1989-PLAYBOOK-HiRes

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P L AY B O O K

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Card Notes

Sample Turn +

The Many Explanations for the Collapse of Communism

Confrontation and Cooperation from the West +

The End of the Socialist Empire +

The Space of Revolution +

The Wave of History +

Dissent in the Police State +

Clausewitz' Trinity in 1989 +

Credits. +

+ +

1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

1. LEGACY OF MARTIAL LAW: For the Communists the im-

position of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was a great

success. The raids that rounded up the leadership of Solidarity were

meticulously planned and flawlessly executed. Solidarity was totally

unprepared for the mass arrests, and lost almost all of its money and

its printing and broadcast equipment. Nonetheless, martial law rep-

resented an unprecedented humiliation for the Communists. Never

before had the civilian party become so weak that it had to surrender

power to the army.

2. SOLIDARITY LEGALIZED:

Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski

was the strongest of the Communist

leaders in Eastern Europe in 1989.

He was the only leader who had

the confidence of Mikhail Gor-

bachev, and it was this personal

relationship with Gorbachev that

permitted Jaruzelski to proceed with

his experiment to legalize the Soli-

darity trade union, which had been

suppressed under martial law. In

January 1989, Jaruzelski proposed

that the government enter talks

with Solidarity to set conditions

under which the martial-law-era ban could be lifted. The majority of

Central Committee delegates were opposed, but Jaruzelski stood be-

fore the meeting and presented an ultimatum: either Solidarity would

be recognized or he would resign. Faced with losing the core of its

leadership, the hard-line Central Committee members backed down. A

few days later Solidarity agreed to enter negotiations with the regime,

calling the invitation a “basic step toward social dialogue.” Solidarity’s

leadership had little choice. Solidarity needed the talks to sustain the

perception that it was the principal opposition to the regime, particu-

larly after the strikes of April and August 1988, which were driven by

younger workers who did not owe their allegiance to the old heroes

of the 1980-81 movement. The talks ultimately resulted in Solidarity

again being recognized as an independent trade union, and elections

that would sweep Solidarity into power. For Jaruzelski, his dream of

becoming the Polish Gorbachev was shattered. His willingness to risk

his position to bring the party to the negotiating table with Solidarity

would be quickly forgotten. In the minds of the Polish people he would

forever remain the face of martial law.

3. WALESA: Lech Walesa was the most important opposition leader

of 1989. An electrician by trade, he led the 1980 strikes at the Lenin

Shipyard in Gdansk that began the Solidarity movement. Walesa had

an unabashed personality, and that complete lack of self-conscious-

ness gave him the ability to connect to the crowds. Though meagerly

educated, he was an excellent debater. As a working man Walesa had

contempt for the intellectual class, but he did work with them, and

the partnership he was able to forge between the intellectuals and

the workers was critical to ending communism in Poland. After 1989

Walesa became one of the loudest voices in favor of tough lustration

laws and prosecutions of former Communists for crimes committed

during the martial law period. This put Walesa in direct opposition to

his friend and choice for prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who

wanted “a thick line” between the democratic and Communist eras.

Walesa defeated Mazowiecki in the Polish presidential election of 1990.

Since that time Walesa’s reputation has suffered, but he remains one

of the great figures of the second half of the 20th century.

4. MICHNIK: The democrats in

Poland had a perfect recipe for a

social revolution: broad support

among the working class and strong

intellectual leaders, among them

Jacek Kuron, Bronislaw Geremek,

Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Adam

Michnik. Michnik was part of

the Worker’s Defense Committee

founded after the Helsinki Accords

to defend workers arrested during

the 1976 strikes. As a Solidarity

adviser, he was arrested in the first

sweep during martial law and spent

the early 1980s in jail. As a result of

the round-table agreement, Michnik

was able to publish an election newspaper (“Gazeta Wyborcza”) which

remains Poland’s second largest circulation newspaper. Michnik’s

essay “Your President, Our Prime Minister” is widely credited for

establishing the structure for a compromise that allowed Solidarity

to form Poland’s first non-Communist government in August 1989.

5. GENERAL STRIKE: Of all the methods of protest chosen by the

revolutionaries of 1989, the general strike was considered the riskiest,

both to the regimes and to the movements themselves. A strike was a

test, a gauge of worker support for the aims of the democratic revo-

lution. Often the opposition leadership was leery to call them. A poor

showing of participation risked revealing that the revolution was limit-

ed to the intelligentsia and the students - that the workers still supported

the regime. For the Communists, already facing economies in crisis,

a strike broadly supported for an extended period was an existential

threat and belied their claim to be the vanguard of the working class.

6. BROUGHT IN FOR QUESTIONING: All the countries of the

Warsaw Pact had security services and all conducted surveillance on

their own people. Two, the Stasi of East Germany and the Securitate

of Romania, were particularly central to the events of 1989 and have

their own event cards. This event represents the general harassment

that dissidents faced on a daily basis.

7. STATE RUN MEDIA: Control of the media was critical to main-

taining support for the regimes. The level of propaganda varied widely

within the region, with the Polish press generally speaking the most

free and the Romanian being nothing more than a propaganda machine.

State control of the press was so strict in Romania that every type-

writer in the country had to be registered and a sample of the typeface

submitted to the state, so that it could be compared to any petition or

samizdat critical of the regime.

8. PRUDENCE: George Bush was famously prudent, and his caution

served him well in 1989. Bush cultivated personal relationships with

foreign leaders, jotting personal notes and making calls. He worked

closely with Helmut Kohl, especially during the 2-plus-4 talks over

German reunification. Baker and Shevardnadze also forged a personal

bond that helped end the Cold War. Most of all, Bush allowed events

to unfold without undue celebration. He used restraint to try to protect

Gorbachev from attack by Kremlin hardliners. The effects of this event

represent either side being too cautious.

9. THE WALL: From the foundation of the GDR in 1949 through

construction of the Wall in 1961 about 20% of the East German pop-

ulation left the country, most of them through West Berlin. Worse yet,

C A R D N O T E S

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

most of the escapees were students, intellectuals and young workers,

leaving behind an aging population. Almost immediately, people at-

tempted to escape - by running, climbing, digging tunnels, and even

by homemade air balloon. The border guards, or Green Troops, had

“shoot-to-kill” orders, and an estimated 200 people were killed trying

to cross to the West.

10. CULT OF PERSONALITY: The Ceausescu personality cult was

carefully managed. Bus loads of people would be taken to the airport to

greet the Ceausescus when they would return from foreign trips. In any

newspaper article that quoted the Ceausescus, other people could not

be named. They insisted their photos be printed with red background

to remind the people they were leaders of the Romanian revolution.

When the great Conducator would give a speech, the crowd’s cheering

would be amplified by speakers. The crowd would perform chants of

praise such as “Ceausescu and the people!” while holding their banners

aloft, all orchestrated and monitored by the Securitate.

11. DISSIDENT ARRESTED: Truncheons pounding on the door was

a familiar sound for the dissidents of Eastern Europe under commu-

nism. Many dissidents spent years in prison. In February 1989, Czech

playwright Vaclav Havel was arrested on charges of hooliganism for

his part in the Jan Palach Week demonstrations and spent a month in

jail. His final arrest was on October 27, 1989.

12. APPARATCHIKS: The game

1989 divides the Communist es-

tablishment into two broad groups:

the elites who are at the top of the

power structure and enjoy all the

corresponding privileges of power,

and the lower tier of party members

who are in charge of the day-to-day

operations of the state. These lower

level bureaucrats are, for the most

part, Communists in name only.

For them the party is a means of

career advancement. By and large

the bureaucrats will survive the

lustration process and hold import-

ant positions in post-Communist

governments.

13. STASI: The Ministry of State Security was a vast network of

thousands of spies and hundreds of thousands of informants. It was,

most of all, the outward manifestation of the East German Communists’

obsessive need for control. The other East European security forces

were mostly instruments of physical suppression. Their tools were

the truncheon, the water cannon, and in the case of the Securitate, the

bullet. The Stasi was mostly an instrument of oppression of the mind,

and its tool was information. Millions of people had dossiers in the

Stasi headquarters. Even children were watched. A remark critical of

the regime could follow an individual around for the rest of his life,

denying him a job or the opportunity to travel.

14. GORBACHEV CHARMS THE WEST: This card represents

Gorbachev leveraging his foreign policy successes into greater author-

ity at home, which he used to demote hardliners and elevate supporters

of his agenda. By ending the Cold War, Gorbachev hoped to ease

problems in his own economy and buy time to revitalize socialism.

This card is also a reference to ‘Hannibal Charms Italy’, a strategy

card from the game “Hannibal: Rome versus Carthage” on which the

1989 Power Struggle deck is based.

15. HONECKER: Honecker was

the principal architect of the Berlin

Wall, built while he was a protégé

of Walter Ulbricht. Honecker rose

under Ulbricht’s tutelage until 1971,

when Honecker turned on Ulbricht

and pushed him aside to seize pow-

er. Outwardly an ascetic, behind

the walls of his compound he led a

debauched lifestyle, feasting while

normal East Germans worked long

hours for little pay. This facade was

reflected in East Germany itself.

Projecting an image of success

rivaling the West, the GDR was

in fact an economic basket case,

relying on ever-increasing loans from Western banks to stay afloat.

16. NOMENKLATURA: Despite the rhetoric of abolishing class

divisions, the Communists had their own upper class. Members of the

nomenklatura went to the elite party schools, had drivers for their Volvo

limousines and shopped at their own stores that were well stocked with

fresh fruits and imported wines. The life of privilege was in stark con-

trast to the deprivations of everyday life for the rest of the population.

17. ROUND-TABLE TALKS: Even the shape of the famous round

table was a subject of negotiations between Solidarity and the regime.

In typical Polish fashion one negotiator determined the record distance

for human expectoration was 8 meters so all agreed the table must

be at minimum 9 meters in diameter. Humor and a common pride of

Polishness under-girded the negotiations. Overshadowing everything

was the possibility of Soviet intervention. When one Solidarity rep-

resentative privately asked General Jaruzelski how far the Soviets

would permit democratic reforms to proceed in Poland, Jaruzelski

circumspectly replied, “I don’t know. Let us find out together.” The

negotiations lasted from February to April 1989. Solidarity was led in

the negotiations by Walesa and Michnik as well as intellectuals such

as Bronislaw Geremek and (future Prime Minister) Tadeusz Mazow-

iecki. The government was led by the much hated Czeslaw Kiszczak,

Minister of Internal Affairs during the 1981 imposition of martial law,

but who was crucial to the ultimate success of the round-table. The

final results were free elections to a new body called the Senate, and

permission that Solidarity could contest 35% of the seats in the Sejm.

The president would be selected by the Sejm so all expected this to

guarantee that Communists would retain the presidency and control of

foreign and defense ministries. In game terms this event is drawn and

played several times in 1989. The Polish round-table process as well

as the outcome would serve as a model for other east bloc states. Each

would hold its own round-table sessions, though without the strength

of leadership of Solidarity.

18. POZSGAY DEFENDS THE REVOLUTION: In 1988 the

Hungarians established a commission to review the events of the 1956

revolution. The Soviets and Hungary’s long time ruler Janos Kadar had

always termed the events of 1956 a “counter-revolution.” One of the

members of this truth commission was Imre Pozsgay. The historical

committee’s report was completed on January 27, 1989. Pozsgay, see-

ing an opportunity for himself, went on the radio the next morning to

announce the committee’s findings: that the ‘56 revolution was a peo-

ple’s uprising, not a counter-revolution, and that the participants were

justified. This news created a sensation throughout Hungary. Finally,

the leaders and participants in the revolution would be rehabilitated.

There was only one problem: the report had not yet been approved for

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

release by the government, and the party leadership remained deeply

divided over the events of 1956. Many of them were Kadar loyalists,

Grosz included. The Russians had not been consulted either, and they

had always taken a much harder line against the Hungarian revolution

than the Prague Spring. Pozsgay and the other reformers waited ner-

vously for Soviet response. After several days a Soviet representative

informed them that there would be no Soviet response. For the first of

many times in 1989, Leonid Brezhnev was turning over in his grave.

19. PAPAL VISIT: A visit from John Paul II usually included an open-

air Mass, which could draw hundreds of thousands. Many, less devout,

would attend as a silent protest against the Communists.

20. DEUTSCHE MARKS: The Ost Mark was a non-convertible

currency, and the East Germans needed D-Marks to pay interest on

their hard currency debts. One way they earned hard currency was a

“catch and release” program, in which dissidents would be arrested

and then ransomed for money to West Germany.

21. COMMON EUROPEAN HOME: This was the catch phrase of

Gorbachev’s policy towards Western Europe. It was part of his overall

peace offensive and meant that the Europeans should de-emphasize

the role of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as rival alliances. It was not

intended to marginalize the Americans so much as to suggest rival

economic systems could exist side by side without threat of military

confrontation. The phrase was in contrast to the Bush Administration’s

policy of “a Europe whole and free.”

22. Scoring card—POLAND

23. Scoring card—HUNGARY

24. ST. NICHOLAS CHURCH:

The East German revolution was

largely a leaderless revolution. The

focal point was instead a place of

worship, St. Nicholas Church in

Leipzig. The Lutheran church was

the only East German institution

that had some independence from

the state. In the early 1980s the

Church’s political focus was the

nuclear disarmament movement. In

September, 1982, the pastor of St.

Nicholas Church, Christian Fuhrer,

began leading services on Monday evenings called Peace Prayers.

These Peace Prayers were small gatherings of the faithful praying for

a peaceful end to the Cold War. They would continue weekly for the

following 7 years. Then in the fall of 1989, quite suddenly, the Peace

Prayers would erupt into the Monday Demonstrations.

25. PERESTROIKA: Perestroika was the name for Gorbachev’s

domestic reform policies. The goal was to make socialism more

efficient, though the nature of those policies changed over time. Its

central components were decentralization, replacement of corrupt

bureaucrats and plant managers, and implementation of very limited

market reforms grafted onto the socialist system. Some of the Eastern

European Communists gave lip service to perestroika. Ceausescu and

Honecker were openly hostile to it. None made meaningful reforms.

26. HELSINKI FINAL ACT: The adoption of the Helsinki Accords

was one of the biggest achievements of detente. Brezhnev viewed the

agreements as a victory because it recognized current borders and ef-

fectively put a stamp of approval on Soviet seizure of the Baltics. He

didn’t take seriously the human rights declarations, but the Helsinki

Final Act became a tool for dissidents across Eastern Europe. In Poland

the intellectuals created the K.O.R., the Workers’ Defense Committee.

In Czechoslovakia Charter 77 was formed, originally to protest the

banning of the rock group Plastic People of the Universe. Outside the

K.O.R. these were small groups offering token opposition, but they

established the framework within which the 1989 revolutionaries would

operate. Except for Romania, the Communists were concerned about

their international reputation, and the VP penalty for support checks

in Student and Intellectual spaces represents the loss of international

prestige suffered when violating basic norms of human rights.

27. CONSUMERISM: In the

1970s the Communists sought

to gain legitimacy by improving

living standards, which had fallen

noticeably behind the West. Em-

phasis was placed on production of

consumer goods like refrigerators

and washing machines. This binge

was financed by heavy borrowing

from the West, which set the stage

for the debt crises of the 1980s.

The policy of consumerism did

give Eastern Europeans a taste for

a better standard of living, and the

bare store shelves of 1989 created

discontent that turned many against

the Communists.

28. FACTORY PARTY CELLS: The Eastern European economies

were built upon heavy industry. Some facilities employed up to 25,000

people. In every factory was the party cell, a legacy of the early days of

the Russian Revolution. In 1989, party representatives were responsi-

ble for keeping up morale, organizing voluntary work days or official

holiday observances, and monitoring worker loyalties. The party cells

also could report under-performing managers or stolen materials to

central planners. Most of all, the party cell was a reminder to workers

that the party was a part of every aspect of daily life.

29. JAN PALACH WEEK: Jan Palach was a student who commit-

ted suicide by self-immolation in Wenceslas Square in January 1969.

He was not protesting the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia so

much as the acquiescence of the Czechoslovak people to the process

of normalization. The Czechs retained the reputation of being the least

rebellious people of the northern tier of Communist states, a reputation

that would change in 1989. On the 20th anniversary of Jan Palach’s

death, the human rights group Charter 77 and students in Prague

organized marches that were violently suppressed. Jan Palach Week

would be a preview of the Velvet Revolution.

30. TEAR GAS: Crowds larger than a few dozen usually were dealt

with by specially trained security forces. In addition to shields and

night sticks, these units had specially equipped vehicles with tear gas

and water cannon to disperse crowds.

31. INTELLIGENTSIA: Most of the intellectual leaders of the 1989

revolutions were themselves former Marxists. The most important

exception was Havel, who was the grandson of a wealthy Czech in-

dustrialist. The intellectuals became disillusioned with Marxism after

the invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring reform

movement. The invasion was the turning point for communism in

Eastern Europe. It showed that the Communists would not permit an

alternative model of socialism with rights of dissent. For most of the

‘70s and ‘80s the intellectuals did not call for open defiance of the

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

regimes. Instead they called for creation of a civil society apart from

the totalitarian system - a social space where individuals could interact

outside party control. Kuron talked about “anti-politics.” Havel talked

about “living in truth.” The idea was the regimes were too powerful

to confront directly, but if people could construct an alternative social

space, and act as if the state did not control their private lives, then

the totalitarian foundation of communism would crack and the edifice

would eventually be toppled.

32. PEASANT PARTIES: The “people’s democracies” were supposed

to be societies where the workers and peasants were at the top of the

social ladder, as opposed to the “bourgeois democracies” where the

capitalists were on top. The Communists abolished opposition parties

but kept the peasant parties, ostensibly to represent the peasants while

the Communists represented the workers. In reality, legislatures were

little more than window dressing; all decisions were made by the

party Central Committee, or, more often, a small cadre including the

Communist Party General Secretary and his closest advisers.

33. SAJUDIS: This card represents

the start of the Singing Revolution,

the independence movements in the

Baltic republics of the USSR. These

cards have a dual purpose in the

game as they also represent ethnic

minorities in Romania and Bulgar-

ia. Nationalism has always been

a potent force in Eastern Europe,

and the Communists were never so

popular as when they invoked na-

tionalism against Communists from

other states. In 1989 tensions rose

so high between Hungary and Ro-

mania over Ceausescu’s treatment

of the Hungarian ethnic minority

in Transylvania that the Hungarians redeployed some of their armed

forces from the western border to the Romanian border, and Ceausescu

made threats of nuclear attack.

34. FIDESZ: FIDESZ (The Alliance of Young Democrats) was a po-

litical party of radical students based in Budapest. Members had to be

under 30 years old. One of its leaders was Viktor Orban, a law student

at Eotvos Lorand University. Orban’s speech at the reburial of Imre

Nagy criticizing the regime for hypocrisy and calling for Soviet troops

to withdraw from Hungary made him a national figure. Today FIDESZ

is the most powerful political party in Hungary, sweeping the 2010

parliamentary elections and making Orban Prime Minister of Hungary.

35. HEAL OUR BLEEDING WOUND: This card represents the

final withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan on February 15,

1989. Gorbachev had called the Afghan War the Soviets’ “bleeding

wound.” Surprisingly, the Communist government in Afghanistan

held on, defeating the mujahedin in a series of engagements in the

spring of 1989. This strengthened Gorbachev’s hand when he refused

to intervene to support the Communists in Eastern Europe.

36. DASH FOR THE WEST: The last victim shot while trying to

cross through the Berlin Wall was Chris Gueffroy on February 6, 1989.

He was 21 years old. His friend Christian Gaudian was also shot but

survived. He was captured and sentenced to 3 years for first-degree

illegal border crossing.

37. NAGY REBURIED: Imre Nagy was the leader of Hungary during

the 1956 revolution. He was a committed Communist, but he was

repulsed by the excesses of the Stalin era. After the Soviet invasion

of Hungary he was executed on orders of Krushchev and replaced by

Janos Kadar, who remained in power for 30 years. Over the years, the

lies from the regime about the revolution and circumstances surround-

ing Nagy’s death had alienated the people from the party. The reform

Communists wanted to reconcile the party to the people by admitting

the lies of the past. One step was to rebury Nagy with state honors.

Kadar’s successor Karoly Grosz opposed Nagy’s rehabilitation, and the

reinterment ceremony represented a victory for the reform wing of the

party. Removing the Communist SPs in the elite space represents Grosz

and the rest of the old guard of the Kadar regime being pushed aside.

38. THE JULY CONCEPT: This was Todor Zhivkov’s high sounding

name for a program of reforms to the Bulgarian economy. On paper

it went farther than perestroika in terms of allowing privatization of

smaller firms and public-private partnerships. The July Concept has

the distinction of being the only reform proposal in Eastern Europe that

was criticized in the official Soviet press for going too far, too fast. In

reality it never went anywhere, but it was a good example of Zhivkov

trying to be whatever he thought would curry favor with Moscow at

the time. Shameless sycophancy was how he had been able to survive

as ruler of Bulgaria for more than 30 years.

39. ECO-GLASNOST: Single issue environmental groups played

an important role in the 1989 revolutions. Eco-Glasnost was initially

a movement based in Ruse, Bulgaria, to protest air pollution from a

Romanian chemical plant across the Danube River. Eco-Glasnost later

became a vehicle for broader anti-Communist protests, and was one of

the founding groups of the Union of Democratic Forces.

40. HUNGARIAN DEMOCRAT-

IC FORUM: Most of the oppo-

sition movements in 1989 tried

to incorporate some reference to

unity or dialogue in their name: This

Forum, That Forum, Union of these

or those, Alliance of such and such.

One reason was that in societies

where dissent was systematically

suppressed, merely the idea of dia-

logue with the regime was radical.

The second reason was many of

these umbrella groups contained

elements that were adverse to one

another, and united only in their

opposition to the Communists.

The M.D.F. was the main opposition party in Hungary, and it was

more nationalistic than most of the other prominent Eastern European

opposition groups. It was especially concerned with treatment of Hun-

garians in Romania and removal of Soviet forces from Hungarian soil.

This event also represents the Communists abandoning the Leninist

principle, enshrined in each country's constitution, that the Party must

retain a "leading role" in society.

41. CEAUSESCU: Despite rather stiff competition, Nicolae Ceausescu

may be judged the worst of the Communist leaders in 1989. His early

defiance of the Soviets (he opposed the 1968 invasion of Czechoslo-

vakia) made him popular with Western governments, but by 1989 his

Stalinist brutality had made him an international pariah. There was

virtually no open opposition to the Ceausescu regime inside Romania

until December 1989. The presence of any criticism was attributed to

a conspiracy against him, usually imagined to have originated in Bu-

dapest, Washington, or even Moscow. Romanians whose loyalty was

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

doubted would be denounced in the party newspaper, or placed under

house arrest. Sometimes they would simply disappear.

42. Scoring Card—EAST GERMANY

43. Scoring Card—BULGARIA

44. INFLATIONARY CUR-

RENCY: The Eastern European

economies suffered a problem of

monetary overhang. Goods were

priced according to political con-

siderations rather than supply and

demand, with prices almost always

set below the market clearing price.

This created chronic shortages of

most necessities, while consumers

had cash they could not spend.

Attempts to rationalize the system

usually included partial freeing of

prices, which typically resulted in

strikes and unrest. Poland had the

most severe inflation problems in

1989, where Consumer Price Inflation for the year reached over 600%.

45. SOVIET TROOP WITH-

DRAWALS: The presence of So-

viet troops was always a thorn in

the side of the Eastern Europeans,

who viewed them as an occupying

force. As part of Gorbachev’s New

Thinking in foreign relations he

proposed sweeping reductions

in Soviet conventional arms in

Europe. These proposals were

announced at Gorbachev’s UN

speech in December 1988. Initially

skeptical of Russian intentions,

American President George Bush

found himself playing catch up in

the court of public opinion, as the

two sides entered a bidding war of who would disarm faster. The result

was the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, negotiated

throughout 1989 and signed in 1990.

46. GOODBYE LENIN!: This is a reference to the popular Ostalgie

film about an East German Communist woman who falls into a coma

before the opening of the Berlin Wall. When she recovers the doctors

tell her son that he must prevent her from discovering the GDR no

longer exists or the shock might kill her. So her son goes about rec-

reating life in East Germany in their apartment, including shopping

for her favorite Spreewald pickles. It’s also a reference to the role of

pop culture in the revolutions of 1989 and the role of Cold War films

(Dr. Strangelove and War Games) in the game Twilight Struggle, on

which 1989 is based.

47. BULGARIAN TURKS EXPELLED: Zhivkov started a Bulgar-

ization campaign against the Turks in the early '80s, requiring ethnic

Turks to adopt Bulgarian sounding names and defacing gravestones

with Turkish names. Looking for a scapegoat for Bulgaria’s economic

problems, the Communists ordered the Turks to leave Bulgaria. During

the summer of 1989, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks were driven

from Bulgaria. The move was widely condemned in the international

community as a human rights abuse. Ironically, the expulsion of the

Turks made Bulgaria’s economic crisis even worse, as city residents

were forced to go into the fields to harvest crops.

48. “WE ARE THE PEOPLE!”:

This was the most famous chant

of the marchers in the Monday

Demonstrations. They were telling

the “people’s democracies” that

the people were against them. In

the game 1989 it also represents

the crowds growing so large, and

the regime growing so weak, that

the security forces could not to use

violence to stop the demonstrations.

49. FOREIGN CURRENCY

DEBT BURDEN: All the Eastern

Bloc countries except Romania

owed large sums to western gov-

ernments and banks. These loans were in hard currency so they had

to be repaid using income generated from exports. The debts grew so

large that they could only be serviced by borrowing ever greater sums,

creating a debt spiral.

50. THE SINATRA DOCTRINE: This phrase was coined by Sovi-

et press spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov to describe the new Soviet

policy toward Eastern Europe that replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Each socialist state would be permitted to pursue its own path, as in

the Frank Sinatra song “I Did It My Way.”

51. 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION: On October 7 the

East Germans threw a party for the fortieth anniversary of the creation

of the GDR. It was a surreal event with Honecker toasting to the

achievements of real, existing socialism while attendees could hear

the crowds shouting and demonstrating in the streets outside. During

the parade, before the reviewing stand of Communist dignitaries, the

representatives of the Free German Youth started chanting “Gorby

help us!” “Gorby help us!” Honecker pretended not to hear them.

Polish General Secretary Mieczyslaw Rakowski asked Gorbachev if

he understood the chant. Gorbachev said yes. Rakowski replied, “It’s

over.” Honecker was ousted 11 days later.

52. NORMALIZATION: This was the process of removing tens of

thousands of Prague Spring supporters from the government and the

Czechoslovak Communist party. It was implemented by Milos Jakes,

who later rose to replace Gustav Husak as leader of Czechoslovakia.

In his rise to power Jakes spoke the words of a reformer, praising per-

estroika, but in reality acted as a hardliner. He refused to rehabilitate

Dubcek or the other leaders of the Prague Spring. Jakes was widely

mocked by the Czech people as a colorless incompetent.

53. LI PENG: Li was the leader of the hardliners that wanted a violent

crackdown on the students in Tiananmen Square. Opposing him was

Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, a liberal who had

been instrumental in China’s move toward an export-based market

system. Zhao was also a close friend of Hu Yaobang, whose death had

originally prompted the protests (the Reformer Memorialized/Reformer

Discredited space on the Tiananmen Square track). In the middle was

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Deng sided with Li, and martial law

was declared. Zhao was removed as CCP General Secretary shortly

after the Tiananmen Square massacre and spent the remaining 15 years

of his life under house arrest.

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

54. THE CROWD TURNS AGAINST CEAUSESCU: Inexplicably,

after the uprising in Timisoara started, Ceausescu went to Tehran to

negotiate an arms deal with the Iranians. He returned on December 21st

and gave a lengthy harangue to the party Congress, then went out on

the balcony of the Central Committee building to address the crowd.

This speech was broadcast on live television. After a few moments,

a murmur went through the crowd. Then the scripted chants stopped,

and people began to scream, boo and hiss. Others started chanting

“Timisoara! Timisoara!” and “Death to the Dictator!” Elena shouted,

“Offer them something.” but Nicolae was too stunned to say anything

except “Hello! Hello!” Bodyguards rushed him from the balcony, and

the broadcast feed was cut off. But it was too late for the Ceausescus

- all Romania had seen the start of the revolution.

55. Scoring Card—CZECHOSLAKIA

56. FOREIGN TELEVISION:

Though travel was restricted across

the Eastern Bloc, the people could

emigrate every night by watching

TV. The most popular adult edu-

cation course in Romania was the

Russian language, so the Roma-

nians could understand Russian

TV shows. Bulgarians watched

Yugoslavian TV. East Germans

kept up with the world through

West German news and programs

like “Lindenstrasse”, except for

the area around Dresden (dubbed

“The Valley of the Clueless”) where

geography blocked the signal.

57. CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESHUFFLE: This card represents

the common practice of shoving aside an aging leader to give the party

a fresh face without changing any policy (Grosz replacing Kadar,

Jakes replacing Husak, and Egon Krenz replacing Erich Honecker).

This was usually the equivalent of the organ grinder being replaced

with the monkey.

58. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY BORDER REOPENED: As part of their

reform agenda the Hungarian Communists took down the barbed wire

fence that separated Hungary from Austria. The East Germans, who

frequently took summer holidays in Hungary, started crossing the open

border and emigrating through Austria to West Germany, where they

were granted immediate citizenship. The East German leadership was

outraged that the Hungarians were violating a treaty by allowing GDR

citizens to emigrate. The trickle became a flood before the GDR began

refusing permission to travel to Hungary.

59. GRENZTRUPPEN: “Green Troops” was the nickname for border

guards that patrolled the border with West Germany and the Wall.

60. TOXIC WASTE: Communism was an environmental catastro-

phe for Eastern Europe. Mining, heavy manufacturing and chemical

plants were the basis of the economy. There was little environmental

regulation, and what regulations there were often were ignored. People

in affected areas suffered greater risk of respiratory and other health

problems including birth defects, as well as shortened life expectancy.

61. THE MONDAY DEMONSTRATIONS: After a summer break

the Peace Prayers resumed at St. Nicholas. In September the crowds

grew from a few hundred to several thousand. The confrontation with

the regime finally reached a climax on October 9th. The local Stasi

chief made ominous warnings about issuing double allotments of am-

munition and body bags to “defend the achievements of socialism.” A

group of civic leaders, including conductor Kurt Mazur, broadcast a

petition across the city calling for non-violence on all sides. At 6 p.m.

there were 70,000 Leipzigers marching around the Ringstrasse. The

crowds overwhelmed the Stasi, and without clear orders from Berlin

the local officials backed down. From that point, the regime lost its

nerve and rapidly collapsed. The demonstrations spread first to Dres-

den, then to Berlin, where on November 4th 500,000 rallied against

the Communists. The Wall was opened 5 days later.

62. YAKOVLEV COUNSELS

GORBACHEV: Alexander Ya-

kovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze

were the most important advisers

to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. In

1983, while Gorbachev was Min-

ister of Agriculture, Yakovlev and

Gorbachev had a chance meeting

in Canada that would change the

course of the Cold War. The two

did not know each other well, so

they began speaking as if on sort

of a reform Communist blind date.

Each knew that a single heretical

statement could be discovered by

the KGB and used by political

enemies to remove them from their positions in the elite of the party.

Then Yakovlev, perhaps sensing Gorbachev’s willingness to broach

the subject, began to bare his feelings. He later remembered the con-

versation, “both of us suddenly were just kind of flooded and let go.

I somehow, for some reason, threw caution to the wind and started

telling him about what I considered to be utter stupidities in the area

of foreign affairs, especially about those SS-20 missiles that were

being stationed in Europe and a lot of other things. And he did the

same thing. We were completely frank. He frankly talked about the

problems in the internal situation in Russia. He was saying that under

these conditions, the conditions of dictatorship and absence of freedom,

the country would simply perish. So it was at that time, during our

three-hour conversation, almost as if our heads were knocked together,

that we poured it all out and during that three-hour conversation we

actually came to agreement on all our main points.” And so it was that

the policies of the Gorbachev era and the end of the Cold War were

hatched during an agricultural fact finding visit to Canada. Yakovlev’s

policy would later be termed “initiativism” . The theory was that the

Soviet system was doomed, but if the party reformed quickly enough

then the people would accept the reformed party and allow it to remain

in power by democratic means.

63. GENSCHER: Hans-Dietrich Genscher was Foreign Minister

of West Germany from 1974 to 1992. In September 1989 Genscher

brokered a deal with Honecker to allow safe passage for East German

refugees who had spent weeks camped out in the West German embassy

in Prague. He played a critical role in relations between East and West

Germany, as well as the development of the European Union and the

unification of Germany.

64. LEGACY OF 1968: The era of reform communism (roughly 1964

to 1968) reached its peak with the Prague Spring, an experiment of

“socialism with a human face.” It was led by Slovak Alexander Dubcek.

In August 1968 Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev launched an invasion

of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact (except Romania) to overthrow

Dubcek and the reform Communists. Brezhnev was convinced a rival

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

model of communism was a threat to communism everywhere. The

legacy of 1968 was a recognition among intellectuals and Communist

sympathizers in the West that the system was morally bankrupt. After

the horrors of the imposition of communism across the region in the

late 1940s and early 1950s, many were willing to give communism a

second chance. They thought only a monster like Stalin, not the system

itself, could be responsible for such arbitrary brutality. However, the

Brezhnev doctrine stripped away any remaining claim to legitimacy

the system had.

65. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT: Bush traveled to Warsaw and Budapest

in July 1989. He met privately with Walesa and the Hungarian opposi-

tion leadership. Walesa had hoped for an Eastern European Marshall

Plan. He would be disappointed. Bush’s message to the Hungarian

dissidents was to be prudent, slow down and not to rock the boat. He

didn’t feel they were ready to take power. The visit amounted to a

photo opportunity for Bush and little more.

66. NEW FORUM: New Forum was one of many such organizations

established in 1989 whose main goal was simply opening a dialogue

with the regime. It was the first in East Germany. New Forum was

important in moving the protest movement outside the sanctuary of the

Lutheran churches, but was eventually superseded by events.

67. REFORMER REHABILITATED: In the midst of the Velvet

Revolution, Havel called for Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the

Prague Spring, to visit the capital. When Dubcek spoke to the crowd

in Wenceslas Square they cheered him with the phrase “Dubcek to the

castle!” meaning that he should be reinstalled as ruler of Czechoslova-

kia. Dubcek stayed in Prague during the revolution and was on stage at

a press conference with the Civic Forum when it was announced that

the Communist government had resigned. The bittersweet reaction on

Dubcek’s face was in stark contrast to the jubilation in the rest of the

room. Dubcek was a humanist, but he remained a loyal Communist

too, one who could have led a reform movement inside the CCP if the

hardliners had agreed to rehabilitate him.

68. KLAUS AND KOMAREK:

Vaclav Klaus and Valtr Komarek

were Czech economists that became

outspoken critics of the regime.

They are representative of many

technocrats that worked inside the

Communist system but successfully

transitioned to take important po-

sitions in post-Communist govern-

ments. Klaus became Finance Min-

ister in December 1989, and later

became Prime Minister during the

dissolution of Czechoslovakia. He

is currently president of the Czech

Republic. They also represent the

wide range of ideologies inside the

Civic Forum. Klaus is a Thatcherite. Komarek remains one of the

leading voices for social democratic values in the Czech Republic.

69. SYSTEMATIZATION: One of the crazier ideas sprung from

Nicolae Ceausescu’s head was to “systematize” Romania by destroy-

ing small villages and transplanting the villagers to cities. This was

part of his plan to create a “multilateral developed socialist society.”

Systematization was implemented only on a limited scale, particularly

around the suburbs of Bucharest. Ceausescu also bulldozed vast swaths

of downtown Bucharest to create his People’s Palace. Instead of bull-

dozing, rural villages might be targeted with cutting off electricity,

heating fuel or even supplies of food.

70. SECURITATE: The Romanian

secret police were the most violent

in Eastern Europe, responsible for

the arrest and deaths of thousands

of people. The Securitate used

surveillance techniques similar to

the East German Stasi, from wire

tapping telephones to pregnancy

testing (as a part of Ceausescu’s

forced population growth policies).

The Securitate was also Ceauses-

cu’s personal military force. They

were fiercely loyal to him and

were better equipped (including

armored personnel carriers) and

better compensated than the rest of

the Romanian armed forces.

71. KISS OF DEATH: This is a picture taken at the 40th anniversary

celebration of the GDR. While in East Germany Gorbachev made

a few complimentary remarks about the SED, but nothing at all in

support of Honecker. It was obvious that Gorbachev thought it was

time for Honecker to go.

72. PEASANT PARTIES REVOLT: In July, the situation in Poland

had reached an impasse. After Solidarity’s stunning victory in the June

elections, Jaruzelski nominated Kiszczak to form a Communist-led

government. However, all knew the government would have no legiti-

macy without Solidarity agreeing to participate, and Solidarity refused.

Instead Walesa approached the Communists’ traditional peasant party

allies in the United People’s Party, which had won some seats in the

Sejm, and they agreed to enter a coalition with Solidarity. It was enough

for Solidarity to form a government.

73. LASZLO TOKES: Tokes was an ethnic Hungarian minister of

the Reformed Church and one of the few people inside Romania brave

enough to criticize the Ceausescu regime. The decision to evict him

from his home on December 16th led to the Timisoara protests and

massacre.

74. FRG EMBASSIES: After the

opening of the Austro-Hungarian

border, East Germans started fleeing

to West Germany through Austria.

The SED’s response was to close

off travel to Hungary, which left

thousands of East Germans strand-

ed in West German embassies in

Prague and Budapest. The embas-

sies served as a safe haven until

a resolution could be negotiated.

Ultimately Honecker allowed the

refugees to leave, but only if they

traveled through East Germany first

so he could claim they had been

expelled.

75. EXIT VISAS: Travel was tightly restricted across the Eastern Bloc;

a visa permitting travel to the West was a coveted prize.

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

76. WARSAW PACT SUMMIT:

The Bucharest Summit was the

first meeting of leaders since the

Polish elections. In a complete

reversal of 1968, Ceausescu called

for armed intervention in Poland

and Hungary to stop the slide away

from socialism. Hungarian Prime

Minister Nemeth glanced across

the table to the Soviet delegation,

where the Soviet representative just

rolled his eyes and shook his head

“no.” There would be no repeat of

the ‘56 invasion.

77. SAMIZDAT: Without a free

press, dissidents relied on secret publication to spread their message.

Often these were produced by hand or typewriter and laboriously

re-copied. One of the most famous samizdat was Havel’s essay “The

Power of the Powerless.”

78. WORKERS REVOLT: Austerity programs were never popular

with the workers, whether imposed by Communist or post-Communist

governments. Usually these involved freeing prices and imposing wage

controls, along with shuttering money-losing factories. Appeasing

workers through wage concessions had to be balanced against main-

taining the credibility of fiscal reforms for Western lenders.

79. THE THIRD WAY: The game 1989 is a binary system, but most

of the advocacy groups, and even the Communists themselves, were

not so easy to classify. For instance the founders of the opposition

group New Forum did not want to do away with socialism or East

Germany itself. They opposed the materialism of the West German

“elbow society.” The intellectuals of the GDR such as Christa Wolf

sought a third way between communism and capitalism, but their ideals

were swept away in the tide. As the people learned of the wealth of the

Federal Republic and the rampant corruption of the SED leadership,

opinion turned decisively in favor of unification with West Germany.

80. NEPOTISM: The old joke in Romania was the Ceausescus were

building “socialism in one family.” Family connections accounted for

much of the opportunity for advancement in the Balkans under com-

munism. Sometimes this would work out well. Lyudmila Zhivkova

(pictured on the card) was a member of the politburo and acted as a

cultural minister under her father Todor Zhivkov, promoting the arts.

Her brother Vladimir Zhivkov was a disaster, and his promotion was

one of the factors that turned the rest of the Bulgarian leadership against

“Uncle Tosho.” The Ceausescus’ son Nicu Ceausescu (also pictured)

was a playboy who lost a fortune of the Romanian treasury gambling

in casinos and entertaining women.

He drank himself to death and died

of cirrhosis of the liver in 1996.

81. THE BALTIC WAY: This was

a 350 mile chain of people holding

hands across Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania on August 23, 1989.

They were commemorating the 50th

anniversary of the Molotov - Rib-

bentrop non-aggression pact, which

had secret codicils that divided

Poland close to the pre-Napoleonic

imperial border and ceded the Baltic

States to Stalin.

82. SPITZEL: On January 15, 1990 a mob ransacked the Stasi head-

quarters in Berlin. The Stasi files revealed that many prominent East

Germans had been informants. One of the most important spitzel was

the leader of the CDU in East Germany, Lothar de Maziere, who had

to resign his position in the Kohl government. The Stasi headquarters

is now a museum.

83. MODROW: Hans Modrow was the Dresden party chief of the

SED. After Honecker’s replacement, Egon Krenz, was ousted on

December 7, Modrow became the de facto leader of East Germany.

Modrow was known as a reformer, but his accession was too late to

save the party or even the state. His role was principally as a caretaker

while elections were organized to create a government that would

negotiate East Germany’s demise.

84. BREAKAWAY BALTIC REPUBLICS: This event represents the

Baltic States declaring their independence from the USSR. It prevents

‘Gorbachev Charms the West’ as an event because Gorbachev could

no longer translate foreign policy victories into power domestically

as the USSR broke apart. Lithuania declared independence in March

1990 and Latvia in May 1990. Estonia’s path to independence was

more gradual, first adopting a sovereignty declaration in November

1988 and finally holding a referendum on independence which passed

easily in January 1991.

85. TANK COLUMN/TANK MAN: The identity and the fate of the

Tank Man remain a mystery. The men who escorted him off the street

may have been just bystanders, or they may have been plain clothes

police. The image of a solitary figure stopping a column of tanks is

one of the iconic images of 1989.

86. “THE WALL MUST GO!”:

On November 9th at the end of a

long press conference GDR spokes-

man Gunter Schabowski made a

comment that travel restrictions

from East Germany were to be

lifted. He was asked when would

this policy take effect, and after

fumbling through his notes he said

(mistakenly), “You should have

this information... err.... The policy

takes effect immediately.” The

stunned western reporters ran to

their telephones to call in the news.

The news was broadcast by West

German television back into East

Germany, and people started gathering at the checkpoints to enter West

Berlin. The border guards did not know what to do and could not get

any direction. The crowds began chanting, “We will be right back!”

and “The wall must go!” Finally the border guards lifted the gates,

and the people walked into West Berlin.

87. KOHL PROPOSES REUNIFICATION: On November 21st

an envoy from Gorbachev presented Kohl’s adviser Horst Teltschik a

hastily written note stating that the Soviets were prepared to consider

all options for the future, “even the unthinkable”, including a united

Germany without nuclear weapons and outside the NATO alliance.

The Germans were shocked to read this offer, and Kohl decided he

should take the initiative and propose a plan for reunification. Kohl

presented a ten point plan on November 28th in a speech before the

Bundestag. The British, the French and the Soviets were not consulted.

The Americans, the fourth of the Allied powers, were sent a copy of

the text but not in time for it to be read prior to Kohl delivering the

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

speech. Needless to say the speech generated quite a reaction. Gor-

bachev was infuriated. In a meeting with Genscher the following week

Shevardnadze compared Kohl to Hitler. In the end Kohl got what he

wanted, a united Germany in NATO.

88. ADAMEC: In late November, after the resignation of CCP General

Secretary Milos Jakes, Ladislav Adamec became the de facto leader

of the Czechsolvak Communists. Adamec tried to assemble a coali-

tion government, appointing various Civic Forum figures as minority

partners in a Communist-dominated government. The people rejected

this arrangement, leading to the fall of the Adamec government on

December 10.

89. DOMINO THEORY: The Domino Theory was a justification for

American military intervention in Southeast Asia. It held that if one

country went Communist other countries in the region would follow.

1989 saw the Domino Theory working in reverse. Once Poland and

Hungary made democratic reforms, and it became clear there would

be no Soviet intervention, the dissidents in the other countries became

emboldened.

90. CIVIC FORUM: The Velvet

Revolution began November 17th

as a march to commemorate the

50th anniversary of the murder of

Jan Opletal who had been killed

by the Nazis in November 1939.

The regime cracked down harshly,

and there were false rumors that

a student had been killed. The

students called for a strike, which

was supported by the actors. Even

ninety year old Cardinal Frantisek

Tomasek joined in supporting the

students. On November 19th Civic

Forum was created as the umbrella

opposition group in the Czech

lands. Its leadership was an eclectic mix of economists, actors, former

Prague Spring Communists, students, workers and intellectuals who

assembled nightly in the basement of The Magic Lantern Theater in

Prague. Starting on November 20th, Civic Forum held enormous daily

rallies in Wenceslas Square that ultimately toppled the regime.

91. MY FIRST BANANA: There was an approximately 3 week period

after the opening of the wall on November 9th in which the future of the

GDR was unclear. After the East Germans had a chance to travel to the

West (with a 100 DM welcoming present from the West German gov-

ernment) and see the abundance in the grocery stores and other shops,

support for a reformed socialism in East Germany started to collapse.

92. BETRAYAL: The record of cooperation between the Bulgarian

and Romanian Orthodox churches and the Communist parties made

the Orthodox churches unlikely sources for democratic protest. After

the massacre in Timisoara, Romanian Patriarch Teoctist sent a telegram

to Ceausescu praising his “brilliant activity” and “daring thinking.”

93. SHOCK THERAPY: Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs, then just

34 years old, served as consultant to Polish Finance Minister Leszek

Balcerowicz in drawing a radical economic plan to transform Poland

from a command to a free market economy. The plan was dubbed Shock

Therapy because it was designed to give a jolt to the heart instead of

using piecemeal reforms. Because Poland was facing hyper-inflation,

interest rates were raised to over 100% and the zloty was pegged to

the dollar. Prices were freed on virtually everything. Money losing

firms were shuttered, creating massive unemployment in a society

where unemployment had been virtually non-existent. Surviving state

owned firms were gradually privatized. As a result of Shock Therapy

Poland suffered a severe recession in 1990-1991, but recovered faster

than other states that took a less aggressive approach. In a remarkable

success story, since 1991 Poland has enjoyed 20 consecutive years of

economic growth and was the only EU member state to avoid recession

during the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

94. UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES: The UDF was a collec-

tion of opposition groups in Bulgaria founded December 7, 1989. Its

leader was philosophy professor Zhelyu Zhelev, who would be elected

president of Bulgaria in August 1990.

95. Scoring Card—ROMANIA

96. THE CHINESE SOLUTION: The possibility of security forces

using live ammunition against the crowds loomed over the events

of 1989. In Timisoara, protests prompted by the eviction of Father

Tokes resulted in dozens of people being killed by army and Securitate

agents, and in Bucharest another 1,000 died between December 21 and

December 25, though most of the victims were killed after the Ceaus-

escus had been captured. The +3 VP penalty represents international

condemnation of the use of force against the demonstrators.

97. THE TYRANT IS GONE: It’s

remarkable that a man as paranoid

as Nicolae Ceausescu had no escape

plan in the event of an uprising or

coup. After the crowd turned against

him, Ceausescu and his wife Elena

spent the night of December 21st

in the Central Committee building,

then attempted to escape the follow-

ing day by helicopter. By radio the

pilot was given instructions to land,

and put the helicopter down only

40 miles from Bucharest, telling

the Ceausescus that he had to land

because they were going to be fired

upon. The Ceausescus then stole a

car but were quickly captured and transported to a nearby army base.

On Christmas Day there was a farcical trial, and they were put against

the wall and shot.

98. POLITBURO INTRIGUE: In

early November, Zhivkov created

another international embarrass-

ment when he ordered a crackdown

against Eco-Glasnost in front of a

group of Western delegates to the

Conference on Security and Coop-

eration in Europe meeting in Sofia.

The CSCE (now the OSCE) is the

Helsinki working group, and to

have public beatings while hosting

a human rights conference did not

help Bulgaria’s reputation. A long

planned palace coup against Zhivkov

was launched on November 10th,

and he was replaced by the coup’s

instigator Petr Mladenov. Mladenov himself was forced to resign in

July 1990 when tapes surfaced of him calling for violent suppression

of a UDF rally in December 1989, saying “The tanks had better come.”

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1989 Dawn of Freedom — PLAYBOOK

99. LIGACHEV: Yegor Ligachev was the leading voice of the hard-

liners inside the Kremlin in 1989. Ligachev challenged Gorbachev’s

hands off policy toward Eastern Europe, arguing instead for “the class

nature” of Soviet foreign policy.

100. STAND FAST: This card

represents supporters of either side

resisting the crowd mentality that

swayed so many in 1989. Polls

showed majorities of Eastern Eu-

ropeans supported the egalitarian

goals of socialism, while rejecting

the corrupt and failed Communist

parties. For most people the 1989

revolutions were not ideological;

they rejected utopian visions for

the future. They just wanted to live

normal lives. Certainly the work-

ers who revolted did not want to

replace communism with a system

that would immediately close their

money-losing factory. Still, people could get caught up in the moment

as part of the crowd. Voices of moderation were drowned out by pro-

verbial calls of “Off with their heads!”

101. ELENA: The personality cult around Elena Ceausescu rivaled that

of her husband. She was poorly educated, but in Romanian propaganda

she became a brilliant chemist, taking credit for research conducted

by real scientists.

102. NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT: In Romania, the revolution

began before an opposition movement had even emerged, and there

simply were no dissidents to form an opposition leadership. Instead

the second tier of the Communist party assumed the mantle of the op-

position. At first they promised free elections and democratic reforms,

but soon reneged on those promises.

103. GOVERNMENT RESIGNS: The final capitulation of the re-

gimes might take the form of a resignation en masse by the government.

This happened in December in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

104. NEW YEAR’S EVE PARTY: The historic year 1989 ended with

a party at the Brandenburg Gate on New Year’s Eve. The party has

become an annual tradition in Berlin, with more than a million people

celebrating on New Year’s Eve each year. This card is a Communist

event because it represents time running out on the Democratic player.

105. PUBLIC AGAINST VIOLENCE: Historically, support for

communism was weaker in Slovakia than in Bohemia and Moravia.

Public Against Violence was the Slovak counterpart of Civic Forum,

and like Civic Forum it broke apart quickly after the Velvet Revolution.

Most of the leadership of Public Against Violence would go on to lead

the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which advocated for Slovak

independence, resulting in the Velvet Divorce and the dissolution of

Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993.

106. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM ADOPTED: After

the 1989 Revolutions, the Communist parties renamed themselves

and splintered into factions. The reformed Communists adopted a

left wing agenda that respected the new institutions of democracy.

The Bulgarian Communists, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party,

would retain power in free elections in March 1990. The Romanian

Communists also remained in power through less honest means. The

other Communists would return to power as social democrats across

the region in the mid to late 1990s.

107. MASSACRE IN TIMISOARA: On December 16th a small

group of parishioners of Timisoara’s Hungarian Reformed church

started protesting outside the church over the eviction of their pastor

Father Tokes. The church was near a train stop, and Romanian workers

on the way to their factories saw the protest and started joining in. The

crowd quickly grew and turned into an anti-Ceausescu demonstration.

The demonstration turned to a riot as the crowd moved to ransack the

party headquarters. The following day Securitate and army elements

fired on the crowds, killing more than 80 people. News of the massa-

cre spread to Bucharest, and outrage at the events helped foment the

revolution beginning on December 21st.

108. ARMY BACKS REVOLUTION: The morning of December

22nd, it was reported that the Romanian Defense Minister Vasile Milea

had shot himself after being discovered as a traitor. This was the turning

point for the army. Assuming Milea had been murdered for refusing

orders to fire on the crowds, the army decisively turned against the

Ceausescus. The ensuing three days saw bloody street fights between

the army and elements of the Securitate still loyal to the regime;

however, it was often unclear who was shooting at whom. Many of

the Securitate wore plainclothes and simply slipped away, while many

ordinary Romanians were caught in the crossfire.

109. KREMLIN COUP!: This card represents the overthrow of

Gorbachev by conservatives in the party. The abortive coup against

Gorbachev was launched in August 1991 and accelerated the disso-

lution of the USSR.

110. MALTA SUMMIT: In De-

cember, 1989 Bush and Gorbachev

held a summit on the island of Malta

to discuss the rapidly changing situ-

ation in Eastern Europe. The meet-

ings had been scheduled to take

place aboard Soviet and American

warships on the Mediterranean Sea.

Unfortunately there was terrible

weather in Malta, and a number of

the scheduled meetings were can-

celled because of sea sickness. This

summit can be considered the end of

the Cold War. In its place there was

to be a “New World Order.” The

New World Order was supposed

to begin with co-operation between the super powers to combat arms

trafficking and terrorism, and gradual inclusion of the Soviet Union

in international organizations such as the G-7. It also entailed future

debt relief to Eastern Europe through the International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank. This grandiose talk sounded somewhat out of

character for the prudent Mr. Bush, and he was criticized by some for

not being more ambitious in support of Gorbachev. This New World

Order would be brief, as the United States would find itself at war in

the Gulf in 1990, and the Soviet Union itself would collapse and cease

to exist in 1991.

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