Action. Like Troops, Police on LoCs or in spaces with

+

Support can spot (Activate) marching Guerrillas (very important to

+

protect the Cities), and inhibit FARC and the AUC from Extorting

+

in a space.

+

• Police can be used to Patrol LoCs to activate Guerrillas on LoCs,

+

and even conduct an Assault on a LoC as a part of the Sweep.

+

• Within Cities, Police can participate in an Assault.

+

• Police, like Troops, can protect a Government Base from Attack

+

(cubes must be removed before a Base is removed).

+

So far they probably don’t sound terribly useful to the player. There

+

is, however, one crucial role Police have that makes them indispens-

+

able: Police enable the Government player to conduct Civic Actions

+

during a Propaganda card, and also as part of a Train Operation.

+

Civic Action is the means by which the Government player degrades

+

Opposition and/or adds/improves Support—necessary to fulfill the

+

Government victory conditions. At least 1 Police cube is required

+

to conduct Civic Action in a Propaganda Phase or as a postscript

+

to a Train Operation.

+

Police cannot move by Airlift or (usually) Sweep. They can only

+

be moved onto LoCs and/or Cities from an adjacent space during a

+

Patrol. If LoCs are free of Insurgent Guerrillas, Police can continue

+

to move from LoC to LoC and City to LoC, etc., until a guerrilla is

+

encountered or the player chooses to stop moving. But getting Police

+

into Departments is not quite as simple and requires some planning.

+

So how do you get Police to where you need them without using a

+

Patrol Operation? There are two methods principally:

+

Training—You can get Police into a space where they are needed by

+

simply undertaking the Train Operation and Training Police in that

+

space. For Cities, this is not a problem as you can Train in any City.

+

Training in a Department, however, requires a bit of planning.

+

In order to place cubes by Training in a Department, you must have

+

a Base there. In order to get a Base into that Department, you must

+

first have three cubes in that Department. OK, so how do you get

+

cubes into a Department so you can place a Base? Typically, you will

+

undertake a Sweep Operation to move Troops into a Department.

+

You could also use the Airlift Special Activity to fly an additional

+

3 Troops there. Then, in a subsequent turn, you undertake a Train

+

Operation in that Department, only you don’t place cubes; instead,

+

you remove 3 cubes and place a Base.

+

Once you have a Base, in a future turn, you can Train and place

+

Police into that Department. If you have Troops and Police and more

+

Government pieces than any other Faction in that Department, you

+

may also pay for Civic Action in order to improve Support (even

+

without a Base).

+

Redeploy—During the Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card, the

+

Government player can reposition any and all of his Police to any

+

LoCs or any space with Government Control.

+

Adjacency does not apply during this Phase, so this is a very pow-

+

erful opportunity to move otherwise less-mobile Police around the

+

board. The player must plan very carefully here lest he be forced to

+

waste Resources and Operational tempo later on.

+

And so, in short, the Government player may reposition his Police

+

preemptively and for free during the Redeploy Phase. The Govern-

+

ment player may place new Police reactively and for a considerable

+

cost in Resources when undertaking a Train Operation during an

+

event card play. Police enable the Government to gain precious

+

support necessary to fulfilling his victory conditions. This then, will

+

likely free up Troops to deploy elsewhere against Insurgents. Police

+

give the Government player staying power.

+
+ +
+

16

+

Andean Abyss

+

Bases

+

Bases are crucial to Government success in that they

+

provide the only means by which the Government

+

player can maintain a constant Troop presence in the

+

countryside. The Government player has only three

+

Bases they can establish. Don’t waste them!

+

Where do you need Bases? You need them in Departments. You

+

do not need them in Cities. Why? Cities, are de facto Bases. Bases

+

enable the player to Train Troops and/or Police in that space. Since

+

you an already do that in a City, you do not need to give up three

+

cubes and use one of your three Base pieces there! The only good

+

a Base will do the Government in a City is deny the ability to place

+

a Base in that City to one of the Insurgent Factions. But since the

+

Government only has three Bases with which to work, this seems

+

to be a wasted use of a Base.

+

Why do you need Bases? You need Bases in order to Train Police

+

and Troops in a Department. In order to decrease Opposition and

+

increase Support for the Government, the Government player must

+

undertake Civic Actions either in conjunction with a Train Operation

+

or during a Propaganda card. In order to undertake a Civic Action,

+

one or more Police must be in that space. In order to get Police into

+

a Department where there are presently no Police, they must usually

+

be Trained there. To be Trained there, you need a Base.

+

Bases also allow Troops to remain in a Department during the

+

Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card. And so if the Government

+

player is still fighting to wrest control of a Department from an

+

Insurgent faction when a Propaganda card is resolved, the presence

+

of a Base in that Department allows the Government player to keep

+

his Troops in the field.

+

So there you have it! Bases are one more important cog in the

+

Government’s machinery.

+

ROLE SUMMARIES

+

Government

+

Situation. Colombia is at the edge of abyss. Illegal armed

+

groups—flush with drug money—are multiplying in the

+

countryside. Terror, sabotage, assassination, and kidnapping

+

have reached alarming rates, and little of the rural population sup-

+

ports the national Government. Only a full-out, whole-of-Govern-

+

ment counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign can restore law and

+

order to your nation.

+

Goal. Expand the Government’s legitimacy throughout the country.

+

The more population that supports you, the greater your chance to

+

win.

+

Tools. You can train forces to outnumber and assault the enemy

+

with fearsome firepower. But guerrillas must first be flushed out

+

from underground by sweeping cities or rural departments where

+

they hide. Your troops are highly mobile by ground or air lift but

+

must return to bases or city garrisons. Police—once established in

+

a department—can stay. Police and troops together can conduct

+

civic action to build your popular support. But COIN requires

+

resources—be sure to control the country’s cities, pipelines, and

+

other lines of communications and cultivate foreign aid to ensure

+

your war chest remains full.

+

Deals. It’s tempting to single-mindedly hammer the FARC and let

+

the cartels and AUC do their thing, since FARC’s political interests

+

directly oppose yours. But the smaller insurgents can quietly gain

+

momentum and win. Imagine a temporary truce in which you leave

+

FARC free to fight off the dread paramilitaries, while your eradica-

+

tion of the Cartels’ fields helps FARC politically and fills your aid

+

coffers.

+

Tip. COIN is a gradual campaign—plan your territorial control and

+

civic action several operations ahead.

+

FARC

+

Situation. Colombia’s popular revolution is ready to tran-

+

sition to the mobile phase. The Government has abandoned

+

the countryside. Your revolutionary movement—the

+

FARC—is drawing resources from Colombia’s drug economy. It’s

+

time to move: rally your People’s Army and march on the strongholds

+

of reaction!

+

Goal. Build opposition to the Government to prepare its collapse.

+

The more of the country’s population you can swing from support

+

to opposition while sustaining your logistics, the better chance

+

you’ll win.

+

Tools. That probably will mean infiltrating cities with your guerril-

+

las to agitate the bourgeoisie into uprising. Wherever you control

+

the population by outnumbering all enemy forces with your fighters

+

and logistical bases, you can agitate. Even where you can’t control

+

territory, you can terrorize the populace into resenting Government

+

fecklessness. To operate, you’ll need resources: extort controlled

+

areas or kidnap and ransom resources away from wealthy drug lords

+

or Government collaborators. If the Government or the reactionary

+

paramilitaries come after you, ambush them first!

+

Deals. You share the countryside with the cartels and can protect

+

drug Bases by making the areas dangerous for troops or police. You

+

share with your Insurgent enemies an interest in a weak Govern-

+

ment—their terror can erode Government support and aid; you in

+

turn can limit the growth of your logistical bases to placate the AUC.

+

Even the Government may help you—giving you a pause to trim

+

the AUC or Cartels when too strong or doing so itself.

+

Tip. Strike the country’s lines of communications—they are the

+

arteries of Government resources and maneuver.

+

AUC

+

Situation. Colombia’s Government has proven incapable

+

of controlling the leftist scourge of the FARC. You will step

+

into the security vacuum and use the terrorists’ own tactics

+

against them. Funded by landowners who have suffered an epi-

+

demic of FARC kidnapping, you will rally the autodefensa militias

+

under the AUC banner and cleanse the land of leftist infrastruc-

+

ture—or at least provide a counterweight.

+

Goal. Eliminate FARC logistical bases while building your own. The

+

more disparity in AUC’s favor, the closer you are to winning.

+

Tools. Your guerrillas are every bit as effective as the FARC’s,

+

though often less numerous, and can ambush to guarantee a suc-

+

cessful attack. Your terror operations enable you to eliminate even

+

protected FARC logistical bases through assassination, neutralize

+

local opposition to the Government to allow you rally forces, and

+

even trim back popular support of and foreign aid for the Government

+

when it’s getting too strong. You can rally your forces in relatively

+

safe Government areas and extort there for resources, then march

+

a guerrilla army into a FARC stronghold to attack or infiltrate indi-

+

vidual units to terrorize.

+
+ +
+

17

+

Andean Abyss

+

Deals. You can help the Government by going where it can’t: Your

+

informants enable you to attack underground guerrillas, your terror

+

instantly dampens FARC-based popular opposition, and you can

+

take on FARC within demilitarized zones. But don’t dismiss hand-

+

shakes with other Insurgents. FARC rallying directly affects your

+

victory—offer truce. And your assassinations can easily target the

+

Cartels’ business—extract drug shipments for “protection”.

+

Tip. You’re a remora on the Government shark. Swim along, but

+

be ready for the day it shakes you off and bites.

+

Cartels

+

Situation. You have taken over Colombia’s illegal narcot-

+

ics industry. The bad news is that the Government is gear-

+

ing up its “war on drugs”, and the more it eradicates your

+

drug production bases, the more gringo aid it gets. The good news

+

is that the country is at the height of a civil war, and there are

+

plenty of other illegal groups around to keep the Government busy

+

and off your back.

+

Goal. Make money. And grow your productive base to make sure

+

that you can keep making money. The more resources and bases

+

you accumulate, the more likely you are to win.

+

Tools. You are a commercial insurgency and can attack and terror-

+

ize your enemies like the rest. But your gunmen are less numerous

+

and can’t protect everything you own. Your strength is that you are

+

the fastest growing enterprise in the country: cultivate and process

+

until you’re rich. Then bribe to neutralize whatever enemy guer-

+

rillas, police, or bases stand in your way. Process drugs and use

+

profits from the shipments to grease your operational skids and

+

grow even faster.

+

Deals. You got the drugs and the money, so you can get the deals.

+

Resources are transferable, and—sooner or later—you should have

+

garnered more than you need. Use them to buy friends. Or offer to

+

process shipments for other Insurgents—or even for a staged Gov-

+

ernment drug bust! Or agree to bribe away whatever threatens your

+

enemy—anything to keep the heat off your coca fields.

+

Tip. The potent Medellín gang just got shot up, so you are start-

+

ing weak. Try to get a lot of bases and shipments ready to earn

+

resources—but not so many as to draw unwanted attention!

+

1-PLAYER EXAMPLE OF PLAY

+

Once you have gone over the tutorial starting on page 2, we rec-

+

ommend trying out this step-by-step run through part of a solitaire

+

game: it will help you learn how Non-player Factions work for 2- or

+

3-player games as well. Follow along, referring to the illustrations,

+

or set up the game board and conduct the moves described. You can

+

fish out each card as it is named, or preset the deck with the card

+

order provided in the shaded box at right. A numbered paragraph be-

+

gins each new card played. Italicized shaded text adds comment.

+

The player decides to use no optional rules and sets up the board

+

and deck (rule 2.1). Playing ANDEAN ABYSS solo, the player is the

+

Government, trying to beat the 3 Insurgent Factions run by Non-

+

player rules (section 8).

+

1) The player flips the first card to be played and reveals the next:

+

they are Op Millenium and Raúl Reyes. The Cartels are 1st Eligible

+

on Op Millenium, so the player consults the gray (Non-player) text

+

on the Sequence of Play aid sheet, which indicates that a 1st Eligible

+

Non-player executes an Operation (Op), unless it has the leftmost

+

symbol on the card (8.1, 1st bullet). The Cartels on this card are

+

leftmost, so they will play the Event.

+

Non-players always use the shaded portion of dual-use Events

+

(8.4.1). This shaded text says to replace 2 Police with Cartels pieces:

+

because there are some Police to replace and some Cartels pieces

+

available, the Event will have an effect and so will be executed.

+

(For an Event with no effect, Cartels would have reverted to Ops,

+

per the 3rd bullet of 8.1). The player checks the Cartels panel of the

+

Non-Player foldout (because Op Millenium has the Cartels symbol

+

leftmost) to see if there are any special instructions for Non-player

+

execution of the event (8.4.4). There are: Police in random Cities

+

will be replaced before any in Departments.

+

The player next must determine the 2 random Cities where Cartels

+

pieces will replace Police. The player rolls the three colored dice

+

and obtains red 1, yellow 3, green 1. Referring to the Random City

+

or Department chart on the Non-Player foldout (8.2), red 1 yields

+

the left column of boxes, yellow 3 the middle row, and green 1 the

+

space at the top of that box, Medellín. Medellín is a City with Police

+

in it, so it will be the first space affected by the Event. It has only 1

+

Police, so a second space is needed.

+

The roll to select the second space is red 6, yellow 1, green 2—the

+

Department of Amazonas. Amazonas does not qualify because it is

+

not a City, so the player tracks down the column on the Random

+

City or Department chart (or finds Amazonas on the Planning Map

+

aid and follows the arrows) until a City (light purple) with Police

+

is reached: Neiva.

+

So the Non-player Cartels will replace 1 Police cube each in Medellín

+

and Neiva. Non-players always place Bases instead of Guerrillas, if

+

Preparing the Deck for This Example

+

If you want to set up the game to follow along with this example,

+

prepare the deck as follows:

+

Stack the following cards face down, in order from top to

+

bottom.

+

• Op Millenium

+

• Raúl Reyes

+

• Soldados Campesinos

+

• Gramaje

+

• Air Bridge

+

• Former Military

+

• Fuerza Aérea Colombiana

+

• Senado & Cámara

+

• Misil Antiaéreo

+

• Propaganda!

+

• Pipeline Repairs

+

• Sucumbíos

+

• Narco-War

+

• National Coordination Center

+

• Limpieza

+

• Oil Spill

+

• Deserters & Defectors

+

• Ayahuasca Tourism

+

• Propaganda!

+

Divide the remaining Event cards into 3 roughly equal piles

+

and shuffle a Propaganda card into 2 of the piles. Stack the 3

+

piles face down under the above cards, with the Propaganda

+

cards in the bottom 2 piles.

+
+ +
+

18

+

Andean Abyss

+

possible (8.1.2, 1st bullet). The Cartels do have Bases available, and

+

there is stacking room for the Bases in each City. The Police cubes

+

in Medellín and Neiva are placed into the Government’s Available

+

Forces box and an available Cartels Base is placed into each City,

+

bringing the total number of Cartels Bases to 8.

+

The Cartels have put down an off-shoot in Pablo Escobar’s

+

old territory!

+

The Government is 2nd Eligible and can execute an Operation and

+

Special Activity. The player decides to respond to the Cartels’ threat

+

by Training to add 3 Troops and 3 Police each to Medellín and Cali,

+

4 Troops and 2 Police to Neiva, and—looking ahead to fighting other

+

insurgents—2 Troops and 4 Police to Santander-Boyacá. Following

+

up with Civic Action to bring Cali to Active Support, the Government

+

brings Total Support up to 56 and has spent 18 Resources, down

+

to 22. Positioning for future operations in the Llanos interior, the

+

player then Air Lifts 3 of the Government’s now abundant Troops

+

from Cali to Guaviare.

+

Government training responds to the Cartels’ infiltration of Medel-

+

lín and Neiva.

+

2) Now Raúl Reyes is played (the top card of the deck, to be played

+

next, is revealed to be Soldados Campesinos). The Non-player FARC

+

is 1st Eligible and will execute the Event (8.1). There are instruc-

+

tions for Raúl Reyes on the Non-Player FARC aid panel, which are

+

to place the FARC Base in a space with FARC Guerrillas and with

+

Support, if possible. Santander-Boyacá has both a FARC Guerrilla

+

and (Active) Support and has room for a Base, so the FARC slips

+

in a new Base there: Opposition + Bases to 21. The battle for the

+

Colombian Andes is on! In addition, the Event grants the FARC +6

+

Resources, to 16.

+

Only the AUC remains Eligible. Because the 1st Eligible Faction

+

(FARC) executed the Event, the AUC as 2nd Eligible must execute

+

Ops. The player consults the Non-Player AUC aid (8.6). The first

+

question on the flowchart is whether the AUC has 6 or more Guerril-

+

las available or could place a Base (if it Rallied). It could not place

+

a Base, which would require removing 2 Guerrillas from a space,

+

but it does have at least 6 Guerrillas available. The answer to the

+

flowchart’s question is “Yes”, so the AUC will Rally.

+

Per the Rally box on the Non-Player AUC aid (8.6.1), the AUC

+

will Rally in up to 3 non-Opposition spaces by the following pri-

+

orities:

+

• First, placing Bases wherever there are at least 2 AUC Guerrillas.

+

That is nowhere.

+

• Next, flipping Guerrillas Underground in certain spaces with

+

Active AUC Guerrillas. There are no Active AUC Guerrillas, so

+

again nowhere.

+

• Finally, placing AUC Guerrillas wherever possible with FARC

+

Bases, then with AUC Bases, then randomly. Santander-Boyacá and

+

Huila-Tolima each have a FARC Base but no Opposition, so each of

+

those 2 spaces receives an AUC Guerrilla. Only Antioquia-Bolívar

+

has an AUC Base, so it is the third AUC Rally space, receiving 3

+

AUC Guerrillas. AUC has spent 3 Resources down to 7.

+

The flowchart’s “then” arrow takes us to the Extort box for the Non-

+

player AUC’s Special Activity (8.6.1). The box says to Extort every-

+

where that AUC outnumbers enemies and has underground Guerril-

+

las—in other words, everywhere possible. Only Antioquia-Bolívar and

+

Atlántico-Magdalena qualify: an AUC Guerrilla is flipped to Active

+

in each and the AUC receives +2 Resources, back to 9.

+

The AUC is girding for assassination in FARC base areas,

+

but its addition to the growing guerrilla presence in

+

pro-Government Santander-Boyacá is unwelcome to the

+

Government.

+

The Andes heat up as Left and Right gird for a fight.

+

3) The next played card is Soldados Campesinos, and the upcoming

+

Event will be Gramaje. With the AUC Ineligible, the player decides

+

to take advantage of Soldados Campesinos to quickly establish some

+

effective policing of the countryside. The Government places 1 Po-

+

lice each into Chocó-Córdoba, Nariño-Cauca, Putumayo-Caquetá,

+

Guaviare, Meta East, and Cesar-La Guajira.

+

Only the Cartels remain Eligible, and so, after the Government’s

+

Event, they conduct Ops and a Special Activity. Consulting the Non-

+

Player Cartels flowchart, the Cartels with at least 10 pieces—Guer-

+

rillas plus Bases—available will Rally (8.5).

+

The Cartels Rally box’s first 2 bullets do not apply, so the Cartels’

+

3 Rally spaces will begin where Cartels Bases have no Cartels

+

Guerrillas. There are 5 such spaces, so those which will receive

+

Cartels Guerrillas will be determined randomly. The first roll—2

+

lone Cartels Base. red, 4 yellow, 2 green—hits Medellín, which happens to have a

+
+ +
+

19

+

Andean Abyss

+

The next roll—6, 3, 6—is Huila, which does not have a Cartels

+

Base. So the player follows the arrows on the Planning Map (or the

+

Random City or Department chart) until a candidate Rally space

+

is reached: Huila to Pasto, Ecuador, Nariño, Chocó, Cali, Ibagué,

+

Antioquia, then Medellín. Medellín has a Base but has already been

+

selected for Rally, so the player continues along the arrows from

+

there, arriving eventually at Meta East for the second Rally.

+

The player could determine the third Rally space with the same

+

process, but decides it would be easier to randomly select among

+

the 3 remaining candidates with a single, equal chance die roll (see

+

8.2 Play Note). Assigning 1-2 to Neiva, 3-4 to Meta West, and 5-6

+

to Guaviare, the player rolls a 3. The third Cartels Rally will occur

+

in Meta West.

+

As reminders, the player places white Ops pawns into Medellín, Meta

+

East, and Meta West (3.1.1). Medellín receives 4 Cartels Guerrillas

+

and Meta East and Meta West get 2 Guerrillas each. The Cartels

+

have spent 3 Resources for the Rallying, down to 7.

+

The Non-Player Cartels flowchart indicates that the Cartels will now

+

Cultivate in a space with more than 0 Population and more Cartels

+

Guerrillas than Police. The first priority (1st bullet of the Cultivate

+

box) is to place a Base in a Department where the Cartels just Ral-

+

lied. Medellín is not a Department, and neither Meta East nor Meta

+

West has room to place a Base.

+

The next priority (bullet) is to move a Cartels Base to a space with

+

no Cartels Base. Because a Cultivate space must have more Cartels

+

Guerrillas than Police, and all spaces with Cartels Guerrillas already

+

have a Cartels Base, this priority similarly does not apply.

+

Per the final bullet, the Cartels therefore do not execute a Special

+

Activity. The Cartels’ actions and the card are completed, and the

+

player removes the 3 Ops pawns.

+

The Cartels have protected much of their businesses from

+

Government Assault—and Medellín is again a kingpin

+

haven!

+

Government and Cartels build strength in the central lowlands.

+

4) Gramaje is played, revealing Air Bridge. The FARC, leftmost on

+

the Gramaje card, executes the Event, taking the Cartels’ remaining

+

7 Resources to give itself a total of 23 Resources.

+

The FARC is well-resourced for the long term, but its leeching

+

off the Cartels may slow the latter’s growth down and ease

+

pressure on the Government in the short term.

+

AUC Ops and Special Activity are up next. With 7 AUC Guer-

+

rillas available (and the ability to place a Base in any event), the

+

Non-player AUC Rallies. By the AUC Rally box’s 1st bullet, AUC

+

replaces 2 Guerrillas in Antioquia-Bolívar with a new Base. (There

+

are 2 AUC Guerrillas in Santander-Boyacá, but no room for a Base.)

+

Non-players remove their Active before their Underground Guer-

+

rillas (8.1.2, 4th bullet), so the Active AUC Guerrilla in Antioquia

+

is one of those replaced.

+

The 2nd bullet of Rally does not apply, because the remaining space

+

with an Active AUC Guerrilla—Atlántico—has no cube. The 3rd

+

bullet results in placing AUC Guerrillas again in Santander and

+

Huila—the only 2 spaces with FARC Bases where AUC can Rally.

+

AUC then Extorts again in Antioquia—the only space where it

+

can—having spent 3 Resources and earned 1 back, ending with 7.

+

5) Air Bridge played reveals Former Military. The Cartels execute

+

the Air Bridge Event to place 3 Bases, one each into a Department

+

without Cartels pieces. (The Cartels being out of Resources does

+

not stop the Event.) With many candidate spaces, the player rolls on

+

the random spaces chart: 4, 3, 6 yields Meta East—already hosting

+

Cartels pieces and in any event fully stacked, so the first Cartels

+

Base goes to Vichada. Next, the rolls 1, 4, 5 yield Santander, again

+

already hosting 2 Bases, so placing the Cartels Base into the next

+

open Department along the chart sequence (or Planning Map ar-

+

rows), Atlántico. Finally, 1, 2, 1 leads (eventually) to Cesar for the

+

third Cartels Base.

+

Coca cultivation is exploding, even with the Cartels tapped

+

out of operating funds.

+

The Government player—seeing an opportunity to shut the FARC

+

out of the next card and to pocket some resources—decides to pass

+

(Government Resources to 25).

+

6) Former Military played reveals Fuerza Aérea Colombiana. Ex-

+

ecuting the Former Military Event, the AUC will free March and

+

then Ambush.

+

The Non-Player AUC sheet instructs to use AUC’s March and Attack

+

priorities for the Event, so the AUC will first free March into 1 space

+

per the March box on the Non-Player AUC panel. The candidate

+

space must have FARC—a FARC Base, if possible—and no AUC

+

Guerrillas. Such space into which AUC Guerrillas could March

+

and remain Underground must be chosen first. Also, the candidate

+

spaces must have AUC Guerrillas adjacent that would March, even

+

though only AUC Guerrillas in excess of 1 will leave spaces with

+

AUC Bases or with any FARC pieces (8.6.2).

+

A random space roll of 5, 3, 2 yields Meta West. The space has a

+

FARC Base, no AUC Guerrillas, and will allow 1 AUC Guerrilla to

+

slip in Underground. The adjacent AUC Guerrillas in Guaviare and

+

Putumayo will not March out because they are alone with FARC

+

pieces, but there are 2 AUC Guerrillas in Huila—one of which

+

could March into Meta West, Underground. All priorities are met,

+

so no further looking is needed: the AUC Guerrilla Marches from

+

Huila to Meta West.

+

Next, per the Event, the AUC Ambushes in Meta West per its Attack

+

priorities (8.6.3). There are no Shipments to target, so FARC is Am-

+

bushed, losing its 2 Guerrillas in Meta West. The Ambushing AUC

+
+ +
+

20

+

Andean Abyss

+

Guerrilla there goes Active and is joined by a fresh, Underground

+

AUC Guerrilla (4.3.2, 4.4.1).

+

Led by former military officers, AUC guerrillas strike into Meta

+

West.

+

The player, seeing a number of attractive targets for the free Air

+

Strikes with the next Event, again passes and afterall gives the FARC

+

its move. Government Resources rise to 28.

+

Per the Non-Player FARC flowchart, the FARC will Rally because

+

it has at least 9 Guerrillas available (8.7.1). The first 2 bullets in the

+

Rally box do not apply—the FARC cannot place any Bases with

+

Rally, nor are there any Active FARC Guerrillas. So FARC first will

+

Rally to place Guerrillas wherever it has Bases (and there is no Sup-

+

port). A total of 13 FARC Guerrillas appear among 6 Departments:

+

2 each in Chocó, Arauca, Meta East, Meta West, and Guaviare, and

+

3 in Huila.

+

But the FARC is not finished building. Its final Rally priority is to

+

place a Guerrilla into 1 additional, random space. A roll of 4, 1, 2

+

designates Atlántico—ineligible for FARC Rally because it has Sup-

+

port—leading to Cesar, which receives a FARC Guerrilla.

+

By the flowchart (or 8.7.1), the FARC now Extorts where it can

+

and it has at least 2 Underground Guerrillas: in Chocó-Córdoba,

+

Arauca-Casanare, and Huila-Tolima. It spent 7 Resources to Rally

+

and earned 3 by Extortion, ending the card with 19 total.

+

The FARC finally launches operations, quickly raising an

+

impressive force and covering its exposed Meta West base

+

against the pending Government air strikes.

+

7) Fuerza Aérea Colombiana is up; Senado & Cámara will be next.

+

The Government player decides to employ the Colombian Air Force

+

to trim the cocaleros, striking exposed Cartels Bases in Cesar-La

+

Guajira, Atlántico-Magdalena, and Guaviare. The only other Eligible

+

Faction is the Cartels. They are to Operate but have 0 Resources, so

+

they Pass instead (8.1, 4th bullet), gaining 1 Resource.

+

8) The AUC executes Senado & Cámara, protecting itself from

+

Government Sweep and Assault. The Cartels will Operate: they

+

have fewer than 10 pieces available, but they can use Rally to place

+

a Base in Medellín, replacing 2 of their Guerrillas to do so (8.5.1).

+

Since the Cartels then again reach 0 Resources, they conduct no

+

further Rally (8.1, 4th bullet). No Cultivate priorities are met, so

+

the Cartels conduct no Special Activity (8.5.1).

+

9) Misil Antiaéreo is the next card played, revealing Propaganda!

+

thereafter. The FARC executes the Event, sharply if temporarily

+

constraining Government Special Activities. (Per 8.1, Insurgent

+

Momentum always counts as an effect for Non-player execution,

+

no matter how briefly it will remain in play.)

+

The player takes advantage of the Government receiving the final

+

move before the Propaganda Round to position for Civic Action

+

in 3 Departments: 3 Troops from Bogotá use the empty Road to

+

Guaviare; 1 Troop from Cali Sweeps Nariño-Cauca; and 1 other

+

Troop from Cali and 3 from Medellín Sweep Chocó-Córdoba. The

+

Government then Eradicates the Cartels Base in Vichada, placing a

+

FARC Guerrilla there. Government Resources drop to 19 and Aid

+

rises to 13.

+

Government troops sweep into FARC regions in the west and east.

+

10) The first Propaganda! card proceeds as follows:

+

• VICTORY: No Faction has met its Victory condition (and

+

even if the Government had, per 8.8, this 1-player game would

+

continue).

+

• CONTROL: The player puts Govt Control markers in Chocó-

+

Córdoba, Nariño-Cauca, Guaviare, and Santander-Boyacá

+

(and decides just to keep in mind that all Cities also are Govt

+

Controlled). The player marks FARC Control in Huila-Tolima,

+

Arauca-Casanare, and Vichada.

+

• RESOURCES: Government Resources increase to 49, FARC to

+

26, AUC to 9, and Cartels to 24.

+

• SUPPORT: The player decides to increase Support with as

+

much Civic Action as possible—obtaining 4 shifts each in

+

Chocó, Nariño, and Guaviare, for a whopping expenditure of 36

+

Resources, down to 13.

+

• With plenty of money, FARC similarly Agitates to the maximum

+

extent possible (8.7.5). It shifts Huila-Tolima to Active Opposition,

+

spending 2 Resources, to 24.

+

• Between the Civic Action and Agitation, Total Opposition + FARC

+

Bases has dropped a net 2, to 19. Total Support is 62, and Samper

+

remains in power.

+

• The AUC’s free Rally with Elite Backing cannot place a Base,

+

so its places Guerrillas by its priorities, adding 4 Guerrillas to its

+
+ +
+

21

+

Andean Abyss

+

Bases in Antioquia-Bolívar (8.6.1).

+

• REDEPLOY: The player Redeploys 2 Police each from Cali to

+

Nariño, Medellín to Chocó, and Santander to Guaviare, and the

+

Troops from each of those 3 destination Departments 1 each to

+

Medellín and Cali and the remaining 9 to Bogotá-Villavicencio.

+

The Government has risked committing most of its re-

+

sources to rural development while still facing substantial

+

insurgent forces. And with Samper still in, foreign aid will

+

remain scarce.

+

• RESET: The board is Reset: the two Momentum Events are

+

discarded, all Guerrillas go Underground, and all Factions are

+

Eligible.

+

11) The next card played is Pipeline Repairs, revealing Sucumbíos

+

thereafter. The AUC plays the Event (regardless of whether or not

+

doing so directly benefits that Faction). Pipeline Repairs sabotages

+

3 Pipelines with or adjacent to FARC Guerrillas. The highest-Econ

+

Pipelines are chosen first (8.3, 1st bullet). All three 3-Econ Pipe-

+

lines are adjacent to FARC Guerrillas, so each is Sabotaged, further

+

constraining future Government Resources.

+

The Cartels have 11 pieces available, so Rally. They cannot place

+

a Base, nor do they have any Active Guerrillas. But they do have

+

an unprotected Base in Neiva, so they Rally to place 2 Guerrillas

+

there (8.5.1, 3rd bullet).

+

The Cartels then Rally in 1 more space (only: 8.5.1, 4th bullet), in

+

a Department where they could then Cultivate. A roll of 6 red, 1

+

yellow, 3 green starts the search for a candidate Department at Pu-

+

tumayo, already stacked full. The Planning Map arrows pass through

+

Guaviare—where there are too many Police to Cultivate with the 1

+

Guerrilla that the Cartels would receive there—Meta West, Neiva,

+

and finally Huila, where Cultivation will be possible. The Cartels

+

Rally to place 1 Guerrilla in Huila-Tolima and then Cultivate there

+

to place a Base (8.5.1). The Cartels have spent 2 Resources to 22.

+

Huila-Tolima-Meta-Guaviare: 4-way contest.

+

12) FARC executes Sucumbíos, placing both of its available Bases

+

into Ecuador (8.4.2) and increasing Opposition + FARC Bases to

+

21. The next card revealed is Narco-War.

+

With intelligence that a Narco-War is brewing and the Government

+

on a shoestring, the player decides to Pass, and thereby be Eligible

+

to spark an Event that will whittle down and expose the competing

+

Cartel networks.

+

The FARC finds a sanctuary.

+

13) Narco-War is played, and National Coordination Center will be

+

the next card. The Cartels are leftmost and would execute the Event

+

by 8.1. However, checking the instructions for Narco-War on the

+

Non-player Cartels sheet, the player sees that Non-player Factions

+

always choose Ops on that card.

+

Rally by the Cartels could place a Base in Neiva, so that is what

+

they do, replacing their 2 Guerrillas there. A random space roll then

+

determines that their Rally and Cultivate occur in Atlántico-Magda-

+

lena, which receives a Cartels Guerrilla and Base. The cost of Rally

+

in 2 spaces drops Cartels Resources to 20.

+

The Government then plays the Event, hoping that a renewed narco-

+

war between the Cali and Medellín Cartels—albeit at the cost of a

+

spasm of terror—will finally break their power. Each of the several

+

spaces hosting 2 Cartels Guerrillas is stripped to just 1. All Cartels

+

Guerrillas execute free Terror, going Active, and sinking Total Sup-

+

port to 55 and Opposition + FARC Bases to 16.

+

The Government will have to jump on the opening against

+

the Cartels by Assaulting their exposed networks before they

+

duck back Underground.

+

Eve of the Cartels’ downfall? An internecine narco-war may provide

+

an opening for a Government counter-drug assault but leaves cities

+

and countryside ravaged.

+
+ +
+

22

+

Andean Abyss

+

Arauca-Casanare, where FARC could place Bases, and FARC has 2

+

Bases available to place there. Opposition + Bases rises to 13.

+

Continuing to follow the bullets in the Rally box, there are no Active

+

FARC Guerrillas, so the FARC next Rallies wherever it can place

+

Guerrillas with its Bases: in Meta West and Meta East, placing 4

+

Guerrillas total. (It cannot place any more pieces in Ecuador because

+

of the Sucumbíos Event text.)

+

Finally, the FARC Rallies to place a Guerrilla in a random space.

+

A roll of 4, 4, 1 makes that space Vichada, where the new Guer-

+

rilla unit joins a FARC Guerrilla already there. FARC has spent 5

+

Resources, down to 19.

+

Cartels—AUC terror wave and partial FARC recovery.

+

For its Special Activity, the FARC now Extorts in each space where

+

it has more forces than all enemies and at least 2 Underground Guer-

+

rillas (only, since it has no forces on LoCs: 8.7.1). Its Resources

+

rise again to 24.

+

Cartels and AUC terror ravaged the FARC politically, but the

+

FARC’s army has now grown almost to its maximum and

+

still has plenty of cash.

+

15) Playing Limpieza (next card will be Oil Spill), the Cartels are

+

1st Eligible but not leftmost, so will execute Ops (8.1, 1st bullet).

+

They have fewer than 10 pieces available and could not replace 2

+

Guerrillas with a Base, so the answer to the question in the first

+

diamond on the Non-Player Cartels flowchart is “No”, pointing to

+

the next diamond down. That question asks if there is a Shipment

+

available: there are 4, so the answer is “Yes”, indicating that the

+

Cartels should March.

+

By the March box’s 2nd bullet, however, the Cartels would March

+

only with Guerrillas beyond 1 in each space with a Cartels Base.

+

The player realizes that the Cartels will not be able to execute any

+

March, because they have only 1 Guerrilla per space (after the recent

+

narco-war), all already protecting their Bases. So the player follows

+

the flowchart’s “If none” arrow back up to the Rally box (8.1.1).

+

The Cartels will Rally after all!

+

The Rally cannot place Bases (1st bullet) but will flip Guerrillas

+

Underground (2nd bullet) in 3 of the 4 spaces with Active Cartels

+

14) The AUC is up to execute the National Coordination Center

+

Event (Limpieza will be next), but the event would have no effect

+

because all AUC Guerrillas are already Underground. Therefore,

+

the AUC will execute Ops instead (8.1, 3rd bullet).

+

The AUC does not have 6 Guerrillas available, nor is it in position

+

to place a Base, so it will not Rally (8.6.1).

+

Per the Non-Player AUC flowchart, the player next checks to see if

+

the AUC has Guerrillas in at least half the spaces with FARC Bases.

+

There are 8 spaces with FARC Bases (Chocó, Santander, Huila,

+

Arauca, Meta West, Meta East, Guaviare, and Ecuador). Five of the

+

8 spaces have AUC Guerrillas, so the answer is “Yes”, and AUC

+

therefore will not March (8.6.2).

+

Finally, the player checks whether any Underground AUC Guerrilla

+

is in a space with a FARC Base. There are several, so the answer

+

is “Yes”, and thus the AUC will execute Terror rather than Attack

+

(8.6.3-4).

+

According to the Non-Player AUC Terror box (8.6.4), the AUC will

+

execute Terror in up to 3 spaces with its Underground Guerrillas. The

+

first space is one with a FARC Base. There are 5 candidate spaces,

+

so the player rolls the dice: 1 red, 3 yellow, 2 green yields Medellín,

+

pointing to Bucaramanga, and then to Santander—where there are

+

Underground AUC Guerrillas and a FARC Base.

+

The next priority (2nd bullet in the Terror box) is 1 City or Depart-

+

ment with any FARC piece. A roll of 6, 4, 5 yields Huila, which

+

qualifies.

+

The final priority is in random Cities or Departments. A roll of 3, 6,

+

2 yields Vichada, leading eventually to Putumayo—where there is

+

an Underground AUC Guerrilla—as the third Terror space.

+

For its Special Activity, the AUC will Assassinate in each of the

+

Terror spaces where its Guerrillas exceed Police (8.6.4). So it will

+

Assassinate in Santander-Boyacá (3 AUC Guerrillas, 2 Police) and

+

Huila-Tolima (no Police) and execute Terror without Assassination

+

in Putumayo-Caquetá (1 AUC Guerrilla and 1 Police).

+

The Terror-Assassination in Santander removes the FARC Base

+

(8.6.4 and 8.1.2) and shifts the space to Passive Support, and in

+

Huila removes another FARC Base and shifts the space to Neutral.

+

Terror in Putumayo shifts that space to Neutral. Total Support drops

+

to 53, Opposition + FARC Bases to 11, and Aid to 8. The AUC has

+

spent 3 Resources, down to 6.

+

The only Eligible Faction remaining is the FARC, so it is 2nd Eli-

+

gible. The player must determine whether it will execute the Event

+

or Operations. The situation on the map has changed: the Terror

+

caused some AUC Guerrillas to go Active in spaces with cubes

+

(Santander and Putumayo). The shaded Event is no longer Ineffective

+

and therefore can be chosen by Non-player Factions for execution

+

(8.1, 3rd bullet). The FARC nevertheless will execute Ops instead

+

of the Event because the card bears the gray “2” symbol, meaning

+

2nd Eligible Non-player Factions will choose Ops rather than the

+

Event (8.1, 2nd bullet). The FARC will not use its action simply to

+

help its AUC adversary!

+

The FARC can place Bases, so will Rally (8.7.1). While a player

+

Faction’s Operation following the AUC Ops would have to be Lim-

+

ited, the Non-player FARC is not so restricted (8.1, 5th bullet).

+

Following the Non-player FARC Rally box (8.7.1), FARC first re-

+

places Guerrillas with Bases. There are 2 spaces, Huila-Tolima and

+
+ +
+

23

+

Andean Abyss

+

Guaviare—removing 1 AUC Guerrilla and 1 Police. The Ambush

+

in Santander removes 2 Underground AUC Guerrillas, leaving 1

+

Active AUC Guerrilla in the space (8.1.2, 3rd bullet) and places a

+

new Underground FARC Guerrilla.

+

Central Colombia after the FARC counter-offensive.

+

The FARC’s attacks have preempted potential AUC Assas-

+

sinations and solidified its forces’ control of several Depart-

+

ments where later Agitation can re-generate Opposition.

+

The AUC is 2nd Eligible. Because the FARC used a Special Activity

+

(Ambush)—and because the Oil Spill card has no gray “2nd: Ops”

+

symbol—the AUC executes the shaded Event (8.1, 2nd bullet).

+

The first instruction on the Event is to Sabotage a Pipeline. Random

+

LoC selection (8.3) begins with the highest Econ: all 3-Econ Pipe-

+

lines are already Sabotaged, so the player must randomly select a

+

2-Econ Pipeline to receive a Sabotage marker. The next step is to

+

find a LoC candidate adjacent to a random City (8.3, 2nd bullet).

+

A roll of 6, 6, 3 turns up first the City of Cali—it has no 2-Econ

+

LoCs adjacent—and then leads to Ibagué—which does. The player

+

places a Sabotage marker on the central Ibagué-Bucaramanga-Bo-

+

gotá Pipeline.

+

The Event next says to shift a Department adjacent to the selected

+

Pipeline 1 level toward Active Opposition. Non-player shifts of

+

Support or Opposition via Event text first select spaces with the

+

greatest impact on Total Support and Total Opposition (8.4.3)—typi-

+

cally meaning wherever the greatest Population resides. All three

+

Departments adjacent to the affected Pipeline have 2 Population, so

+

that a 1-level shift in any would affect either Support or Opposition

+

totals by 2. So the player rolls to select a space among them: 6, 6, 6

+

points from Chocó to Antioquia—the AUC heartland—which shifts

+

to Passive Opposition. Total Opposition + FARC Bases is now 15.

+

17) Play of Deserters & Defectors reveals Ayahuasca Tourism.

+

The Cartels Rally to flip their Active Guerrilla in Putumayo and

+

to place 2 Guerrillas each into Meta East—to cover their exposed

+

Base there—and in the randomly-selected Atlántico-Magdalena, to

+

Guerrillas, cubes, and a Cartels Base: Medellín, Cali, Putumayo,

+

and Meta East. Die rolls determine that Rally flips the Guerrillas in

+

Medellín, Cali, and Meta East. The Cartels spend 3 Resources, down

+

to 17—having protected their urban Bases from Assault.

+

By the flowchart, the Cartels then Cultivate. They cannot execute the

+

1st bullet of the Cultivate box, to place a Base in a Department just

+

selected for Rally: the only such Department was Meta East, where

+

there is no stacking room and as many Police as Cartels Guerrillas.

+

By the 2nd bullet, the Cartels would move a Base to a space with no

+

Cartels Bases, but that is also not possible: Cartels Guerrillas in the

+

destination space must outnumber Police, and all Cartels Guerrillas

+

on the map are already with Cartels Bases. So, by the 3rd bullet, the

+

Cartels execute no Special Activity.

+

The Government is 2nd Eligible and—because the 1st Eligible

+

Cartels executed Operations only—may only execute a Limited

+

Operation or Pass. Frustrated in not being able to strike a greater

+

blow at the recently exposed Cartels, the player decides at least to

+

Assault and remove the 2 unprotected Cartels Bases in Neiva. The

+

Government spends 3 Resources, down to 13.

+

Neiva cleaned up, but the Medellín and Cali Cartels remain securely

+

in business.

+

16) The FARC is up, 1st Eligible with Oil Spill (Deserters & De-

+

fectors will be next). It is not leftmost, so executes Ops. While the

+

FARC has Guerrillas positioned to place a Base in Vichada, it has

+

no Bases available, so will not Rally (8.7.1).

+

The next question (next diamond-shaped box down on the Non-

+

Player FARC flowchart) is whether a space with Support or a LoC

+

has 3 or more FARC forces or an Underground FARC Guerrilla

+

(8.7.2). No LoCs host FARC pieces, but several spaces with either

+

Active or Passive Support do. So the answer is “Yes”, leading down

+

the flowchart to the next diamond question.

+

That question is whether the FARC has more Resources than

+

the Government. The FARC has 24 Resources compared to the

+

Government’s 13, so the answer is “Yes”, and so the FARC will

+

Attack (8.7.3).

+

According to the Attack box, the FARC will Attack enemies in all

+

spaces with at least 3 FARC Guerrillas, plus in 1 other space where

+

the FARC could Ambush. The player marks Chocó-Córdoba, Meta

+

West, Meta East, and Guaviare with Ops pawns, then rolls 2, 3, 3

+

to determine that Santander will be the 1 other space—a total of 5

+

Attack spaces. FARC Resources drop to 19.

+

For its Special Activity, the FARC will Ambush in the Attack space

+

with the fewest FARC Guerrillas: Santander-Boyacá.

+

All Attacking FARC Guerrillas go Active. There are no Ship-

+

ments to target, so Attacks will remove AUC, then Government,

+

then Cartels pieces (8.7.3). The Attack rolls and results are: 6 in

+

Chocó—failing; 2 in Meta West—removing 2 AUC Guerrillas ; 2

+

in Meta East—removing 1 Police and 1 Cartels Guerrilla; and 4 in

+
+ +
+

24

+

Andean Abyss

+

set up a Cultivation that places a second Base there as well. Cartels

+

Resources drop to 14.

+

The player contemplates a Limited Operation, but wants to save

+

the Government’s diminished Resources for an Op with a Special

+

Activity. With no options on the next card, a Pass is also uninvit-

+

ing. So the Government executes the Deserters & Defectors Event

+

in a bid to hang on to the Active Support in Guaviare. The player

+

replaces 2 FARC Guerrillas in Guaviare with (Underground) Cartels

+

Guerrillas, robbing FARC forces of Control there.

+

18) Play of Ayahuasca Tourism reveals a Propaganda! card beneath.

+

The AUC, 1st Eligible but not leftmost on Ayahuasca Tourism, will

+

execute Ops. After taking losses in the recent FARC Attacks, the

+

AUC again has at least 6 Guerrillas available, so will Rally in up

+

to 3 spaces (8.6.1). Its first 2 Rally bullets do not apply. But the

+

first priority within the 3rd bullet—to place Guerrillas at all FARC

+

Bases—applies to 4 spaces where the AUC could Rally: Chocó-

+

Córdoba, Huila-Tolima, Ecuador, and Guaviare. Random space

+

rolls determine that the 3 of the 4 spaces to receive AUC Guerrillas

+

are Huila, Ecuador, and Guaviare: each receives 1 Underground

+

AUC Guerrilla.

+

The AUC then Extorts (8.6.1) in Antioquia. AUC Resources end

+

the move at 4.

+

The FARC, 2nd Eligible, then executes the Event, because Aya-

+

huasca Tourism has no 2nd: Ops symbol. Although the FARC is

+

executing the Event, the relevant special instructions are on the

+

Non-Player Cartels sheet, because the Cartels symbol is leftmost

+

on the Ayahuasca Tourism card. Per the instructions, it will be the

+

FARC’s Guerrillas that execute free Terror, Active Guerrillas before

+

Underground (since “any” Guerrillas can be used).

+

FARC Terror hits Chocó-Córdoba, Nariño-Cauca, Putumayo-Ca-

+

quetá, Meta West, and Guaviare. Each of those Forest Departments

+

adds a Terror marker and shifts 1 level toward Active Opposition.

+

Total Support drops to 50, and Opposition + Bases rises to 17. The

+

Underground FARC Guerrilla in Nariño-Cauca goes Active. FARC

+

adds +15 Resources to 34.

+

Government efforts to generate Support in the lowlands

+

have proven vulnerable to the continued presence of FARC

+

guerrillas. The amply resourced leftist rebels will generate

+

even more Opposition by Agitating in the coming Propa-

+

ganda Round.

+

19) The second Propaganda! card proceeds as follows:

+

VICTORY: Again, no Faction has met its Victory condition.

+

CONTROL: The player puts Govt Control markers in Santander-

+

Boyacá, Nariño-Cauca, and the 2 Cities where Civic Action will be

+

possible: Medellín and Cali (mentally noting for possible Redeploy-

+

ment that all other Cities also are Govt Controlled). The player marks

+

FARC Control where Agitation will be possible: Chocó-Córdoba

+

and Meta East.

+

RESOURCES: Government Resources—crimped by pipeline dis-

+

ruptions and lack of aid—increase by only 19, to 32. The FARC’s

+

grow to 43, the AUC’s to 6, and the Cartels’ to 44.

+

SUPPORT: The player decides that the Government is too poor to

+

create Support everywhere it has established Control—especially

+

before the political effects of terror have faded. Civic Action could

+

bump Support in Santander-Boyacá, but FARC and especially AUC

+

Guerrillas there are likely to execute Terror again, so the player

+

decides to wait. Nariño-Cauca is Controlled by Police but has no

+

Troops positioned for Civic Action. Only the populous Medellín and

+

Cali seem like defensible venues for Civic Action, bringing Total

+

Support from 50 to 56 and spending 12 Resources down to 20.

+

Flush, the FARC again Agitates wherever it can (8.7.5). Spending 6

+

Resources (down to 38), it removes Terror from and shifts Chocó-

+

Córdoba and Meta East each to Active Opposition. Opposition +

+

Bases grows to 20, while Total Support drops back 1 point to 55.

+

An Election finally removes Samper in favor of Pastrana. The

+

player places a FARC Zone where the FARC has the most pieces,

+

in Meta East.

+

Elite Backing still cannot place a Base, but the AUC can place a

+

Guerrilla with a FARC Base (8.6.1). By random selection, the new

+

AUC Guerrilla is placed in Guaviare—putting the AUC in a 3-way

+

race to establish the next Insurgent Base there.

+

The Cartels are coming on strong despite the Government-sponsored

+

narco-war, and the FARC has accomplished a resurgence. Removal

+

of Cartels and FARC Bases should be a Government priority next

+

campaign.

+

Had this been the final Propaganda Round, the outcome would have

+

been as follows. Victory margins:

+

Government –5

+

FARC –5

+

AUC –7

+

Cartels 0.

+

The Government’s margin would be 5 below (5

+

worse than) the highest Insurgent margin, the Car-

+

tels’—a score of less than 0 for a result of “COIN

+

Failure” (8.8).

+

Fortunately for the player, this was not the final

+

round. Nevertheless, here ends our example (a

+

game played by the designer), having introduced

+

most routines used in solitaire play. You can con-

+

tinue from here against the Insurgents: reveal the

+

next card after Propaganda!, Redeploy Govern-

+

ment Forces per 6.5, Reset per 6.6, and play the

+

next card. ... Or start a new game on your own.

+

Best of luck!

+

“Ayahuasca Terrorism” strikes the southern forests.

+
+ +
+

25

+

Andean Abyss

+

Non-Player FARC March Example

+

The occasional March by FARC can be the most intricate Non-player

+

Operation to implement. To follow this example, first set up the map

+

as if for a new game (2.1), then place 2 more FARC Guerrillas in

+

each space with a FARC Base except Huila-Tolima (5 spaces). Or

+

simply refer to the nearby illustration.

+

It is early in a 1-player game, and the FARC is to March. Follow

+

along the bullet lists in the March box of the Non-Player FARC

+

flowchart sheet, referring as needed to Rules section 8.7.2.

+

Non-player FARC will March between all applicable adjacent spaces

+

until it runs out of Resources or candidate Guerrillas. It is easiest

+

to begin by determining which spaces have FARC Guerrillas that

+

can March by the bottom 2 bullets of the March box (8.7.2). The

+

FARC will March only from spaces already at Active Opposition,

+

spaces with 0 Population, or LoCs already Sabotaged. As an added

+

stricture, the FARC must leave 1 Guerrilla in each space where any

+

Faction has a Base. In the example, all spaces with FARC Guerrillas

+

qualify as origins for March except Santander-Boyacá and Huila-

+

Tolima (each with Population not in Active Opposition, as well as

+

having only 1 FARC Guerrilla with a Base).

+

By the 1st bullet in the March box (8.7.2), because the next Propa-

+

ganda will not be final, the FARC Marches 1 Guerrilla onto each

+

unSabotaged LoC that the FARC can reach and that does not already

+

have a Guerrilla.

+

A. The FARC selects highest Econ LoCs first (8.3), so 1 Guerrilla

+

Marches from Arauca-Casanare onto the adjacent 3-Econ

+

Pipeline—the only 3-Econ LoC that FARC can reach.

+

B. Among 2-Econ LoCs, the FARC can reach only Sincelejo-

+

Medellín, Bogotá-Neiva, and Bogotá-Yopal. A Chocó Guerrilla

+

Marches onto the Sincelejo Pipeline, and a Meta West Guerrilla

+

onto Bogotá-Neiva. The FARC can reach Bogotá-Yopal from

+

either Arauca or Meta East: an equal-chance roll (8.2, 8.7.2 note)

+

determines that a FARC Guerrilla Marches from Meta East.

+

C. Guerrillas can reach several 1-Econ LoCs, so the player selects

+

destination LoCs in random order: the random-selected City

+

Medellín has a 1-Econ LoC to the south, onto which a Guerrilla

+

Marches from Chocó. On another Random City roll, the first

+

City adjacent to an unoccupied 1-Econ LoC that the FARC can

+

reach is Bogotá, so a Guerrilla will March onto the San José

+

del Guaviare Road. A roll determines that the FARC Guerrilla

+

moves from Meta West.

+
+ +
+

26

+

Andean Abyss

+

D. The only other reachable LoCs that do not already hold FARC

+

Guerrillas are those adjacent to Nariño and Putumayo. (Chocó’s 1

+

remaining Guerrilla in will not March away from the Base there.)

+

One of the 2 Putumayo FARC Guerrillas enters the Neiva-Pasto

+

Road (the only way for FARC to reach that LoC). A roll selects

+

the Pasto-Tumaco Road as destination for the lone Guerrilla from

+

Nariño (where there is no Base).

+

E. By the 2nd bullet in the March box (8.7.2), the FARC will now

+

March into up to 3 spaces at Support or Neutral where Agitation

+

(6.4.2) is not yet possible, selecting first those spaces where a

+

March that keeps Underground Guerrillas Underground (3.3.2)

+

is possible. Spaces meeting those priorities include Antioquia-

+

Bolívar and all the Cities with just 1 cube—a good reason to

+

garrison your Cities as the Government! (Huila-Tolima—though

+

Neutral—does not qualify because Agitation is already possible;

+

Santander-Boyacá and the larger Cities are lower priority

+

because any FARC Guerrillas Marching in would go Active.)

+

No remaining candidate Marching Guerrillas are adjacent to

+

Antioquia, any northern Cities, nor Pasto. So the remaining

+

highest-priority destination—Neiva—receives an Underground

+

FARC Guerrilla from Meta West, leaving a last FARC Guerrilla

+

with the Bases there (costing FARC 1 Resource, down to 9).

+

F. Only 3 origin spaces remain: Arauca-Casanare, Meta East, and

+

Guaviare. Arauca can reach the lower-priority destination of

+

Santander-Boyacá, and Meta East either Santander or Bogotá.

+

A roll selects Santander: a Guerrilla each from Arauca and Meta

+

East enter Santander and go Active (Resources to 8).

+

G. Only Guaviare remains as an origin, and it cannot reach a 3rd

+

space for the March box’s 2nd bullet. So the player consults the

+

final “March To” bullet: March to a space with greater than 0

+

Population from the space with the most FARC Guerrillas that

+

could still move. Guaviare will be the origin and either Meta

+

East, Meta West, or Putumayo-Caquetá the destination. A roll

+

selects Meta East, and so 3 Guerrillas March there from Guaviare

+

(Resources to 7). March priorities are at an end—FARC will now

+

Extort (8.7.1).

+

What if a Non-Player Faction

+

Cannot Execute its Assigned

+

Operation?

+

Rarely, a Non-player flowchart will lead to a type of Operation that

+

that Faction cannot execute in the given situation on the board, even

+

though it has Resources. In such a case, rule 8.1.1 “OP NOT POS-

+

SIBLE” kicks in: follow the curved “if none” arrow up one box and

+

execute that next higher Operation (and then Special Activity) on the

+

chart instead. If Rally is assigned but impossible, Pass instead.

+

Examples that can arise include:

+

• Cartels March when Cartels Guerrillas are spread 1 per Cartels

+

Base space.

+

• AUC Attack when the AUC has only 1 or 2 Active Guerrillas in

+

each target space.

+

• FARC Terror when FARC Guerrillas are all Active or they occupy

+

only already-Sabotage LoCs and no Kidnap targets or spaces that

+

could be shifted toward Active Opposition.

+
+ +
+

27

+

Andean Abyss

+

DESIGN NOTES

+

ANDEAN ABYSS seeks to depict Colombia’s recent struggle in a

+

game that captures key principles of insurgency and counterinsurgen-

+

cy (COIN). Such principles include a focus on legitimacy (popular

+

support or opposition), the contest between government firepower

+

and guerrilla information advantage, and multiparty warfare. I aimed

+

to present the topic via rules no harder to learn than Labyrinth: The

+

War on Terror and with enthralling gameplay spanning multiplayer,

+

2-player, and solitaire. These Notes go into some of the reasoning

+

and history behind the game and its mechanics.

+

Origins

+

Why a COIN Series?

+

Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today. Indeed,

+

though military establishments persist in regarding it as “irregu-

+

lar” or “unconventional”, guerrilla war has been the commonest

+

of conflicts throughout history, occurring in one variety or another

+

in almost all known societies.

+

—David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2010

+

Much like the study of warfare (in my country at least), board

+

wargaming traditionally has focused on conventional conflict. Even

+

within the realm of modern conflict, designers often choose hypo-

+

thetical conventional wars rather than real, ongoing insurgencies.

+

This fact leaves fields of virgin snow for the game designer who

+

would venture into the complicated topic of insurgency—the effort

+

of armed groups to use both violent and non-violent means to affect

+

political affairs within a state. I design and play wargames in part

+

to grapple with historically relevant issues, and the frequency of

+

insurgency in our life-times surely makes it among the most relevant

+

sorts to conflicts to us today.

+

Perhaps because insurgency (like terrorism) so intimately blends

+

politics with the use of force, too few boardgames have succeeded in

+

adequately representing even the fundamentals of counterinsurgency

+

(or COIN), such as the complex relationship between area control

+

and political legitimacy, to name just one.

+

The first board wargame that I came across that delved substantially

+

into COIN was Nick Karp’s Vietnam 1965-1975 (Victory Games,

+

1984), and once I played it, I was hooked on gaming guerrilla

+

ambushes in the jungle, airborne sweeps, pacification, and the rest.

+

But, for all its merits in depicting COIN, Vietnam still focused on

+

the maneuvers and clashes of big military units, with political affairs

+

as a backdrop, and in any event took several hundred hours to play

+

if its political-strategic aspects were to be included.

+

The greatest recent advances in boardgaming COIN, in my view, are

+

to be found in the designs of Canadian Brian Train. Brian’s wargames

+

feature insurgency itself (rather than a hex-and-counter tradition)

+

as their starting perspective, then build accessible simulations from

+

there. His Algeria: The War of Independence, 1954-1962 (Fiery

+

Dragon, 2006) more than any other game, provided the conceptual

+

basis for ANDEAN ABYSS. ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics rendering

+

asymmetric Operations, Troops and Police, Underground Guer-

+

rillas, Government Redeploy and Guerrilla March, Civic Action,

+

territorial Control, Terror and political Support all have starting

+

points in Algeria.

+

The menu of topics for future volumes in the COIN Series is rich.

+

For Volume II, Cuba Libre, ANDEAN ABYSS playtester Jeff Gross-

+

man and I adapted the Colombia game to Fidel Castro’s 1957-1958

+

insurgency. Cuba Libre exploits the same core system for ease of

+

learning, but portrays a far different insurgency and four factions

+

that each plays quite differently from those in ANDEAN ABYSS. I

+

plan the COIN Series in future to visit Africa, East Asia, and the

+

Mid-East—design time and gamer interest being the only limits.

+

Why Colombia?

+

With the wide menu of topics available, I chose Colombia for COIN

+

Volume I both because it is among those topics under-treated in con-

+

flict simulation and because of the remarkable richness of its story.

+

As far as I know, only one other boardgame about Colombia’s recent

+

insurgency exists, Crisis Games: Colombia by Karsten and Kaarin

+

Engelmann, (published in 1990, coincidentally, from my own town

+

of Vienna, Virginia). And that, printed over 20 years ago, predates

+

the period that ANDEAN ABYSS depicts.

+

The violence has worsened in Colombia, as the insurgent armed

+

struggle has become more entrenched and widespread. The most

+

violent zones of the country are those where two or more of the ac-

+

tors involved in social conflict—guerrillas, drug cartels, and illegal

+

self-defense (paramilitary) groups—are active.

+

—Colombian Labyrinth, RAND Project Air Force, 2001

+

Colombia’s recent history features a full array of combatants of

+

different objectives and tactics, ample to fuel a 4-way asymmetric

+

multiplayer game. The Colombian state in the mid-1990s faced

+

several simultaneous and well-resourced insurgencies—the FARC

+

and its ally ELN, the Cali Cartel and its successors, and the AUC.

+

By the mid-2000s, the state had contained each of them as significant

+

threats to governance. How? I wanted to explore that.

+

It was in the period chosen for the game that the Colombian Gov-

+

ernment learned how to do COIN—jointly by military and civil

+

institutions, extending state presence throughout the national terri-

+

tory, building legitimacy by taking on all illegal armed groups. (See

+

“Why does only the Government get permanent events?” below.)

+

According to some researchers, Colombia is a model COIN success,

+

and indeed the Colombians are now teaching other states.

+

Why multiplayer?

+

My previous designs, Labyrinth and Wilderness War, feature 2-way

+

asymmetry of roles as a central theme. I wished my next design to

+

take asymmetry to a new level: 4-way, including a solitaire experi-

+

ence that would bring home the complex interplay of many interests

+

that is COIN.

+

Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many

+

groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of its

+

agenda—counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided.

+

—Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles”, reproduced in Counter-

+

insurgency

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the 4-way contest allows exploration, for

+

example, of the ambiguous, multi-faceted relationships between

+

Colombia’s Government and the right-wing AUC paramilitaries,

+

and between the FARC and the drug cartels. How long do such

+
+ +
+

28

+

Andean Abyss

+

uncomfortable bedfellows cooperate? When do they turn on each

+

other? Such decision points become key features of the game’s nar-

+

rative, as they were in history.

+

As in Labyrinth, ends (victory conditions) differ among roles just

+

as do ways and means (operations and forces). I had played Joe

+

Miranda’s Battle for Baghdad (MCS Group, 2010) and was taken

+

with its 6-way, overlapping victory conditions: each player con-

+

stantly has to watch the progress of every other against the unique

+

conditions of each, and more than one player can be making progress

+

without directly impeding the other. The play tension and diplomatic

+

depth offered thereby are tremendous. ANDEAN ABYSS attempts

+

something similar (if more modest, with just four factions).

+

The greatest design challenge was to render such a multi-faction

+

contest in a solitaire system. ANDEAN ABYSS provides multiple,

+

asymmetric algorithms for solitaire play—I hope in an accessible

+

enough form that solo players, once used to the play aids, will find

+

the non-player routines well worth the effort of implementing. They

+

generate a kaleidoscopic narrative, in which “bots” react to one

+

another as well as to the player. At the same time, the separate non-

+

player algorithms allow two or three players to represent Colombia’s

+

4-way conflict in a variety of player combinations.

+

An incidental benefit of ANDEAN ABYSS’s role-specific non-player

+

system is that any player but the Government can leave a game in

+

progress, and that game can continue with the system smoothly

+

taking over the departed player’s role (a benefit revealed to good

+

effect during pre-publication demonstrations of ANDEAN ABYSS

+

at game stores and conventions).

+

Core Mechanics

+

Why no hands of cards?

+

ANDEAN ABYSS is not in the Card-Driven Game (CDG) family. But

+

it does draw from CDG tradition the exemplary ability of cards with

+

choices between operations and events to bring detailed political and

+

economic occurrences into a wargame’s narrative without fuss.

+

Instead of dealing hands of cards, ANDEAN ABYSS offers events one

+

at a time from a face-down deck. This puts the focus not on “what’s

+

in my hand” but on “what’s happening on the map,” which seems

+

a more direct representation of managing an insurgent or counter-

+

insurgent campaign. Meanwhile, the unique design of the game’s

+

event card sequence of play interweaves the event and operations

+

choices with the exertion of influence by a faction with the initiative

+

over the options of an adversary or ally.

+

With both the current and upcoming event card exposed, and me-

+

chanics such as lingering “Govt Capabilities” events, ANDEAN

+

ABYSS retains the painful tradeoffs between short- and long-term

+

benefits of great CDGs. But player interaction and development

+

of board position dominate rather than hand or deck management.

+

Insurgency and COIN are long-term strategies, and players who

+

build their position on the map of Colombia toward the endgame

+

tend to succeed.

+

Why so many dual-use events?

+

In the development of Labyrinth, Joel Toppen and I found ourselves

+

adding more and more events that featured effects that differed

+

depending on which side played them. Because of Labyrinth’s

+

mechanic of card play triggering an enemy event, and therefore the

+

need to have a majority of events dedicated to only one side or the

+

other, these dual-use events had to be limited in number. But they

+

appeared so useful to represent alternative historical paths and the

+

ambiguous nature of real-world occurrences, that I set dual-use

+

events as the norm for ANDEAN ABYSS.

+

Dual-use events proved particularly helpful in representing the

+

historical and ideological controversy over Colombia’s struggle

+

prevalent in the sources that I had available (see “Fantasy of the

+

Right—or Left?” below). But these event cards represent not only

+

alternative interpretations, but also alternative history (that which

+

did not occur, but could have) and double-edged swords (uncertain-

+

ties over which of two effects might most influence the course of

+

conflict).

+

Where dual-use events at least in part represent alternative interpreta-

+

tions, I have sought to provide representatives of both views in the

+

event background notes and their sourcing in this playbook.

+

Why different sets of operations?

+

Beyond giving each faction its own historical identity and flavor,

+

ANDEAN ABYSS tries to model the asymmetric contest between

+

insurgent guerrillas and government security forces. The most central

+

distinction in this regard is the pitting of the insurgents’ information

+

advantage against the counterinsurgents’ firepower advantage—and

+

the nature of insurgent and COIN operations in the game reflects

+

this distinction.

+

Government forces must sweep to expose (find) underground

+

guerrillas before organizing a strike upon them—often giving the

+

insurgents a chance to escape first. Guerrillas know who and where

+

their enemies are, but their attacks are weak compared to govern-

+

ment troop assaults.

+

Since the insurgents get their information advantage from melding

+

with the local population, a hostile population can undo that advan-

+

tage by reporting on (exposing) guerrillas that march into their area.

+

Even a neutral population will quietly tolerate armed forces in their

+

midst, so allowing guerrillas to move safely.

+

These game mechanics represent the real-life cat-and-mouse char-

+

acteristic of COIN engagement, whether in an army “search and

+

destroy” mission against guerrilla columns in the jungle hinterland

+

or a police investigation of an urban underground.

+

Why does only the Government get permanent events?

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the Government alone may receive potent

+

improvements to capability that last the remainder of the game.

+

The insurgents, in contrast, can achieve only a momentum that

+

dissipates after a single campaign. This difference represents the

+

fact that, as mentioned above, the period of Colombian conflict

+

portrayed was fundamentally characterized by a steady building of

+

the Government’s COIN skill and capacity.

+

That building capacity rested on unifying COIN into one effort by

+

the whole government: national political leadership from president to

+

legislature, the joint military services, national police and judiciary,

+

and economic development orchestrated as never before to win

+

the war. It also included a better understanding of the nature of the

+

enemy’s strategy, so that military operations could be more effective

+

and supportive of a counter-strategy. The game’s Govt Capabilities

+

events National Defense & Security Council, 1st Division, Tapias,

+

Ospina & Mora and others represent this organizational and strategic

+

development of a potent Colombian COIN.

+

Uribe pursued an aggressive plan to address Colombia’s decade-long

+

conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitary

+

groups and to reduce the production of illicit drugs. ... [Colombia]

+
+ +
+

29

+

Andean Abyss

+

has made significant progress in reestablishing government control

+

over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist

+

activities, and reducing poverty.

+

—Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2011

+

With increasing US training and equipment assistance during the

+

period, first under the “War on Drugs” then the “War on Terror”,

+

and with Uribe’s full-force war effort against illegal groups, mate-

+

rial COIN capacity built along with skill and strategy. So we have

+

Blackhawks for air mobility, High Mountain Battalions for Andean

+

operations, 7th Special Forces for US training, and so on.

+

This treatment of a building COIN versus more ephemeral insurgent

+

capabilities contrasts with that in Volume II, Cuba Libre. There, to

+

represent the growth of insurgent potency contrasted with the Batista

+

regime’s failure to adapt its means, the game reverses mechanics

+

and instead presents lasting “Insurgent Capabilities” and temporary

+

“Govt Momentum”.

+

Why include lines of communication?

+

The game’s mechanics surrounding lines of communication (LoCs)

+

represent the dependence of the country’s economy, government

+

revenues, and therefore COIN operations tempo on railways, roads,

+

powerlines, and—in Colombia especially—pipelines delivering

+

energy exports.

+

A guerrilla sabotage and kidnapping campaign against the LoCs

+

of a government that is already resource-limited can spike a COIN

+

campaign. But insurgent players will find that sabotage is not cake:

+

LoCs are dangerous places for guerrillas, as security forces can reach

+

them quickly and tend to defend them aggressively.

+

What does the Propaganda Round represent?

+

ANDEAN ABYSS’s Propaganda Rounds punctuate insurgency-COIN

+

campaigns at irregular and not precisely predictable moments. They

+

represents less a given moment or time period distinct from the

+

general course of the conflict and more an accounting of various

+

matters that are really progressing concurrently with the game’s

+

events and operations: tax collection, export earnings, the political

+

effects of ongoing and steady FARC propaganda activities (agita-

+

tion) and government investment (civic action), relocation of forces

+

among relatively quiet or controlled areas, and the development of

+

effective local police forces.

+

Knowing only with very little warning exactly when this accounting

+

will take place adds to play tension and represents the real-world

+

uncertainties in war regarding the outcomes of these larger, cumula-

+

tive processes (how much revenue will we collect? how popular will

+

our political and military efforts be? and the like).

+

COIN History in the Game:

+

Local Security as a Key

+

Establishing local security for the population in order to deny support

+

to guerrillas is another key aspect of counterinsurgency represented

+

ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics. US COIN scholar Tom Marks de-

+

scribes the local security situation in the Colombian countryside

+

as of the mid-1990s—a good description of the challenge for the

+

Government player at the beginning of the game:

+

Domination of local areas was the linchpin of the counterinsurgent

+

effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions were tried to maintain

+

state presence in affected areas... But in the absence of local forces,

+

which had fallen afoul of constitutional court restrictions and thus

+

were disbanded, it was difficult to consolidate gains. As areas were

+

retaken, they could not be garrisoned with home guards. Instead,

+

regular units rotated in and out in a perpetual shell game designed

+

to keep FARC off balance.

+

—Military Review, March-April 2007

+

Troops and Police. In the game, Troops represent the Government’s

+

regular forces: highly mobile across the countryside and hard-hitting

+

against enemy forces, but eventually forced to return to garrison

+

in cities or bases. Police represent the local security forces: time-

+

consuming to build to effectiveness in contested areas, but essential

+

to day-to-day law and order and therefore to the Government’s

+

legitimacy and popular support.

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, Government troops can sweep into an enemy

+

area and locate and assault guerrilla forces. As troops establish con-

+

trol, police eventually can deploy into the area to stay. Or the troops

+

can establish a Government base to more quickly train local police.

+

Only once both troops and effective police forces are in place, can

+

the Government invest in local development through civic action,

+

thereby building popular support and countering the insurgency.

+

“Imaginitive Solutions”—Help for the Government to Stay

+

in Local Areas

+

The above process is time-consuming and uncertain for the Govern-

+

ment. However, several events can help it establish effective day-

+

to-day security in the countryside more quickly. One example is the

+

establishment of local forces platoons called Soldados Campesinos:

+

forces that blend the advantages of regular troops and regional

+

police.

+

Whether these opportunities become available is not entirely up to

+

the Government COIN strategist: Will the talent to discover and

+

implement imaginative solutions emerge? Will politics and bureau-

+

cracy allow them to bear fruit? In the game, the event card may or

+

may not come up, and the Government player may or may not be

+

eligible to play it when it does, or may decide that other operations

+

are more urgent.

+

+

The Other Edge of the Sword—Military and “Paramilitary”

+

In light of Colombia’s tradition of local self-defense militias and

+

the evolution of those “autodefensas” into anti-FARC illegal armed

+

groups (labeled “paramilitaries”) eventually under the leadership

+

of Carlos Castaño’s AUC, there historically was concern that new

+

local forces platoons would simply augment the AUC’s reactionary

+

insurgents. In the game, the AUC is more likely than the Government

+

to get the first crack at the Soldados Campesinos event (because of

+

the order of the faction symbols on the card). And the AUC player

+

(or non-player, if run by the game system) would almost certainly

+

implement the card’s shaded, pro-insurgent effect, turning defecting

+

rural police into AUC guerrillas.

+

And so what is the FARC doing about it?

+

Beyond such special occurrences as defections, the Government’s

+

rural forces will have to weather the more routine threats that are

+

within the capabilities of the insurgent factions: FARC ambushes,

+

AUC assassinations, Cartels Bribes, and the like. Insurgent players

+

on the ball will be gunning for any newly established rural police

+

before Government civic action can gain the populace’s support

+

and make local insurgent operations that much more difficult: once

+

populations support the Government, they block FARC from ral-

+

lying new forces and (as discussed above) report on any guerrillas

+

entering the area, flushing them from underground status and thereby

+

blocking their ability to terrorize, ambush, and extort.

+
+ +
+

30

+

Andean Abyss

+

FARC History in the Game:

+

Nation Held Hostage

+

Insurgencies, like governments, need resources to operate, but the

+

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the world’s leftist move-

+

ments largely on their own. In their 2010 book about Colombian

+

hostages, journalists Victoria Bruce, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique

+

Botero describe how Colombia’s revolutionary FARC insurgency

+

turned to the drug trade for financing—contributing by the mid-

+

1990s both to its development of a kidnapping industry and to the

+

rise of the autodefensas that later merged into the FARC’s right-wing

+

AUC enemy:

+

The FARC ... controlled many of the coca-growing regions in central

+

and southern Colombia, while the cartels managed much of the co-

+

caine production and trafficking. The guerrillas operated by taxing

+

the cartels and drug producers for protection and services. ... This

+

economic alliance began to collapse when the leaders of the cartels

+

... began investing their newfound wealth in property, primarily

+

large cattle ranches which placed them firmly in the ranks of the

+

guerrillas’ traditional enemy—the landowning elite. ... In turn, the

+

guerrillas began a policy of kidnapping and extortion of the cartel

+

members. For protection and retaliation, the drug lords organized

+

and financed their own paramilitary armies.

+

—Hostage Nation: Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

+

War on Drugs, 2010

+

Map from official Colombian sources

+

showing intensity of FARC guerrilla ac-

+

tivity during the period covered by the

+

game. Western Meta and Caquetá De-

+

partments are a hotbed containing the

+

sites of famous captures of both Colom-

+

bian presidential candidate Betancourt

+

and of three US DoD contractors.

+

FARC Kidnapping, Cartels and Government Victims, and

+

AUC Growth

+

Colombian analysts in 1998 estimated that kidnappings by the FARC

+

and its sister group, the ELN, accounted for 20 to 30 percent of all

+

kidnappings in the world (RAND, Colombian Labyrinth, p32). The

+

FARC held hundreds of hostages at a time—a large-scale ransoming

+

enterprise for them and a tragedy for the country that developed into

+

a political issue and a cause for national hatred of the guerrillas.

+

ANDEAN ABYSS depicts the enterprise through the kidnapping spe-

+

cial activity that the FARC faction may add to its terror operations.

+

It also depicts the impact of FARC hostage-taking on politics and

+

military affairs through a series of event cards.

+

In the game, FARC can use underground Guerrillas to terrorize local

+

populations into opposing the Colombian government. If the terror-

+

ized region has a drug cartels base or is a city or line of communica-

+

tion—and if FARC guerrillas outnumber local police—FARC may

+

kidnap as well to forcibly transfer a die roll’s worth of resources (or

+

a drug shipment) in ransom from the Cartels or Government faction

+

to FARC. As reaction to FARC kidnapping historically contributed

+

to growth of the right-wing “paramilitaries”, a particularly costly

+

kidnapping (a die roll of “6”) mobilizes a local AUC guerrilla unit

+

or base.

+

Defense Against Kidnapping

+

To avoid a grievous drain of resources from the counterinsurgency,

+

the Government will have to protect the populace from FARC kid-

+

nappers with police patrols of the country’s roads and cities. The

+

Cartels often can better afford the drain, but it may at some point

+

have to turn on the FARC parasite, relocate to FARC-free areas,

+

or just pay off the FARC player. The latter option illustrates how

+

ANDEAN ABYSS explores the multifaceted relations among the

+

contenders for control of 1990s Colombia through varied avenues

+

for player diplomacy.

+

AUC History in the Game:

+

Right-Wing Army

+

Colombia in the mid-1990s saw the leftist FARC insurgency build-

+

ing its strength dramatically as it transitioned from small-unit terror

+

tactics to military attacks on the Colombian Army. But the Govern-

+

ment was not yet on a war footing and still tacitly conceded immense

+

areas of countryside to the guerrillas. To protect themselves from

+

FARC terror, landowners in several localities raised self-defense

+

forces, autodefensas, that would use the FARC’s own tactics against

+

it. By 1996, these local anti-FARC units formed a nationwide force

+

under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense

+

Forces of Colombia or AUC) umbrella.

+

Over the next decade, the AUC grew to an estimated 17,000 fighters,

+

approaching the FARC’s strength. Journalist Mario Murillo describes

+

this illegal armed power:

+

Along with the ongoing collaboration between elements of the army

+

and the AUC, [as of 2004] there are approximately 1,000 active

+

AUC members who have served in the Colombian military, includ-

+

ing fifty-three retired military officers who have served as advisors

+

to the AUC. They have up to fourteen state of the art helicopters, a

+

dozen small planes, and countless speed-boats with mounted ma-

+

chine guns to use in their war against the guerrillas. Indeed, they

+

are a full-fledged army, operating almost with complete impunity

+

throughout the country.

+

—Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabiliza-

+

tion, 2004

+

Logo of the AUC

+

FARC guerrillas

+
+ +
+

31

+

Andean Abyss

+

Potent Anti-FARC Faction

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the AUC faction can build an army rivaling the

+

FARC’s in the number of guerrilla pieces—and an army as military

+

effective and typically not under the pressure that Government

+

forces place on the FARC. Both FARC and AUC guerrillas can use

+

an ambush special activity that guarantees a successful attack and

+

the capture of materiel and recruits to form a new underground unit.

+

And a variety of event cards depict additional AUC capacities, both

+

military and terrorist.

+

AUC Aces in the Hole: Death Squads and Assassination

+

More than on military attacks, the AUC relied on terror and mas-

+

sacres as its principal means of taking control of FARC-dominated

+

areas. They mimicked FARC terror, but on a more brutal level,

+

including mass-murders of suspected FARC sympathizers and other

+

undesirables—so-called “limpiezas” that resembled the “ethnic

+

cleansing” that the same period featured in the Balkans. In the game,

+

the AUC can accompany its terror operations with assassination

+

special activities. Provided the AUC can position underground

+

guerrillas in a target area, AUC terror can eliminate an enemy base

+

even when protected by enemy guerrillas. Because the AUC wins by

+

reducing FARC bases to fewer in number than its own, assassination

+

of FARC base pieces is a key AUC tactic.

+

Double-Edged Sword for the Government

+

The AUC as blood enemy to the FARC would seem an unalloyed

+

friend to the Government, able to strike the enemy in ways that legal

+

Government forces cannot. But the AUC nevertheless remains an

+

insurgency—an illegal armed group that challenges Government

+

law and order and must in the end be suppressed.

+

In the game, too many AUC forces in a region block Government

+

control and thus the ability to build popular support—the Govern-

+

ment’s victory condition. AUC terror wrecks not only FARC’s politi-

+

cal base but support for the Government, as victimized populations

+

resent the Government’s failure to protect them. And international

+

suspicion of Colombian Army complicity in AUC atrocities costs

+

the Government foreign aid resources. This interplay of capabilities

+

and victory conditions poses the question every game: when will

+

the Government turn on its brutal AUC helpmate—as it ultimately

+

did historically—to trim its control of the countryside?

+

Cartels History in the Game:

+

Chess Player of Cali

+

[Cali cartel co-founder Gilberto Rodríguez] became known as the

+

“Chess Player” for his ruthless and calculating approach to the drug

+

business. ... The Rodríguez brothers ... controlled Cali in the way

+

that feudal barons once ruled medieval estates. ... Buy Colombia,

+

rather than terrorize it, became their guiding philosophy. ... The

+

cartel built dozens of high-rise offices and apartment buildings as

+

a way of laundering their money. The Cali skyline changed, and

+

thousands of jobs were created. Their money permeated the city’s

+

economy, and the natives became addicted to laundered cash and

+

conspicuous consumption.

+

—Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali

+

Cartel, 2003

+

Along with Government security forces, FARC rebels, and AUC

+

paramilitaries, ANDEAN ABYSS also depicts the Colombian drug

+

cartels. While the illegal drug industry does not care much about

+

legitimacy, it is an insurgency nevertheless. By definitions laid out

+

by National War College scholar Bard O’Neill, the cartels are “com-

+

mercialist insurgent” groups—contesting political power purely to

+

aid their acquisition of material resources (Insurgency & Terrorism:

+

From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2005).

+

In the game, the Cartels faction wins not through popular support

+

or opposition but by building its criminal organization (expanding

+

its bases) and amassing resources. But its presence can get in the

+

way of other factions’ objectives of territorial control and political

+

support. The Cartels, for example, start the game within one rally

+

action of controlling Cali, which begins politically neutral rather

+

than supportive of the Government.

+

As a result of the dismantling of the drug cartels, trafficking has

+

experienced radical changes in structure. ... There are [now] be-

+

tween 250 and 300 trafficking organizations in Colombia. Their

+

leaders are some of the former cartels’ second-rank members ... The

+

new organizations are smaller, closed, and secret ... . [They] have

+

developed strategies, methods and techniques aimed at making the

+

business more dynamic, sneaking away from law enforcement and

+

blending in better in their respective regions.

+

—Álvaro Camacho and Andrés López, “From Smugglers to

+

Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in Illicit Colombian Drug

+

Organizations,” in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in

+

Colombia, 2007

+

War of Weeds

+

The historical period of game—mid-1990s to mid-2000s—saw the

+

sunset of Colombia’s flashy, politically active drug cartels, but not

+

of the illicit drug industry that the game’s Cartels faction represents.

+

And so, in ANDEAN ABYSS, the Cartels can reconstitute themselves,

+

able to slip readily out of areas of danger and regrow elsewhere.

+

Unlike other insurgents, the Cartels can recruit forces anywhere:

+

battalions of hired guns—sicarios—await among the poor. But

+

the Cartels’ guerrilla force pool is the smallest: it cannot organize

+

One way to get drugs to US market: a narco-submarine, designed

+

to evade detection while it carries its load of product on the pas-

+

sage northward.

+

Cali skyline

+

Photo by D.A. Rendón

+
+ +
+

32

+

Andean Abyss

+

campaigns on the scale of the more military FARC or AUC. And the

+

Cartels do not have the other insurgents’ potent battle tactics.

+

The Cartels faction wins by accumulating resources (money) and

+

bases (the coca and poppy fields, processing labs, and distribution

+

infrastructure needed to continue making money). It will find it hard

+

to protect its bases with its smaller number of guerrillas, and rural

+

Cartels bases are vulnerable to aerial spraying (the Government’s

+

eradication action).

+

But the Cartels also can place new bases more easily than any other

+

faction, quickly though special cultivation actions or with delay but

+

cheaply though processing actions to ready drug shipments. Ship-

+

ment markers represent major caches of processed cocaine or heroin

+

awaiting delivery to market outside Colombia—they are vulnerable

+

to seizure by the other factions: any insurgent faction can liquidate

+

them to accelerate operations. But if defended and held long enough

+

to get to market (in the Propaganda Round), they yield resources

+

or a free base.

+

Cartels terror can hurt the Government or FARC politically, but the

+

Cartels’ most potent weapon is corruption: they can bribe to expose,

+

hide, or neutralize enemy forces—anywhere. Bribes are expensive,

+

however, and so only become a true threat once the Cartels are well

+

above their victory goal in resources. And so the other factions face

+

a choice: dedicate precious time and resources early on to trim the

+

Cartels weeds, or risk the Cartels growing so rich that they can block

+

any offensive by bribing their way out.

+

Fantasy of the Right—or Left?

+

English language studies of the Colombian conflict read so differ-

+

ently from one another that they seem to be describing multiple

+

countries. Is Colombia a thriving democracy, with a popular gov-

+

ernment that has brought economic prosperity and relative peace

+

to its people in the face of vicious terrorist and criminal threats?

+

Or is Colombia a harsh dictatorship by an economic elite, dressed

+

up as democracy but in fact using state-sponsored terror to keep its

+

ever more impoverished masses under heel, and the FARC simply

+

the people’s defense? You can find either thesis in North American

+

scholarship.

+

ANDEAN ABYSS does not attempt to settle these questions. I took

+

care to draw from writers (necessarily, for me, in English) who

+

view Colombia’s conflict from a range of political perspectives (see

+

Selected Sources). No one view seems able to tell the full story, and

+

I hope that players of a variety of persuasions will find something

+

relevant in the game’s design.

+

The game does take some positions. For example, it does not fully

+

buy the Left’s thesis of the AUC as an “extension” of the Govern-

+

ment in that both defend elite interests against the rest of the people

+

(see Murillo somewhat and Hristov especially). Yes, the Colombian

+

Government and AUC shared a core interest in suppressing the

+

FARC, and ANDEAN ABYSS accounts for this shared interest in the

+

factions’ victory conditions. Indeed, Government and AUC players

+

often will collaborate.

+

But the Government under Uribe developed and executed a plan to

+

extend its writ throughout the country—a true and, by the far-Left

+

model, unnecessary departure—including against AUC. Casualties

+

caused the AUC, extraditions of its leaders, and its imperfect but not

+

false demobilization show a real parting of Government and AUC

+

ways. And Colombia’s vigorous electoral politicking and, under

+

Uribe, undeniable and widespread popular enthusiasm for President,

+

government, and army seemed to gainsay the Leftist model of Co-

+

lombia as an exploitative oligarchy defended from its people by force

+

of terror. So ANDEAN ABYSS has the Government seeking popular

+

support to win, rather than the exploitation of the country’s poor by

+

the violence-backed rich, as the far Left might have it.

+

As for the nature of the FARC, the game does not depict the group

+

as mere “narco-terrorists” who have left people’s revolution behind

+

and continue mainly for personal drug profit (as some on the Right

+

argue). An insurgency may at once benefit from the drug trade and

+

provide much needed services to rural under-privileged. ANDEAN

+

ABYSS models the latter aspect with the FARC Agitation mechanic

+

and the effects of events such as Crop Substitution, Unión Sindical

+

Obrera, and others.

+

The persistence in hard times of the FARC’s leaders and fighters

+

demonstrates ideological commitment—dedication to something

+

larger than self. Purely commercialist insurgent leaders at some

+

point wish to live the high life. In contrast, Reyes, Mono Jojoy,

+

Cano, and the rest carried on in the face of the hardships of lethal

+

Government pursuit—and despite opportunities for reconciliation.

+

In the game, FARC victory depends directly on popular opposi-

+

tion and the strength of the movement’s political and logistical

+

base—the preconditions for an eventual revolution and overthrow

+

of the existing order.

+

Finally, ANDEAN ABYSS represents the US-sponsored “War on

+

Drugs” as neither clear failure nor clear success. Eradication in the

+

game may be a mixed bag politically, but, used judiciously, it is a

+

necessary and potent means for the Government to keep the Cartels

+

in check. Historically, aerial coca eradication has had its place in

+

curbing supply, as have the successes of the kingpin strategy of the

+

Colombian Police and US DEA. Economics being what they are,

+

Colombian coca production continues. But the country has escaped

+

the level of terror and political challenge of the big cartels that now

+

traumatize Mexico and Central America so brutally. Colombians

+

today can take pride in a low murder rate, growing economy, and

+

better governance.

+

Thanks and Dedication

+

My special gratitude is due to several groups and individuals for their

+

efforts on behalf of ANDEAN ABYSS: To Joel Toppen, who patiently

+

heard me out as we drove through the desert, when all I had was

+

first drafts of curious ops menus. To GMT Games and the testers

+

and players across many countries who made this project happen.

+

And to Dr. Thomas Marks of the National Defense University, for

+

sharing with me his photos and his deep and personal knowledge

+

of Colombian COIN.

+

Finally, I dedicate the design of ANDEAN ABYSS to Juan Fran-

+

cisco’s nation and people: They have faced their past—may they

+

overcome it.

+

Volko F. Ruhnke

+

January, 2012 Vienna, Virginia

+
+ +
+

33

+

Andean Abyss

+

EVENT TEXT AND BACKGROUND

+

This section reproduces the full text of each event card, along with

+

sourced historical and other background commentary.

+

1. 1st Division GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Jointness: 1 Civic Action space each Support Phase requires Govt

+

Control and any cube.

+

Service parochialism: Civic Action requires at least 2 Troops and

+

2 Police.

+

The Colombian Army’s 1st Division in late 2004 became a joint

+

operational command, part of a process of integrating services to

+

replace exclusively army divisional areas. (Marks p137)

+

2. Ospina & Mora GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

COIN experts take charge: Sweep costs 1 Resource per space.

+

COIN strategy eludes Army: Sweep Operations may target only 1

+

space per card.

+

Senior army commanders Carlos Ospina Ovalle and Jorge Mora

+

Rangel collaborated intimately—Ospina fathering a sound coun-

+

terinsurgent strategy from his study of captured FARC documents

+

and Mora ensuring its practical implementation. (Conversation with

+

Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Ospina pp57,58,60)

+

General Mora Photo by Tom Marks

+

3. Tapias GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

CO tightens civil-military bonds: Assault costs 1 Resource per

+

space.

+

Civil-military rivalries fester: Assault Operations may target only

+

1 space per card.

+

Military Forces Commander Fernando Tapias Stahelin drew the

+

political backing to forge a whole-of-government COIN effort.

+

(Conversation with Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Marks, p139; Ospina

+

p60)

+

4. Caño Limón—Coveñas GFCA

+

Profitable pipeline: Add twice the Econ of 3 unSabotaged pipelines

+

to Government Resources.

+

Pipeline draws attacks: Sabotage the 3 pipelines with highest value

+

and no cubes.

+

A particularly lucrative energy export pipeline from Arauca to the

+

sea attracted both rebel attacks and US training assistance. (Brittain

+

p23; Ricks-Lightner pp25,58,80; Hristov p34)

+

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol GFCA

+

Oil company security: Place 6 Police onto pipelines. 3 Guerrillas

+

there or adjacent flip to Active.

+

Industry thought exploitative: Shift a space adjacent to a 3-Econ

+

LoC by 2 levels toward Active Opposition.

+

Joint ventures between US and Colombian oil companies provided

+

enough government revenue to justify major security measures.

+

(Brittain p228; Ricks-Lightner p80) A $93-million batch of US

+

counterterrorism aid in 2003, for example, focused on protection

+

of Colombian assets of California-based Occidental Petroleum.

+

(Hristov p34) Critics saw government concessions to multinational

+

oil giants as overly generous and tied poverty and human rights

+

violations to US support for oil industry in the country. (Murillo

+

pp87-88; Hristov pp17-18,34-35)

+

6. Oil Spill GFCA

+

Rebels blamed: Shift 2 Opposition or Neutral Departments adjacent

+

to Sabotage to Passive Support.

+

Multinationals make mess: Sabotage a pipeline. Shift an adjacent

+

Department by 1 level toward Active Opposition.

+

Spilled oil from attacks created substantial environmental damage,

+

generating local hostility against whichever combatant side got the

+

blame. (Ricks-Lightner p80)

+

7. 7th Special Forces GAFC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Infrastructure protection training: Each Control phase, Govt may

+

remove 1-3 Terror or Sabotage.

+

US training ineffective: Control phase—Sabotage LoCs with any

+

Guerrillas equal to cubes.

+

The US Bush Administration deployed some 600 personnel of the 7th

+

Special Forces Group (Airborne), most to train a new “infrastructure

+

protection brigade” in embattled Arauca Department. (Marks p131;

+

Ricks-Lightner p25)

+

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana GAFC

+

COIN strike aircraft: Govt executes 3 free Air Strikes.

+

Budget diverted to expensive jets: Government Resources –9.

+

After FARC successes in the late 1990s in overrunning remote

+

government centers, the Colombian military equipped its air force

+

with night-vision gear and learned to integrate air power in support

+

of ground operations. (RAND pp101-102) Less relevant to COIN,

+

Colombia also maintained a force of high-speed Kfir and Mirage

+

V jets. (RAND p42)

+

9. High Mountain Battalions GAFC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Elites guard high-altitude corridors: Assault treats Mountain as

+

City.

+

Equipment not delivered: Assault in Mountain removes only 1 piece

+

for 4 Troops.

+

The Army in the Pastrana years equipped and situated special bat-

+

talions to block insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inac-

+

cessible heights. (Marks p135)

+
+ +
+

34

+

Andean Abyss

+

10. Blackhawks GACF

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

US helos delivered: Air Lift moves any number of Troops.

+

Delivery of US helos delayed: Air Lift moves only 1 Troops cube.

+

The military as of 2000 had only 17 operational heavy-lift helicop-

+

ters. The US was to add 30 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 UH-1H Huey

+

transports, but they had yet to be delivered. (RAND pp63,65,68-

+

69,104)

+

11. National Defense & Security Council GACF

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Military-police jointness: 1 Police may enter each Sweep space.

+

Military-police rivalry: A Sweep Operation Activates Guerrillas via

+

Troops or Police, not both.

+

Uribe’s “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” integrated

+

COIN planning, adding a National Defense and Security Council

+

to ensure coordinated and unified action by all state bodies. (Marks

+

pp132-133)

+

12. Plan Colombia GACF

+

US “War on Drugs”: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Resources.

+

Then Aid +10.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

US aid focuses on drug war: No Air Strike or Activation by Patrol

+

until next Propaganda.

+

The Pastrana Government’s response to Colombia’s insurgency,

+

Plan Colombia, included seeking $3.5-billion in foreign aid. The

+

US earmarked 3/4ths of its part of that aid to counternarcotics.

+

(RAND pp61-62)

+

13. Plan Meteoro GCFA

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Transport protection units: Patrol conducts a free Assault in each

+

LoC.

+

Transport security deemphasized: Patrols do not conduct a free

+

Assault.

+

The Uribe Administration funded special transportation network

+

protection units under “Plan Meteor”. (Marks p135)

+

14. Tres Esquinas GCFA

+

Forward base: Government places 1 Base and 3 Troops into any

+

Department.

+

Base overrun: Remove 1 Government Base and 1 cube from a

+

Department.

+

During the late-1990s heyday of the FARC’s large-unit “mobile

+

warfare”, it succeeded in overrunning a series of isolated army po-

+

sitions and briefly holding the capital of Vaupés. (Ospina pp59-60;

+

Marks p127; RAND pp42-43) Tres Esquinas was a key army base

+

at the heart of later Government sweeps into the FARC strongholds

+

of the southeast. (www.GlobalSecurity.org; Brittain pp226-227)

+

As of 2002, it hosted a Joint Intelligence Center and some 100 US

+

military advisors. (Hristov p35)

+

15. War Tax GCFA

+

Defense budget shot in the arm: Roll a die and add 4 times the result

+

to Government Resources.

+

Middle class resents cost of war: Shift a City from Neutral or Pas-

+

sive Support to Passive Opposition.

+

Uribe shifted and increased the tax burden in order to help fund the

+

military effort against the guerrillas. (Brittain p228-229)

+

16. Coffee Prices GCAF

+

They’re up: Each Mountain, +5 Resources to Faction with most

+

pieces, tied spaces to Govt.

+

They’re down: Government Resources –10.

+

Export income from coffee—a traditional source of economic

+

security to the Colombian highlands—fluctuated wildly from the

+

1990s on, mostly downward. (Brittain pp84-88; Hristov p191;

+

RAND p5) The late 1990s saw increased guerrilla presence in

+

the country’s agricultural backbone, the central coffee-growing

+

departments, apparently as part of FARC, ELN, and AUC strategy.

+

(RAND pp46-47)

+

17. Madrid Donors GCAF

+

Aid conference generous: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Re-

+

sources. Then Aid +6.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

EU aid focuses on reconstruction: No Sweep or Assault in Depts

+

until next Propaganda.

+

European and Japanese donors to Colombia channeled aid to non-

+

military programs. A July 2000 donors’ conference in Madrid, for

+

example, pledged $619-million, mostly for social development

+

projects. (RAND pp62,64)

+

18. NSPD-18 GCAF

+

US “War on Terror” takes on FARC: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to

+

Govt Resources. Then Aid +20.

+

US focused on Mid-East and South Asia: Government Resources

+

–6. Subtract a die roll from Aid.

+

In a departure from the more restrictive “war on drugs”, the US Bush

+

Administration’s 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 18,

+

“Supporting Democracy in Colombia”, called on the State Depart-

+

ment to implement a new US political-military plan in direct support

+

of Colombian national security strategy. The Bush Administration

+

had linked the counternarcotics fight to the “war on terror” and

+

would pursue not only cartels but the FARC and the AUC directly.

+

(Marks p131; Chepesiuk p281)

+

19. General Offensive FGAC

+

In each space possible, choose and execute either free Sweep without

+

movement or Assault (if Government), or free Attack or Terror (if

+

Insurgent).

+

The conflict during the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a number of

+

FARC offensives, including the use of homemade armored vehicles.

+

The Government’s 2003-2004 Plan Patriota included a major military

+

offensive around the capital and into FARC-held territory in the

+

southeast. (Ospina pp59-60; CRS p10; Hristov p36)

+
+ +
+

35

+

Andean Abyss

+

20. Mono Jojoy FGAC

+

KIA puts FARC in disarray: Govt player repositions up to 6 FARC

+

Guerrillas into adjacent spaces.

+

Military strategist: FARC free Marches any of its Guerrillas then

+

flips up to 3 of its Guerrillas Underground.

+

A Colombian military and police operation in Meta Department in

+

September 2010 killed the FARC’s operational second-in-command,

+

Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez or “Mono

+

Jojoy”, adding to a period of strong pressure on guerrilla remnants.

+

(CRS pp1,13)

+

21. Raúl Reyes FGAC

+

FARC Deputy killed: FARC Resources –6. Remove 1 FARC Base.

+

FARC Deputy channels foreign support: FARC Resources +6. Place

+

a FARC Base in a City or Department.

+

A 2008 Colombian military raid into Ecuador killed then second-

+

highest FARC commander Luís Édgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”)

+

and recovered evidence of planned Venezuelan and possibly Ecua-

+

doran support to the FARC. (CRS p10; Marks pp140-141n)

+

22. Alfonso Cano FGCA

+

FARC leader killed in military strike: Shift an Opposition space to

+

Neutral.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

Ideologue: May Agitate also in up to 3 spaces with FARC piece

+

and no Govt Control.

+

Communist Bogotá University student Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas

+

joined the FARC in the 1980s and eventually became its master

+

revolutionary ideologue, “Alfonso Cano”. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

+

pp138-139) A 2011 military strike in Cauca Department killed him.

+

(www.ColombiaReports.com)

+

23. DoD Contractors FGCA

+

US provides aircrew: In a Dept, Activate all Guerrillas and remove

+

all Cartels Bases.

+

Plane down—hostage search and evasion: Govt removes 3 Troops.

+

Mark Govt and FARC Ineligible through next card.

+

US contractors provided pilots for crop spraying over FARC-held ter-

+

ritory and for reconnaissance flights to pinpoint guerrillas. Patrolling

+

FARC guerrillas in 2003 shot down one such flight along the western

+

slopes of Caquetá and took three US personnel hostage, setting off a

+

Colombian Army manhunt. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp3-19,107)

+

24. Operación Jaque FGCA

+

Dramatic hostage rescue: 1 City to Active Support. Mark FARC

+

Ineligible through next card.

+

Hostage rescue goes awry: Remove 2 Troops from a space with

+

FARC pieces. Shift a City with Support to Neutral.

+

In a show of operational prowess, Colombian forces in 2008 tricked

+

FARC captors into delivering celebrity hostage Ingrid Betancourt

+

and 3 US DoD contractors held since 2003. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

+

pp238-256)

+

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional FAGC

+

ELN and FARC jockey: Remove all FARC pieces from 1 Moun-

+

tain.

+

ELN and FARC coordinate ops: Place any 3 FARC pieces into

+

Antioquia or an adjacent Department.

+

Colombia’s second-largest revolutionary army, the Castroite ELN,

+

concentrated in the northern mountains, where it sought a Sierra

+

Maestra-style stronghold. While the ELN and the FARC shared the

+

same enemies and often coordinated operations, the two Marxist

+

groups occasionally clashed over territory or resources. (RAND

+

pp30-31,44; CRS pp13-14)

+

26. Gramaje FAGC

+

FARC protection rejected: All Cartels Guerrillas in spaces with

+

FARC free Attack FARC.

+

Schedule of fees: Cartels transfers 3 Resources to FARC for each

+

space with Cartels Base and FARC Guerrilla.

+

The FARC had a precise schedule of fees, gramaje, that it charged

+

to drug producers and smugglers for protection and other services.

+

Though imposed by the guerrillas, these taxes served as a US argu-

+

ment that the FARC and the drug lords were in cahoots. (RAND

+

p32; Camacho-López p80)

+

27. Misil Antiaéreo FAGC

+

FARC MANPADs deemed a myth: Government executes 3 free

+

Special Activities.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

MANPADs feared: Until next Propaganda, no Govt Special Activi-

+

ties where Guerrillas.

+

Given the importance of air power to Colombian COIN, fears grew

+

that guerrilla use of surface-to-air missiles could change the strategic

+

balance. (RAND pp35,102)

+

28. Hugo Chávez FACG

+

Caracas controls border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

+

space next to Venezuela.

+

Caracas aids rebels: Place a FARC Base in a Dept next to Venezuela.

+

Sabotage each empty LoC touching Cúcuta.

+

FARC information taken in the 2008 raid on Raúl Reyes suggested

+

that Venezuela was providing support to the insurgent group, includ-

+

ing plans by the Hugo Chávez regime to grant millions of dollars for

+

weapons purchases. Chávez later that year called on the FARC to

+

cease military operations, signaling a change in at least Venezuela’s

+

public stance. (CRS p10)

+

29. Kill Zone FACG

+

Army sniffs out FARC trap: Govt in 1 space Activates all FARC and

+

executes free Assault.

+

Tactics lure enemy in: FARC or AUC in a space executes 2 free

+

Ambushes with any of its Guerrillas without Activating.

+

The FARC between 1996 and 2000 developed a tactic to lure Army

+

reaction forces into a prepared kill zone surrounded by intercon-

+

nected rifle pits and bunkers. In one such kill-zone action in late

+

2000 along a key route from Antioquia to Chocó, guerrillas inflicted

+

heavy casualties on special forces of the Colombian 4th Brigade.

+

Often, however, the army could detect the kill zone before falling

+

into the trap. (RAND pp44-45,45n)

+
+ +
+

36

+

Andean Abyss

+

30. Peace Commission FACG

+

FARC accused in Commissioner’s killing: Remove 1 FARC Zone.

+

Peace bid: Government places 1 FARC Zone. (See 6.4.3)

+

The FARC’s ambush and execution in late 2000 of the head of the

+

Colombian congressional peace commission, Diego Torbay, dealt

+

Pastrana’s peace policy a new blow. (RAND pp73-74)

+

31. Betancourt FCGA

+

Sympathy for famous hostage: Shift 2 Cities and 1 Dept 1 level each

+

toward Active Support.

+

Hostage negotiations forum for FARC: Shift 3 spaces from Passive

+

Opposition to Active Opposition

+

Spitfire senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—

+

known among other things for her outreach to the FARC—fell

+

hostage in 2002 as she toured the recently remilitarized FARC

+

zone. She became an international symbol of Colombia’s hostage

+

tragedy—and of the FARC’s role in it. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-

+

102,145,168-171,242)

+

32. Secuestrados FCGA

+

Fed up with hostage-taking: Shift 2 spaces from Neutral or Passive

+

Opposition to Passive Support.

+

Ransoming highly profitable: FARC Resources +12.

+

Colombian media constantly reminded the populace that kidnap-

+

pings were garnering 100s of millions of dollars for the FARC and

+

other groups. Public outcry grew under Pastrana as negotiations

+

with FARC failed to end the scourge, and regular radio messages

+

from loved ones to hostages further broadcast the trauma. (Bruce-

+

Hayes-Botero pp95-96,141-143,173)

+

33. Sucumbíos FCGA

+

Ecuadoran buffer zone: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

+

space bordering Ecuador.

+

Cross-border war: Place 2 pieces in Ecuador. It is a 0 Pop Dept. No

+

more than 2 pieces per Faction may stack there.

+

As the 2008 Colombian raid on a FARC camp in the Ecuadoran

+

province of Sucumbíos vividly illustrated, Colombia’s insurgency

+

and counterinsurgency often spilled over borders. The FARC used

+

Ecuador’s territory for rest, resupply, and training; and some coca

+

processing took place there as well. (CRS pp10,23-24) Ecuadoran

+

troops at times clashed with suspected Colombian guerrillas within

+

Ecuador. Quito planned increases in development spending in border

+

provinces such as Sucumbíos to create a social and economic buffer

+

zone. (RAND pp88-89)

+

34. Airdropped AKs FCAG

+

Insurgents scammed by Russian criminals: Drop an Insurgent

+

Faction’s Resources by –5.

+

Covert weapons delivery: An Insurgent Faction places 2 Guerrillas

+

and 1 Base into a 0 Population Department.

+

A creative arms-for-drugs deal brokered by Russian mafia in 2000

+

included Russian planes parachuting as many as 30,000 automatic

+

rifles to the FARC in eastern Colombia. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero p91;

+

RAND pp36-37)

+

35. Crop Substitution FCAG

+

Government initiative: Replace the Cartels Bases in 1 Department

+

with 1 Police each. Aid +3.

+

FARC proposals lauded: Shift a Department with a Cartels Base by

+

2 levels toward Active Opposition.

+

Crop substitution or “alternative development” programs sought to

+

supplement coca and poppy eradication by providing licit income

+

to farmers who otherwise would replant drug crops. FARC initia-

+

tives in its zone in 1999-2002 drew attention and support from the

+

United Nations, the European Union, and other foreigners. (Brittain

+

pp95-98) US support via Plan Colombia also featured crop substitu-

+

tion. The US Agency for International Development claimed such

+

a program from 2005-2009 reduced coca growing by 85% in a key

+

cultivation region of western Meta. (CRS pp26-29)

+

36. Zona de Convivencia FCAG

+

ELN gets its DMZ: Govt places a FARC Zone in Mountain. (See

+

6.4.3) Shift 2 adjacent Neutral spaces to Passive Support, if possible.

+

Executing Faction remains Eligible past this card.

+

The Pastrana administration explored negotiations with the ELN,

+

parallel to those with the FARC. The ELN demanded a zone analo-

+

gous to that granted to the FARC, and Pastrana agreed in principle to

+

a 5000km2 “live-and-let-live zone” around the juncture of Antioquia,

+

Bolívar, and Santander. (RAND pp41,74) Uribe also pursued the

+

ELN’s negotiated demobilization, but the group broke off talks in

+

2008. (CRS pp13-14)

+

37. Former Military AGFC

+

Ties that bind: Government free Sweeps or Assaults FARC within

+

each space, no moves; AUC Guerrillas act as Troops.

+

Ex-officers advise paramilitaries: AUC free Marches any of its

+

Guerrillas and then, at any 1 destination, free Ambushes.

+

The AUC was purported to collaborate with elements of the Colom-

+

bian Army and to have some 1000 active members who had served

+

in the nation’s armed forces, including 53 retired military officers

+

who acted as AUC advisors. AUC leader Carlos Castaño himself

+

corroborated these estimates when in 2000 he claimed to have more

+

than 1000 ex-soldiers and 135 former army officers among his forces.

+

(Murillo p100; Hristov pp71,86-87)

+

38. National Coordination Center AGFC

+

New command fights paramilitaries: Remove all Active AUC Guer-

+

rillas from up to 3 spaces with cubes or Support.

+

Sympathizers alert AUC: All AUC Guerrillas in spaces with cubes

+

or Support to Underground.

+

The Colombian Government as of 2000 had declared the battle

+

against illegal autodefensas to be a strategic priority and established

+

the National Coordination Center to lead that fight. Government-

+

reported kills and captures of paramilitaries had been far lower than

+

of rebel guerrillas in absolute numbers. The casualties were more

+

comparable in percentages of total AUC and FARC-ELN strength,

+

however. Moreover, argued the Defense Ministry, the fact that rebels

+

sought out confrontations with security forces more often than would

+

paramilitaries explained any disparity. (RAND pp57-58)

+
+ +
+

37

+

Andean Abyss

+

39. Soldados Campesinos AGFC

+

Local forces platoons: Place 1 Police into each of 6 Depts.

+

Local forces augment autodefensas: In up to 3 Depts, replace 1

+

Police with 1 available AUC Guerrilla.

+

The reestablishment of local forces—Soldados Campesinos (“Peas-

+

ant Soldiers”), later Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”)—and

+

a related expansion of municipal police proved indispensable to

+

Uribe’s counterinsurgency in providing a state presence in threatened

+

areas. (Marks p135,136) Others saw such forces as legitimation of

+

paramilitaries, in light of the overlap of their membership with that

+

of the AUC. (Murillo pp103,113-114)

+

40. Demobilization AGCF

+

Negotiated reintegration: Replace 3 AUC Guerrillas with available

+

Police.

+

Talks a ruse, fighters recycled: Move all cubes in a Dept with AUC

+

to any Cities. Place 1 AUC piece in each of 2 Cities.

+

The Uribe administration in 2003-2006 negotiated the AUC’s

+

demobilization. Some suspected that the aim was to rein in para-

+

militaries mainly to legitimize the state’s main offensive against the

+

FARC. (Murillo p102) Others charged that—while thousands of

+

AUC members demobilized and turned in weapons—much of the

+

demobilization was faked or of only temporary impact on paramili-

+

tary capabilities. (Hristov pp146-160) A UN and US view was that

+

remaining paramilitary bands were of a different nature, criminal

+

rather than political in purpose. (CRS p14)

+

41. Mancuso AGCF

+

AUC No.2 extradited: AUC Resources –6. Remove all AUC pieces

+

from 1 space.

+

AUC drug lord: AUC Resources +3 for each space with AUC and

+

Cartels pieces.

+

The FARC was far from the only insurgent group to benefit from

+

the drug trade. The AUC’s chief in 2000 acknowledged that the

+

paramilitary coalition received a majority of its financing from

+

drug trafficking. The US labeled the AUC a “cocaine-smuggling

+

terrorist” organization and sought its leaders’ extradition. Colom-

+

bian authorities extradited AUC deputy and military commander

+

Salvatore Mancuso to the US in 2008. (Camacho-López pp85-86;

+

Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp90-91; Murillo pp105,111-112; Hristov p80;

+

Chepesiuk p280; www.ColombiaReports.com)

+

42. Senado & Cámara AGCF

+

Unity behind Presidential war policy: 2 Neutral spaces to Passive

+

Support. Govt Resources +3.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

Insurgent sympathies: No Sweep or Assault against executing Fac-

+

tion until next Propaganda.

+

The Left charged that not only the military but the entire Colombian

+

political system defended elite interests by protecting right-wing

+

paramilitary violence, and therefore constituted no more than a

+

“death-squad democracy”. (Brittain pp204-205) Some claimed that

+

a third to a half of Colombian legislators were pro-AUC. (Murillo

+

pp105,212n34; Hristov p133) Paramilitary intimidation of politicians

+

may have played a role. (Hristov p125) Other AUC sympathies in

+

the legislature may have represented popular views, in light of polls

+

seeing the paramilitaries as less of a threat than the FARC. (RAND

+

pp56,59) As for the cartels, buying politicians rather than terrorizing

+

the public was a key Cali tactic, and some drug lords themselves

+

competed electorally at the local level. (Chepesiuk p68; Camacho-

+

López pp75-76) Finally, legislators and political candidates who saw

+

themselves as Government-FARC interlocutors engaged personally

+

in the peace process. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-97) In any event,

+

by Uribe’s term, public distaste for the status quo provided a uni-

+

fied political front for his war on all illegal armed groups. (Marks

+

pp129,131,138-139; Ospina p60)

+

43. Calima Front AFGC

+

Suspect leftists massacred: Place 2 Terror in and remove all FARC

+

Bases from a Dept with Troops.

+

Brutality blamed on Army: Place 2 Terror in a Dept with Troops.

+

Aid –9.

+

Affected communities charged that paramilitaries carried out assas-

+

sinations in broad daylight and close proximity to military posts. The

+

Army in 1999 in Cauca reportedly helped set up a paramilitary group

+

called the Calima Front, with military officers providing weapons,

+

logistics, and intelligence to AUC fighters—a case emblematic to

+

human rights observers of the AUC’s ability to wage war on civilians

+

with impunity. (Murillo pp94-97)

+

44. Colombia Nueva AFGC

+

Anti-corruption campaign: Shift a non-Opposition City to Active

+

Support. Govt Resources +3.

+

Political campaign divisive: Shift a City from Support to Neutral.

+

Govt Resources –3.

+

Young congresswoman and later senator Ingrid Betancourt made her

+

political reputation by outing fellow legislators for corruption and

+

by pursuing President Samper’s impeachment. Her tenacity earned

+

her both wild popularity and death threats. By her 2002 presidential

+

run— “Colombia Nueva” was her slogan—she had lost her popular-

+

ity, blamed for airing Colombia’s dirty laundry internationally in

+

her French-published autobiography. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero, pp94-

+

97,136-137)

+

45. Los Derechos Humanos AFGC

+

Officers disciplined: Shift each space with cubes and Terror 1 level

+

toward Active Support.

+

International human rights cartel: –1 Aid for each space with AUC

+

pieces. Subtract a die roll from Govt Resources.

+

Debates in the US Congress over aid funding focused on allega-

+

tions of human rights abuses on all sides, especially by paramilitary

+

groups and the Colombian military. Colombian authorities took

+

steps against military-paramilitary collusion, for example, in 2000

+

dismissing 388 military officers and NCOs for human rights abuses

+

or corruption and indicting several generals. (RAND, p58) By

+

2010, the Obama Administration certified to Congress that “years

+

of reforms and training [were] leading to an increased respect for ...

+

human rights by most members of the [Colombian] Armed Forces.”

+

Some outside observers felt that human rights charges had gone

+

too far and constituted “lawfare” against Colombia’s self-defense

+

by an international “human rights cartel”. In this view, foreign crit-

+

ics—hostile to the Colombian state itself—remained unwilling to

+

acknowledge any human rights progress despite a surging national

+

popularity of military and government. (Murillo p19; CRS pp14-

+

15,18-19,36; Marks pp129,137)

+
+ +
+

38

+

Andean Abyss

+

46. Limpieza AFCG

+

Ruthless elimination: An Insurgent Faction executes free Terror

+

with any Guerrilla, removes any 2 enemy pieces in the space, and

+

sets it to Passive Support or Opposition (unless 0 Pop). The Terror

+

places 2 markers.

+

“Limpieza social” (“social cleansing”) killings rose in Colombia in

+

the late-1990s and early-2000s, as both leftist guerrillas and rightist

+

paramilitaries sought to consolidate control by eliminating people

+

considered misfits or suspected of collaboration with the other side.

+

(RAND p6-7) Paramilitaries would defend areas from guerrillas

+

preemptively, by drawing up lists of potential leftist sympathizers

+

and then exterminating them, or using random terror to seed fear

+

and show what might happen to anyone leaning toward the FARC

+

or ELN. (Hristov pp74,92-94)

+

47. Pinto & del Rosario AFCG

+

Human rights investigators: All AUC Guerrillas Active. All Police

+

free Assault AUC as if Troops.

+

Prosecutors killed: AUC places 2 Guerrillas in Cúcuta, executes free

+

Terror there, and flips any 2 AUC Guerrillas Underground.

+

Colombian police and judicial authorities investigating right-wing

+

involvement in massacres became targets of threats and assassina-

+

tion. (Hristov p133) In what appeared to be one such case in 2001,

+

Cúcuta special prosecutor María del Rosario Silva Ríos and then her

+

replacement Carlos Arturo Pinto Bohórquez were both shot to death.

+

Authorities later convicted Cúcuta regional paramilitary commander

+

Jorge Iván “The Iguana” Laverde Zapata in the killings. Demobi-

+

lized paramilitary Orlando Bocanegra Arteaga also acknowledged

+

responsibility. (www.ElEspectador.com; www.ElTiempo.com)

+

48. Unión Sindical Obrera AFCG

+

AUC targets oil labor organizers: Remove 1 Opposition or FARC

+

Base adjacent to 3-Econ pipeline.

+

Labor backs FARC: Shift 1 level toward Active Opposition in 2

+

Cities other than Bogotá.

+

Labor unions—suspected of a similar social agenda as that of the

+

rebel guerrillas and therefore of collusion with them—became fre-

+

quent targets of right-wing paramilitary violence. The FARC and

+

the ELN had maintained a strong presence around the oil-refining

+

town of Barrancabermeja in Santander, a hotbed of the powerful oil

+

workers union, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO). The AUC entered the

+

area in 2001, killing 180 and displacing some 4000—acts popularly

+

seen as a continuation of efforts to suppress popular organizing

+

in the town. AUC leader Carlos Castaño in 2003 sent a menacing

+

email to the union, declaring all USO leaders and the children of

+

USO members to be “military targets”. (Murillo pp87-88; Hristov

+

pp77,117,120)

+

49. Bloques ACGF

+

Militias defy Castaño: Permanently remove 3 available AUC Guer-

+

rillas.

+

Independent militias join AUC: Place an AUC Guerrilla and Base

+

in any Department.

+

The AUC came together in the mid-1990s as an umbrella for several

+

regional “self-defense” organizations (bloques). An amalgam of

+

autonomous groups, the AUC was less cohesive than the FARC.

+

Several powerful groups, such as the Bloque Central Bolívar, did

+

not recognize AUC leadership, and paramilitaries fought turf wars

+

amongst themselves. (RAND pp54-55; Hristov p70; Murillo p108;

+

Brittain p126)

+

50. Carabineros ACGF

+

National police field forces: Govt places a total of up to 3 Police

+

into any Departments.

+

National police corruption: Remove any 2 Police or replace them

+

with available AUC Guerrillas.

+

During the Pastrana and then Uribe years, Colombia systematically

+

established police presence in every county of the country. Those

+

areas historically thought too dangerous for police presence were

+

manned by police field forces (Carabineros), similar in size and na-

+

ture to army local forces but more mobile and better armed. (Marks

+

pp136,145n38) As with the Army, however, some police were

+

suspected of collusion with the paramilitaries, for example taking

+

payments in return for armed protection of paramilitary units while

+

the latter carried out their terror campaigns. (Hristov, p87)

+

51. Pipeline Repairs ACGF

+

Speedy patching: Remove all Pipeline Sabotage or, if none, Govern-

+

ment Resources +12.

+

Security concerns hinder maintenance: Sabotage 3 Pipelines with

+

or adjacent to FARC Guerrillas.

+

Guerrilla action against energy pipelines often becomes a race be-

+

tween how often the saboteurs can damage the line and how quickly

+

the defenders can repair them. Attacks on the key northern-Colom-

+

bian Caño-Limón pipeline in the guerrilla heyday of 2001 shut it

+

down for 240 days out of the year. (Ricks-Lightner p80) Coordinated

+

FARC pipeline attacks as late as 2008 halted production of over

+

800,000 barrels of oil. (Brittain p23)

+

52. Castaño ACFG

+

AUC leader’s memoir a best seller: Shift 2 City or Mountain each

+

1 level toward Active Support.

+

Charismatic AUC political leader: Place an AUC Base into a space

+

with AUC, then add +1 AUC Resources per AUC Base.

+

Charismatic AUC chief Carlos Castaño Gil gave interviews to lead-

+

ing national publications and obtained favorable media coverage to

+

portray the movement as a politically legitimate “third actor” in the

+

Colombian conflict. The 2001 book Mi Confesión, purporting to

+

“reveal his secrets”, sold in all major Colombian cities and became

+

one of the most popular books in the country. (Murillo p99)

+

53. Criminal Air Force ACFG

+

Insurgent access to small aircraft: An Insurgent Faction moves 1

+

or 2 Guerrillas between any 2 Departments and flips them Under-

+

ground.

+

The AUC as of 2004 reportedly fielded up to 14 state-of-art helicop-

+

ters and a dozen small planes. (Murillo p100) AUC chief Castaño

+

in 2001 claimed to have loaned helicopters to the Cali Cartel.

+

(Chepesiuk p143) Witnesses reported Army helicopters deploying

+

AUC fighters to new regions or supplying them with ammunition

+

and medications while on terror operations. (Hristov pp85,88) Some

+

charged that troops wearing AUC armbands in 2003 parachuted

+

from military aircraft into a region of Arauca to conduct a massacre.

+

(Brittain p136)

+
+ +
+

39

+

Andean Abyss

+

54. Deserters & Defectors ACFG

+

Remove up to 2 Guerrillas or replace them with any other Factions’

+

available Guerrillas.

+

AUC ranks contained numerous FARC deserters, because of the

+

harsh discipline imposed by the FARC and because the AUC of-

+

fered protection from retaliation by former comrades. (RAND p56)

+

Castaño in 2000 claimed 800 ex-leftist guerrillas among his forces.

+

One such defector from the FARC led the rightist Bloque Norte y

+

Anorí. The AUC also offered monthly wages to unemployed youth

+

who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they would

+

serve as AUC troops. (Hristov pp71,88,96,106)

+

55. DEA Agents CGFA

+

Law enforcement assistance: Remove a Shipment and any 5 Cartels

+

Guerrillas.

+

Más Yanquis: In 3 spaces with Cartels pieces, shift 1 level toward

+

Active Opposition.

+

Colombian-US counternarcotics cooperation thrived from the mid-

+

1990s on, especially via the US Drug Enforcement Administration.

+

Some regard the takedown of the Cali Cartel during this period as

+

the DEA’s greatest victory. The relationship was not without its

+

political frictions, though, including a struggle under Samper over

+

how much control the Colombians would have over DEA activities

+

in the country. Exaggeration in Colombian media may have added

+

to the tension: the press in 1995 reported the presence of more than

+

500 DEA agents in Cali alone, even though the agency in reality

+

had no more than 2 or 3 agents there at a time. (Chepesiuk pp201-

+

202,272)

+

56. Drogas La Rebaja CGFA

+

Cali cartel’s drugstore chain seized: Transfer 9 Resources from

+

Cartels to Government.

+

Retail empire: Add twice Cartels pieces in Cities to Cartels Re-

+

sources. Then place a Cartels Base in each of 2 Cities.

+

The Cali Cartel’s Rodríguez brothers used their cocaine profits

+

to build a semi-legal business empire, the heart of which was the

+

Drogas La Rebaja drugstore chain. The Government in 2004 seized

+

the 400-store chain, breaking the back of that cartel’s finances.

+

(Chepesiuk pp68-69,259)

+

57. Op Millennium CGFA

+

Colombian-US strike at Bernal syndicate: Replace up to 3 Cartels

+

pieces with available Police.

+

Investigation penetrated: In each of 2 spaces, replace a Police with

+

an available Cartels piece.

+

After dismembering the Medellín and Cali cartels, Colombian and

+

US authorities pressed ahead with joint efforts to capture leaders

+

of the surviving, decentralized “cartelitos”. Operation Millenium

+

in 1999 netted drug group leader Alejandro Bernal and previously

+

released Medellín Cartel co-founder Fabio Ochoa. But an estimated

+

several hundred small cartels remained, into which Colombian po-

+

lice and the US DEA had little insight. (Chepesiuk pp241,276-277;

+

RAND pp15-16)

+

58. General Serrano CGAF

+

National Police hammer cartels: Cartels Resources –6. Remove all

+

Cartels Guerrillas.

+

Officials on cartel payroll: Cartels relocate up to 4 Police to any

+

spaces.

+

Colombian police—traditionally seen as corrupt, and many of whose

+

members were at the service of the Cali Cartel—in the mid-1990s

+

effectively declared war against drug traffickers. (Camacho-López

+

p79) Studious and tough Policía Nacional chief General Rosso José

+

Serrano Cadena cleaned house and from late 1994 on led the as-

+

sault on the Cali Cartel, in close alliance with the US. (Chepesiuk

+

pp xxi,192-197)

+

59. Salcedo CGAF

+

Cartel informant: All Cartels Guerrillas to Active. Free Assault

+

against Cartels in each space.

+

Cali cartel security chief: Cartels flip all their Guerrillas Under-

+

ground and relocate up to 3 of them anywhere.

+

Jorge Salcedo was a key member of the Cali Cartel’s intelligence

+

and security team—the talented, charismatic son of a Colombian

+

general, he had military training, counterinsurgency field experience,

+

excellent computer skills, and fluent English. Turned informant

+

by US enforcement authorities, Salcedo opened a window on Cali

+

Cartel operations and enabled the capture of its leaders. (Chepesiuk

+

pp137-138,212-219)

+

60. The Chess Player CGAF

+

Kingpin strategy scores: Remove all Cartels pieces from 2 Cities

+

or 1 Dept. Govt Resources +6.

+

Cali’s Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela expands empire: Cartels place

+

an available Base in each of 2 Cities and free Bribe in 1 space.

+

Less violent than Medellín’s Pablo Escobar, Cali Cartel co-found-

+

ers Gilberto (“The Chess Player”—cartel strategic planner) and

+

Miguel (“El Señor”—cartel boss) Rodríguez Orejuela only became

+

a Government priority after Escobar’s death in late 1993 and a drug

+

financing scandal reached the Presidency of Ernesto Samper in 1994.

+

A Colombian-US strategy of combining leads and focusing resources

+

on capturing cartel leaders netted the Rodríguez brothers’ arrests by

+

1996 and extradition to the US by 2005. (Camacho-López pp78-79;

+

Chepesiuk, pp xxi,22-23,68,95,202,269-270)

+

61. Air Bridge CFGA

+

Peruvian coca supply controlled: Remove all Cartels pieces from

+

1 City. Cartels Resources –6.

+

Colombian coca growers fill Peruvian void: Place 1 Cartels Base

+

into each of 3 Depts with no Cartels pieces.

+

Traditionally, the bulk of coca processed into cocaine in Colombia

+

had been grown in Peru and Bolivia. An “air-bridge” strategy of

+

US-Peruvian interdiction of coca deliveries into Colombia denied

+

Colombian traffickers most of this central-Andean crop—with the

+

unintended effect of encouraging coca cultivation inside Colombia.

+

Between 1995 and 1999, Colombia became the center of all stages

+

of cocaine production, from harvest to delivery. (RAND pp12,20-21;

+

Camacho-López pp 82-83)

+
+ +
+

40

+

Andean Abyss

+

66. Tingo María CFAG

+

Coca crop fails: Remove 3 Cartels Bases from Forest.

+

Hearty coca variety: Within stacking, place an available Cartels

+

Base into each Forest that already has one.

+

Under pressure from the Government’s coca eradication spraying

+

to shift cultivation to less ideal terrain, growers adapted by devel-

+

oping new varieties of the coca plant. One such variety, the Tingo

+

María, would produce 3 times as much coca as the traditional plant.

+

(RAND p66)

+

67. Mexican Traffickers CAGF

+

Major shipment busted en route: Cartels Resources –10.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

New routes to US market: This Resources phase, Cartels add Re-

+

sources equal to 4 x Bases.

+

The Cali Cartel had relied on its own delivery networks to get cocaine

+

to US market. Disruption of that cartel’s distribution routes through

+

the Caribbean and the dismantling of the Cartel itself in 1995-1996

+

created opportunities for Mexican traffickers to provide Colombian

+

wholesalers with delivery and retailing services. Already prior to

+

Op Millenium, the Colombian Bernal group was working with a

+

Mexican Ciudad Juárez-based cartel to deliver 20-30 tons of cocaine

+

monthly to the United States. Mexicans soon came to dominate US

+

cocaine distribution with more extensive and efficient networks.

+

(Camacho-López p83; Chepesiuk p278; RAND p15)

+

68. Narco-Subs CAGF

+

Submersibles seized: Remove from coastal spaces 2 Cartels pieces

+

or up to 2 Shipments.

+

Littoral stealth: Cartels Resources +2 per Cartels piece in coastal

+

spaces.

+

A predawn Colombian police raid on a Bogotá warehouse in 2000

+

discovered a 100-foot submarine under construction, a joint proj-

+

ect between a Colombian cartel and the Russian mob, intended to

+

smuggle tons of narcotics. (Chepesiuk pp227-8)

+

69. Riverines & Fast Boats CAGF

+

Move any of your cubes or Guerrillas from 1 space through a chain

+

of up to 3 adjacent Depts. You then may execute a free Op other

+

than Patrol or March within the final space.

+

Colombia features two major river valleys—the Magdalena and

+

the Cauca—running south-to-north along the Andes, numerous

+

major rivers draining the eastern plains into the Amazon, and both

+

Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In all, 18,000km of navigable rivers in

+

Colombia serve as highways for Government forces, guerrillas,

+

62. Amazonía CFGA

+

Brasília’s Op Cobra blocks border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces

+

from 0 Population Forests.

+

Jungle landing strips: Place 1 Cartels Base each in Guainía, Vaupés,

+

and Amazonas.

+

The lowlands of eastern Colombia, comprising 60 percent of national

+

territory but only 4 percent of population, formed a vast hinterland

+

vacuum for illegal groups to fill. Government pressure in the late

+

1990s and early 2000s pushed these groups—coca growers and

+

FARC alike—ever deeper into jungle sanctuaries. Brazil shared an

+

interest with Colombia in controlling their vast Amazonian frontier.

+

So it sought to block the daily clandestine flights between Colombia

+

and its airspace and, with Colombian authorities, dismantled numer-

+

ous jungle landing strips near the border. In 2000, it launched its

+

3-year Operation Cobra to augment its border presence with the

+

deployment of 6,000 Brazilian troops to the region. (Marks p129;

+

RAND pp66,90-91)

+

63. Narco-War CFGA

+

Rival syndicates go for the throat: In each space with Cartels Guer-

+

rillas, remove all but 1; Cartels conduct free Terror with that 1. Mark

+

Cartels Ineligible through next card.

+

Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel in 1993 fell into a tit-for-tat ter-

+

ror battle with a vigilante group (“los pepes”) backed by the Cali

+

Cartel—a narco-war that played a substantial role in Escobar’s fall.

+

(Chepesiuk pp139-142) Fighting among cartels as of the late 1990s

+

remained a major cause of the country’s 30,000 murders annually.

+

(RAND p17)

+

64. Cocaine Labs CFAG

+

FARC taps suppliers: Place a Shipment with a FARC Guerrilla in

+

the same space as a Cartels Base.

+

Well-oiled industry: For each Cartels Base, Cartels Resources +2 if

+

in City, +1 if in Dept.

+

Colombia’s illicit drug industry built on a long tradition of Latin

+

American smuggling. It initially required only the investment in

+

urban laboratories to process rural crop into cocaine and heroin.

+

Over decades, cartels built up into large-scale enterprises. The

+

Cali Cartel boasted safe houses strategically spread across the city

+

and an intelligence network of hotel clerks, corrupt police, street

+

vendors, and 5,000 taxi drivers. With the breakup of the big urban

+

cartels in the mid-1990s, profits declined, but the industry continued.

+

(Camacho-López pp61,64-67,82-84; Chepesiuk pp203-204) The

+

FARC helped fill any vacuum. For a fee, it would protect cocaine

+

laboratories and landing strips, transport precursor chemicals, or

+

ship finished cocaine. (RAND pp32-33)

+

65. Poppies CFAG

+

Growers and Government eradication focus on heroin source:

+

Place or remove 1 Shipment or Insurgent Base in any Mountain

+

Department.

+

Colombia in the 1990s became the Western Hemisphere’s largest

+

producer of opium poppies and refined heroin (though Asia produced

+

far more), with an estimated 7,500 hectares under poppy cultiva-

+

tion as of 1999. Locals in coffee-growing regions had responded

+

to a precipitous drop in coffee prices by switching to poppies, and

+

the Government quickly responded with aerial spraying. (RAND

+

pp12-13; Chepesiuk p27; Hristov p191)

+
+ +
+

41

+

Andean Abyss

+

and drug shipments. To exploit and control these waterways, the

+

Government with US support in 1999 established a riverine brigade

+

of 5 battalions spread throughout the country. The AUC meanwhile

+

fielded large numbers of speedboats with mounted machineguns

+

for their war against the FARC. And on the coasts, Colombian

+

narcotraffickers and guerrillas used fast boats that outclassed those

+

available to regional navies. (RAND pp xix,33,65,86,97; Hristov

+

p190; Bruce-Hayes-Botero p90; Murillo p100)

+

70. Ayahuasca Tourism CAFG

+

Eco-tourism helps trade balance: Government Resources +6 for

+

each Forest without Guerrillas.

+

Eco-tourists taken: A Faction executes free Terror with any 1 Guer-

+

rilla in each Forest and gets +3 Resources per Terror.

+

Colombia hosts some of the most pristine rain forests in South

+

America, drawing a growing eco-tourist trade (locally known as

+

Ayahuasca tourism). Pharmaceutical companies have shown in-

+

creased interest in the Colombian forest for potential medicines. The

+

amazing variety of species also supports a thriving illegal export of

+

animals. (Ricks-Lightner pp12-13)

+

71. Darién CAFG

+

Arms traffic interdicted: Remove a Guerrilla from Chocó; its Faction

+

suffers –5 Resources.

+

Border sanctuary: Place 1-2 Bases in Panamá. It is a 0 Pop Forest.

+

Sweep does not Activate Guerrillas there.

+

Arms stockpiles from the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan civil wars of

+

the 1980s were a major source of weapons smuggled into Colombia.

+

Central American arms arrived in part via a network of 40-50 foot-

+

paths through the triple-canopy jungle of Panama’s Darién province

+

bordering Colombia. The same network served to smuggle drugs

+

in the opposite direction. The FARC reportedly maintained 2 bat-

+

talion-sized units and a major logistics and support base in Darién,

+

outgunning the Panamanians. (RAND pp35,36f,85-86)

+

72. Sicarios CAFG

+

Hired drug guns unreliable: Replace all Cartels Guerrillas in 2

+

spaces with other Guerrillas.

+

Unemployed ready to work for syndicates: Place all available Cartels

+

Guerrillas into spaces with Cartels Bases.

+

Colombia’s big drug traffickers and guerrilla groups created a

+

violent social type—the sicario: a poor youngster, mainly urban,

+

who for a sum of money would kill a cartel’s opponents. The M19

+

guerrilla group in the 1980s, before its demobilization, organized

+

and trained such poor urban youth, who later became gangsters for

+

hire to the highest bidder, typically the cartels. (Camacho-López

+

pp79-80) The AUC in turn offered monthly wages to unemployed

+

youth who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they

+

would serve as AUC troops. (Hristov p96) Finally, ex-AUC fight-

+

ers with few alternatives often became sicarios for drug traffickers.

+

(Hristov p155)

+

SELECTED SOURCES

+

(roughly, from Right to Left)

+

“Insights from Colombia’s ‘Prolonged War’” by Carlos Alberto

+

Ospina Ovalle, JFQ, issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006. The importance

+

of strategy, doctrine, and legitimacy in internal war, from the

+

architect of modern Colombian COIN.

+

“Colombia—Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response”

+

by Thomas A. Marks, Prism 1, No.4, August 2010. How the

+

Colombian Army and Government learned COIN during the

+

period of the game and won against FARC and AUC.

+

Colombian Labyrinth—The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency

+

and Its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa

+

and Peter Chalk, RAND, 2001. From mid-period of the game,

+

a US view of how to win as the Government.

+

Colombia—Issues for Congress by June Beittel, Congressional

+

Research Service (CRS), March 2011. Looking back on prog-

+

ress in Colombian COIN and counter-narcotics, as assessed

+

for the US Congress.

+

Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali Cartel by Ron

+

Chepesiuk, Milo Books Ltd, 2003. Focused on US assistance

+

to the Government in fighting the last flashy cartel.

+

Insurgency & Terrorism—From Revolution to Apocalypse by

+

Bard O’Neill, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. Theoretical discus-

+

sion of insurgency and COIN, including the nature of egalitarian

+

(FARC), preservationist (AUC), and commercialist (Cartels)

+

insurgencies worldwide.

+

Colombia: d20—Guerilla Warfare by Tom Ricks and Ken

+

Lightner, Holistic Design Inc., 2003. Background for roleplay-

+

ing the Colombian conflict, including economic and cultural

+

aspects.

+

“From Smugglers to Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in

+

Illicit Colombian Drug Organizations” by Álvaro Camacho

+

Guizado and Andrés López Restrepo, Peace, Democracy, and

+

Human Rights in Colombia, University of Notre Dame Press,

+

2007. How the big cartels learned to decentralize and keep a

+

low profile.

+

Hostage Nation—Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

+

War on Drugs by Victoria Bruce and Karin Hayes, with Jorge

+

Enrique Botero, Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. The stories of the most

+

famous FARC hostages of the Uribe period.

+

Colombia and the United States—War, Unrest and Destabiliza-

+

tion by Mario A. Murillo, Seven Stories Press, 2003. Discus-

+

sion of the development, nature, and capabilities of the AUC;

+

sees Government design in the formation and tolerance of the

+

paramilitaries.

+

Blood and Capital—The Paramilitarization of Colombia by

+

Jasmin Hristov, Ohio University Press, 2009. A catalogue of

+

human rights abuses by AUC and Army, pinned herein on class

+

interests and Government complicity.

+

Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia—The Origin and

+

Direction of the FARC-EP by James J. Brittain, Pluto Press,

+

2010. The Marxist view of the conflict and why FARC is

+

destined to win.

+
+ +
+

42

+

Andean Abyss

+
+ +
+

43

+

Andean Abyss

+

CREDITS

+

Game Design: Volko Ruhnke

+

Development: Joel Toppen

+

Art Director, Cover Art and Package De-

+

sign: Rodger B. MacGowan

+

Map and Counters: Chechu Nieto, Xavier

+

Carrascosa

+

Cards: Mark Simonitch and Chechu Nieto

+

Rules and Charts: Mark Simonitch and

+

Charles Kibler

+

Playtest: Solitaire Aces—Steve Caler, James

+

“Norbert” Stockdale, Todd Quinn; 2-Player

+

Remoras—Jeremy Antley, Mike Owens;

+

3-Player Home Front—Andrew Ruhnke,

+

Daniel Ruhnke; Cartels Kingpin—Darién

+

Fenoglio; Team Bogotá—Juan Francisco

+

Torres; Devil’s Advocates—Jeff Baker,

+

John Gitzen, Dan McGuire, Patrick Neary,

+

Joel Tamburo; Demo King—Mark Mitchell;

+

Guerrilleros—Paul Aceto, Wendell Al-

+

bright, Mike Bertucelli, Jeff Grossman, Igor

+

Horst, Michael Lessard, Fred Manzo, Tim

+

Porter, Stéphane Renard, Martin Sample,

+

Roger Taylor.

+

VASSAL Module: Joel Toppen

+

Images: 1st Division, Ospina & Mora,

+

High Mountain Battalions, Plan Meteoro,

+

Kill Zone, Soldados Campesinos, National

+

Coordination Center, Carabineros—Tom

+

Marks; Caño Limón-Coveñas—Sémhur;

+

Occidental & Ecopetrol—Pedro Filipe;

+

War Tax, Colombia Nueva —Julián Ortega

+

Martínez & equinoXio; DoD Contractors—P

+

Alejandro Diaz; Gramaje—Luis Acosta;

+

Hugo Chávez—Presidencia Argentina;

+

Peace Commission—Germán Cabrejo;

+

Secuestrados—Paola Vargas & equinoXio;

+

Former Military—TerceraInformacion.

+

es; Calima Front—La FM; Senado & Cá-

+

mara—Leandro Neumann Ciuffo; Pinto &

+

del Rosario—Louise Wolff; Unión Sindical

+

Obrera—Mennonot; Bloques—Silvia An-

+

drea Moreno; Castaño—Socialist Worker;

+

Criminal Air Force—Mabadia71; Deserters

+

& Defectors—John Jairo Bonilla; Drogas

+

La Rebaja—jthadeo; Amazonía—Navy of

+

Brazil; Narco-War—F3rn4nd0; Cocaine

+

Labs—Valter Campanato ABr; Tingo

+

María—H Zell; Darién—Christian Ziegler;

+

Sicarios—Luis Pérez.

+

Production Coordination: Tony Curtis

+

Producers: Tony Curtis, Rodger Mac-

+

Gowan, Andy Lewis, Gene Billingsley and

+

Mark Simonitch

+

GFAC

+

1. 1st Division

+

2. Ospina & Mora

+

3. Tapias

+

GFCA

+

4. Caño Limón - Coveñas

+

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol

+

6. Oil Spill

+

GAFC

+

7. 7th Special Forces

+

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana

+

9. High Mountain Battalions

+

GACF

+

10. Blackhawks

+

11. National Defense & Security Council

+

12. Plan Colombia

+

GCFA

+

13. Plan Meteoro

+

14. Tres Esquinas

+

15. War Tax

+

GCAF

+

16. Coffee Prices

+

17. Madrid Donors

+

18. NSPD-18

+

FGAC

+

19. General Offensive

+

20. Mono Jojoy

+

21. Raúl Reyes

+

FGCA

+

22. Alfonso Cano

+

23. DoD Contractors

+

24. Operación Jaque

+

FAGC

+

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional

+

26. Gramaje

+

27. Misil Antiaéreo

+

FACG

+

28. Hugo Chávez

+

29. Kill Zone

+

30. Peace Commission

+

FCGA

+

31. Betancourt

+

32. Secuestrados

+

33. Sucumbíos

+

FCAG

+

34. Airdropped AKs

+

35. Crop Substitution

+

36. Zona de Convivencia

+

AGFC

+

37. Former Military

+

38. National Coordination Center

+

39. Soldados campesinos

+

AGCF

+

40. Demobilization

+

41. Mancuso

+

42. Senado & Cámara

+

AFGC

+

43. Calima Front

+

44. Colombia Nueva

+

45. Los Derechos Humanos

+

AFCG

+

46. Limpieza

+

47. Pinto & del Rosario

+

48. Unión Sindical Obrera

+

ACGF

+

49. Bloques

+

50. Carabineros

+

51. Pipeline Repairs

+

ACFG

+

52. Castaño

+

53. Criminal Air Force

+

54. Deserters & Defectors

+

CGFA

+

55. DEA Agents

+

56. Drogas La Rebaja

+

57. Op Millennium

+

CGAF

+

58. General Serrano

+

59. Salcedo

+

60. The Chess Player

+

CFGA

+

61. Air Bridge

+

62. Amazonía

+

63. Narco-War

+

CFAG

+

64. Cocaine Labs

+

65. Poppies

+

66. Tingo María

+

CAGF

+

67. Mexican Traffickers

+

68. Narco-Subs

+

69. Riverines & Fast Boats

+

CAFG

+

70. Ayahuasca Tourism

+

71. Darién

+

72. Sicarios

+

73-76. Propaganda!

+

CARD LIST

+
+ +
+

44

+

Andean Abyss

+

GMT Games, LLC

+

P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308

+

www.GMTGames.com

+

SPACES LIST

+

Cities

+

+

Pop

+

Bogotá & Villavicencio . . . . . . . . .

+

8

+

Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

3

+

Medellín. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

3

+

Bucaramanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

2

+

Ibagué & Pereira . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

2

+

Santa Marta & Barranquilla. . . . . .

+

2

+

Cartagena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Neiva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Sincelejo & Montería. . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Total Population: 25

+

Departments

+

Type

+

Pop

+

Antioquia - Bolívar . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Huila - Tolima . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Santander - Boyacá . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Arauca - Casanare . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

+

Atlántico - Magdalena . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Cesar - La Guajira . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .1

+

Chocó - Córdoba . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Guaviare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Meta East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

+

Meta West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Nariño - Cauca. . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Putumayo - Caquetá . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Amazonas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Guainía. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Vaupés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Vichada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .0

+

Total Population: 15

+

Lines of Communication

+

Type Econ

+

Arauca - Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Cúcuta - Ayacucho . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Ayachucho - Sincelejo . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Bucaramanga - Ayacucho. . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Ayacucho - Barranquilla . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Medellín - Sincelejo. . . . . . . . Pipe . . .2

+

Neiva - Bogotá. . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Yopal - Bogotá . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Bogotá-Ibagué-Bucaramanga Pipe. . . .2

+

Cartagena - Sincelejo. . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Medellín - Ibagué. . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Ibagué - Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Cali - Buenaventura . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Cartagena - Barranquilla . . . . Road . . .1

+

Bogotá - San José. . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Cali - Pasto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Neiva - Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Pasto - Tumaco. . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Total Economic Value: 30

+
+ + diff --git a/info/playbook.html b/info/playbook.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a66bac --- /dev/null +++ b/info/playbook.html @@ -0,0 +1,2148 @@ + + + +Andean Abyss - Playbook + + + + + +
+

P L A Y B O O K

+

COIN Series,

+

Volume I

+

by

+

Volko Ruhnke

+

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Colombia

+

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

+ +

Tutorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

+

Guide to COIN Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

+

Role Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

+

1-Player Example of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

+

Non-Player FARC March Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

+

What if a Non-Player Cannot Op? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

+

Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

+

Event Text and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

+

Selected Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

+

Counter Scan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

+

Card List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

+

Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

+

Spaces List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

+ +

© 2012 GMT Games, LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com

+
+ +
+

15

+

Andean Abyss

+

GUIDE TO COIN OPERATIONS

+

Strategy Notes for the Government

+

by Joel Toppen

+

Here is an introduction to the forces and some key actions available

+

to the Government Faction.

+

Troops

+

Troops are your workhorses. They’re going to do all the

+

heavy lifting for you. Essentially, Troops are your pieces

+

that can be moved into spaces to search (Sweep) and de-

+

stroy (Assault) Insurgent Guerrillas and Bases.

+

Troops are brought into the game through the Train Operation.

+

Troops can move via:

+

• Sweep Operation—into an adjacent City or Department to find

+

(Activate) Insurgent Guerrillas.

+

• Patrol Operation—into and/or along LoCs to find (Activate)

+

Insurgent Guerrillas and perhaps kill them in one such space.

+

• Airlift Special Activity—any 3 troops (unlimited with Black-

+

hawks Government Capability) move from anywhere to anywhere

+

on the map. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of this Special

+

Activity!

+

Troops kill Insurgent Guerrillas via the Assault Operation, but only

+

Active guerillas.

+

Guerrillas must be Activated by a Sweep (or some action they them-

+

selves undertook) before Government Troops can eliminate them.

+

Also, through their presence, Troops can project Government control

+

of a space in a Control Phase of a Propaganda card. But, and this is

+

important, by themselves, Troops cannot alter Support/Opposition

+

status in an area. They need Police support to effect that. In the

+

Redeploy Phase, Troops in a LoC or Department space without a

+

Government Base must deploy out of that area (even if that space

+

is Government controlled). Thus their staying power outside a City

+

is limited.

+

Lastly, Troops, by their presence in a space, can inhibit the ability

+

of the AUC and FARC to make use of the Extort Special Action.

+

Also, when positioned with Support or on a LoC, Troops can spot

+

(Activate) marching Guerrillas.

+

Police

+

Police are very, very important Government pieces. While

+

much less mobile than Troops, Police give the Government

+

player crucial positional staying power.

+

Here’s what Police do for you:

+

• Police cannot move with Troops on a Sweep (unless the National

+

Defense & Security Council Government Capability is in play).

+

But they can, if already positioned in the space, assist the Troops

+

in the space being swept. Police cubes count when factoring the

+

effect of a Sweep.

+

• Police inhibit the ability of the Cartels to use the Cultivate Special

+

Action. Police can also inhibit FARC from using the Kidnapping

+

Special Action. Like Troops, Police on LoCs or in spaces with

+

Support can spot (Activate) marching Guerrillas (very important to

+

protect the Cities), and inhibit FARC and the AUC from Extorting

+

in a space.

+

• Police can be used to Patrol LoCs to activate Guerrillas on LoCs,

+

and even conduct an Assault on a LoC as a part of the Sweep.

+

• Within Cities, Police can participate in an Assault.

+

• Police, like Troops, can protect a Government Base from Attack

+

(cubes must be removed before a Base is removed).

+

So far they probably don’t sound terribly useful to the player. There

+

is, however, one crucial role Police have that makes them indispens-

+

able: Police enable the Government player to conduct Civic Actions

+

during a Propaganda card, and also as part of a Train Operation.

+

Civic Action is the means by which the Government player degrades

+

Opposition and/or adds/improves Support—necessary to fulfill the

+

Government victory conditions. At least 1 Police cube is required

+

to conduct Civic Action in a Propaganda Phase or as a postscript

+

to a Train Operation.

+

Police cannot move by Airlift or (usually) Sweep. They can only

+

be moved onto LoCs and/or Cities from an adjacent space during a

+

Patrol. If LoCs are free of Insurgent Guerrillas, Police can continue

+

to move from LoC to LoC and City to LoC, etc., until a guerrilla is

+

encountered or the player chooses to stop moving. But getting Police

+

into Departments is not quite as simple and requires some planning.

+

So how do you get Police to where you need them without using a

+

Patrol Operation? There are two methods principally:

+

Training—You can get Police into a space where they are needed by

+

simply undertaking the Train Operation and Training Police in that

+

space. For Cities, this is not a problem as you can Train in any City.

+

Training in a Department, however, requires a bit of planning.

+

In order to place cubes by Training in a Department, you must have

+

a Base there. In order to get a Base into that Department, you must

+

first have three cubes in that Department. OK, so how do you get

+

cubes into a Department so you can place a Base? Typically, you will

+

undertake a Sweep Operation to move Troops into a Department.

+

You could also use the Airlift Special Activity to fly an additional

+

3 Troops there. Then, in a subsequent turn, you undertake a Train

+

Operation in that Department, only you don’t place cubes; instead,

+

you remove 3 cubes and place a Base.

+

Once you have a Base, in a future turn, you can Train and place

+

Police into that Department. If you have Troops and Police and more

+

Government pieces than any other Faction in that Department, you

+

may also pay for Civic Action in order to improve Support (even

+

without a Base).

+

Redeploy—During the Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card, the

+

Government player can reposition any and all of his Police to any

+

LoCs or any space with Government Control.

+

Adjacency does not apply during this Phase, so this is a very pow-

+

erful opportunity to move otherwise less-mobile Police around the

+

board. The player must plan very carefully here lest he be forced to

+

waste Resources and Operational tempo later on.

+

And so, in short, the Government player may reposition his Police

+

preemptively and for free during the Redeploy Phase. The Govern-

+

ment player may place new Police reactively and for a considerable

+

cost in Resources when undertaking a Train Operation during an

+

event card play. Police enable the Government to gain precious

+

support necessary to fulfilling his victory conditions. This then, will

+

likely free up Troops to deploy elsewhere against Insurgents. Police

+

give the Government player staying power.

+
+ +
+

16

+

Andean Abyss

+

Bases

+

Bases are crucial to Government success in that they

+

provide the only means by which the Government

+

player can maintain a constant Troop presence in the

+

countryside. The Government player has only three

+

Bases they can establish. Don’t waste them!

+

Where do you need Bases? You need them in Departments. You

+

do not need them in Cities. Why? Cities, are de facto Bases. Bases

+

enable the player to Train Troops and/or Police in that space. Since

+

you an already do that in a City, you do not need to give up three

+

cubes and use one of your three Base pieces there! The only good

+

a Base will do the Government in a City is deny the ability to place

+

a Base in that City to one of the Insurgent Factions. But since the

+

Government only has three Bases with which to work, this seems

+

to be a wasted use of a Base.

+

Why do you need Bases? You need Bases in order to Train Police

+

and Troops in a Department. In order to decrease Opposition and

+

increase Support for the Government, the Government player must

+

undertake Civic Actions either in conjunction with a Train Operation

+

or during a Propaganda card. In order to undertake a Civic Action,

+

one or more Police must be in that space. In order to get Police into

+

a Department where there are presently no Police, they must usually

+

be Trained there. To be Trained there, you need a Base.

+

Bases also allow Troops to remain in a Department during the

+

Redeploy Phase of a Propaganda card. And so if the Government

+

player is still fighting to wrest control of a Department from an

+

Insurgent faction when a Propaganda card is resolved, the presence

+

of a Base in that Department allows the Government player to keep

+

his Troops in the field.

+

So there you have it! Bases are one more important cog in the

+

Government’s machinery.

+

ROLE SUMMARIES

+

Government

+

Situation. Colombia is at the edge of abyss. Illegal armed

+

groups—flush with drug money—are multiplying in the

+

countryside. Terror, sabotage, assassination, and kidnapping

+

have reached alarming rates, and little of the rural population sup-

+

ports the national Government. Only a full-out, whole-of-Govern-

+

ment counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign can restore law and

+

order to your nation.

+

Goal. Expand the Government’s legitimacy throughout the country.

+

The more population that supports you, the greater your chance to

+

win.

+

Tools. You can train forces to outnumber and assault the enemy

+

with fearsome firepower. But guerrillas must first be flushed out

+

from underground by sweeping cities or rural departments where

+

they hide. Your troops are highly mobile by ground or air lift but

+

must return to bases or city garrisons. Police—once established in

+

a department—can stay. Police and troops together can conduct

+

civic action to build your popular support. But COIN requires

+

resources—be sure to control the country’s cities, pipelines, and

+

other lines of communications and cultivate foreign aid to ensure

+

your war chest remains full.

+

Deals. It’s tempting to single-mindedly hammer the FARC and let

+

the cartels and AUC do their thing, since FARC’s political interests

+

directly oppose yours. But the smaller insurgents can quietly gain

+

momentum and win. Imagine a temporary truce in which you leave

+

FARC free to fight off the dread paramilitaries, while your eradica-

+

tion of the Cartels’ fields helps FARC politically and fills your aid

+

coffers.

+

Tip. COIN is a gradual campaign—plan your territorial control and

+

civic action several operations ahead.

+

FARC

+

Situation. Colombia’s popular revolution is ready to tran-

+

sition to the mobile phase. The Government has abandoned

+

the countryside. Your revolutionary movement—the

+

FARC—is drawing resources from Colombia’s drug economy. It’s

+

time to move: rally your People’s Army and march on the strongholds

+

of reaction!

+

Goal. Build opposition to the Government to prepare its collapse.

+

The more of the country’s population you can swing from support

+

to opposition while sustaining your logistics, the better chance

+

you’ll win.

+

Tools. That probably will mean infiltrating cities with your guerril-

+

las to agitate the bourgeoisie into uprising. Wherever you control

+

the population by outnumbering all enemy forces with your fighters

+

and logistical bases, you can agitate. Even where you can’t control

+

territory, you can terrorize the populace into resenting Government

+

fecklessness. To operate, you’ll need resources: extort controlled

+

areas or kidnap and ransom resources away from wealthy drug lords

+

or Government collaborators. If the Government or the reactionary

+

paramilitaries come after you, ambush them first!

+

Deals. You share the countryside with the cartels and can protect

+

drug Bases by making the areas dangerous for troops or police. You

+

share with your Insurgent enemies an interest in a weak Govern-

+

ment—their terror can erode Government support and aid; you in

+

turn can limit the growth of your logistical bases to placate the AUC.

+

Even the Government may help you—giving you a pause to trim

+

the AUC or Cartels when too strong or doing so itself.

+

Tip. Strike the country’s lines of communications—they are the

+

arteries of Government resources and maneuver.

+

AUC

+

Situation. Colombia’s Government has proven incapable

+

of controlling the leftist scourge of the FARC. You will step

+

into the security vacuum and use the terrorists’ own tactics

+

against them. Funded by landowners who have suffered an epi-

+

demic of FARC kidnapping, you will rally the autodefensa militias

+

under the AUC banner and cleanse the land of leftist infrastruc-

+

ture—or at least provide a counterweight.

+

Goal. Eliminate FARC logistical bases while building your own. The

+

more disparity in AUC’s favor, the closer you are to winning.

+

Tools. Your guerrillas are every bit as effective as the FARC’s,

+

though often less numerous, and can ambush to guarantee a suc-

+

cessful attack. Your terror operations enable you to eliminate even

+

protected FARC logistical bases through assassination, neutralize

+

local opposition to the Government to allow you rally forces, and

+

even trim back popular support of and foreign aid for the Government

+

when it’s getting too strong. You can rally your forces in relatively

+

safe Government areas and extort there for resources, then march

+

a guerrilla army into a FARC stronghold to attack or infiltrate indi-

+

vidual units to terrorize.

+
+ +
+

17

+

Andean Abyss

+

Deals. You can help the Government by going where it can’t: Your

+

informants enable you to attack underground guerrillas, your terror

+

instantly dampens FARC-based popular opposition, and you can

+

take on FARC within demilitarized zones. But don’t dismiss hand-

+

shakes with other Insurgents. FARC rallying directly affects your

+

victory—offer truce. And your assassinations can easily target the

+

Cartels’ business—extract drug shipments for “protection”.

+

Tip. You’re a remora on the Government shark. Swim along, but

+

be ready for the day it shakes you off and bites.

+

Cartels

+

Situation. You have taken over Colombia’s illegal narcot-

+

ics industry. The bad news is that the Government is gear-

+

ing up its “war on drugs”, and the more it eradicates your

+

drug production bases, the more gringo aid it gets. The good news

+

is that the country is at the height of a civil war, and there are

+

plenty of other illegal groups around to keep the Government busy

+

and off your back.

+

Goal. Make money. And grow your productive base to make sure

+

that you can keep making money. The more resources and bases

+

you accumulate, the more likely you are to win.

+

Tools. You are a commercial insurgency and can attack and terror-

+

ize your enemies like the rest. But your gunmen are less numerous

+

and can’t protect everything you own. Your strength is that you are

+

the fastest growing enterprise in the country: cultivate and process

+

until you’re rich. Then bribe to neutralize whatever enemy guer-

+

rillas, police, or bases stand in your way. Process drugs and use

+

profits from the shipments to grease your operational skids and

+

grow even faster.

+

Deals. You got the drugs and the money, so you can get the deals.

+

Resources are transferable, and—sooner or later—you should have

+

garnered more than you need. Use them to buy friends. Or offer to

+

process shipments for other Insurgents—or even for a staged Gov-

+

ernment drug bust! Or agree to bribe away whatever threatens your

+

enemy—anything to keep the heat off your coca fields.

+

Tip. The potent Medellín gang just got shot up, so you are start-

+

ing weak. Try to get a lot of bases and shipments ready to earn

+

resources—but not so many as to draw unwanted attention!

+
+ +
+

27

+

Andean Abyss

+

DESIGN NOTES

+

ANDEAN ABYSS seeks to depict Colombia’s recent struggle in a

+

game that captures key principles of insurgency and counterinsurgen-

+

cy (COIN). Such principles include a focus on legitimacy (popular

+

support or opposition), the contest between government firepower

+

and guerrilla information advantage, and multiparty warfare. I aimed

+

to present the topic via rules no harder to learn than Labyrinth: The

+

War on Terror and with enthralling gameplay spanning multiplayer,

+

2-player, and solitaire. These Notes go into some of the reasoning

+

and history behind the game and its mechanics.

+

Origins

+

Why a COIN Series?

+

Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today. Indeed,

+

though military establishments persist in regarding it as “irregu-

+

lar” or “unconventional”, guerrilla war has been the commonest

+

of conflicts throughout history, occurring in one variety or another

+

in almost all known societies.

+

—David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2010

+

Much like the study of warfare (in my country at least), board

+

wargaming traditionally has focused on conventional conflict. Even

+

within the realm of modern conflict, designers often choose hypo-

+

thetical conventional wars rather than real, ongoing insurgencies.

+

This fact leaves fields of virgin snow for the game designer who

+

would venture into the complicated topic of insurgency—the effort

+

of armed groups to use both violent and non-violent means to affect

+

political affairs within a state. I design and play wargames in part

+

to grapple with historically relevant issues, and the frequency of

+

insurgency in our life-times surely makes it among the most relevant

+

sorts to conflicts to us today.

+

Perhaps because insurgency (like terrorism) so intimately blends

+

politics with the use of force, too few boardgames have succeeded in

+

adequately representing even the fundamentals of counterinsurgency

+

(or COIN), such as the complex relationship between area control

+

and political legitimacy, to name just one.

+

The first board wargame that I came across that delved substantially

+

into COIN was Nick Karp’s Vietnam 1965-1975 (Victory Games,

+

1984), and once I played it, I was hooked on gaming guerrilla

+

ambushes in the jungle, airborne sweeps, pacification, and the rest.

+

But, for all its merits in depicting COIN, Vietnam still focused on

+

the maneuvers and clashes of big military units, with political affairs

+

as a backdrop, and in any event took several hundred hours to play

+

if its political-strategic aspects were to be included.

+

The greatest recent advances in boardgaming COIN, in my view, are

+

to be found in the designs of Canadian Brian Train. Brian’s wargames

+

feature insurgency itself (rather than a hex-and-counter tradition)

+

as their starting perspective, then build accessible simulations from

+

there. His Algeria: The War of Independence, 1954-1962 (Fiery

+

Dragon, 2006) more than any other game, provided the conceptual

+

basis for ANDEAN ABYSS. ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics rendering

+

asymmetric Operations, Troops and Police, Underground Guer-

+

rillas, Government Redeploy and Guerrilla March, Civic Action,

+

territorial Control, Terror and political Support all have starting

+

points in Algeria.

+

The menu of topics for future volumes in the COIN Series is rich.

+

For Volume II, Cuba Libre, ANDEAN ABYSS playtester Jeff Gross-

+

man and I adapted the Colombia game to Fidel Castro’s 1957-1958

+

insurgency. Cuba Libre exploits the same core system for ease of

+

learning, but portrays a far different insurgency and four factions

+

that each plays quite differently from those in ANDEAN ABYSS. I

+

plan the COIN Series in future to visit Africa, East Asia, and the

+

Mid-East—design time and gamer interest being the only limits.

+

Why Colombia?

+

With the wide menu of topics available, I chose Colombia for COIN

+

Volume I both because it is among those topics under-treated in con-

+

flict simulation and because of the remarkable richness of its story.

+

As far as I know, only one other boardgame about Colombia’s recent

+

insurgency exists, Crisis Games: Colombia by Karsten and Kaarin

+

Engelmann, (published in 1990, coincidentally, from my own town

+

of Vienna, Virginia). And that, printed over 20 years ago, predates

+

the period that ANDEAN ABYSS depicts.

+

The violence has worsened in Colombia, as the insurgent armed

+

struggle has become more entrenched and widespread. The most

+

violent zones of the country are those where two or more of the ac-

+

tors involved in social conflict—guerrillas, drug cartels, and illegal

+

self-defense (paramilitary) groups—are active.

+

—Colombian Labyrinth, RAND Project Air Force, 2001

+

Colombia’s recent history features a full array of combatants of

+

different objectives and tactics, ample to fuel a 4-way asymmetric

+

multiplayer game. The Colombian state in the mid-1990s faced

+

several simultaneous and well-resourced insurgencies—the FARC

+

and its ally ELN, the Cali Cartel and its successors, and the AUC.

+

By the mid-2000s, the state had contained each of them as significant

+

threats to governance. How? I wanted to explore that.

+

It was in the period chosen for the game that the Colombian Gov-

+

ernment learned how to do COIN—jointly by military and civil

+

institutions, extending state presence throughout the national terri-

+

tory, building legitimacy by taking on all illegal armed groups. (See

+

“Why does only the Government get permanent events?” below.)

+

According to some researchers, Colombia is a model COIN success,

+

and indeed the Colombians are now teaching other states.

+

Why multiplayer?

+

My previous designs, Labyrinth and Wilderness War, feature 2-way

+

asymmetry of roles as a central theme. I wished my next design to

+

take asymmetry to a new level: 4-way, including a solitaire experi-

+

ence that would bring home the complex interplay of many interests

+

that is COIN.

+

Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many

+

groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of its

+

agenda—counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided.

+

—Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles”, reproduced in Counter-

+

insurgency

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the 4-way contest allows exploration, for

+

example, of the ambiguous, multi-faceted relationships between

+

Colombia’s Government and the right-wing AUC paramilitaries,

+

and between the FARC and the drug cartels. How long do such

+
+ +
+

28

+

Andean Abyss

+

uncomfortable bedfellows cooperate? When do they turn on each

+

other? Such decision points become key features of the game’s nar-

+

rative, as they were in history.

+

As in Labyrinth, ends (victory conditions) differ among roles just

+

as do ways and means (operations and forces). I had played Joe

+

Miranda’s Battle for Baghdad (MCS Group, 2010) and was taken

+

with its 6-way, overlapping victory conditions: each player con-

+

stantly has to watch the progress of every other against the unique

+

conditions of each, and more than one player can be making progress

+

without directly impeding the other. The play tension and diplomatic

+

depth offered thereby are tremendous. ANDEAN ABYSS attempts

+

something similar (if more modest, with just four factions).

+

The greatest design challenge was to render such a multi-faction

+

contest in a solitaire system. ANDEAN ABYSS provides multiple,

+

asymmetric algorithms for solitaire play—I hope in an accessible

+

enough form that solo players, once used to the play aids, will find

+

the non-player routines well worth the effort of implementing. They

+

generate a kaleidoscopic narrative, in which “bots” react to one

+

another as well as to the player. At the same time, the separate non-

+

player algorithms allow two or three players to represent Colombia’s

+

4-way conflict in a variety of player combinations.

+

An incidental benefit of ANDEAN ABYSS’s role-specific non-player

+

system is that any player but the Government can leave a game in

+

progress, and that game can continue with the system smoothly

+

taking over the departed player’s role (a benefit revealed to good

+

effect during pre-publication demonstrations of ANDEAN ABYSS

+

at game stores and conventions).

+

Core Mechanics

+

Why no hands of cards?

+

ANDEAN ABYSS is not in the Card-Driven Game (CDG) family. But

+

it does draw from CDG tradition the exemplary ability of cards with

+

choices between operations and events to bring detailed political and

+

economic occurrences into a wargame’s narrative without fuss.

+

Instead of dealing hands of cards, ANDEAN ABYSS offers events one

+

at a time from a face-down deck. This puts the focus not on “what’s

+

in my hand” but on “what’s happening on the map,” which seems

+

a more direct representation of managing an insurgent or counter-

+

insurgent campaign. Meanwhile, the unique design of the game’s

+

event card sequence of play interweaves the event and operations

+

choices with the exertion of influence by a faction with the initiative

+

over the options of an adversary or ally.

+

With both the current and upcoming event card exposed, and me-

+

chanics such as lingering “Govt Capabilities” events, ANDEAN

+

ABYSS retains the painful tradeoffs between short- and long-term

+

benefits of great CDGs. But player interaction and development

+

of board position dominate rather than hand or deck management.

+

Insurgency and COIN are long-term strategies, and players who

+

build their position on the map of Colombia toward the endgame

+

tend to succeed.

+

Why so many dual-use events?

+

In the development of Labyrinth, Joel Toppen and I found ourselves

+

adding more and more events that featured effects that differed

+

depending on which side played them. Because of Labyrinth’s

+

mechanic of card play triggering an enemy event, and therefore the

+

need to have a majority of events dedicated to only one side or the

+

other, these dual-use events had to be limited in number. But they

+

appeared so useful to represent alternative historical paths and the

+

ambiguous nature of real-world occurrences, that I set dual-use

+

events as the norm for ANDEAN ABYSS.

+

Dual-use events proved particularly helpful in representing the

+

historical and ideological controversy over Colombia’s struggle

+

prevalent in the sources that I had available (see “Fantasy of the

+

Right—or Left?” below). But these event cards represent not only

+

alternative interpretations, but also alternative history (that which

+

did not occur, but could have) and double-edged swords (uncertain-

+

ties over which of two effects might most influence the course of

+

conflict).

+

Where dual-use events at least in part represent alternative interpreta-

+

tions, I have sought to provide representatives of both views in the

+

event background notes and their sourcing in this playbook.

+

Why different sets of operations?

+

Beyond giving each faction its own historical identity and flavor,

+

ANDEAN ABYSS tries to model the asymmetric contest between

+

insurgent guerrillas and government security forces. The most central

+

distinction in this regard is the pitting of the insurgents’ information

+

advantage against the counterinsurgents’ firepower advantage—and

+

the nature of insurgent and COIN operations in the game reflects

+

this distinction.

+

Government forces must sweep to expose (find) underground

+

guerrillas before organizing a strike upon them—often giving the

+

insurgents a chance to escape first. Guerrillas know who and where

+

their enemies are, but their attacks are weak compared to govern-

+

ment troop assaults.

+

Since the insurgents get their information advantage from melding

+

with the local population, a hostile population can undo that advan-

+

tage by reporting on (exposing) guerrillas that march into their area.

+

Even a neutral population will quietly tolerate armed forces in their

+

midst, so allowing guerrillas to move safely.

+

These game mechanics represent the real-life cat-and-mouse char-

+

acteristic of COIN engagement, whether in an army “search and

+

destroy” mission against guerrilla columns in the jungle hinterland

+

or a police investigation of an urban underground.

+

Why does only the Government get permanent events?

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the Government alone may receive potent

+

improvements to capability that last the remainder of the game.

+

The insurgents, in contrast, can achieve only a momentum that

+

dissipates after a single campaign. This difference represents the

+

fact that, as mentioned above, the period of Colombian conflict

+

portrayed was fundamentally characterized by a steady building of

+

the Government’s COIN skill and capacity.

+

That building capacity rested on unifying COIN into one effort by

+

the whole government: national political leadership from president to

+

legislature, the joint military services, national police and judiciary,

+

and economic development orchestrated as never before to win

+

the war. It also included a better understanding of the nature of the

+

enemy’s strategy, so that military operations could be more effective

+

and supportive of a counter-strategy. The game’s Govt Capabilities

+

events National Defense & Security Council, 1st Division, Tapias,

+

Ospina & Mora and others represent this organizational and strategic

+

development of a potent Colombian COIN.

+

Uribe pursued an aggressive plan to address Colombia’s decade-long

+

conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitary

+

groups and to reduce the production of illicit drugs. ... [Colombia]

+
+ +
+

29

+

Andean Abyss

+

has made significant progress in reestablishing government control

+

over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist

+

activities, and reducing poverty.

+

—Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 2011

+

With increasing US training and equipment assistance during the

+

period, first under the “War on Drugs” then the “War on Terror”,

+

and with Uribe’s full-force war effort against illegal groups, mate-

+

rial COIN capacity built along with skill and strategy. So we have

+

Blackhawks for air mobility, High Mountain Battalions for Andean

+

operations, 7th Special Forces for US training, and so on.

+

This treatment of a building COIN versus more ephemeral insurgent

+

capabilities contrasts with that in Volume II, Cuba Libre. There, to

+

represent the growth of insurgent potency contrasted with the Batista

+

regime’s failure to adapt its means, the game reverses mechanics

+

and instead presents lasting “Insurgent Capabilities” and temporary

+

“Govt Momentum”.

+

Why include lines of communication?

+

The game’s mechanics surrounding lines of communication (LoCs)

+

represent the dependence of the country’s economy, government

+

revenues, and therefore COIN operations tempo on railways, roads,

+

powerlines, and—in Colombia especially—pipelines delivering

+

energy exports.

+

A guerrilla sabotage and kidnapping campaign against the LoCs

+

of a government that is already resource-limited can spike a COIN

+

campaign. But insurgent players will find that sabotage is not cake:

+

LoCs are dangerous places for guerrillas, as security forces can reach

+

them quickly and tend to defend them aggressively.

+

What does the Propaganda Round represent?

+

ANDEAN ABYSS’s Propaganda Rounds punctuate insurgency-COIN

+

campaigns at irregular and not precisely predictable moments. They

+

represents less a given moment or time period distinct from the

+

general course of the conflict and more an accounting of various

+

matters that are really progressing concurrently with the game’s

+

events and operations: tax collection, export earnings, the political

+

effects of ongoing and steady FARC propaganda activities (agita-

+

tion) and government investment (civic action), relocation of forces

+

among relatively quiet or controlled areas, and the development of

+

effective local police forces.

+

Knowing only with very little warning exactly when this accounting

+

will take place adds to play tension and represents the real-world

+

uncertainties in war regarding the outcomes of these larger, cumula-

+

tive processes (how much revenue will we collect? how popular will

+

our political and military efforts be? and the like).

+

COIN History in the Game:

+

Local Security as a Key

+

Establishing local security for the population in order to deny support

+

to guerrillas is another key aspect of counterinsurgency represented

+

ANDEAN ABYSS’s mechanics. US COIN scholar Tom Marks de-

+

scribes the local security situation in the Colombian countryside

+

as of the mid-1990s—a good description of the challenge for the

+

Government player at the beginning of the game:

+

Domination of local areas was the linchpin of the counterinsurgent

+

effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions were tried to maintain

+

state presence in affected areas... But in the absence of local forces,

+

which had fallen afoul of constitutional court restrictions and thus

+

were disbanded, it was difficult to consolidate gains. As areas were

+

retaken, they could not be garrisoned with home guards. Instead,

+

regular units rotated in and out in a perpetual shell game designed

+

to keep FARC off balance.

+

—Military Review, March-April 2007

+

Troops and Police. In the game, Troops represent the Government’s

+

regular forces: highly mobile across the countryside and hard-hitting

+

against enemy forces, but eventually forced to return to garrison

+

in cities or bases. Police represent the local security forces: time-

+

consuming to build to effectiveness in contested areas, but essential

+

to day-to-day law and order and therefore to the Government’s

+

legitimacy and popular support.

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, Government troops can sweep into an enemy

+

area and locate and assault guerrilla forces. As troops establish con-

+

trol, police eventually can deploy into the area to stay. Or the troops

+

can establish a Government base to more quickly train local police.

+

Only once both troops and effective police forces are in place, can

+

the Government invest in local development through civic action,

+

thereby building popular support and countering the insurgency.

+

“Imaginitive Solutions”—Help for the Government to Stay

+

in Local Areas

+

The above process is time-consuming and uncertain for the Govern-

+

ment. However, several events can help it establish effective day-

+

to-day security in the countryside more quickly. One example is the

+

establishment of local forces platoons called Soldados Campesinos:

+

forces that blend the advantages of regular troops and regional

+

police.

+

Whether these opportunities become available is not entirely up to

+

the Government COIN strategist: Will the talent to discover and

+

implement imaginative solutions emerge? Will politics and bureau-

+

cracy allow them to bear fruit? In the game, the event card may or

+

may not come up, and the Government player may or may not be

+

eligible to play it when it does, or may decide that other operations

+

are more urgent.

+

+

The Other Edge of the Sword—Military and “Paramilitary”

+

In light of Colombia’s tradition of local self-defense militias and

+

the evolution of those “autodefensas” into anti-FARC illegal armed

+

groups (labeled “paramilitaries”) eventually under the leadership

+

of Carlos Castaño’s AUC, there historically was concern that new

+

local forces platoons would simply augment the AUC’s reactionary

+

insurgents. In the game, the AUC is more likely than the Government

+

to get the first crack at the Soldados Campesinos event (because of

+

the order of the faction symbols on the card). And the AUC player

+

(or non-player, if run by the game system) would almost certainly

+

implement the card’s shaded, pro-insurgent effect, turning defecting

+

rural police into AUC guerrillas.

+

And so what is the FARC doing about it?

+

Beyond such special occurrences as defections, the Government’s

+

rural forces will have to weather the more routine threats that are

+

within the capabilities of the insurgent factions: FARC ambushes,

+

AUC assassinations, Cartels Bribes, and the like. Insurgent players

+

on the ball will be gunning for any newly established rural police

+

before Government civic action can gain the populace’s support

+

and make local insurgent operations that much more difficult: once

+

populations support the Government, they block FARC from ral-

+

lying new forces and (as discussed above) report on any guerrillas

+

entering the area, flushing them from underground status and thereby

+

blocking their ability to terrorize, ambush, and extort.

+
+ +
+

30

+

Andean Abyss

+

FARC History in the Game:

+

Nation Held Hostage

+

Insurgencies, like governments, need resources to operate, but the

+

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the world’s leftist move-

+

ments largely on their own. In their 2010 book about Colombian

+

hostages, journalists Victoria Bruce, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique

+

Botero describe how Colombia’s revolutionary FARC insurgency

+

turned to the drug trade for financing—contributing by the mid-

+

1990s both to its development of a kidnapping industry and to the

+

rise of the autodefensas that later merged into the FARC’s right-wing

+

AUC enemy:

+

The FARC ... controlled many of the coca-growing regions in central

+

and southern Colombia, while the cartels managed much of the co-

+

caine production and trafficking. The guerrillas operated by taxing

+

the cartels and drug producers for protection and services. ... This

+

economic alliance began to collapse when the leaders of the cartels

+

... began investing their newfound wealth in property, primarily

+

large cattle ranches which placed them firmly in the ranks of the

+

guerrillas’ traditional enemy—the landowning elite. ... In turn, the

+

guerrillas began a policy of kidnapping and extortion of the cartel

+

members. For protection and retaliation, the drug lords organized

+

and financed their own paramilitary armies.

+

—Hostage Nation: Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

+

War on Drugs, 2010

+

Map from official Colombian sources

+

showing intensity of FARC guerrilla ac-

+

tivity during the period covered by the

+

game. Western Meta and Caquetá De-

+

partments are a hotbed containing the

+

sites of famous captures of both Colom-

+

bian presidential candidate Betancourt

+

and of three US DoD contractors.

+

FARC Kidnapping, Cartels and Government Victims, and

+

AUC Growth

+

Colombian analysts in 1998 estimated that kidnappings by the FARC

+

and its sister group, the ELN, accounted for 20 to 30 percent of all

+

kidnappings in the world (RAND, Colombian Labyrinth, p32). The

+

FARC held hundreds of hostages at a time—a large-scale ransoming

+

enterprise for them and a tragedy for the country that developed into

+

a political issue and a cause for national hatred of the guerrillas.

+

ANDEAN ABYSS depicts the enterprise through the kidnapping spe-

+

cial activity that the FARC faction may add to its terror operations.

+

It also depicts the impact of FARC hostage-taking on politics and

+

military affairs through a series of event cards.

+

In the game, FARC can use underground Guerrillas to terrorize local

+

populations into opposing the Colombian government. If the terror-

+

ized region has a drug cartels base or is a city or line of communica-

+

tion—and if FARC guerrillas outnumber local police—FARC may

+

kidnap as well to forcibly transfer a die roll’s worth of resources (or

+

a drug shipment) in ransom from the Cartels or Government faction

+

to FARC. As reaction to FARC kidnapping historically contributed

+

to growth of the right-wing “paramilitaries”, a particularly costly

+

kidnapping (a die roll of “6”) mobilizes a local AUC guerrilla unit

+

or base.

+

Defense Against Kidnapping

+

To avoid a grievous drain of resources from the counterinsurgency,

+

the Government will have to protect the populace from FARC kid-

+

nappers with police patrols of the country’s roads and cities. The

+

Cartels often can better afford the drain, but it may at some point

+

have to turn on the FARC parasite, relocate to FARC-free areas,

+

or just pay off the FARC player. The latter option illustrates how

+

ANDEAN ABYSS explores the multifaceted relations among the

+

contenders for control of 1990s Colombia through varied avenues

+

for player diplomacy.

+

AUC History in the Game:

+

Right-Wing Army

+

Colombia in the mid-1990s saw the leftist FARC insurgency build-

+

ing its strength dramatically as it transitioned from small-unit terror

+

tactics to military attacks on the Colombian Army. But the Govern-

+

ment was not yet on a war footing and still tacitly conceded immense

+

areas of countryside to the guerrillas. To protect themselves from

+

FARC terror, landowners in several localities raised self-defense

+

forces, autodefensas, that would use the FARC’s own tactics against

+

it. By 1996, these local anti-FARC units formed a nationwide force

+

under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense

+

Forces of Colombia or AUC) umbrella.

+

Over the next decade, the AUC grew to an estimated 17,000 fighters,

+

approaching the FARC’s strength. Journalist Mario Murillo describes

+

this illegal armed power:

+

Along with the ongoing collaboration between elements of the army

+

and the AUC, [as of 2004] there are approximately 1,000 active

+

AUC members who have served in the Colombian military, includ-

+

ing fifty-three retired military officers who have served as advisors

+

to the AUC. They have up to fourteen state of the art helicopters, a

+

dozen small planes, and countless speed-boats with mounted ma-

+

chine guns to use in their war against the guerrillas. Indeed, they

+

are a full-fledged army, operating almost with complete impunity

+

throughout the country.

+

—Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabiliza-

+

tion, 2004

+

Logo of the AUC

+

FARC guerrillas

+
+ +
+

31

+

Andean Abyss

+

Potent Anti-FARC Faction

+

In ANDEAN ABYSS, the AUC faction can build an army rivaling the

+

FARC’s in the number of guerrilla pieces—and an army as military

+

effective and typically not under the pressure that Government

+

forces place on the FARC. Both FARC and AUC guerrillas can use

+

an ambush special activity that guarantees a successful attack and

+

the capture of materiel and recruits to form a new underground unit.

+

And a variety of event cards depict additional AUC capacities, both

+

military and terrorist.

+

AUC Aces in the Hole: Death Squads and Assassination

+

More than on military attacks, the AUC relied on terror and mas-

+

sacres as its principal means of taking control of FARC-dominated

+

areas. They mimicked FARC terror, but on a more brutal level,

+

including mass-murders of suspected FARC sympathizers and other

+

undesirables—so-called “limpiezas” that resembled the “ethnic

+

cleansing” that the same period featured in the Balkans. In the game,

+

the AUC can accompany its terror operations with assassination

+

special activities. Provided the AUC can position underground

+

guerrillas in a target area, AUC terror can eliminate an enemy base

+

even when protected by enemy guerrillas. Because the AUC wins by

+

reducing FARC bases to fewer in number than its own, assassination

+

of FARC base pieces is a key AUC tactic.

+

Double-Edged Sword for the Government

+

The AUC as blood enemy to the FARC would seem an unalloyed

+

friend to the Government, able to strike the enemy in ways that legal

+

Government forces cannot. But the AUC nevertheless remains an

+

insurgency—an illegal armed group that challenges Government

+

law and order and must in the end be suppressed.

+

In the game, too many AUC forces in a region block Government

+

control and thus the ability to build popular support—the Govern-

+

ment’s victory condition. AUC terror wrecks not only FARC’s politi-

+

cal base but support for the Government, as victimized populations

+

resent the Government’s failure to protect them. And international

+

suspicion of Colombian Army complicity in AUC atrocities costs

+

the Government foreign aid resources. This interplay of capabilities

+

and victory conditions poses the question every game: when will

+

the Government turn on its brutal AUC helpmate—as it ultimately

+

did historically—to trim its control of the countryside?

+

Cartels History in the Game:

+

Chess Player of Cali

+

[Cali cartel co-founder Gilberto Rodríguez] became known as the

+

“Chess Player” for his ruthless and calculating approach to the drug

+

business. ... The Rodríguez brothers ... controlled Cali in the way

+

that feudal barons once ruled medieval estates. ... Buy Colombia,

+

rather than terrorize it, became their guiding philosophy. ... The

+

cartel built dozens of high-rise offices and apartment buildings as

+

a way of laundering their money. The Cali skyline changed, and

+

thousands of jobs were created. Their money permeated the city’s

+

economy, and the natives became addicted to laundered cash and

+

conspicuous consumption.

+

—Ron Chepesiuk, Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali

+

Cartel, 2003

+

Along with Government security forces, FARC rebels, and AUC

+

paramilitaries, ANDEAN ABYSS also depicts the Colombian drug

+

cartels. While the illegal drug industry does not care much about

+

legitimacy, it is an insurgency nevertheless. By definitions laid out

+

by National War College scholar Bard O’Neill, the cartels are “com-

+

mercialist insurgent” groups—contesting political power purely to

+

aid their acquisition of material resources (Insurgency & Terrorism:

+

From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2005).

+

In the game, the Cartels faction wins not through popular support

+

or opposition but by building its criminal organization (expanding

+

its bases) and amassing resources. But its presence can get in the

+

way of other factions’ objectives of territorial control and political

+

support. The Cartels, for example, start the game within one rally

+

action of controlling Cali, which begins politically neutral rather

+

than supportive of the Government.

+

As a result of the dismantling of the drug cartels, trafficking has

+

experienced radical changes in structure. ... There are [now] be-

+

tween 250 and 300 trafficking organizations in Colombia. Their

+

leaders are some of the former cartels’ second-rank members ... The

+

new organizations are smaller, closed, and secret ... . [They] have

+

developed strategies, methods and techniques aimed at making the

+

business more dynamic, sneaking away from law enforcement and

+

blending in better in their respective regions.

+

—Álvaro Camacho and Andrés López, “From Smugglers to

+

Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in Illicit Colombian Drug

+

Organizations,” in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in

+

Colombia, 2007

+

War of Weeds

+

The historical period of game—mid-1990s to mid-2000s—saw the

+

sunset of Colombia’s flashy, politically active drug cartels, but not

+

of the illicit drug industry that the game’s Cartels faction represents.

+

And so, in ANDEAN ABYSS, the Cartels can reconstitute themselves,

+

able to slip readily out of areas of danger and regrow elsewhere.

+

Unlike other insurgents, the Cartels can recruit forces anywhere:

+

battalions of hired guns—sicarios—await among the poor. But

+

the Cartels’ guerrilla force pool is the smallest: it cannot organize

+

One way to get drugs to US market: a narco-submarine, designed

+

to evade detection while it carries its load of product on the pas-

+

sage northward.

+

Cali skyline

+

Photo by D.A. Rendón

+
+ +
+

32

+

Andean Abyss

+

campaigns on the scale of the more military FARC or AUC. And the

+

Cartels do not have the other insurgents’ potent battle tactics.

+

The Cartels faction wins by accumulating resources (money) and

+

bases (the coca and poppy fields, processing labs, and distribution

+

infrastructure needed to continue making money). It will find it hard

+

to protect its bases with its smaller number of guerrillas, and rural

+

Cartels bases are vulnerable to aerial spraying (the Government’s

+

eradication action).

+

But the Cartels also can place new bases more easily than any other

+

faction, quickly though special cultivation actions or with delay but

+

cheaply though processing actions to ready drug shipments. Ship-

+

ment markers represent major caches of processed cocaine or heroin

+

awaiting delivery to market outside Colombia—they are vulnerable

+

to seizure by the other factions: any insurgent faction can liquidate

+

them to accelerate operations. But if defended and held long enough

+

to get to market (in the Propaganda Round), they yield resources

+

or a free base.

+

Cartels terror can hurt the Government or FARC politically, but the

+

Cartels’ most potent weapon is corruption: they can bribe to expose,

+

hide, or neutralize enemy forces—anywhere. Bribes are expensive,

+

however, and so only become a true threat once the Cartels are well

+

above their victory goal in resources. And so the other factions face

+

a choice: dedicate precious time and resources early on to trim the

+

Cartels weeds, or risk the Cartels growing so rich that they can block

+

any offensive by bribing their way out.

+

Fantasy of the Right—or Left?

+

English language studies of the Colombian conflict read so differ-

+

ently from one another that they seem to be describing multiple

+

countries. Is Colombia a thriving democracy, with a popular gov-

+

ernment that has brought economic prosperity and relative peace

+

to its people in the face of vicious terrorist and criminal threats?

+

Or is Colombia a harsh dictatorship by an economic elite, dressed

+

up as democracy but in fact using state-sponsored terror to keep its

+

ever more impoverished masses under heel, and the FARC simply

+

the people’s defense? You can find either thesis in North American

+

scholarship.

+

ANDEAN ABYSS does not attempt to settle these questions. I took

+

care to draw from writers (necessarily, for me, in English) who

+

view Colombia’s conflict from a range of political perspectives (see

+

Selected Sources). No one view seems able to tell the full story, and

+

I hope that players of a variety of persuasions will find something

+

relevant in the game’s design.

+

The game does take some positions. For example, it does not fully

+

buy the Left’s thesis of the AUC as an “extension” of the Govern-

+

ment in that both defend elite interests against the rest of the people

+

(see Murillo somewhat and Hristov especially). Yes, the Colombian

+

Government and AUC shared a core interest in suppressing the

+

FARC, and ANDEAN ABYSS accounts for this shared interest in the

+

factions’ victory conditions. Indeed, Government and AUC players

+

often will collaborate.

+

But the Government under Uribe developed and executed a plan to

+

extend its writ throughout the country—a true and, by the far-Left

+

model, unnecessary departure—including against AUC. Casualties

+

caused the AUC, extraditions of its leaders, and its imperfect but not

+

false demobilization show a real parting of Government and AUC

+

ways. And Colombia’s vigorous electoral politicking and, under

+

Uribe, undeniable and widespread popular enthusiasm for President,

+

government, and army seemed to gainsay the Leftist model of Co-

+

lombia as an exploitative oligarchy defended from its people by force

+

of terror. So ANDEAN ABYSS has the Government seeking popular

+

support to win, rather than the exploitation of the country’s poor by

+

the violence-backed rich, as the far Left might have it.

+

As for the nature of the FARC, the game does not depict the group

+

as mere “narco-terrorists” who have left people’s revolution behind

+

and continue mainly for personal drug profit (as some on the Right

+

argue). An insurgency may at once benefit from the drug trade and

+

provide much needed services to rural under-privileged. ANDEAN

+

ABYSS models the latter aspect with the FARC Agitation mechanic

+

and the effects of events such as Crop Substitution, Unión Sindical

+

Obrera, and others.

+

The persistence in hard times of the FARC’s leaders and fighters

+

demonstrates ideological commitment—dedication to something

+

larger than self. Purely commercialist insurgent leaders at some

+

point wish to live the high life. In contrast, Reyes, Mono Jojoy,

+

Cano, and the rest carried on in the face of the hardships of lethal

+

Government pursuit—and despite opportunities for reconciliation.

+

In the game, FARC victory depends directly on popular opposi-

+

tion and the strength of the movement’s political and logistical

+

base—the preconditions for an eventual revolution and overthrow

+

of the existing order.

+

Finally, ANDEAN ABYSS represents the US-sponsored “War on

+

Drugs” as neither clear failure nor clear success. Eradication in the

+

game may be a mixed bag politically, but, used judiciously, it is a

+

necessary and potent means for the Government to keep the Cartels

+

in check. Historically, aerial coca eradication has had its place in

+

curbing supply, as have the successes of the kingpin strategy of the

+

Colombian Police and US DEA. Economics being what they are,

+

Colombian coca production continues. But the country has escaped

+

the level of terror and political challenge of the big cartels that now

+

traumatize Mexico and Central America so brutally. Colombians

+

today can take pride in a low murder rate, growing economy, and

+

better governance.

+

Thanks and Dedication

+

My special gratitude is due to several groups and individuals for their

+

efforts on behalf of ANDEAN ABYSS: To Joel Toppen, who patiently

+

heard me out as we drove through the desert, when all I had was

+

first drafts of curious ops menus. To GMT Games and the testers

+

and players across many countries who made this project happen.

+

And to Dr. Thomas Marks of the National Defense University, for

+

sharing with me his photos and his deep and personal knowledge

+

of Colombian COIN.

+

Finally, I dedicate the design of ANDEAN ABYSS to Juan Fran-

+

cisco’s nation and people: They have faced their past—may they

+

overcome it.

+

Volko F. Ruhnke

+

January, 2012 Vienna, Virginia

+
+ +
+

33

+

Andean Abyss

+

EVENT TEXT AND BACKGROUND

+

This section reproduces the full text of each event card, along with

+

sourced historical and other background commentary.

+

1. 1st Division GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Jointness: 1 Civic Action space each Support Phase requires Govt

+

Control and any cube.

+

Service parochialism: Civic Action requires at least 2 Troops and

+

2 Police.

+

The Colombian Army’s 1st Division in late 2004 became a joint

+

operational command, part of a process of integrating services to

+

replace exclusively army divisional areas. (Marks p137)

+

2. Ospina & Mora GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

COIN experts take charge: Sweep costs 1 Resource per space.

+

COIN strategy eludes Army: Sweep Operations may target only 1

+

space per card.

+

Senior army commanders Carlos Ospina Ovalle and Jorge Mora

+

Rangel collaborated intimately—Ospina fathering a sound coun-

+

terinsurgent strategy from his study of captured FARC documents

+

and Mora ensuring its practical implementation. (Conversation with

+

Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Ospina pp57,58,60)

+

General Mora Photo by Tom Marks

+

3. Tapias GFAC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

CO tightens civil-military bonds: Assault costs 1 Resource per

+

space.

+

Civil-military rivalries fester: Assault Operations may target only

+

1 space per card.

+

Military Forces Commander Fernando Tapias Stahelin drew the

+

political backing to forge a whole-of-government COIN effort.

+

(Conversation with Tom Marks, 30Apr2011; Marks, p139; Ospina

+

p60)

+

4. Caño Limón—Coveñas GFCA

+

Profitable pipeline: Add twice the Econ of 3 unSabotaged pipelines

+

to Government Resources.

+

Pipeline draws attacks: Sabotage the 3 pipelines with highest value

+

and no cubes.

+

A particularly lucrative energy export pipeline from Arauca to the

+

sea attracted both rebel attacks and US training assistance. (Brittain

+

p23; Ricks-Lightner pp25,58,80; Hristov p34)

+

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol GFCA

+

Oil company security: Place 6 Police onto pipelines. 3 Guerrillas

+

there or adjacent flip to Active.

+

Industry thought exploitative: Shift a space adjacent to a 3-Econ

+

LoC by 2 levels toward Active Opposition.

+

Joint ventures between US and Colombian oil companies provided

+

enough government revenue to justify major security measures.

+

(Brittain p228; Ricks-Lightner p80) A $93-million batch of US

+

counterterrorism aid in 2003, for example, focused on protection

+

of Colombian assets of California-based Occidental Petroleum.

+

(Hristov p34) Critics saw government concessions to multinational

+

oil giants as overly generous and tied poverty and human rights

+

violations to US support for oil industry in the country. (Murillo

+

pp87-88; Hristov pp17-18,34-35)

+

6. Oil Spill GFCA

+

Rebels blamed: Shift 2 Opposition or Neutral Departments adjacent

+

to Sabotage to Passive Support.

+

Multinationals make mess: Sabotage a pipeline. Shift an adjacent

+

Department by 1 level toward Active Opposition.

+

Spilled oil from attacks created substantial environmental damage,

+

generating local hostility against whichever combatant side got the

+

blame. (Ricks-Lightner p80)

+

7. 7th Special Forces GAFC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Infrastructure protection training: Each Control phase, Govt may

+

remove 1-3 Terror or Sabotage.

+

US training ineffective: Control phase—Sabotage LoCs with any

+

Guerrillas equal to cubes.

+

The US Bush Administration deployed some 600 personnel of the 7th

+

Special Forces Group (Airborne), most to train a new “infrastructure

+

protection brigade” in embattled Arauca Department. (Marks p131;

+

Ricks-Lightner p25)

+

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana GAFC

+

COIN strike aircraft: Govt executes 3 free Air Strikes.

+

Budget diverted to expensive jets: Government Resources –9.

+

After FARC successes in the late 1990s in overrunning remote

+

government centers, the Colombian military equipped its air force

+

with night-vision gear and learned to integrate air power in support

+

of ground operations. (RAND pp101-102) Less relevant to COIN,

+

Colombia also maintained a force of high-speed Kfir and Mirage

+

V jets. (RAND p42)

+

9. High Mountain Battalions GAFC

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Elites guard high-altitude corridors: Assault treats Mountain as

+

City.

+

Equipment not delivered: Assault in Mountain removes only 1 piece

+

for 4 Troops.

+

The Army in the Pastrana years equipped and situated special bat-

+

talions to block insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inac-

+

cessible heights. (Marks p135)

+
+ +
+

34

+

Andean Abyss

+

10. Blackhawks GACF

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

US helos delivered: Air Lift moves any number of Troops.

+

Delivery of US helos delayed: Air Lift moves only 1 Troops cube.

+

The military as of 2000 had only 17 operational heavy-lift helicop-

+

ters. The US was to add 30 UH-60 Blackhawk and 33 UH-1H Huey

+

transports, but they had yet to be delivered. (RAND pp63,65,68-

+

69,104)

+

11. National Defense & Security Council GACF

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Military-police jointness: 1 Police may enter each Sweep space.

+

Military-police rivalry: A Sweep Operation Activates Guerrillas via

+

Troops or Police, not both.

+

Uribe’s “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” integrated

+

COIN planning, adding a National Defense and Security Council

+

to ensure coordinated and unified action by all state bodies. (Marks

+

pp132-133)

+

12. Plan Colombia GACF

+

US “War on Drugs”: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Resources.

+

Then Aid +10.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

US aid focuses on drug war: No Air Strike or Activation by Patrol

+

until next Propaganda.

+

The Pastrana Government’s response to Colombia’s insurgency,

+

Plan Colombia, included seeking $3.5-billion in foreign aid. The

+

US earmarked 3/4ths of its part of that aid to counternarcotics.

+

(RAND pp61-62)

+

13. Plan Meteoro GCFA

+

GOVT CAPABILITIES

+

Transport protection units: Patrol conducts a free Assault in each

+

LoC.

+

Transport security deemphasized: Patrols do not conduct a free

+

Assault.

+

The Uribe Administration funded special transportation network

+

protection units under “Plan Meteor”. (Marks p135)

+

14. Tres Esquinas GCFA

+

Forward base: Government places 1 Base and 3 Troops into any

+

Department.

+

Base overrun: Remove 1 Government Base and 1 cube from a

+

Department.

+

During the late-1990s heyday of the FARC’s large-unit “mobile

+

warfare”, it succeeded in overrunning a series of isolated army po-

+

sitions and briefly holding the capital of Vaupés. (Ospina pp59-60;

+

Marks p127; RAND pp42-43) Tres Esquinas was a key army base

+

at the heart of later Government sweeps into the FARC strongholds

+

of the southeast. (www.GlobalSecurity.org; Brittain pp226-227)

+

As of 2002, it hosted a Joint Intelligence Center and some 100 US

+

military advisors. (Hristov p35)

+

15. War Tax GCFA

+

Defense budget shot in the arm: Roll a die and add 4 times the result

+

to Government Resources.

+

Middle class resents cost of war: Shift a City from Neutral or Pas-

+

sive Support to Passive Opposition.

+

Uribe shifted and increased the tax burden in order to help fund the

+

military effort against the guerrillas. (Brittain p228-229)

+

16. Coffee Prices GCAF

+

They’re up: Each Mountain, +5 Resources to Faction with most

+

pieces, tied spaces to Govt.

+

They’re down: Government Resources –10.

+

Export income from coffee—a traditional source of economic

+

security to the Colombian highlands—fluctuated wildly from the

+

1990s on, mostly downward. (Brittain pp84-88; Hristov p191;

+

RAND p5) The late 1990s saw increased guerrilla presence in

+

the country’s agricultural backbone, the central coffee-growing

+

departments, apparently as part of FARC, ELN, and AUC strategy.

+

(RAND pp46-47)

+

17. Madrid Donors GCAF

+

Aid conference generous: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to Govt Re-

+

sources. Then Aid +6.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

EU aid focuses on reconstruction: No Sweep or Assault in Depts

+

until next Propaganda.

+

European and Japanese donors to Colombia channeled aid to non-

+

military programs. A July 2000 donors’ conference in Madrid, for

+

example, pledged $619-million, mostly for social development

+

projects. (RAND pp62,64)

+

18. NSPD-18 GCAF

+

US “War on Terror” takes on FARC: Add lesser of Aid or +20 to

+

Govt Resources. Then Aid +20.

+

US focused on Mid-East and South Asia: Government Resources

+

–6. Subtract a die roll from Aid.

+

In a departure from the more restrictive “war on drugs”, the US Bush

+

Administration’s 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 18,

+

“Supporting Democracy in Colombia”, called on the State Depart-

+

ment to implement a new US political-military plan in direct support

+

of Colombian national security strategy. The Bush Administration

+

had linked the counternarcotics fight to the “war on terror” and

+

would pursue not only cartels but the FARC and the AUC directly.

+

(Marks p131; Chepesiuk p281)

+

19. General Offensive FGAC

+

In each space possible, choose and execute either free Sweep without

+

movement or Assault (if Government), or free Attack or Terror (if

+

Insurgent).

+

The conflict during the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a number of

+

FARC offensives, including the use of homemade armored vehicles.

+

The Government’s 2003-2004 Plan Patriota included a major military

+

offensive around the capital and into FARC-held territory in the

+

southeast. (Ospina pp59-60; CRS p10; Hristov p36)

+
+ +
+

35

+

Andean Abyss

+

20. Mono Jojoy FGAC

+

KIA puts FARC in disarray: Govt player repositions up to 6 FARC

+

Guerrillas into adjacent spaces.

+

Military strategist: FARC free Marches any of its Guerrillas then

+

flips up to 3 of its Guerrillas Underground.

+

A Colombian military and police operation in Meta Department in

+

September 2010 killed the FARC’s operational second-in-command,

+

Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez or “Mono

+

Jojoy”, adding to a period of strong pressure on guerrilla remnants.

+

(CRS pp1,13)

+

21. Raúl Reyes FGAC

+

FARC Deputy killed: FARC Resources –6. Remove 1 FARC Base.

+

FARC Deputy channels foreign support: FARC Resources +6. Place

+

a FARC Base in a City or Department.

+

A 2008 Colombian military raid into Ecuador killed then second-

+

highest FARC commander Luís Édgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”)

+

and recovered evidence of planned Venezuelan and possibly Ecua-

+

doran support to the FARC. (CRS p10; Marks pp140-141n)

+

22. Alfonso Cano FGCA

+

FARC leader killed in military strike: Shift an Opposition space to

+

Neutral.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

Ideologue: May Agitate also in up to 3 spaces with FARC piece

+

and no Govt Control.

+

Communist Bogotá University student Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas

+

joined the FARC in the 1980s and eventually became its master

+

revolutionary ideologue, “Alfonso Cano”. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

+

pp138-139) A 2011 military strike in Cauca Department killed him.

+

(www.ColombiaReports.com)

+

23. DoD Contractors FGCA

+

US provides aircrew: In a Dept, Activate all Guerrillas and remove

+

all Cartels Bases.

+

Plane down—hostage search and evasion: Govt removes 3 Troops.

+

Mark Govt and FARC Ineligible through next card.

+

US contractors provided pilots for crop spraying over FARC-held ter-

+

ritory and for reconnaissance flights to pinpoint guerrillas. Patrolling

+

FARC guerrillas in 2003 shot down one such flight along the western

+

slopes of Caquetá and took three US personnel hostage, setting off a

+

Colombian Army manhunt. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp3-19,107)

+

24. Operación Jaque FGCA

+

Dramatic hostage rescue: 1 City to Active Support. Mark FARC

+

Ineligible through next card.

+

Hostage rescue goes awry: Remove 2 Troops from a space with

+

FARC pieces. Shift a City with Support to Neutral.

+

In a show of operational prowess, Colombian forces in 2008 tricked

+

FARC captors into delivering celebrity hostage Ingrid Betancourt

+

and 3 US DoD contractors held since 2003. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero

+

pp238-256)

+

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional FAGC

+

ELN and FARC jockey: Remove all FARC pieces from 1 Moun-

+

tain.

+

ELN and FARC coordinate ops: Place any 3 FARC pieces into

+

Antioquia or an adjacent Department.

+

Colombia’s second-largest revolutionary army, the Castroite ELN,

+

concentrated in the northern mountains, where it sought a Sierra

+

Maestra-style stronghold. While the ELN and the FARC shared the

+

same enemies and often coordinated operations, the two Marxist

+

groups occasionally clashed over territory or resources. (RAND

+

pp30-31,44; CRS pp13-14)

+

26. Gramaje FAGC

+

FARC protection rejected: All Cartels Guerrillas in spaces with

+

FARC free Attack FARC.

+

Schedule of fees: Cartels transfers 3 Resources to FARC for each

+

space with Cartels Base and FARC Guerrilla.

+

The FARC had a precise schedule of fees, gramaje, that it charged

+

to drug producers and smugglers for protection and other services.

+

Though imposed by the guerrillas, these taxes served as a US argu-

+

ment that the FARC and the drug lords were in cahoots. (RAND

+

p32; Camacho-López p80)

+

27. Misil Antiaéreo FAGC

+

FARC MANPADs deemed a myth: Government executes 3 free

+

Special Activities.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

MANPADs feared: Until next Propaganda, no Govt Special Activi-

+

ties where Guerrillas.

+

Given the importance of air power to Colombian COIN, fears grew

+

that guerrilla use of surface-to-air missiles could change the strategic

+

balance. (RAND pp35,102)

+

28. Hugo Chávez FACG

+

Caracas controls border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

+

space next to Venezuela.

+

Caracas aids rebels: Place a FARC Base in a Dept next to Venezuela.

+

Sabotage each empty LoC touching Cúcuta.

+

FARC information taken in the 2008 raid on Raúl Reyes suggested

+

that Venezuela was providing support to the insurgent group, includ-

+

ing plans by the Hugo Chávez regime to grant millions of dollars for

+

weapons purchases. Chávez later that year called on the FARC to

+

cease military operations, signaling a change in at least Venezuela’s

+

public stance. (CRS p10)

+

29. Kill Zone FACG

+

Army sniffs out FARC trap: Govt in 1 space Activates all FARC and

+

executes free Assault.

+

Tactics lure enemy in: FARC or AUC in a space executes 2 free

+

Ambushes with any of its Guerrillas without Activating.

+

The FARC between 1996 and 2000 developed a tactic to lure Army

+

reaction forces into a prepared kill zone surrounded by intercon-

+

nected rifle pits and bunkers. In one such kill-zone action in late

+

2000 along a key route from Antioquia to Chocó, guerrillas inflicted

+

heavy casualties on special forces of the Colombian 4th Brigade.

+

Often, however, the army could detect the kill zone before falling

+

into the trap. (RAND pp44-45,45n)

+
+ +
+

36

+

Andean Abyss

+

30. Peace Commission FACG

+

FARC accused in Commissioner’s killing: Remove 1 FARC Zone.

+

Peace bid: Government places 1 FARC Zone. (See 6.4.3)

+

The FARC’s ambush and execution in late 2000 of the head of the

+

Colombian congressional peace commission, Diego Torbay, dealt

+

Pastrana’s peace policy a new blow. (RAND pp73-74)

+

31. Betancourt FCGA

+

Sympathy for famous hostage: Shift 2 Cities and 1 Dept 1 level each

+

toward Active Support.

+

Hostage negotiations forum for FARC: Shift 3 spaces from Passive

+

Opposition to Active Opposition

+

Spitfire senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—

+

known among other things for her outreach to the FARC—fell

+

hostage in 2002 as she toured the recently remilitarized FARC

+

zone. She became an international symbol of Colombia’s hostage

+

tragedy—and of the FARC’s role in it. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-

+

102,145,168-171,242)

+

32. Secuestrados FCGA

+

Fed up with hostage-taking: Shift 2 spaces from Neutral or Passive

+

Opposition to Passive Support.

+

Ransoming highly profitable: FARC Resources +12.

+

Colombian media constantly reminded the populace that kidnap-

+

pings were garnering 100s of millions of dollars for the FARC and

+

other groups. Public outcry grew under Pastrana as negotiations

+

with FARC failed to end the scourge, and regular radio messages

+

from loved ones to hostages further broadcast the trauma. (Bruce-

+

Hayes-Botero pp95-96,141-143,173)

+

33. Sucumbíos FCGA

+

Ecuadoran buffer zone: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces from a

+

space bordering Ecuador.

+

Cross-border war: Place 2 pieces in Ecuador. It is a 0 Pop Dept. No

+

more than 2 pieces per Faction may stack there.

+

As the 2008 Colombian raid on a FARC camp in the Ecuadoran

+

province of Sucumbíos vividly illustrated, Colombia’s insurgency

+

and counterinsurgency often spilled over borders. The FARC used

+

Ecuador’s territory for rest, resupply, and training; and some coca

+

processing took place there as well. (CRS pp10,23-24) Ecuadoran

+

troops at times clashed with suspected Colombian guerrillas within

+

Ecuador. Quito planned increases in development spending in border

+

provinces such as Sucumbíos to create a social and economic buffer

+

zone. (RAND pp88-89)

+

34. Airdropped AKs FCAG

+

Insurgents scammed by Russian criminals: Drop an Insurgent

+

Faction’s Resources by –5.

+

Covert weapons delivery: An Insurgent Faction places 2 Guerrillas

+

and 1 Base into a 0 Population Department.

+

A creative arms-for-drugs deal brokered by Russian mafia in 2000

+

included Russian planes parachuting as many as 30,000 automatic

+

rifles to the FARC in eastern Colombia. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero p91;

+

RAND pp36-37)

+

35. Crop Substitution FCAG

+

Government initiative: Replace the Cartels Bases in 1 Department

+

with 1 Police each. Aid +3.

+

FARC proposals lauded: Shift a Department with a Cartels Base by

+

2 levels toward Active Opposition.

+

Crop substitution or “alternative development” programs sought to

+

supplement coca and poppy eradication by providing licit income

+

to farmers who otherwise would replant drug crops. FARC initia-

+

tives in its zone in 1999-2002 drew attention and support from the

+

United Nations, the European Union, and other foreigners. (Brittain

+

pp95-98) US support via Plan Colombia also featured crop substitu-

+

tion. The US Agency for International Development claimed such

+

a program from 2005-2009 reduced coca growing by 85% in a key

+

cultivation region of western Meta. (CRS pp26-29)

+

36. Zona de Convivencia FCAG

+

ELN gets its DMZ: Govt places a FARC Zone in Mountain. (See

+

6.4.3) Shift 2 adjacent Neutral spaces to Passive Support, if possible.

+

Executing Faction remains Eligible past this card.

+

The Pastrana administration explored negotiations with the ELN,

+

parallel to those with the FARC. The ELN demanded a zone analo-

+

gous to that granted to the FARC, and Pastrana agreed in principle to

+

a 5000km2 “live-and-let-live zone” around the juncture of Antioquia,

+

Bolívar, and Santander. (RAND pp41,74) Uribe also pursued the

+

ELN’s negotiated demobilization, but the group broke off talks in

+

2008. (CRS pp13-14)

+

37. Former Military AGFC

+

Ties that bind: Government free Sweeps or Assaults FARC within

+

each space, no moves; AUC Guerrillas act as Troops.

+

Ex-officers advise paramilitaries: AUC free Marches any of its

+

Guerrillas and then, at any 1 destination, free Ambushes.

+

The AUC was purported to collaborate with elements of the Colom-

+

bian Army and to have some 1000 active members who had served

+

in the nation’s armed forces, including 53 retired military officers

+

who acted as AUC advisors. AUC leader Carlos Castaño himself

+

corroborated these estimates when in 2000 he claimed to have more

+

than 1000 ex-soldiers and 135 former army officers among his forces.

+

(Murillo p100; Hristov pp71,86-87)

+

38. National Coordination Center AGFC

+

New command fights paramilitaries: Remove all Active AUC Guer-

+

rillas from up to 3 spaces with cubes or Support.

+

Sympathizers alert AUC: All AUC Guerrillas in spaces with cubes

+

or Support to Underground.

+

The Colombian Government as of 2000 had declared the battle

+

against illegal autodefensas to be a strategic priority and established

+

the National Coordination Center to lead that fight. Government-

+

reported kills and captures of paramilitaries had been far lower than

+

of rebel guerrillas in absolute numbers. The casualties were more

+

comparable in percentages of total AUC and FARC-ELN strength,

+

however. Moreover, argued the Defense Ministry, the fact that rebels

+

sought out confrontations with security forces more often than would

+

paramilitaries explained any disparity. (RAND pp57-58)

+
+ +
+

37

+

Andean Abyss

+

39. Soldados Campesinos AGFC

+

Local forces platoons: Place 1 Police into each of 6 Depts.

+

Local forces augment autodefensas: In up to 3 Depts, replace 1

+

Police with 1 available AUC Guerrilla.

+

The reestablishment of local forces—Soldados Campesinos (“Peas-

+

ant Soldiers”), later Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”)—and

+

a related expansion of municipal police proved indispensable to

+

Uribe’s counterinsurgency in providing a state presence in threatened

+

areas. (Marks p135,136) Others saw such forces as legitimation of

+

paramilitaries, in light of the overlap of their membership with that

+

of the AUC. (Murillo pp103,113-114)

+

40. Demobilization AGCF

+

Negotiated reintegration: Replace 3 AUC Guerrillas with available

+

Police.

+

Talks a ruse, fighters recycled: Move all cubes in a Dept with AUC

+

to any Cities. Place 1 AUC piece in each of 2 Cities.

+

The Uribe administration in 2003-2006 negotiated the AUC’s

+

demobilization. Some suspected that the aim was to rein in para-

+

militaries mainly to legitimize the state’s main offensive against the

+

FARC. (Murillo p102) Others charged that—while thousands of

+

AUC members demobilized and turned in weapons—much of the

+

demobilization was faked or of only temporary impact on paramili-

+

tary capabilities. (Hristov pp146-160) A UN and US view was that

+

remaining paramilitary bands were of a different nature, criminal

+

rather than political in purpose. (CRS p14)

+

41. Mancuso AGCF

+

AUC No.2 extradited: AUC Resources –6. Remove all AUC pieces

+

from 1 space.

+

AUC drug lord: AUC Resources +3 for each space with AUC and

+

Cartels pieces.

+

The FARC was far from the only insurgent group to benefit from

+

the drug trade. The AUC’s chief in 2000 acknowledged that the

+

paramilitary coalition received a majority of its financing from

+

drug trafficking. The US labeled the AUC a “cocaine-smuggling

+

terrorist” organization and sought its leaders’ extradition. Colom-

+

bian authorities extradited AUC deputy and military commander

+

Salvatore Mancuso to the US in 2008. (Camacho-López pp85-86;

+

Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp90-91; Murillo pp105,111-112; Hristov p80;

+

Chepesiuk p280; www.ColombiaReports.com)

+

42. Senado & Cámara AGCF

+

Unity behind Presidential war policy: 2 Neutral spaces to Passive

+

Support. Govt Resources +3.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

Insurgent sympathies: No Sweep or Assault against executing Fac-

+

tion until next Propaganda.

+

The Left charged that not only the military but the entire Colombian

+

political system defended elite interests by protecting right-wing

+

paramilitary violence, and therefore constituted no more than a

+

“death-squad democracy”. (Brittain pp204-205) Some claimed that

+

a third to a half of Colombian legislators were pro-AUC. (Murillo

+

pp105,212n34; Hristov p133) Paramilitary intimidation of politicians

+

may have played a role. (Hristov p125) Other AUC sympathies in

+

the legislature may have represented popular views, in light of polls

+

seeing the paramilitaries as less of a threat than the FARC. (RAND

+

pp56,59) As for the cartels, buying politicians rather than terrorizing

+

the public was a key Cali tactic, and some drug lords themselves

+

competed electorally at the local level. (Chepesiuk p68; Camacho-

+

López pp75-76) Finally, legislators and political candidates who saw

+

themselves as Government-FARC interlocutors engaged personally

+

in the peace process. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero pp94-97) In any event,

+

by Uribe’s term, public distaste for the status quo provided a uni-

+

fied political front for his war on all illegal armed groups. (Marks

+

pp129,131,138-139; Ospina p60)

+

43. Calima Front AFGC

+

Suspect leftists massacred: Place 2 Terror in and remove all FARC

+

Bases from a Dept with Troops.

+

Brutality blamed on Army: Place 2 Terror in a Dept with Troops.

+

Aid –9.

+

Affected communities charged that paramilitaries carried out assas-

+

sinations in broad daylight and close proximity to military posts. The

+

Army in 1999 in Cauca reportedly helped set up a paramilitary group

+

called the Calima Front, with military officers providing weapons,

+

logistics, and intelligence to AUC fighters—a case emblematic to

+

human rights observers of the AUC’s ability to wage war on civilians

+

with impunity. (Murillo pp94-97)

+

44. Colombia Nueva AFGC

+

Anti-corruption campaign: Shift a non-Opposition City to Active

+

Support. Govt Resources +3.

+

Political campaign divisive: Shift a City from Support to Neutral.

+

Govt Resources –3.

+

Young congresswoman and later senator Ingrid Betancourt made her

+

political reputation by outing fellow legislators for corruption and

+

by pursuing President Samper’s impeachment. Her tenacity earned

+

her both wild popularity and death threats. By her 2002 presidential

+

run— “Colombia Nueva” was her slogan—she had lost her popular-

+

ity, blamed for airing Colombia’s dirty laundry internationally in

+

her French-published autobiography. (Bruce-Hayes-Botero, pp94-

+

97,136-137)

+

45. Los Derechos Humanos AFGC

+

Officers disciplined: Shift each space with cubes and Terror 1 level

+

toward Active Support.

+

International human rights cartel: –1 Aid for each space with AUC

+

pieces. Subtract a die roll from Govt Resources.

+

Debates in the US Congress over aid funding focused on allega-

+

tions of human rights abuses on all sides, especially by paramilitary

+

groups and the Colombian military. Colombian authorities took

+

steps against military-paramilitary collusion, for example, in 2000

+

dismissing 388 military officers and NCOs for human rights abuses

+

or corruption and indicting several generals. (RAND, p58) By

+

2010, the Obama Administration certified to Congress that “years

+

of reforms and training [were] leading to an increased respect for ...

+

human rights by most members of the [Colombian] Armed Forces.”

+

Some outside observers felt that human rights charges had gone

+

too far and constituted “lawfare” against Colombia’s self-defense

+

by an international “human rights cartel”. In this view, foreign crit-

+

ics—hostile to the Colombian state itself—remained unwilling to

+

acknowledge any human rights progress despite a surging national

+

popularity of military and government. (Murillo p19; CRS pp14-

+

15,18-19,36; Marks pp129,137)

+
+ +
+

38

+

Andean Abyss

+

46. Limpieza AFCG

+

Ruthless elimination: An Insurgent Faction executes free Terror

+

with any Guerrilla, removes any 2 enemy pieces in the space, and

+

sets it to Passive Support or Opposition (unless 0 Pop). The Terror

+

places 2 markers.

+

“Limpieza social” (“social cleansing”) killings rose in Colombia in

+

the late-1990s and early-2000s, as both leftist guerrillas and rightist

+

paramilitaries sought to consolidate control by eliminating people

+

considered misfits or suspected of collaboration with the other side.

+

(RAND p6-7) Paramilitaries would defend areas from guerrillas

+

preemptively, by drawing up lists of potential leftist sympathizers

+

and then exterminating them, or using random terror to seed fear

+

and show what might happen to anyone leaning toward the FARC

+

or ELN. (Hristov pp74,92-94)

+

47. Pinto & del Rosario AFCG

+

Human rights investigators: All AUC Guerrillas Active. All Police

+

free Assault AUC as if Troops.

+

Prosecutors killed: AUC places 2 Guerrillas in Cúcuta, executes free

+

Terror there, and flips any 2 AUC Guerrillas Underground.

+

Colombian police and judicial authorities investigating right-wing

+

involvement in massacres became targets of threats and assassina-

+

tion. (Hristov p133) In what appeared to be one such case in 2001,

+

Cúcuta special prosecutor María del Rosario Silva Ríos and then her

+

replacement Carlos Arturo Pinto Bohórquez were both shot to death.

+

Authorities later convicted Cúcuta regional paramilitary commander

+

Jorge Iván “The Iguana” Laverde Zapata in the killings. Demobi-

+

lized paramilitary Orlando Bocanegra Arteaga also acknowledged

+

responsibility. (www.ElEspectador.com; www.ElTiempo.com)

+

48. Unión Sindical Obrera AFCG

+

AUC targets oil labor organizers: Remove 1 Opposition or FARC

+

Base adjacent to 3-Econ pipeline.

+

Labor backs FARC: Shift 1 level toward Active Opposition in 2

+

Cities other than Bogotá.

+

Labor unions—suspected of a similar social agenda as that of the

+

rebel guerrillas and therefore of collusion with them—became fre-

+

quent targets of right-wing paramilitary violence. The FARC and

+

the ELN had maintained a strong presence around the oil-refining

+

town of Barrancabermeja in Santander, a hotbed of the powerful oil

+

workers union, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO). The AUC entered the

+

area in 2001, killing 180 and displacing some 4000—acts popularly

+

seen as a continuation of efforts to suppress popular organizing

+

in the town. AUC leader Carlos Castaño in 2003 sent a menacing

+

email to the union, declaring all USO leaders and the children of

+

USO members to be “military targets”. (Murillo pp87-88; Hristov

+

pp77,117,120)

+

49. Bloques ACGF

+

Militias defy Castaño: Permanently remove 3 available AUC Guer-

+

rillas.

+

Independent militias join AUC: Place an AUC Guerrilla and Base

+

in any Department.

+

The AUC came together in the mid-1990s as an umbrella for several

+

regional “self-defense” organizations (bloques). An amalgam of

+

autonomous groups, the AUC was less cohesive than the FARC.

+

Several powerful groups, such as the Bloque Central Bolívar, did

+

not recognize AUC leadership, and paramilitaries fought turf wars

+

amongst themselves. (RAND pp54-55; Hristov p70; Murillo p108;

+

Brittain p126)

+

50. Carabineros ACGF

+

National police field forces: Govt places a total of up to 3 Police

+

into any Departments.

+

National police corruption: Remove any 2 Police or replace them

+

with available AUC Guerrillas.

+

During the Pastrana and then Uribe years, Colombia systematically

+

established police presence in every county of the country. Those

+

areas historically thought too dangerous for police presence were

+

manned by police field forces (Carabineros), similar in size and na-

+

ture to army local forces but more mobile and better armed. (Marks

+

pp136,145n38) As with the Army, however, some police were

+

suspected of collusion with the paramilitaries, for example taking

+

payments in return for armed protection of paramilitary units while

+

the latter carried out their terror campaigns. (Hristov, p87)

+

51. Pipeline Repairs ACGF

+

Speedy patching: Remove all Pipeline Sabotage or, if none, Govern-

+

ment Resources +12.

+

Security concerns hinder maintenance: Sabotage 3 Pipelines with

+

or adjacent to FARC Guerrillas.

+

Guerrilla action against energy pipelines often becomes a race be-

+

tween how often the saboteurs can damage the line and how quickly

+

the defenders can repair them. Attacks on the key northern-Colom-

+

bian Caño-Limón pipeline in the guerrilla heyday of 2001 shut it

+

down for 240 days out of the year. (Ricks-Lightner p80) Coordinated

+

FARC pipeline attacks as late as 2008 halted production of over

+

800,000 barrels of oil. (Brittain p23)

+

52. Castaño ACFG

+

AUC leader’s memoir a best seller: Shift 2 City or Mountain each

+

1 level toward Active Support.

+

Charismatic AUC political leader: Place an AUC Base into a space

+

with AUC, then add +1 AUC Resources per AUC Base.

+

Charismatic AUC chief Carlos Castaño Gil gave interviews to lead-

+

ing national publications and obtained favorable media coverage to

+

portray the movement as a politically legitimate “third actor” in the

+

Colombian conflict. The 2001 book Mi Confesión, purporting to

+

“reveal his secrets”, sold in all major Colombian cities and became

+

one of the most popular books in the country. (Murillo p99)

+

53. Criminal Air Force ACFG

+

Insurgent access to small aircraft: An Insurgent Faction moves 1

+

or 2 Guerrillas between any 2 Departments and flips them Under-

+

ground.

+

The AUC as of 2004 reportedly fielded up to 14 state-of-art helicop-

+

ters and a dozen small planes. (Murillo p100) AUC chief Castaño

+

in 2001 claimed to have loaned helicopters to the Cali Cartel.

+

(Chepesiuk p143) Witnesses reported Army helicopters deploying

+

AUC fighters to new regions or supplying them with ammunition

+

and medications while on terror operations. (Hristov pp85,88) Some

+

charged that troops wearing AUC armbands in 2003 parachuted

+

from military aircraft into a region of Arauca to conduct a massacre.

+

(Brittain p136)

+
+ +
+

39

+

Andean Abyss

+

54. Deserters & Defectors ACFG

+

Remove up to 2 Guerrillas or replace them with any other Factions’

+

available Guerrillas.

+

AUC ranks contained numerous FARC deserters, because of the

+

harsh discipline imposed by the FARC and because the AUC of-

+

fered protection from retaliation by former comrades. (RAND p56)

+

Castaño in 2000 claimed 800 ex-leftist guerrillas among his forces.

+

One such defector from the FARC led the rightist Bloque Norte y

+

Anorí. The AUC also offered monthly wages to unemployed youth

+

who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they would

+

serve as AUC troops. (Hristov pp71,88,96,106)

+

55. DEA Agents CGFA

+

Law enforcement assistance: Remove a Shipment and any 5 Cartels

+

Guerrillas.

+

Más Yanquis: In 3 spaces with Cartels pieces, shift 1 level toward

+

Active Opposition.

+

Colombian-US counternarcotics cooperation thrived from the mid-

+

1990s on, especially via the US Drug Enforcement Administration.

+

Some regard the takedown of the Cali Cartel during this period as

+

the DEA’s greatest victory. The relationship was not without its

+

political frictions, though, including a struggle under Samper over

+

how much control the Colombians would have over DEA activities

+

in the country. Exaggeration in Colombian media may have added

+

to the tension: the press in 1995 reported the presence of more than

+

500 DEA agents in Cali alone, even though the agency in reality

+

had no more than 2 or 3 agents there at a time. (Chepesiuk pp201-

+

202,272)

+

56. Drogas La Rebaja CGFA

+

Cali cartel’s drugstore chain seized: Transfer 9 Resources from

+

Cartels to Government.

+

Retail empire: Add twice Cartels pieces in Cities to Cartels Re-

+

sources. Then place a Cartels Base in each of 2 Cities.

+

The Cali Cartel’s Rodríguez brothers used their cocaine profits

+

to build a semi-legal business empire, the heart of which was the

+

Drogas La Rebaja drugstore chain. The Government in 2004 seized

+

the 400-store chain, breaking the back of that cartel’s finances.

+

(Chepesiuk pp68-69,259)

+

57. Op Millennium CGFA

+

Colombian-US strike at Bernal syndicate: Replace up to 3 Cartels

+

pieces with available Police.

+

Investigation penetrated: In each of 2 spaces, replace a Police with

+

an available Cartels piece.

+

After dismembering the Medellín and Cali cartels, Colombian and

+

US authorities pressed ahead with joint efforts to capture leaders

+

of the surviving, decentralized “cartelitos”. Operation Millenium

+

in 1999 netted drug group leader Alejandro Bernal and previously

+

released Medellín Cartel co-founder Fabio Ochoa. But an estimated

+

several hundred small cartels remained, into which Colombian po-

+

lice and the US DEA had little insight. (Chepesiuk pp241,276-277;

+

RAND pp15-16)

+

58. General Serrano CGAF

+

National Police hammer cartels: Cartels Resources –6. Remove all

+

Cartels Guerrillas.

+

Officials on cartel payroll: Cartels relocate up to 4 Police to any

+

spaces.

+

Colombian police—traditionally seen as corrupt, and many of whose

+

members were at the service of the Cali Cartel—in the mid-1990s

+

effectively declared war against drug traffickers. (Camacho-López

+

p79) Studious and tough Policía Nacional chief General Rosso José

+

Serrano Cadena cleaned house and from late 1994 on led the as-

+

sault on the Cali Cartel, in close alliance with the US. (Chepesiuk

+

pp xxi,192-197)

+

59. Salcedo CGAF

+

Cartel informant: All Cartels Guerrillas to Active. Free Assault

+

against Cartels in each space.

+

Cali cartel security chief: Cartels flip all their Guerrillas Under-

+

ground and relocate up to 3 of them anywhere.

+

Jorge Salcedo was a key member of the Cali Cartel’s intelligence

+

and security team—the talented, charismatic son of a Colombian

+

general, he had military training, counterinsurgency field experience,

+

excellent computer skills, and fluent English. Turned informant

+

by US enforcement authorities, Salcedo opened a window on Cali

+

Cartel operations and enabled the capture of its leaders. (Chepesiuk

+

pp137-138,212-219)

+

60. The Chess Player CGAF

+

Kingpin strategy scores: Remove all Cartels pieces from 2 Cities

+

or 1 Dept. Govt Resources +6.

+

Cali’s Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela expands empire: Cartels place

+

an available Base in each of 2 Cities and free Bribe in 1 space.

+

Less violent than Medellín’s Pablo Escobar, Cali Cartel co-found-

+

ers Gilberto (“The Chess Player”—cartel strategic planner) and

+

Miguel (“El Señor”—cartel boss) Rodríguez Orejuela only became

+

a Government priority after Escobar’s death in late 1993 and a drug

+

financing scandal reached the Presidency of Ernesto Samper in 1994.

+

A Colombian-US strategy of combining leads and focusing resources

+

on capturing cartel leaders netted the Rodríguez brothers’ arrests by

+

1996 and extradition to the US by 2005. (Camacho-López pp78-79;

+

Chepesiuk, pp xxi,22-23,68,95,202,269-270)

+

61. Air Bridge CFGA

+

Peruvian coca supply controlled: Remove all Cartels pieces from

+

1 City. Cartels Resources –6.

+

Colombian coca growers fill Peruvian void: Place 1 Cartels Base

+

into each of 3 Depts with no Cartels pieces.

+

Traditionally, the bulk of coca processed into cocaine in Colombia

+

had been grown in Peru and Bolivia. An “air-bridge” strategy of

+

US-Peruvian interdiction of coca deliveries into Colombia denied

+

Colombian traffickers most of this central-Andean crop—with the

+

unintended effect of encouraging coca cultivation inside Colombia.

+

Between 1995 and 1999, Colombia became the center of all stages

+

of cocaine production, from harvest to delivery. (RAND pp12,20-21;

+

Camacho-López pp 82-83)

+
+ +
+

40

+

Andean Abyss

+

66. Tingo María CFAG

+

Coca crop fails: Remove 3 Cartels Bases from Forest.

+

Hearty coca variety: Within stacking, place an available Cartels

+

Base into each Forest that already has one.

+

Under pressure from the Government’s coca eradication spraying

+

to shift cultivation to less ideal terrain, growers adapted by devel-

+

oping new varieties of the coca plant. One such variety, the Tingo

+

María, would produce 3 times as much coca as the traditional plant.

+

(RAND p66)

+

67. Mexican Traffickers CAGF

+

Major shipment busted en route: Cartels Resources –10.

+

INSURGENT MOMENTUM

+

New routes to US market: This Resources phase, Cartels add Re-

+

sources equal to 4 x Bases.

+

The Cali Cartel had relied on its own delivery networks to get cocaine

+

to US market. Disruption of that cartel’s distribution routes through

+

the Caribbean and the dismantling of the Cartel itself in 1995-1996

+

created opportunities for Mexican traffickers to provide Colombian

+

wholesalers with delivery and retailing services. Already prior to

+

Op Millenium, the Colombian Bernal group was working with a

+

Mexican Ciudad Juárez-based cartel to deliver 20-30 tons of cocaine

+

monthly to the United States. Mexicans soon came to dominate US

+

cocaine distribution with more extensive and efficient networks.

+

(Camacho-López p83; Chepesiuk p278; RAND p15)

+

68. Narco-Subs CAGF

+

Submersibles seized: Remove from coastal spaces 2 Cartels pieces

+

or up to 2 Shipments.

+

Littoral stealth: Cartels Resources +2 per Cartels piece in coastal

+

spaces.

+

A predawn Colombian police raid on a Bogotá warehouse in 2000

+

discovered a 100-foot submarine under construction, a joint proj-

+

ect between a Colombian cartel and the Russian mob, intended to

+

smuggle tons of narcotics. (Chepesiuk pp227-8)

+

69. Riverines & Fast Boats CAGF

+

Move any of your cubes or Guerrillas from 1 space through a chain

+

of up to 3 adjacent Depts. You then may execute a free Op other

+

than Patrol or March within the final space.

+

Colombia features two major river valleys—the Magdalena and

+

the Cauca—running south-to-north along the Andes, numerous

+

major rivers draining the eastern plains into the Amazon, and both

+

Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In all, 18,000km of navigable rivers in

+

Colombia serve as highways for Government forces, guerrillas,

+

62. Amazonía CFGA

+

Brasília’s Op Cobra blocks border: Remove up to 3 Insurgent pieces

+

from 0 Population Forests.

+

Jungle landing strips: Place 1 Cartels Base each in Guainía, Vaupés,

+

and Amazonas.

+

The lowlands of eastern Colombia, comprising 60 percent of national

+

territory but only 4 percent of population, formed a vast hinterland

+

vacuum for illegal groups to fill. Government pressure in the late

+

1990s and early 2000s pushed these groups—coca growers and

+

FARC alike—ever deeper into jungle sanctuaries. Brazil shared an

+

interest with Colombia in controlling their vast Amazonian frontier.

+

So it sought to block the daily clandestine flights between Colombia

+

and its airspace and, with Colombian authorities, dismantled numer-

+

ous jungle landing strips near the border. In 2000, it launched its

+

3-year Operation Cobra to augment its border presence with the

+

deployment of 6,000 Brazilian troops to the region. (Marks p129;

+

RAND pp66,90-91)

+

63. Narco-War CFGA

+

Rival syndicates go for the throat: In each space with Cartels Guer-

+

rillas, remove all but 1; Cartels conduct free Terror with that 1. Mark

+

Cartels Ineligible through next card.

+

Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel in 1993 fell into a tit-for-tat ter-

+

ror battle with a vigilante group (“los pepes”) backed by the Cali

+

Cartel—a narco-war that played a substantial role in Escobar’s fall.

+

(Chepesiuk pp139-142) Fighting among cartels as of the late 1990s

+

remained a major cause of the country’s 30,000 murders annually.

+

(RAND p17)

+

64. Cocaine Labs CFAG

+

FARC taps suppliers: Place a Shipment with a FARC Guerrilla in

+

the same space as a Cartels Base.

+

Well-oiled industry: For each Cartels Base, Cartels Resources +2 if

+

in City, +1 if in Dept.

+

Colombia’s illicit drug industry built on a long tradition of Latin

+

American smuggling. It initially required only the investment in

+

urban laboratories to process rural crop into cocaine and heroin.

+

Over decades, cartels built up into large-scale enterprises. The

+

Cali Cartel boasted safe houses strategically spread across the city

+

and an intelligence network of hotel clerks, corrupt police, street

+

vendors, and 5,000 taxi drivers. With the breakup of the big urban

+

cartels in the mid-1990s, profits declined, but the industry continued.

+

(Camacho-López pp61,64-67,82-84; Chepesiuk pp203-204) The

+

FARC helped fill any vacuum. For a fee, it would protect cocaine

+

laboratories and landing strips, transport precursor chemicals, or

+

ship finished cocaine. (RAND pp32-33)

+

65. Poppies CFAG

+

Growers and Government eradication focus on heroin source:

+

Place or remove 1 Shipment or Insurgent Base in any Mountain

+

Department.

+

Colombia in the 1990s became the Western Hemisphere’s largest

+

producer of opium poppies and refined heroin (though Asia produced

+

far more), with an estimated 7,500 hectares under poppy cultiva-

+

tion as of 1999. Locals in coffee-growing regions had responded

+

to a precipitous drop in coffee prices by switching to poppies, and

+

the Government quickly responded with aerial spraying. (RAND

+

pp12-13; Chepesiuk p27; Hristov p191)

+
+ +
+

41

+

Andean Abyss

+

and drug shipments. To exploit and control these waterways, the

+

Government with US support in 1999 established a riverine brigade

+

of 5 battalions spread throughout the country. The AUC meanwhile

+

fielded large numbers of speedboats with mounted machineguns

+

for their war against the FARC. And on the coasts, Colombian

+

narcotraffickers and guerrillas used fast boats that outclassed those

+

available to regional navies. (RAND pp xix,33,65,86,97; Hristov

+

p190; Bruce-Hayes-Botero p90; Murillo p100)

+

70. Ayahuasca Tourism CAFG

+

Eco-tourism helps trade balance: Government Resources +6 for

+

each Forest without Guerrillas.

+

Eco-tourists taken: A Faction executes free Terror with any 1 Guer-

+

rilla in each Forest and gets +3 Resources per Terror.

+

Colombia hosts some of the most pristine rain forests in South

+

America, drawing a growing eco-tourist trade (locally known as

+

Ayahuasca tourism). Pharmaceutical companies have shown in-

+

creased interest in the Colombian forest for potential medicines. The

+

amazing variety of species also supports a thriving illegal export of

+

animals. (Ricks-Lightner pp12-13)

+

71. Darién CAFG

+

Arms traffic interdicted: Remove a Guerrilla from Chocó; its Faction

+

suffers –5 Resources.

+

Border sanctuary: Place 1-2 Bases in Panamá. It is a 0 Pop Forest.

+

Sweep does not Activate Guerrillas there.

+

Arms stockpiles from the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan civil wars of

+

the 1980s were a major source of weapons smuggled into Colombia.

+

Central American arms arrived in part via a network of 40-50 foot-

+

paths through the triple-canopy jungle of Panama’s Darién province

+

bordering Colombia. The same network served to smuggle drugs

+

in the opposite direction. The FARC reportedly maintained 2 bat-

+

talion-sized units and a major logistics and support base in Darién,

+

outgunning the Panamanians. (RAND pp35,36f,85-86)

+

72. Sicarios CAFG

+

Hired drug guns unreliable: Replace all Cartels Guerrillas in 2

+

spaces with other Guerrillas.

+

Unemployed ready to work for syndicates: Place all available Cartels

+

Guerrillas into spaces with Cartels Bases.

+

Colombia’s big drug traffickers and guerrilla groups created a

+

violent social type—the sicario: a poor youngster, mainly urban,

+

who for a sum of money would kill a cartel’s opponents. The M19

+

guerrilla group in the 1980s, before its demobilization, organized

+

and trained such poor urban youth, who later became gangsters for

+

hire to the highest bidder, typically the cartels. (Camacho-López

+

pp79-80) The AUC in turn offered monthly wages to unemployed

+

youth who had worked as sicarios for the drug organizations, if they

+

would serve as AUC troops. (Hristov p96) Finally, ex-AUC fight-

+

ers with few alternatives often became sicarios for drug traffickers.

+

(Hristov p155)

+

SELECTED SOURCES

+

(roughly, from Right to Left)

+

“Insights from Colombia’s ‘Prolonged War’” by Carlos Alberto

+

Ospina Ovalle, JFQ, issue 42, 3rd quarter 2006. The importance

+

of strategy, doctrine, and legitimacy in internal war, from the

+

architect of modern Colombian COIN.

+

“Colombia—Learning Institutions Enable Integrated Response”

+

by Thomas A. Marks, Prism 1, No.4, August 2010. How the

+

Colombian Army and Government learned COIN during the

+

period of the game and won against FARC and AUC.

+

Colombian Labyrinth—The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency

+

and Its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa

+

and Peter Chalk, RAND, 2001. From mid-period of the game,

+

a US view of how to win as the Government.

+

Colombia—Issues for Congress by June Beittel, Congressional

+

Research Service (CRS), March 2011. Looking back on prog-

+

ress in Colombian COIN and counter-narcotics, as assessed

+

for the US Congress.

+

Drug Lords—The Rise and Fall of the Cali Cartel by Ron

+

Chepesiuk, Milo Books Ltd, 2003. Focused on US assistance

+

to the Government in fighting the last flashy cartel.

+

Insurgency & Terrorism—From Revolution to Apocalypse by

+

Bard O’Neill, Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. Theoretical discus-

+

sion of insurgency and COIN, including the nature of egalitarian

+

(FARC), preservationist (AUC), and commercialist (Cartels)

+

insurgencies worldwide.

+

Colombia: d20—Guerilla Warfare by Tom Ricks and Ken

+

Lightner, Holistic Design Inc., 2003. Background for roleplay-

+

ing the Colombian conflict, including economic and cultural

+

aspects.

+

“From Smugglers to Drug Lords to Traquetos—Changes in

+

Illicit Colombian Drug Organizations” by Álvaro Camacho

+

Guizado and Andrés López Restrepo, Peace, Democracy, and

+

Human Rights in Colombia, University of Notre Dame Press,

+

2007. How the big cartels learned to decentralize and keep a

+

low profile.

+

Hostage Nation—Colombia’s Guerrilla Army and the Failed

+

War on Drugs by Victoria Bruce and Karin Hayes, with Jorge

+

Enrique Botero, Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. The stories of the most

+

famous FARC hostages of the Uribe period.

+

Colombia and the United States—War, Unrest and Destabiliza-

+

tion by Mario A. Murillo, Seven Stories Press, 2003. Discus-

+

sion of the development, nature, and capabilities of the AUC;

+

sees Government design in the formation and tolerance of the

+

paramilitaries.

+

Blood and Capital—The Paramilitarization of Colombia by

+

Jasmin Hristov, Ohio University Press, 2009. A catalogue of

+

human rights abuses by AUC and Army, pinned herein on class

+

interests and Government complicity.

+

Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia—The Origin and

+

Direction of the FARC-EP by James J. Brittain, Pluto Press,

+

2010. The Marxist view of the conflict and why FARC is

+

destined to win.

+
+ +
+

43

+

Andean Abyss

+

CREDITS

+

Game Design: Volko Ruhnke

+

Development: Joel Toppen

+

Art Director, Cover Art and Package De-

+

sign: Rodger B. MacGowan

+

Map and Counters: Chechu Nieto, Xavier

+

Carrascosa

+

Cards: Mark Simonitch and Chechu Nieto

+

Rules and Charts: Mark Simonitch and

+

Charles Kibler

+

Playtest: Solitaire Aces—Steve Caler, James

+

“Norbert” Stockdale, Todd Quinn; 2-Player

+

Remoras—Jeremy Antley, Mike Owens;

+

3-Player Home Front—Andrew Ruhnke,

+

Daniel Ruhnke; Cartels Kingpin—Darién

+

Fenoglio; Team Bogotá—Juan Francisco

+

Torres; Devil’s Advocates—Jeff Baker,

+

John Gitzen, Dan McGuire, Patrick Neary,

+

Joel Tamburo; Demo King—Mark Mitchell;

+

Guerrilleros—Paul Aceto, Wendell Al-

+

bright, Mike Bertucelli, Jeff Grossman, Igor

+

Horst, Michael Lessard, Fred Manzo, Tim

+

Porter, Stéphane Renard, Martin Sample,

+

Roger Taylor.

+

VASSAL Module: Joel Toppen

+

Images: 1st Division, Ospina & Mora,

+

High Mountain Battalions, Plan Meteoro,

+

Kill Zone, Soldados Campesinos, National

+

Coordination Center, Carabineros—Tom

+

Marks; Caño Limón-Coveñas—Sémhur;

+

Occidental & Ecopetrol—Pedro Filipe;

+

War Tax, Colombia Nueva —Julián Ortega

+

Martínez & equinoXio; DoD Contractors—P

+

Alejandro Diaz; Gramaje—Luis Acosta;

+

Hugo Chávez—Presidencia Argentina;

+

Peace Commission—Germán Cabrejo;

+

Secuestrados—Paola Vargas & equinoXio;

+

Former Military—TerceraInformacion.

+

es; Calima Front—La FM; Senado & Cá-

+

mara—Leandro Neumann Ciuffo; Pinto &

+

del Rosario—Louise Wolff; Unión Sindical

+

Obrera—Mennonot; Bloques—Silvia An-

+

drea Moreno; Castaño—Socialist Worker;

+

Criminal Air Force—Mabadia71; Deserters

+

& Defectors—John Jairo Bonilla; Drogas

+

La Rebaja—jthadeo; Amazonía—Navy of

+

Brazil; Narco-War—F3rn4nd0; Cocaine

+

Labs—Valter Campanato ABr; Tingo

+

María—H Zell; Darién—Christian Ziegler;

+

Sicarios—Luis Pérez.

+

Production Coordination: Tony Curtis

+

Producers: Tony Curtis, Rodger Mac-

+

Gowan, Andy Lewis, Gene Billingsley and

+

Mark Simonitch

+

GFAC

+

1. 1st Division

+

2. Ospina & Mora

+

3. Tapias

+

GFCA

+

4. Caño Limón - Coveñas

+

5. Occidental & Ecopetrol

+

6. Oil Spill

+

GAFC

+

7. 7th Special Forces

+

8. Fuerza Aérea Colombiana

+

9. High Mountain Battalions

+

GACF

+

10. Blackhawks

+

11. National Defense & Security Council

+

12. Plan Colombia

+

GCFA

+

13. Plan Meteoro

+

14. Tres Esquinas

+

15. War Tax

+

GCAF

+

16. Coffee Prices

+

17. Madrid Donors

+

18. NSPD-18

+

FGAC

+

19. General Offensive

+

20. Mono Jojoy

+

21. Raúl Reyes

+

FGCA

+

22. Alfonso Cano

+

23. DoD Contractors

+

24. Operación Jaque

+

FAGC

+

25. Ejército de Liberación Nacional

+

26. Gramaje

+

27. Misil Antiaéreo

+

FACG

+

28. Hugo Chávez

+

29. Kill Zone

+

30. Peace Commission

+

FCGA

+

31. Betancourt

+

32. Secuestrados

+

33. Sucumbíos

+

FCAG

+

34. Airdropped AKs

+

35. Crop Substitution

+

36. Zona de Convivencia

+

AGFC

+

37. Former Military

+

38. National Coordination Center

+

39. Soldados campesinos

+

AGCF

+

40. Demobilization

+

41. Mancuso

+

42. Senado & Cámara

+

AFGC

+

43. Calima Front

+

44. Colombia Nueva

+

45. Los Derechos Humanos

+

AFCG

+

46. Limpieza

+

47. Pinto & del Rosario

+

48. Unión Sindical Obrera

+

ACGF

+

49. Bloques

+

50. Carabineros

+

51. Pipeline Repairs

+

ACFG

+

52. Castaño

+

53. Criminal Air Force

+

54. Deserters & Defectors

+

CGFA

+

55. DEA Agents

+

56. Drogas La Rebaja

+

57. Op Millennium

+

CGAF

+

58. General Serrano

+

59. Salcedo

+

60. The Chess Player

+

CFGA

+

61. Air Bridge

+

62. Amazonía

+

63. Narco-War

+

CFAG

+

64. Cocaine Labs

+

65. Poppies

+

66. Tingo María

+

CAGF

+

67. Mexican Traffickers

+

68. Narco-Subs

+

69. Riverines & Fast Boats

+

CAFG

+

70. Ayahuasca Tourism

+

71. Darién

+

72. Sicarios

+

73-76. Propaganda!

+

CARD LIST

+
+ +
+

44

+

Andean Abyss

+

GMT Games, LLC

+

P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308

+

www.GMTGames.com

+

SPACES LIST

+

Cities

+

+

Pop

+

Bogotá & Villavicencio . . . . . . . . .

+

8

+

Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

3

+

Medellín. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

3

+

Bucaramanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

2

+

Ibagué & Pereira . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

2

+

Santa Marta & Barranquilla. . . . . .

+

2

+

Cartagena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Neiva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Sincelejo & Montería. . . . . . . . . . .

+

1

+

Total Population: 25

+

Departments

+

Type

+

Pop

+

Antioquia - Bolívar . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Huila - Tolima . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Santander - Boyacá . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .2

+

Arauca - Casanare . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

+

Atlántico - Magdalena . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Cesar - La Guajira . . . . . . . . . .Mtn. . . .1

+

Chocó - Córdoba . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Guaviare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Meta East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .1

+

Meta West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Nariño - Cauca. . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Putumayo - Caquetá . . . . . . .Forest. . .1

+

Amazonas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Guainía. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Vaupés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forest. . .0

+

Vichada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grass . . .0

+

Total Population: 15

+

Lines of Communication

+

Type Econ

+

Arauca - Cúcuta . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Cúcuta - Ayacucho . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Ayachucho - Sincelejo . . . . . . Pipe. . . .3

+

Bucaramanga - Ayacucho. . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Ayacucho - Barranquilla . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Medellín - Sincelejo. . . . . . . . Pipe . . .2

+

Neiva - Bogotá. . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Yopal - Bogotá . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .2

+

Bogotá-Ibagué-Bucaramanga Pipe. . . .2

+

Cartagena - Sincelejo. . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Medellín - Ibagué. . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Ibagué - Cali. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Cali - Buenaventura . . . . . . . . Pipe. . . .1

+

Cartagena - Barranquilla . . . . Road . . .1

+

Bogotá - San José. . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Cali - Pasto. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Neiva - Pasto . . . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Pasto - Tumaco. . . . . . . . . . . . Road . . .1

+

Total Economic Value: 30

+
+ + diff --git a/info/playbook1.jpg b/info/playbook1.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccb0dbf Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook1.jpg differ diff --git a/info/playbook1.png b/info/playbook1.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d65af8 Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook1.png differ diff --git a/info/playbook15.jpg b/info/playbook15.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d40f9b2 Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook15.jpg differ diff --git a/info/playbook15.png b/info/playbook15.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8033ce Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook15.png differ diff --git a/info/playbook16.jpg b/info/playbook16.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b33a615 Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook16.jpg differ diff --git a/info/playbook16.png b/info/playbook16.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..135c81b Binary files /dev/null and b/info/playbook16.png differ diff --git a/info/playbook17.jpg b/info/playbook17.jpg new file mode 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+

R U L E S O F P L AY

+

SECOND EDITION

+

by Volko Ruhnke

+

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

+ +

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

2. Sequence of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

3. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

4. Special Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

5. Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

6. Propaganda Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

7. Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

8. Non-Player Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

Key Terms Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+

Available Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+ +

2

+

5

+

6

+

8

+

10

+

10

+

12

+

12

+

19

+

20

+ +

© 2018 GMT Games, LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com

+
+
+

2

+

Andean Abyss

+

1.0 INTRODUCTION

+

Andean Abyss is a 1-4-player game depicting insurgent and

+

counterinsurgent (COIN) conflict in Colombia during the 1990s

+

and early 2000s. Each player takes the role of a Faction seek-

+

ing to run Colombian affairs: the Government (Govt) or 1 of 3

+

Insurgent Factions—the Marxist FARC, the right-wing AUC

+

“paramilitaries”, or the narco-trafficking Cartels. Using military,

+

political, and economic actions and exploiting various events,

+

players build and maneuver forces to influence the population,

+

extract resources, or otherwise achieve their Faction’s aims. A

+

deck of cards regulates turn order, events, victory checks, and

+

other processes. The rules can run non-player Factions, enabling

+

solitaire, 2-player, or multi-player games.

+

Andean Abyss is the inaugural volume in the COIN Series of

+

games that use similar rules to cover a variety of insurgencies and

+

other inter-factional conflicts. This Second Edition extensively

+

alters and augments rules and play aids throughout to bring this

+

volume up to date within the Series. Updated cards are marked

+

“2nd Ed”.

+

This rule book lists and defines key game terms in an index on

+

pages 19-20. The most important game functions are summarized

+

on several aid sheets. Game setup is explained on the flip side of

+

the Sequence of Play aid sheet.

+

1.1 General Course of Play

+

Andean Abyss—unlike most card-assisted war games—does not

+

use hands of cards. Instead, cards are played from the deck one at

+

time, with one card ahead revealed to all players. Each Event card

+

shows the order in which the Factions become Eligible to choose

+

between the card’s Event or one of a menu of Operations and

+

Special Activities. Executing an Event or Operation carries the

+

penalty of rendering that Faction Ineligible to do so on the next

+

card. Propaganda cards mixed in with the Event cards provide

+

periodic opportunities for instant wins and for activities such as

+

collecting resources and influencing popular sympathies.

+

1.2 Components

+

A complete set of Andean Abyss includes:

+

• A 22”x34” mounted game board.

+

• A deck of 76 cards.

+

• 153 dark and light blue, red, green, and yellow wooden forces

+

pieces, some embossed (1.4; see “Available Forces” on the rule

+

book’s back for a complete listing).

+

• 8 cylinders, embossed (1.7, 2.2).

+

• 6 black and 6 white pawns (3.1.1).

+

• A sheet of markers.

+

• 2 Sequence of Play and Setup sheets.

+

• 4 Faction player aid foldouts.

+

• 1 Non-player Insurgents flowcharts foldout.

+

• 1 Non-player aid foldout with Government flowchart.

+

• 3 6-sided dice: 1 red, 1 yellow, 1 green.

+

• A background Playbook.

+

• This rule book.

+

1.3 The Map

+

The map shows the country of Colombia divided into various

+

types of spaces, as well as parts of neighboring countries.

+

1.3.1 Map Spaces. Map spaces include rural Departments

+

(Depts), urban Cities, and Lines of Communication (LoCs)

+

between them. All spaces—including LoCs—can hold forces.

+

Mountain Department

+

(Dept)

+

Line of Communication

+

(Pipeline)

+

City

+

Grassland Department

+

Forest Department

+

Town

+

Department Boundary

+

Department Name

+

Population Value

+

Place bases here

+

At Start set up

+

Line of Communication

+

(Road)

+

Place Terror markers here

+

Place Support and Opposition

+

markers here

+
+
+

3

+

Andean Abyss

+

1.3.2 Departments. Each Department shows a Population value

+

(Pop) of 0, 1, or 2 that affects victory via Support for or Oppo-

+

sition to the Government (1.6) and some Insurgent Operations

+

(3.3). Departments are further distinguished by terrain as Tropical

+

Forest (Forest), Mountain, or Grassland, affecting some COIN

+

Operations (3.2) and Events (5.0).

+

1.3.3 Cities. Each City similarly shows a Population value of 1

+

to 8 (each Population value representing a million Colombians).

+

1.3.4 LoCs. Each Line of Communication (LoC) shows an Eco-

+

nomic value (Econ) of 1 to 3 that affects Government Resources

+

(1.7). LoCs are further distinguished as Roads or Pipelines.

+

Pipelines tend to have higher Economic value and affect certain

+

Events.

+

DESIGN NOTE: LoCs also represent other transportation ar-

+

teries and infrastructure such as power lines that parallel roads

+

and pipelines.

+

1.3.5 Foreign Countries. The map includes parts of Brazil (Bra-

+

sil), Ecuador, Panamá, Perú, and Venezuela. They are not spaces

+

(1.3.1) unless and until specified by Event (5.0).

+

EXAMPLE: The “Darién” Event renders Panamá a 0 Population

+

Forest Department for all purposes, except that Sweep Opera-

+

tions do not Activate Guerrillas there (3.2.3).

+

NOTE: Venezuela is next to Guainía but not Vaupés, affecting

+

the “Hugo Chávez” Event.

+

1.3.6 Adjacency. Adjacency affects the movement of forces and

+

implementation of certain Events. Any 2 spaces meeting one of

+

the following conditions are adjacent:

+

• Spaces that border on (touch) one another.

+

• Departments separated by LoCs.

+

• LoCs or Departments separated by Towns.

+

NOTE: Towns are not spaces; they merely separate LoCs or

+

Departments.

+

1.3.7 Coasts. Spaces adjacent to blue areas are coastal, affecting

+

the “Narco-Subs” Event.

+

1.4 Forces

+

The wooden pieces represent the Factions’ various forces: Gov-

+

ernment Troops (dark-blue cubes) and Police (light-blue cubes),

+

Insurgent Guerrillas, and all Factions’ Bases.

+

Government Cubes:

+

FARC

+

Guerrillas:

+

Bases:

+

Troops

+

Police

+

Underground

+

Active

+

AUC

+

Cartels

+

Use to mark City and

+

Department Control (1.8)

+

Use to mark FARC Zones

+

(6.4.4)

+

Govt Capa-

+

bilities

+

Use on the Edge Track:

+

Victory-related and Aid markers

+

Use on the Propa-

+

ganda Track

+

Support and Opposition markers

+

(1.6.2)

+

Terror

+

(3.3.4)

+

Event Reminder

+

markers

+

Sabotage

+

(3.3.4)

+

Drug Shipment

+

Overflow marker

+

TYPES OF FORCES

+

ADJACENCY EXAMPLE: The 4 Departments and 4 LoCs around

+

the Town of Ayacucho are all adjacent to each other because they

+

are separated by a Town. Antioquia and the Forest Department

+

to the west are adjacent because they are separated by a LoC.

+

FARC

+

Govern-

+

ment

+
+
+

4

+

Andean Abyss

+

• With 3 players, AUC runs the Cartels.

+

• With 2 players, Government runs AUC; FARC runs the Cartels.

+

A player running two Factions uses the lower victory margin of

+

the two (7.1-.3) and only causes play to end on a victory check

+

(6.1) if both Factions are meeting their conditions. Players may

+

not voluntarily transfer (1.5.2) between their own Factions.

+

Non-Player Option: If playing solitaire, or as an alternative

+

to the above with two or three players, use the Non-player

+

rules in section 8 to govern leftover Factions:

+

1.5.2 Negotiation. Players may make any mutual arrangements

+

within the rules but may voluntarily transfer only Resources (1.7)

+

or Shipments (4.5.3) and only during either’s execution by the

+

Sequence of Play (2.3.4) of an Operation or Event. All negoti-

+

ations are open. The rules do not bind players to agreements.

+

1.6 Support and Opposition

+

Support and Opposition affect victory and some Operations.

+

1.6.1 Cities and Departments with at least 1 Population (1.3.2-3)

+

always show 1 of 5 levels of its populace’s Support for or Oppo-

+

sition to the Government that can shift during play:

+

• Active Support.

+

• Passive Support.

+

• Neutral.

+

• Passive Opposition.

+

• Active Opposition.

+

1.6.2 Show Active or Passive Support or Opposition with mark-

+

ers placed in each City or Department. Show Neutral spaces by

+

the absence of such markers. Active Support/Opposition counts

+

double for Total Support/Opposition (1.6.3).

+

NOTE: LoCs (1.3.4) and Population 0 Departments never hold

+

Support or Opposition markers (they are always Neutral).

+

1.6.3 Total Support and Total Opposi-

+

tion. Government or FARC victory de-

+

pends on the total value of population

+

Support or Opposition (plus FARC Bases,

+

7.2), respectively. Adjust “Total Support” or “Opposi-

+

tion + Bases” on the numbered edge track per the box

+

below as any change to Support, Opposition, or the

+

number of FARC Bases occurs.

+

Total Support and Opposition Equations

+

Total Support equals:

+

(2 x Population in Active Support) + (1 x Population in Passive

+

Support)

+

Total Opposition equals:

+

(2 x Population in Active Opposition) + (1 x Population in

+

Passive Opposition)

+

Opposition + Bases equals:

+

Total Opposition + The number of FARC Bases on the map

+

DESIGN NOTE: Bases represent not only training and bivouac

+

facilities but also, for the Insurgents, political administration as

+

well as coca or poppy fields and processing labs.

+

PLAY NOTE: Use “Overflow” boxes for Forces that exceed the

+

room in a City or smaller Department on the map; place the

+

corresponding Overflow marker in that space.

+

1.4.1 Availability and Removal. The inventory shown on the

+

“Available Forces” chart on the back of this rule book limits the

+

number of pieces that may be in play. Keep forces not on the

+

map in the Available Forces holding areas. (Place Bases in the

+

highest-numbered empty circles, revealing the number of on-map

+

Bases to help track victory, 7.0)

+

• Forces may only be placed from or replaced with those avail-

+

able in the holding areas—ignore any instructions to place

+

forces if the appropriate type is not available because all are

+

already on the map (remove rather than replace such pieces;

+

see also next bullet).

+

• Important: A player Faction while executing an Operation or

+

Event by the Sequence of Play (2.3.4, 3.0, 5.0), may remove

+

its own pieces to Available Forces. EXAMPLE: Insurgents

+

without Available Guerrillas could remove Guerrillas during

+

a Rally (3.3.1) in order to place them Underground.

+

• Once an enemy Faction is targeted, removal or Activation

+

of pieces to the extent of the executing Faction’s ability is

+

required. EXAMPLE: A Government Assault (3.2.4) with 3

+

Troops in Forest must remove 3 Active pieces if there are at

+

least that many among those Factions targeted.

+

1.4.2 Stacking. No more than 2 Bases (regardless of Faction)

+

may occupy a single Department or City. Bases may not occupy

+

LoCs. Government forces may not occupy a FARC Zone (6.4.4).

+

(See also the “Sucumbíos” Event regarding Ecuador.) Ignore any

+

instructions (such as from Operations or Events) to place or move

+

forces if stacking would be violated. Except as noted above, any

+

number of Government cubes and Guerrillas may occupy a space.

+

1.4.3 Underground/Active. Guerrillas are either

+

Underground—symbol end down—or Ac-

+

tive-symbol end up. Certain actions and Events

+

flip them from one to the other state. Bases, Troops, and Police

+

are always Active. Always set up and place new Guerrillas Un-

+

derground (including if replacing a piece).

+

NOTE: Unless instructions specify “Underground” Guerrilla,

+

it is sufficient to “Activate” already Active Guerrillas (they stay

+

Active).

+

1.5 Players & Factions

+

Andean Abyss is playable by 1-4 players. The 1st player plays

+

the Government (blue), the 2nd the FARC (red), the 3rd the AUC

+

(yellow), and the 4th the Cartels (green) (2.1). (If preferred, the

+

3rd player in a 3-player game can play Cartels instead of AUC.)

+

Each of these Factions is enemy to all others. Leftover Factions

+

are Non-Player; their actions are governed by rules section 8.

+

See the Playbook for a Role Summary of each Faction.

+

1.5.1 Spare Factions. With two or three players, the players run

+

leftover Factions:

+
+
+

5

+

Andean Abyss

+

1.7 Resources and Aid

+

At any moment, each Faction has between 0 and 99

+

Resources that it uses to pay for Operations (3.0).

+

During some Propaganda Rounds (6.3.1) and

+

Events, a level of Aid (between 0 and 29) adds to

+

Government Resources. Mark Resources and Aid on the edge

+

track—for Resources, with a cylinder of the Faction’s color (1.5).

+

1.8 Control

+

+

The Government Controls a City or

+

Department if its pieces alone exceed

+

those of all other Factions combined. In

+

the same way, FARC Controls a City or

+

Department if its pieces alone exceed those of all other Factions

+

combined. Cities or Departments that are not Controlled by either

+

the Government or FARC are Uncontrolled. As helpful, place

+

appropriate Control markers on spaces as reminders.

+

PLAY NOTE: Control mainly affects Propaganda Round (6.2-6.5)

+

and some Non-player Government actions (section 8).

+

DESIGN NOTE: “FARC Control” of a City might not represent

+

complete military control of a major urban area but rather suf-

+

ficient presence to inhibit commerce and encourage resistance

+

to government authority.

+

2.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY

+

2.1 Set Up

+

Follow the instructions onthe flip side of the Sequence of Play

+

aid sheet to decide upon various play options, assign Factions to

+

players, prepare the deck, and set up markers and forces.

+

2.2 Start

+

Begin play by revealing the top card of the draw deck and placing

+

it onto a played cards pile. Then reveal the next card on top of

+

the draw deck. The card on the played card stack is played first;

+

the card on top of the draw deck will be played next. NOTE:

+

Players will see 1 card ahead into the deck. All played cards

+

and the number of cards in the draw deck are open to inspection.

+

RECORD STEPS: As the steps of each Event card play are

+

completed, place a cylinder of the Faction’s color (1.5) into the

+

Sequence of Play track’s appropriate box (or, for Propaganda

+

Rounds [6.0], advance the Prop Card marker).

+

2.3 Event Card

+

When playing an Event card, up to 2 Factions will execute Opera-

+

tions or the Event; other Factions may Pass and collect Resources.

+

• Factions whose cylinder is in the “Eligible” box receive these

+

options in the left-to-right order of the Faction symbols shown

+

at the top of the card.

+

• Factions with cylinders in the “Ineligible” box do nothing.

+

2.3.1 Eligibility. Factions that did not execute an Operation or

+

Event on the previous card are Eligible (their cylinders will start

+

the card in the “Eligible” box per 2.3.7). Factions that did are

+

Ineligible. (All Factions start the game Eligible.) See also Free

+

Operations, 3.1.2.

+

2.3.2 Faction Order. The Eligible Faction with the leftmost

+

symbol in its color (skipping any Ineligible Factions) is the 1st

+

Eligible to execute an Operation or Event or to Pass. The next

+

leftmost is the 2nd Eligible.

+

Faction

+

Order

+

NOTE: The gray 2 symbol and “2nd: Ops” on some cards affect

+

Non-player choices (8.1)—ignore them unless using Non-players.

+

2.3.3 Passing. If a 1st or 2nd Eligible Faction opts to Pass, it

+

receives +1 Resources (or +3 Resources if Government) and

+

remains Eligible for the next card. The next leftmost Eligible

+

Faction then replaces the Passing Faction as the new 1st or 2nd

+

Eligible Faction and receives the same options to execute or Pass.

+

If the last (rightmost) Eligible Faction Passes, adjust cylinders

+

(2.3.7) and play the next card.

+

2.3.4 Options for Eligible Factions.

+

FIRST ELIGIBLE: If the 1st Eligible Faction does not Pass

+

(2.3.3), it may execute either:

+

• An Operation (3.0)—with or without a Special Activity (4.0)—or

+

• The Event shown on the card.

+

OPTIONS FOR 2ND ELIGIBLE: If the 2nd Eligible Faction

+

does not Pass (2.3.3), it also may execute an Operation and pos-

+

sibly the Event, but its options depend on what the 1st Eligible

+

Faction executed:

+

• Op Only: If the 1st Eligible Faction executed an Operation, the

+

2nd Eligible Faction may execute a Limited Operation (2.3.5).

+

• Op & Special Activity: If the 1st Eligible Faction executed an

+

Operation with a Special Activity, the 2nd Eligible Faction

+

may execute either a Limited Operation or the Event. (see also

+

Final Event Card, 2.3.9).

+

• Event: If the 1st Eligible Faction executed the Event, the 2nd

+

Eligible Faction may execute an Operation, with a Special

+

Activity if desired.

+

NOTE: For ease of reference, these options are illustrated on the

+

Sequence of Play aid sheet and on the game board.

+

2.3.5 Limited Operation. A Limited Operation (LimOp) is a

+

player Operation in just 1 space, with no Special Activity. If the

+

Limited Operation is a Patrol (3.2.2), Sweep (3.2.3), or March

+

(3.3.2), it can involve pieces from multiple spaces but only 1 des-

+

tination space. A Limited Operation counts as an Operation. See

+

also Final Event Card (2.3.9) and Non-player Operations (8.1).

+

2.3.6 Ship. Whenever a 1st or 2nd Eligible player Faction pays

+

Resources to execute an Operation (including a Limited Oper-

+

ation, 2.3.5) but executes no Special Activity, it may remove a

+

Shipment that it owns (4.5.3) to immediately execute an addition-

+

al, free, Limited Operation of any type. Alternatively, a different

+

Faction may remove its own Shipment to enable the 1st or 2nd

+

Eligible Faction to execute such a free Operation. A Faction may

+

only benefit from 1 such Shipment per card.

+
+
+

6

+

Andean Abyss

+

EXAMPLE: Cartels is 1st Eligible and executes a March, removes

+

a Shipment, then executes a Rally in 1 space at no Resource cost.

+

DESIGN NOTE: The added Op reflects proceeds from a major

+

drug deal greasing the skids.

+

2.3.7 Adjust Eligibility. After the 1st and 2nd Eligible Factions

+

complete all execution of Operations, Special Activities, and

+

Events (or after all Eligible Factions instead have Passed), adjust

+

cylinders on the Sequence of Play Track as follows:

+

• Move the cylinder to the “Eligible” box if the Faction did not

+

execute an Operation or Event (and not rendered Ineligible by

+

an Event).

+

• Move the cylinder to the “Ineligible” box if the Faction

+

executed an Operation (including a Limited Operation) or

+

Event (unless otherwise specified by the Event; see also Free

+

Operations, 3.1.2.).

+

2.3.8 Next Card. After adjusting Eligibility, move the draw

+

deck’s top card onto the played card pile face-up and reveal the

+

draw deck’s next card. Play the card on the played card pile,

+

proceeding with the appropriate sequence.

+

2.3.9 Final Event Card. On the last Event card before the final

+

Propaganda Card (2.4.1), any player Operations must be Limited

+

(2.3.5, no Special Activities) and may not include Sweep (3.2.3)

+

or March (3.3.2).

+

2.4 Propaganda Card

+

If playing a Propaganda Card, conduct a Propaganda Round (6.0).

+

2.4.1 Final Propaganda. If the 4th Propaganda card’s Round

+

is completed without a victory (6.1), the game ends: determine

+

victory by 7.3.

+

Short Game Option: Agree at set up that the 3rd Propaganda

+

card’s Round will be the final round.

+

PLAY NOTE: Set aside Propaganda cards to show how many

+

have gone by. Each series of Event cards up to a Propaganda

+

Round is called a “Campaign”.

+

3.0 OPERATIONS

+

3.1 Operations in General

+

The Faction executing an Operation (Op) chooses 1 of the 4 Op-

+

erations listed on its Faction aid sheet and, if applicable, selects

+

the map spaces to be involved. The Faction usually pays a cost

+

in Resources (not Aid, 1.7), often per space selected; it must

+

have enough Resources to pay for the Operation, including in

+

each selected space. Select a given space only once for a given

+

Operation.

+

The executing Faction chooses the order of the spaces in which

+

the Operation is resolved, the enemy Factions or pieces to be

+

affected (targeted), and the friendly pieces to be placed or re-

+

placed. A single Operation may target one or more Factions and

+

ignore others. Once targeted, a Faction’s pieces are affected to

+

the maximum extent possible (1.4.1).

+

NOTE: Players pay for Operations space by space as they go,

+

enabling Insurgents at 0 Resources to Extort, Kidnap, or Process

+

to add Resources and then pay for additional Operations spaces.

+

(See 4.1 and its EXAMPLE).

+

3.1.1 Pawns. Players may mark spaces selected for Operations

+

(3.0) with white pawns and Special Activities (4.0) with black

+

pawns. (The pawns are for convenience, not a limit on the number

+

of spaces that may be selected.)

+

3.1.2 Free Operations. Certain Events (5.5), phases (6.4.5), or

+

Shipping drugs (2.3.6) grant free Operations or Special Activities:

+

they cost no Resources and, if executed by a Faction other than

+

the one playing an Event, could leave it Eligible (2.3.7). Other

+

requirements and procedures still apply unless trumped by Event

+

text (5.1.1, 5.5.).

+

3.2 COIN Operations

+

The Government chooses from Train, Patrol, Sweep, and

+

Assault Operations. Note: The Government may never place or

+

move its pieces into FARC Zones; see 6.4.4.

+

3.2.1 Train. Training Operations augment Government forces

+

and possibly build Support (1.6). Select any Departments or

+

Cities and pay 3 Resources per selected space.

+

PROCEDURE: First, in each selected Department with a Gov-

+

ernment Base AND in each selected City, place up to 6 cubes

+

(any combination of Available Troops and Police). Then, in up

+

to 1 selected space, either:

+

• Replace any 3 cubes with 1 Government Base (within

+

stacking,1.4.2), OR

+

• Conduct Civic Action (6.4.1) to build Support. As during the

+

Support Phase, the Government must have Troops, Police, and

+

Control (a majority of forces, 1.8) in the space and must pay

+

added Resources per 6.4.1 (even if Training was free).

+

3.2.2 Patrol. Patrol Operations protect LoCs by moving Troops

+

or Police onto them and finding and removing Guerrillas there.

+

Pay 3 Resources total (not per space). If a Limited Operation

+

(2.3.5), all moving cubes must end on a single destination space.

+

PROCEDURE: Move any number of cubes from any spaces.

+

Each cube may move into any adjacent LoC or City (1.3.6)

+

and may keep entering adjacent LoCs or Cities until the player

+

chooses to stop moving it or it enters a space containing 1 or more

+

Guerrillas. Then, in each LoC (even if a LimOp, and whether or

+

not a cube just moved there), Activate 1 Guerrilla for each cube

+

there. Then, if desired, conduct an Assault (3.2.4) in 1 LoC at

+

no added cost. If a Limited Operation (2.3.5), the Assault must

+

be in the destination LoC.

+

3.2.3 Sweep. Sweep Operations move Troops (typically, into

+

contested areas) and locate enemy Guerrillas. Select any Cities

+

or Departments as destinations (not FARC Zones, 6.4.4). Pay 3

+

Resources per space selected. Sweep is not allowed on the final

+

Event card (2.3.9).

+

PROCEDURE: First, simultaneously move any adjacent Troops

+

desired into selected spaces. In addition, Troops may first move

+
+
+

7

+

Andean Abyss

+

onto adjacent LoCs (1.3.6) that are free of Guerrillas and then

+

into adjacent spaces. (Any Troops that move must reach spaces

+

paid for as destinations.)

+

• Then, in selected spaces other than Forest, Activate 1 Guerrilla

+

(1.4.3) for each cube there (Police plus Troops, whether they

+

just moved or were already there).

+

• In Forest spaces, Activate only 1 Guerrilla for every 2 cubes

+

(round odd cubes down).

+

NOTE: Sweeps do not have to both move Troops and Activate

+

Guerrillas; they may move where no Guerrillas and may simply

+

Activate Guerrillas in place.

+

EXAMPLE: The Government selects Cesar-La Guajira Depart-

+

ment for a Sweep. There are no Guerrillas on any LoCs. Troops

+

could move from Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, and Sincelejo to the

+

LoCs south of Baranquilla and from there into Cesar. Troops

+

already in Baranquilla or any of the 3 Departments or 4 LoCs

+

adjacent to Cesar also could enter Cesar.

+

3.2.4 Assault. Assault Operations eliminate Insurgent forces.

+

Select any spaces and pay 3 Resources per space selected.

+

PROCEDURE: In each selected space, remove 1 Active Guerrilla

+

(1.4.3) for each Troops cube there. Once a targeted Faction has

+

no Guerrillas in the space, remove its Bases instead.

+

• In a City or LoC, also remove 1 enemy piece for each Police

+

cube there.

+

• In Mountain, instead remove only 1 piece for every 2 Troops

+

(rounded down).

+

DESIGN NOTE: Guerrillas are less militarily capable than

+

Government forces but enjoy an information advantage in that

+

Government Operations generally must first Sweep to Activate

+

(locate) them before Assaulting them.

+

NOTE: The Faction aid sheets use the phrase “Bases last” to

+

remind that an Operation cannot remove an enemy Base as long

+

as Guerrillas (Active or Underground), Troops, or Police of the

+

same Faction remain in the same space. Also, all of a Faction’s

+

Guerrillas in a space may be Underground, preventing further

+

removal via Assault of its pieces (including Bases) until the

+

Guerrillas are Activated.

+

3.2.5 Drug Bust. For each Shipment (4.5.3) removed by Assault,

+

add +6 to Aid (to a maximum of 29).

+

3.3 Insurgent Operations

+

Insurgent Factions (FARC, AUC, and Car-

+

tels) choose from Rally, March, Attack, and

+

Terror Operations.

+

Note that, on the Faction aid sheets under “Insurgent Operations”,

+

the terms “Guerrillas” and “Bases” mean those of the executing

+

Faction (friendly), unless otherwise specified.

+

3.3.1 Rally. Rally Operations augment or recover friendly

+

forces. Select any Departments or Cities. Pay 1 Resource per

+

space selected.

+

• FARC may only select Neutral or Opposition spaces, not those

+

with Support (1.6).

+

• AUC may only select Neutral or Support spaces, not those

+

with Opposition.

+

PROCEDURE: In each selected space, the executing Faction

+

places 1 of its Available Guerrillas or replaces 2 of its Guerrillas

+

with 1 of its Bases, within stacking (1.4.2). If the space already

+

has at least 1 of that Faction’s Bases, the Faction may instead

+

either:

+

• Place a number of its Available Guerrillas up to the number

+

of its Bases there plus the space’s Population value (1.3.2-.3)

+

OR

+

• Move any of its Guerrillas from any spaces on the map to

+

there and flip all its Guerrillas there Underground (whether

+

they moved or not) (1.4.3).

+

3.3.2 March. March Operations move friendly Guerrillas. Se-

+

lect any spaces as the origins of the moving Guerrillas. Pay 1

+

Resource per City or Department that Guerrillas move into (0

+

Resources to move onto LoCs). If a Limited Operation (2.3.5),

+

all moving Guerrillas must end in a single destination space.

+

Players may not March on the final Event card (2.3.9).

+

PROCEDURE: The executing Faction moves any of its Guerril-

+

las desired into adjacent spaces (1.3.6). No Guerrilla moves more

+

than once. Guerrillas moving from 1 space to another move as a

+

single group. Set Guerrillas of a moving group to Active (1.4.3) if:

+

• The destination space is a LoC or is a City or Department with

+

Support (1.6)—or, for AUC March, Support or Opposition—

+

AND

+

• The moving group’s number of Guerrillas plus the number

+

of cubes in the destination space exceeds 3. For AUC March,

+

count FARC Guerrillas as cubes.

+

EXAMPLE: A group of 2 Underground FARC Guerrillas March

+

from Meta East to Santander-Boyacá, which has Passive Sup-

+

port and where there are 1 Police and 1 Troops cubes. Because

+

the destination is a Department with Support and the total of 4

+

cubes and moving Guerrillas involved exceeds 3, the 2 moving

+

Guerrillas flip to Active.

+

NOTE: March often Activates Guerrillas, but moves by Event

+

(5.0) do so only if specified.

+
+
+

8

+

Andean Abyss

+

3.3.3 Attack. Attack Operations seek to eliminate enemy forc-

+

es; particularly successful attacks augment friendly Guerrillas

+

(by capturing enemy weapons, equipment, rations, recruits, or

+

drugs). Select any spaces where the executing Faction has at

+

least 1 Guerrilla and 1 enemy piece; pay 1 Resource per space.

+

PROCEDURE: In each selected space, Activate (1.4.3) all the

+

executing Faction’s Guerrillas and then roll a die: if the roll is less

+

than or equal to the number of the executing Faction’s Guerrillas

+

there (whether or not they began Active), remove up to 2 enemy

+

pieces (executing Faction’s choice; may include Underground

+

Guerrillas). The 2 pieces may belong to different Factions. A

+

targeted Faction’s Bases cannot be removed before all its cubes

+

or Guerrillas in the space.

+

CAPTURED GOODS: If the roll was a “1”, place 1 of the exe-

+

cuting Faction’s Available Guerrillas (1.4.1) there. If a Shipment

+

(4.5.3) was removed, place it in the space with a Guerrilla of the

+

executing Faction.

+

3.3.4 Terror. Terror Operations in Depart-

+

ments or Cities neutralize (or, for FARC,

+

build) Support or Opposition (1.6) and

+

place Terror markers that hinder future

+

efforts to influence it. On LoCs, they place Sabotage markers

+

that block Government Resource earnings (6.3.1). AUC Terror

+

harms Aid to the Government. Select any spaces where the ex-

+

ecuting Faction has at least 1 Underground Guerrilla; pay 1

+

Resource per City or Department (0 for LoCs).

+

PROCEDURE: Activate 1 friendly Underground Guerrilla in

+

each selected space.

+

• If the space is a Department or City, place a Terror marker and

+

shift any Support or Opposition 1 level toward Neutral (remove

+

Passive or shift Active to Passive and adjust Total Support or

+

Opposition, 1.6) OR, if FARC, toward Active Opposition.

+

• If the space is a LoC without a Sabotage marker, place a

+

Sabotage marker.

+

• Do not place a Terror/Sabotage marker if all are already on

+

the map. (There are 40.)

+

AID CUT: If AUC is executing the Terror (including via Event,

+

5.0), drop Aid by –3 if the Terror occurred in a single space or

+

by –5 if in 2 or more spaces, to a minimum of 0 (1.7). Note: Aid

+

at 0 does not stop AUC Terror.

+

4.0 SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

+

4.1 Special Activities in General

+

When a Faction per the Event Card sequence of play (2.3) exe-

+

cutes an Operation in at least 1 space (3.0), it may also execute

+

1 type of its Special Activities (Exception: Limited Operations,

+

2.3.5). Some Events grant free Special Activities (3.1.2).

+

• As with Operations, the executing Faction selects spaces,

+

Factions, or pieces affected and the order of actions. A Faction

+

may execute its Special Activity at any one time immediately

+

before, during, or immediately after the execution of its Op-

+

eration.

+

EXAMPLE: FARC with 0 Resources Extorts or Kidnaps enough

+

to pay for the necessary accompanying Operations thereafter

+

(4.1.1).

+

PLAY NOTE: If the 1st Eligible Faction uses a Special Activity,

+

the 2nd Eligible will have the option of executing the card’s

+

Event (2.3.4).

+

4.1.1. Accompanying Operations. Some Special Activities

+

specify that they may only accompany certain types of Opera-

+

tions (3.0). Certain Special Activities may take place only in the

+

locations of their Accompanying Operations. If not otherwise

+

specified, Special Activities may accompany any Operations and

+

take place in any otherwise valid spaces.

+

4.2 Government Special Activities

+

The Government may choose from Air Lift, Air Strike,

+

or Eradicate Special Activities.

+

4.2.1 Air Lift. Air Lift moves Troops, especially to mass them

+

quickly for an Operation.

+

PROCEDURE: Move up to 3 Troops from 1 space to another

+

(not FARC Zone, 6.4.4).

+

4.2.2 Air Strike. An Air Strike destroys an exposed Insurgent

+

unit. It may only accompany a Patrol, Sweep, or Assault (3.2.2-.4)

+

and take place in a single Department or LoC (not City).

+

PROCEDURE: Remove 1 Active Guerrilla or, if the targeted

+

Faction has no Guerrillas in the space, 1 of its Bases.

+

4.2.3 Eradicate. Eradication destroys rural Cartels Bases and

+

earns Aid but at a cost of increasing local sympathy for FARC.

+

It may take place in any 1 Department with Cartels pieces (even

+

Cartels Guerrillas without Bases).

+

PROCEDURE: Boost Aid by +4, to a maximum of 29 (1.7).

+

Remove all Cartels Bases in the selected space (regardless of

+

Guerrillas there). Then:

+

• Shift that or an adjacent Department 1 level toward Active

+

Opposition (1.6.1), if possible.

+

• Or, if not possible (because all are already at Active Opposition

+

or have 0 Population), instead place 1 available FARC Guerrilla

+

in that Department.

+

DESIGN NOTE: Farmers of coca and other crops harmed tend

+

to resent Government spraying.

+

4.3 FARC Special Activities

+

FARC may choose from Ambush, Extort, or Kidnap

+

Special Activities.

+

4.3.1 Extort. Extortion enables FARC to gain Resources from

+

regions they dominate. FARC may simultaneously Extort in any

+

spaces (including LoCs) where FARC forces include at least 1

+

Underground Guerrilla and FARC has Control (its forces out-

+

number all enemies, 1.8).

+

PROCEDURE: For each selected space, Activate 1 Underground

+

FARC Guerrilla there (1.4.3) and add +1 to FARC Resources

+

(1.7).

+
+
+

9

+

Andean Abyss

+

4.3.2 Ambush. An Ambush enables FARC to ensure the complete

+

success of an Attack in 1 space. It must take place in a space

+

selected for Attack (3.3.3, not yet resolved) and that has at least

+

1 Underground FARC Guerrilla (1.4.3).

+

PROCEDURE: Instead of the usual Attack procedure (3.3.3),

+

the Attack in that space Activates 1 Underground Guerrilla only

+

and automatically succeeds (do not roll; remove the 2 enemy

+

pieces normally). Place an Available FARC Guerrilla in the space

+

(Underground, 1.4.3) as if a “1” had been rolled.

+

4.3.3 Kidnap. Kidnapping takes variable amounts of Resources

+

(1.7) from the Government or the Cartels or a Shipment (4.5.3)

+

from the Cartels, at a small risk of adding to AUC growth. It may

+

take place in up to 3 spaces that:

+

• Were or will be selected for Terror (3.3.4) this Operation, AND

+

• Are City, LoC, or have a Cartels Base, AND

+

• Have more FARC Guerrillas than Police.

+

PROCEDURE: Target either the Government if the space is a

+

City or LoC, or the Cartels if the space has 1 or 2 Cartels Bases.

+

Roll a die for each space and transfer to FARC from the targeted

+

Faction a number of Resources equal to the die roll. Whenever a

+

“6” is rolled, AUC places 1 Available piece in that space (within

+

stacking, 1.4.2). If a targeted Faction runs out of Resources, no

+

more is transferred.

+

DRUG RANSOM: If targeting the Cartels where they hold a

+

Shipment (4.5.3), instead of rolling, place the Shipment with a

+

FARC Guerrilla there.

+

DESIGN NOTE: This Special Activity represents the potentially

+

lucrative kidnapping of family members of drug lords, politicians,

+

and other wealthy. Routine kidnapping is represented in the game

+

within Terror and Extort.

+

4.4 AUC Special Activities

+

AUC may choose from Extort, Ambush, or Assassinate

+

Special Activities.

+

4.4.1 Extort & Ambush. AUC Extorts and Ambushes the same

+

as FARC (4.3.1-2) but using AUC instead of FARC forces.

+

4.4.2 Assassinate. Assassination efficiently eliminates enemy

+

units—even protected Bases. It may occur in any of up to 3

+

spaces selected for AUC Terror (3.3.4) this Operation in which

+

AUC Guerrillas outnumber Police.

+

PROCEDURE: In each such space, remove any 1 enemy piece.

+

COMMANDEER: If an Assassination forces the removal of a

+

Shipment (4.5.3) place it with an AUC Guerrilla in the space.

+

4.5 Cartels Special Activities

+

The Cartels may choose from Cultivate, Process, or Bribe

+

Special Activities.

+

4.5.1 Cultivate. Cultivation relocates trafficking activity or

+

propagates a new growing area. It may only accompany a Rally

+

or March Operation (3.3.1-.2). The destination is 1 Department

+

or City with Population greater than 0 and with more Cartels

+

Guerrillas than Police.

+

PROCEDURE: Relocate 1 Cartels Base from any space to the

+

selected space (within stacking, 1.4.2). Or, if the space is a De-

+

partment selected for a Rally Operation (whether or not it just

+

received a Guerrilla), if desired instead place 1 Cartels Base there.

+

DESIGN NOTE: Cultivation represents the ability of drug syn-

+

dicates quickly and clandestinely to arrange purchase from new

+

growers and move processing labs and delivery routes.

+

4.5.2 Process. Processing prepares major drug Shipments or

+

exchanges Bases for Resources. It may only accompany a Rally

+

or March Operation (3.3.1-.2) and may occur in any spaces with

+

at least 1 Cartels Base.

+

PROCEDURE: Remove any Cartels Bases desired and add +3

+

Cartels Resources for each Base removed. Alternatively, place a

+

total of 1 or 2 available Shipments (4.5.3) under any Guerrillas

+

in spaces with Cartels Bases.

+

4.5.3 Shipment Markers. The 4 Shipment markers

+

represent major processed drug caches awaiting

+

delivery and are a limit on play. On the map, they

+

are always placed beneath a Guerrilla and move

+

with it. That Guerrilla’s Faction owns the Shipment. A Guerrilla

+

may hold several Shipments. The owner may transfer the Ship-

+

ment to another Guerrilla in the same space at any time (even as

+

the Guerrilla is removed or replaced and including to another

+

Faction’s Guerrilla). Shipments are only removed via Event (5.0)

+

or as follows:

+

• If a Guerrilla holding a Shipment is removed, the owner must

+

immed iately transfer the Shipment to another Guerrilla if possible,

+

otherwise remove it.

+

• Players after executing Operations without Special Activities

+

may remove a Shipment they own for a free, extra Limited

+

Operation (2.3.6).

+

• During the Resource Phase, all Shipments are removed and

+

provide the owner either a Base or +6 Resources (6.3.3).

+

4.5.4 Bribe. Bribes neutralize other Factions’ units or expose or

+

hide Guerrillas but cost Resources (1.7). They may occur in any

+

of up to 3 spaces, and may accompany any Cartels Operation.

+

PROCEDURE: For each space, reduce Cartels Resources –3 and

+

remove up to 2 cubes there, remove or flip up to 2 Guerrillas

+

there, or remove a Base there. NOTE: Bribe is the only Special

+

Activity with a Resource cost.

+

CONTRABAND: The Cartels player may transfer any Shipments

+

(4.5.3) removed by Bribe to any Guerrilla in the space.

+
+
+

10

+

Andean Abyss

+

5.0 EVENTS

+

Each Event bears a title, italicized flavor text, and Event text.

+

Flavor text provides historical interest and has no effect on play.

+

Cards with text updated for this edition are marked “2nd Ed”.

+

5.1 Executing Events

+

When a Faction executes an Event, it carries out the Event text

+

literally (sometimes involving actions or decisions by other

+

Factions). Unless otherwise specified, the executing Faction

+

makes all selections involved in implementing the text, such

+

as which pieces are affected. EXAMPLE: A Faction executing

+

an Event that forces another Faction to Attack could choose

+

the Attacking Faction; the Attacking Faction would make any

+

selections allowed within the Event’s required Attack (per 3.1).

+

Some Events with lasting effects have markers as aids to play.

+

(For Events that place FARC Zones, see 6.4.4.)

+

5.1.1 Where Event text contradicts rules, the Event takes prece-

+

dence. EXAMPLE: If the Event says any Guerrilla in a partic-

+

ular space executes Terror or Ambush, even an already Active

+

Guerrilla there can do so. However:

+

• Events never place pieces that are not available (1.4.1); they

+

remove rather than replace if the replacement is not available.

+

• Events may not violate stacking (1.4.2, including no

+

Government forces into FARC Zones, 6.4.4).

+

• Events may not raise Aid beyond 29 or a Faction’s Resources

+

beyond 99 (1.7).

+

• Events never allow a Faction to execute a type of Operation

+

or Special Activity available only to other Factions (3.0, 4.0).

+

5.1.2 If two Events contradict, the currently played Event takes

+

precedence.

+

EXAMPLE: “Former Military” could result in Assault against

+

FARC even if FARC had just played “Senado & Cámara”.

+

5.1.3 If not all of an executed Event’s text can be carried out,

+

implement that which can.

+

5.2 Dual Use

+

Many Events have both unshaded and shaded Event text. The

+

executing Faction may select either the unshaded or shaded text

+

to carry out (not both). While the unshaded text often favors the

+

Government, a player may select either text option regardless

+

of Faction.

+

DESIGN NOTE: Dual-use events represent opposed effects of

+

the same cause, forks in the historical road, or instances subject

+

to alternative historical interpretation.

+

5.3 Govt Capabilities

+

Dual-use Events marked “GOVT CAPA-

+

BILITIES” have lasting effects that either

+

help or hurt the Government. When exe-

+

cuting such an Event, place the correspond-

+

ing marker on the appropriate side in the Govt Capabilities box.

+

The Event’s effects last for the rest of the game.

+

5.4 Insurgent Momentum

+

Dual-use shaded Event text marked “INSURGENT MOMEN-

+

TUM” has lasting effects that hurt the Government. When ex-

+

ecuting such shaded text, place the card in one of the Insurgent

+

Momentum holding boxes. The effects last until the next Pro-

+

paganda round’s Reset phase (6.6), when the card is discarded.

+

Note: The 2 holding boxes are intended for convenience and

+

not a limit on the number of Insurgent Momentum Events that

+

can be in play.

+

5.5 Free Operations

+

Some Events allow the Executing or another Faction an im-

+

mediate Operation or Special Activity that interrupts the usual

+

sequence of play and typically is free: it bears no Resource cost

+

and does not affect Eligibility (3.1.2, 2.3.1), though other require-

+

ments remain unless trumped by Event text (5.1.1).

+

EXAMPLE: Free Terror must Activate an Underground Guerrilla

+

per 3.3.4, but Event text specifying Terror by “any Guerrilla”

+

could use an already Active Guerrilla.

+

6.0 PROPAGANDA ROUNDS

+

Conduct a Propaganda Round in the sequence of phases below

+

as each Propaganda Card is played. The Sequence of Play sheet

+

and board also list this sequence.

+

EXCEPTION: Never conduct more than 1 Propaganda Round

+

in a row (without at least 1 Event card in between)—instead,

+

additional Propaganda cards are played without a Propaganda

+

Round. If such an additional Propaganda card is final (2.4.1),

+

end the game and determine victory (7.3).

+

6.1 Victory Phase

+

If any Faction has met its Victory condition, the game ends (ex-

+

ceptions: Non-player option [1.5]; 1-player [8.8]). See Victory

+

(7.0) to determine winner and rank order. Otherwise, continue

+

with the Propaganda Round. After completing the final Propa-

+

ganda card’s Round (2.4.1), determine victory per 7.3.

+

+

Card Number

+

Faction Order

+

Title

+

Italicized Flavor Text

+

Event Text

+

Lasting Effects Indicator

+

Shaded Text

+

(see Dual Use 5.2)

+
+
+

11

+

Andean Abyss

+

6.2 Sabotage Phase

+

+

Sabotage (3.3.4) each unSabotaged LoC

+

where total Guerrillas exceed cubes or

+

for which an adjacent City is under

+

FARC Control.

+

6.3 Resources Phase

+

Add to Factions’ Resources per the following sequence, to a

+

maximum of 99 (1.7).

+

6.3.1 Government Earnings. Add the total Economic value

+

(1.3.4) of all LoCs that have no Sabotage markers (30 minus the

+

Econ of Sabotaged LoCs) plus Aid. Exception: If El Presidente

+

(6.4.3) is Samper, do not add Aid.

+

6.3.2 Insurgent Earnings. Add to:

+

• FARC and AUC: The number of its Bases.

+

• Cartels: Three times its Bases.

+

6.3.3 Drug Profits. FARC, then AUC, then Cartels remove

+

any Shipments (5.2.2) that they own, selecting to receive for

+

each either an available Base at the Shipment’s location (within

+

stacking, 1.4.2) or +6 Resources.

+

6.4 Support Phase

+

The Government then FARC may spend Resources to affect

+

popular Support and Opposition (1.6), then an Election is held.

+

6.4.1 Civic Action. Government may spend any number of

+

Resources to build Support in Govt-Controlled Cities or De-

+

partments (1.8) that have both Troops and Police. Every 3

+

Resources spent removes 1 Terror marker or—once no Terror

+

is in a space—shifts it 1 level toward Active Support. (Adjust

+

Total Support, 1.6.3.)

+

DESIGN NOTE: Troops and Police together provide the security

+

needed to make gains in popular support. See also Training, 3.2.1.

+

6.4.2 Agitation. FARC similarly may spend Resources to encour-

+

age Opposition in FARC-Controlled Cities or Departments (1.8).

+

Every 1 Resource spent removes 1 Terror marker or—once no

+

Terror is in a space—shifts it 1 level toward Active Opposition.

+

(Adjust Opposition+Bases, 1.6.3.) (1-player: see 8.7.5.)

+

6.4.3 Election. A track called El Presidente records who cur-

+

rently is the President of Colombia and notes his effects. If El

+

Presidente is Samper or Pastrana and Total Support is 60 or less,

+

advance the El Presidente marker 1 box rightward and carry out

+

the noted effect.

+

• If Samper, the Government will not collect Resources from

+

Aid during Propaganda Rounds (6.3.1; it may still do so via

+

Events).

+

• If Pastrana, the Government must immediately place 1 FARC

+

Zone (below).

+

• If Uribe, immediately remove all FARC Zones. (Events may

+

still place them.)

+

6.4.4 FARC Zones. Whenever Events or

+

the El Presidente track (6.4.3) specify that

+

a FARC Zone is to be placed, the Gov-

+

ernment selects from among Departments with the most FARC

+

pieces that is not already a FARC Zone to receive a FARC Zone

+

marker.

+

• The Government must immediately Redeploy any cubes (6.5;

+

judge Control, 6.2, at the moment that a FARC Zone is placed)

+

and remove any of its Bases there.

+

• Government Forces may not enter or be placed into a FARC

+

Zone Department (1.4.2), even by Event (5.1.1).

+

EXAMPLE: The “Zona de Convivencia” Event places a FARC

+

Zone into the Mountain Department with the most FARC pieces.

+

The Government player chooses among any Mountain spaces

+

tied for most FARC pieces.

+

PLAY NOTE: FARC Zones have no effect on Air Strikes (4.2.2),

+

Eradication (4.2.3), or the movement or placement of Insurgent

+

forces.

+

6.4.5 Elite Backing. AUC now may free Rally (3.3.1) in 1 space

+

with neither Opposition, nor Govt Control, nor FARC Control

+

(1.8).

+

6.5 Redeploy Phase

+

The Government relocates its forces as described below. Control

+

does not change until all Redeployment is complete.

+

6.5.1 The Government must move any Troops on LoCs or in

+

Departments without Government Bases to Govt-Controlled

+

spaces (1.8) that either are Cities or have Government Bases (if

+

no such spaces, then to Bogotá).

+

6.5.2 The Government may move any other Troops to such

+

Govt-Controlled Cities or Bases.

+

6.5.3 The Government may move any Police to any LoCs or

+

Govt-Controlled spaces.

+

6.5.4 Once all Redeployment is finished, Control of all Cities

+

and Departments adjusts per 1.8.

+

DESIGN AND PLAY NOTE: While Troops are the Government’s

+

main means of attacking Insurgents in the countryside, Police

+

are its main means of maintaining presence over time.

+

6.6 Reset Phase

+

Prepare for the next card as follows:

+

• Mark all Factions Eligible (2.3.1).

+

• Remove all Terror and Sabotage markers.

+

• Place any cards in the Insurgent Momentum holding boxes

+

onto the played cards—their Events’ effects no longer apply

+

(5.4).

+

• Flip all Guerrillas to Underground (1.4.3).

+

• Play the next card from the draw deck and reveal the draw

+

deck’s new top card (2.3.8).

+

PLAY NOTE: In the final Round of the game, players should

+

conduct as much Civic Action and Agitation as possible (6.4.1-2)

+

and can skip the Redeploy and Reset phases (6.5-6).

+
+ +
+

12

+

Andean Abyss

+

7.0 VICTORY

+

Each Faction has unique victory conditions, covered below and

+

on the Faction aid sheets.

+

7.1 Ranking Wins and Breaking Ties

+

If any Non-player Faction (8.0) passes a victory check (7.2), all

+

players lose equally. Otherwise, whenever any player does so or

+

if none does by game end, the Faction that reached the highest

+

victory margin (7.3) comes in 1st place, 2nd-highest comes in

+

2nd place, and so on. Ties go to Non-players, then Cartels, then

+

AUC, then FARC. (See also 1-player victory, 8.8.)

+

7.2 During Propaganda Rounds

+

Check victory at the start of each Propaganda Round (6.1).

+

Victory conditions are:

+

• Government: Total Support exceeds 60.

+

• FARC: Total Opposition plus the number of FARC Bases

+

exceeds 25.

+

• AUC: AUC has more Bases than FARC.

+

• Cartels: Cartels have more than 10 Bases and have Resources

+

above 40.

+

7.3 After Final Propaganda

+

If the final Propaganda Round (2.4.1) is completed without a

+

victory check win (7.2), the Faction with the highest victory

+

margin wins. A Victory Margin is the amount a Faction is beyond

+

or short of its victory condition set forth in 7.2.

+

NOTE: The victory margin will be positive if the Faction has

+

reached its goal, negative or zero if it has not. See the Playbook’s

+

tutorial for a full example of victory determination.

+

• Government: Total Support – 60.

+

• FARC: Total Opposition + FARC Bases – 25.

+

• AUC: AUC Bases – FARC Bases.

+

• Cartels: Take the lower of the following: Cartels Bases – 10,

+

or Cartels Resources – 40.

+
+ +
+

Andean Abyss

+

KEY TERMS INDEX

+

Accompanying: Operation required for Spe-

+

cial Activity. (4.1.1)

+

Activate: Flip or leave Guerrilla Active. (1.4.3)

+

Active: Guerrilla symbol end up: vulnerable to

+

Assault or Air Strike (1.4.3); City or Depart-

+

ment in open Support or Opposition (1.6.1).

+

Adjacent: Spaces next to each other for move-

+

ment or Events. (1.3.3)

+

Agitate: FARC action during Propaganda to

+

increase Opposition. (6.4.2)

+

Aid: Foreign assistance that adds to Govern-

+

ment Resources during Propaganda Rounds or

+

by Event.(1.7, 6.3.1)

+

Air Lift: Government Special Activity that

+

moves Troops. (4.2.1)

+

Air Strike: Government Special Activity that

+

removes enemy piece. (4.2.2)

+

Ambush: FARC/AUC Special Activity ensur-

+

ing Attack success. (4.3.2, 4.4.1)

+

Attack: Insurgent Operation that removes

+

enemy pieces. (3.3.3)

+

Assassinate: AUC Special Activity that re-

+

moves enemy piece. (4.4.2)

+

Assault: Government Operation that removes

+

enemy pieces. (3.2.4)

+

AUC: An Insurgent Faction (Autodefensas

+

Unidas de Colombia: United Self-Defense

+

Forces of Colombia). (1.0, 1.5)

+

Available: Force pieces in holding boxes that

+

may be placed. (1.4.1)

+

Base: Mostly-immobile force pieces that affect

+

Rally, Resources, and Victory, among other

+

functions. (1.4)

+

Bases Last: Requirement for some actions that

+

a target Faction have no cubes or Guerrillas in a

+

space before its Bases can be removed. (3.2.4,

+

3.3.3, 4.2.2)

+

Bribe: Cartels Special Activity that removes

+

or flips pieces. (4.5.4)

+

Campaign: Event card series leading up to a

+

Propaganda Round. (2.4.1)

+

Captured Goods: Place Guerrilla or take

+

Shipment via Attack. (3.3.3.2)

+

Cartels: An Insurgent Faction: Colombian

+

narco-traffickers. (1.0, 1.5)

+

City: Type of space: urban areas. (1.3.3)

+

Civic Action: Government action to increase

+

Support. (3.2.1, 6.4.1)

+

Coastal: Space touching blue area (including

+

Panamá, Ecuador, and Atlántico). (1.3.4)

+

COIN (Counterinsugency): Government

+

Operations. (3.2)

+

Commandeer: Take Shipment via Assassinate.

+

(4.4.3)

+

Contraband: Shipment transfer via Bribe.

+

(4.5.4)

+

Control: Possession of more Forces in a De-

+

partment or City by Government or FARC than

+

all others combined. (1.8, 3.2.1, 4.3.1)

+

Cost: Resources given up for an Operation.

+

(3.1)

+

Cylinder: Token to mark a Faction’s Resources

+

or Eligibility (1.7, 2.2)

+

Cube: Troops or Police piece. (1.4)

+

Cultivate: Cartels Special Activity to place or

+

relocate a Base. (4.5.1)

+

Department (Dept): Type of space represent-

+

ing rural areas. (1.3.2)

+

Deployment: Initial set up of forces. (2.1, back

+

of rulebook)

+

Drug Bust: Assault removing Shipment for

+

Aid. (3.2.5)

+

Drug Ransom: Take Shipment via Kidnap.

+

(4.3.3)

+

Dual Use: Event with 2 alternative effects. (5.2)

+

Economic Value (Econ): Resources that an

+

unSabotaged LoC will provide Government

+

each Propaganda Round. (1.3.4, 6.3.1)

+

Eligible: Faction able to execute Event or

+

Operation: per Faction order, 1st and 2nd Eli-

+

gible. (2.3.1-.2)

+

Elite Backing: AUC option to free Rally

+

during the Support Phase. (6.4.5)

+

El Presidente: Track showing current Presi-

+

dent of Colombia. (6.4.3)

+

Enemy: Assets of another Faction than the

+

executing Faction. (1.5)

+

Eradicate: Government Special Activity to

+

remove rural Cartels Bases and add Aid. (4.2.3)

+

Event: Card with Faction order and text a

+

Faction may execute. (2.3, 5.0)

+

Execute: Implement Event or conduct Opera-

+

tion or Special Activity. (2.3)

+

Extort: FARC/AUC Special Activity that adds

+

Resources. (4.3.1, 4.4.1)

+

Faction: Player or Non-Player role: Govt,

+

FARC, AUC, Cartels. (1.5)

+

Faction Order: Card symbols determining 1st

+

and 2nd Eligible. (2.3.2)

+

FARC: An Insurgent Faction (Fuerzas Arma-

+

das Revolucionarias de Colombia: Revolu-

+

tionary Armed Forces of Colombia). (1.0, 1.5)

+

FARC Zone: Dept that Govt forces may not

+

enter. (1.4.2, 6.4.4)

+

Final: 4th (optionally, 3rd) Propaganda card’s

+

round, game end. (2.4.1, 7.3)

+

Flip: Switch Guerrilla between Underground

+

and Active. (1.4.3)

+

Forces: Troops, Police, Guerrillas, or Bases

+

(pieces). (1.4)

+

Foreign Country: State bordering Colombia.

+

(1.3.5)

+

Forest (Tropical): Department type that hin-

+

ders Sweep. (1.3.2, 3.2.3)

+

Free: Operation or Special Activity via Event

+

or Shipping that does not cost Resources or

+

affect Eligibility. (2.3.6, 3.1.2, 5.5)

+

Friendly: Assets of the executing Faction.

+

Government (Govt): The non-Insurgent Fac-

+

tion. (1.0, 1.5)

+

Govt Capabilities: Enduring event effects that

+

help or hurt Government actions. (5.3)

+

Grassland: Department type that does not

+

hinder Operations. (1.3.2)

+

Guerrilla: Mobile Insurgent forces piece. (1.4)

+

Ineffective Events: Non-player avoidance of

+

Events without effect (8.1).

+

Ineligible: Faction skipped in Faction order.

+

(2.3.1-.2)

+

Insurgent: FARC, AUC, or Cartels Faction.

+

(1.0)

+

Insurgent Discord: A Sequence of Play

+

exception in 2-player games that blocks the

+

FARC player from determining Non-player

+

Event use. (8.1)

+

Insurgent Momentum: Events whose shaded

+

portion stays in effect until next Propaganda

+

Round. (5.4)

+

Kidnap: FARC Special Activity that transfers

+

Resources. (4.3.3)

+

Level: Support/Opposition status of a space.

+

(1.6.1)

+

Limited Operation (LimOp): A player Op-

+

eration in just 1 (destination) space, with no

+

Special Activity. (2.3.5)

+

LoC: Line of Communication: Pipeline or

+

Road. (1.3.4)

+

March: Insurgent Operation to move Guer-

+

rillas. (3.3.2)

+

Mountain: Department type that hinders As-

+

sault. (1.3.2, 3.2.4)

+

Non-Player: Faction controlled by the game.

+

(1.5, 8.0)

+

Neutral: Space not in Support nor Opposition.

+

(1.6.1)

+

Open Deployment: Option with latitude in set

+

up of player forces. (2.1)

+

Operation (Op): Core action Faction performs

+

with its forces. (3.0)

+

Opposition: Status of space’s population

+

against the Government. (1.6)

+

Opposition + Bases: Total Opposition plus

+

the number of FARC Bases on the map. (1.6.3,

+

7.2-.3)

+

Overflow: Boxes and markers to help manage

+

occasional cases of Forces overcrowding. (1.4)

+

Pass: Decline to execute an Event or Op when

+

Eligible. (2.3.3)

+
+ +
+

Andean Abyss

+

© 2018 GMT Games, LLC

+

Passive: City or Department in reserved Sup-

+

port or Opposition. (1.6.1)

+

Pastrana: Andrés Pastrana Arango: El Presi-

+

dente 1998-2002, after Samper. (6.4.3)

+

Patrol: Government Operation to protect

+

LoCs. (3.2.2)

+

Pawn: Token to designate spaces selected for

+

Operation (black) or Special Activity (white).

+

(3.1.1)

+

Phase: Segment of a Propaganda Round. (6.0)

+

Piece: Force unit: Troop or Police cube, Guer-

+

rilla, or Base (not a marker like Shipment). (1.4)

+

Pipeline: LoC type representing petroleum or

+

gas pipelines and parallel or nearby road or

+

rail. (1.3.4)

+

Place: Move a piece from Available to map.

+

(1.4.1)

+

Police: Govt forces that maintain rural control

+

and hinder crime. (1.4)

+

Population (Pop): Representation of the pop-

+

ulace of a Department or City, about 1 million

+

people per point. (1.3.2-.3)

+

Priorities: Rules guiding Non-player Factions.

+

(8.0)

+

Process: Cartels Special Activity to prepare

+

Shipment or liquidate Base. (4.5.2)

+

Propaganda: Cards triggering Rounds of the

+

same name that include victory checks, Re-

+

source acquisition, and several other periodic

+

functions. (2.4, 6.0)

+

Rally: Insurgent Operation to place or regroup

+

pieces. (3.3.1)

+

Redeploy: Propaganda phase in which Gov-

+

ernment moves cubes. (6.5)

+

Remove: Take from map (forces to Available).

+

(1.4.1)

+

Replace: Exchange pieces between Available

+

and map. (1.4.1)

+

Reset: Propaganda phase to ready for next

+

card. (6.6)

+

Resources: Factions’ wherewithal for Opera-

+

tions and other actions. (1.7)

+

Road: LoC representing transport route such

+

as highway or rail. (1.3.4)

+

Sabotage: Place a Sabotage marker on a LoC

+

that does not have one, temporarily damaging

+

it to block addition of Government Resources.

+

(3.3.4, 6.2, 6.3)

+

Samper: Ernesto Samper Pizano: El Presidente

+

1994-1998 and at game start. (2.1, 6.4.3)

+

Select: Choose an action’s locations or targets.

+

(3.1, 3.1.1, 4.1, 5.1)

+

Shaded: 2nd text choice of Dual-Use Event,

+

often anti-Government. (5.2)

+

Shift: Change a space’s Support/Opposition.

+

(1.6.1)

+

Ship: Deliver Shipment and use proceeds for

+

immediate operation. (2.3.6)

+

Shipment: Marker representing major cache of

+

processed drugs awaiting delivery to market.

+

(4.5.3)

+

Space: Map area that holds pieces in play:

+

Department, City, LoC. (1.3.1)

+

Special Activities: Actions accompanying

+

Operations; most are cost-free and unique to

+

a Faction. (4.0)

+

Stacking: Limits on pieces that can occupy a

+

space. (1.4.2)

+

Standard Deployment: Option with pre-de-

+

termined set up of forces. (2.1)

+

Support: Status of space’s population favoring

+

the Government. (1.6)

+

Sweep: Government Operation to move Troops

+

into a space and flip Guerrillas Active. (3.2.3)

+

Target: Enemy Faction or piece that is the

+

object of an Operation, Special Activity, or

+

Event. (3.1, 4.1)

+

Terror: Insurgent Operation that places marker

+

of same name in City or Department or Sabo-

+

tage on LoC. (3.3.4)

+

Total Opposition: Passive Opposition Popula-

+

tion plus twice Active Opposition Population.

+

(1.6.3)

+

Total Support: Passive Support Population

+

plus twice Active Support Population. (1.6.3)

+

Town: Map feature that bounds LoCs (not a

+

space). (1.3.3)

+

Train: Govt Operation to place pieces and

+

conduct Civic Action. (3.2.1)

+

Transfer: Give Resource or Shipment to an-

+

other Faction. (1.5.1)

+

Troops: Mobile Govt forces specializing in

+

Sweep and rural Assault. (1.4)

+

Uncontrolled: A City or Dept with neither

+

Govt nor FARC Control. (6.2)

+

Underground: Guerrilla, symbol end down:

+

not subject to Assault or Air Strike and capable

+

of Terror or Ambush. (1.4.3)

+

Unshaded: 1st text choice of Dual-Use Event,

+

often pro-Government. (5.2)

+

Uribe: Álvaro Uribe Vélez, El Presidente

+

2002-2010, after Pastrana. (6.4.3)

+

Victory Margin: Calculation, unique to a Fac-

+

tion, of closeness to its victory condition. (7.3)

+

AVAILABLE FORCES (1.4.1)

+

(Total, before set up)

+

+

Government

+

FARC

+

AUC

+

Cartels

+

Troops

+

30 x

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

Police

+

30 x

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

Guerrillas

+

-

+

30 x

+

18 x

+

12 x

+

Bases

+

3 x

+

9 x

+

6 x

+

15 x

+

GMT Games, LLC

+

P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com

+
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